Facts:

Dr. Jagannath Mishra, Leader of Opposition, Bihar Legislative Assembly, submitted a letter in 1994 listing 32 charges against Dr. Ram Ashray Yadav.

The President of India referred the matter to the Supreme Court for an inquiry into whether Dr. Yadav should be removed on the grounds of misbehavior.

Charges included favoritism in appointments, influencing the State Government, procedural irregularities, and misuse of Commission resources.

Issues:

Whether the charges against Dr. Yadav amounted to misbehavior justifying removal and if due process was followed in the inquiry.

Held:

The judgment emphasizes the high expectations of objectivity, integrity, and impartiality from the Chairman and Members of Public Service Commissions.

The Court clarified that the actions of the Chairman and Members must meet the most sensitive standards of behavior, considering their role as constitutional trustees.

The judgment outlined the provisions of Article 317(1) of the Constitution, which governs the removal and suspension of the Chairman or Members of Public Service Commissions.

The Court examined specific charges against Dr. Yadav, including allegations related to appointments, procedural irregularities, and misuse of resources.

Charges were evaluated individually, and the Court concluded that none of them amounted to misbehavior justifying removal under Article 317(1).

The Court recognized lapses and shortcomings in the functioning of the Bihar Public Service Commission but clarified that these did not rise to the level of misbehavior.

The judgment emphasized the need for Public Service Commissions to act fairly, impartially, and without any subjective influence.

As Dr. Yadav's term had expired, there was no reinstatement, but he was entitled to all dues as per rules.

Decision: The Court concluded that no charge of misbehavior was established against Dr. Ram Ashray Yadav, and therefore, no action for his removal was warranted.

Facts:

Appellant was the Chief Minister of Kerala during 1991-95.

Allegations of corruption surfaced regarding the import of Palmolein.

Previous attempts to register a case were dismissed by the High Court and Supreme Court.

After a change in government, a preliminary inquiry found fresh material indicating an offense.

Issues:

Legality of the FIR registration against the appellant.

Allegations of mala fides and political rivalry.

Held:

The registration of FIR not barred by previous dismissals; new material found.

The order for the preliminary inquiry was not illegal or unconstitutional.

Menace of corruption cannot be hidden under legal technicalities.

Government order protecting officials from harassment upheld.

Observations on the legality of the order are restricted to its applicability to the FIR registration.

Decision: The appeal is dismissed with the observation that the appellant and other accused may raise all relevant pleas during the trial. The merits of the case are not commented upon to avoid prejudice.

Facts:

The appellant, a casual laborer for over ten years, had his services terminated after being acquitted in a criminal case.

The termination was based on an incident where the appellant allegedly assaulted another employee.

The order of termination was deemed punitive, and the appellant argued that a regular departmental inquiry was necessary.

Issues:

Whether the termination without a regular departmental inquiry was justified.

The applicability of Section 25F of the Industrial Disputes Act in the case.

Constitutional protection and rights of a temporary employee.

Held:

The Tribunal's reasoning that retrenchment compensation acceptance barred challenging termination was incorrect.

The order of termination was deemed punitive, requiring a regular departmental inquiry.

The appellant, having attained temporary status, was entitled to constitutional protection under Article 311.

The termination order was quashed, and the appellant was directed to be reinstated with arrears and benefits.

The Appeal is allowed.

Facts:

The property in question was initially gifted to the ancestors of the respondents for charitable purposes, named 'Gurugranth Sahib Barajman Dharamshala Deb.' The Mahants, however, stopped performing their duties, got the land mutated in their names, and later in the name of 'Guru Granth Sahib Barajman Dharamshala Deb.' Subsequently, legal petitions were filed under Sikh Gurdwaras Act, 1925, seeking a declaration of the property as a Sikh Gurdwara.

Issues:

Validity of the mutation in the revenue records challenged by the respondents.

Recognition of Guru Granth Sahib as a juristic person.

Locus Standi of the respondents in claiