Facts:

Surendra Chauhan (Appellant) convicted under Sections 314/34, IPC.

Involvement of Dr. Ravindra Kumar Sharma in causing the death during an abortion.

Chauhan's illicit relations with Alpana leading to the intent for abortion.

Sharma not qualified to terminate pregnancy, lacking government approval and basic facilities.

Issues:

Applicability of Section 34, IPC regarding common intention.

Competence and approval issues with Dr. Sharma's clinic.

Chauhan's conviction under Sections 314/34, IPC challenged.

Held:

Common intention inferred from Chauhan's actions leading to Sharma's involvement in the abortion.

Dr. Sharma lacked competence, clinic approval, and necessary facilities for abortion.

Chauhan rightly convicted under Sections 314/34, IPC.

Decision:

Chauhan sentenced to seven years' rigorous imprisonment and a fine of Rs. 10,000.

Reduction of imprisonment to one and a half years (18 months) and an enhanced fine of Rs. 25,000.

The appeal is thus partly allowed.

Facts:

The industrial unit of M/s. Mohan Meakins Ltd., a liquor processing company, is accused of discharging noxious trade effluents into the Gomti river, resulting in severe pollution. The State Pollution Control Board initiated proceedings against the company and its directors in 1983. The legal journey includes challenges to the process issuance, attempts to quash the proceedings based on delay, and erroneous interpretations by lower courts.

Issues:

Whether the delay of 17 years in completing the trial is a valid ground for quashing the proceedings.

The responsibility of directors and managers in addressing pollution concerns under the Environment (Protection) Act, 1986.

The requirement of a detailed order by the magistrate while issuing summons under Section 204 of the Criminal Procedure Code.

Held:

The court rejects the argument to quash proceedings based on delay, emphasizing the seriousness of environmental offenses and the need for an expedited trial. [Para 13]

Directors and managers are held accountable for not constructing proper works and plants for treating highly polluting trade effluents, leading to a violation of the Environment (Protection) Act, 1986.The court clarifies that there is no legal requirement for a magistrate to pass a detailed order while issuing summons under Section 204 of the CrPC. [Para 15-16]

Facts:

The respondent-assessee did not claim depreciation for the assessment year. However, the Income Tax Officer allowed it. The Commissioner of Income-Tax (Appeals) and the Tribunal ruled in favor of the assessee, but the High Court held that without the claim by the assessee, the Income Tax Officer couldn't grant depreciation allowance.

Issues:

Whether the depreciation allowance can be granted in the absence of a claim by the assessee, and if the assessment based on a revised return allows the claim of depreciation made in the original return.

Held:

Section 34 of the Income-tax Act mandates that depreciation as a deduction under Section 32 shall be allowed only if prescribed particulars are furnished. In the absence of these particulars, there is no mandate for the Income Tax Officer to compute income by allowing depreciation.

Although Rule SAA of the Income Tax Rules, providing particulars for deduction under Section 32, was deleted, the return of income requires detailed particulars for claiming depreciation.

Circulars highlight that depreciation cannot be allowed without the required particulars, and if no claim is made in the return, the Income-Tax Officer must compute income without allowing depreciation.

A valid revised return, where the claim of depreciation is withdrawn, prevails over the original return for granting depreciation.

"Actually allowed" in the context of depreciation means the deductions claimed. If an assessee hasn't claimed depreciation, it cannot be notionally allowed. the appeal is dismissed.

Facts:

The turnover of rectified spirit and denatured spirit was initially deemed non-taxable under the U.P. Sales Tax Act, 1948. The Trade Tax Tribunal, Muzaffar Nagar, held this position for certain assessment years. The Department filed a review application based on amendments to the Principal Act. The High Court, in a subsequent revision, interpreted Section 39(2) of the Amendment Act concerning the time frame for review applications.

Issues:

The interpretation of Section 39(2) of the Amendment Act, specifically regarding the time limitations for review applications and the coexistence of powers of review and rectification.

Held:

The validating Act aimed to rectify defects identified by authorities, enabling the taxation of alcohol turnover. Section 22 of the Principal Act allowed rectification of mistakes, with a proviso extending the time for disposal of applications made within three years. Section 39(3) specified a period for rectification, while Section 39(2) mandated a review application deadline with no prescribed time limit for disposal.( Paragraph 6)

The Supreme Court emphasized the distinction between the powers of review and rectification. The scheme of the Amendment Act supported the alternative exercise of both powers. If the High Court's interpretation were accepted, the provision for review would become redundant, negating the purpose of differentiation between the two powers.( Paragraph 7)

The High Court's order was set aside, and the Tribunal's decision was restored. The appeals were allowed, and no costs were imposed.( Paragraph 8)

Facts:

Appellant mortgaged a plot to Col. Joginder Singh.

Suit for foreclosure filed by Col. Joginder Singh after the appellant failed to deposit the required amount as per the preliminary decree.

Auction of the property on August 25, 1976, with Nazar Singh (respondent) as the purchaser.

Appellant challenges the auction sale through objections under Order 21, Rule 90, C.P.C., rejected on November 28, 1977.

Sale confirmed on November 29, 1977.

Appellant deposits sums of Rs. 47,250/- on May 3, 1985, and Rs. 525/- on August 19, 1985, during the pendency of appeals in the High Court.

Issues:

Validity of the deposits made by the appellant during the pendency of appeals.

Interpretation of Order 34, Rule 5, C.P.C. in the context of the timing of deposits.

Held:

The Division Bench erred in concluding that deposits made during the pendency of appeals were not valid under Order 34, Rule 5, C.P.C. The Court, relying on precedent, emphasized that if an appeal is pending against an order refusing to set aside the sale, the confirmation of sale remains in a nebulous state. The judgment debtor has the right to make necessary deposits under Order 34, Rule 5 to protect the property from being transferred.

Decision: Appeals allowed, judgment of the Division Bench set aside, and the judgment of the single Judge restored.

Facts:

The case involves appeals against the judgment of the Central Administrative Tribunal, Bangalore Bench, regarding the extension of benefits to technicians appointed prior to 1-1-1986. The government issued orders on 22-10-1990 and 31-3-1992, granting benefits for training periods, but the controversy arose regarding the cut-off date.

Issues:

The primary issue is whether the benefit of Government Order dated 31-3-92 should be extended to technicians appointed before 1-1-1986, and if the cut-off date of 1-1-1986 is valid.

Held:

The Full Bench of the Central Administrative Tribunal, Madras, had previously overruled the Bangalore Bench's decision, stating that the cut-off date was valid. The Court emphasizes the different nature of technical and non-technical posts, justifying the government's decision for a cut-off date based on the financial burden.

Decision: The appeals are allowed, setting aside the judgment of the Bangalore Tribunal. The Court upholds the validity of the cut-off date as per the Full Bench decision of the Madras Tribunal.

Facts:

Respondent appointed as a Conductor in U.P. State Road Transport Corporation in 1965.

Accused of issuing incorrect tickets in 1981, leading to a departmental enquiry and eventual termination.

Respondent challenged termination through appeals, including a Writ Petition in the Allahabad High Court.

Issues:

Main contention: The severity of the punishment (dismissal) in relation to the charges.

Discrepancy in ticket issuance location: High Court questioned the adequacy of evidence, emphasizing the lack of passenger statements or examination during the trial.

Held:

The High Court exercised discretion under Article 226, questioning the proportionality of the punishment.

Emphasized the importance of evidence collection, noting the failure to examine passengers during the trial.

Referred to B.C. Chaturvedi Vs. Union of India and others, highlighting that the court can interfere if the punishment shocks the conscience.

Upheld the High Court's decision to intervene in the quantum of punishment.

Decision: The appeal is dismissed without any order as to costs.

Facts:

Respondent, a driver, was charge-sheeted for habitual absence, unauthorized use of a bus, and misconduct involving a drunken demand for money.

Enquiry conducted by a retired District Judge found the habitual absence charge unproven, but established unauthorized use of the bus and the misconduct charge.

Respondent was removed from service after a show cause notice, leading to an industrial dispute.

Issues:

Whether the Labour Court had the authority to interfere with the quantum of punishment.

The propriety of the punishment imposed on the respondent.

Held:

The Labour Court has the power to consider the proportionality of punishment under Section 11A of the Industrial Disputes Act and Article 226 of the Constitution.

The discretion to interfere is limited to cases where the punishment is "shockingly disproportionate."

The Labour Court, in this instance, was not justified in modifying the order of removal as the serious charge of misconduct stood proved.

The High Court failed to correct the erroneous order of the Labour Court, leading to a potential miscarriage of justice.

Decision: The appeal is allowed, setting aside the High Court's judgment and the Labour Court's award. No costs are awarded.

Facts:

The respondent, engaged in the purchase and crushing of stone boulders for further sale, contested the imposition of sales tax on the resultant products. The argument posited that since sales tax was already paid during the boulder purchase, the subsequent goods should not be subject to taxation.

Issues:

Whether the processed goods (gitti, stone chips, and dust) were distinct enough to warrant separate taxation, considering the initial payment of sales tax during boulder acquisition.

Held:

The Tribunal, in a majority decision upheld by the High Court, concluded that the processed goods retained their identity as stone and should not be considered commercially different for the purpose of sales tax. The court analyzed the definition of 'manufacture' under Section 2(e-1) of the U.P. Sales Tax Act, emphasizing that every activity altering or processing goods falls under this definition. However, it was clarified that for sales tax purposes, the focus should be on the emergence of distinct commercial commodities.

In examining the goods listed in Entry 40 of the September 7, 1981 notification, the court affirmed that once separate commercial commodities emerge from a process, they become individually taxable. Despite potential differences in size, the goods, such as gitti, kankar, and stone ballast, maintained their identity as stone. The court rejected the notion that Entry 40 intended to categorize these goods as something other than stone.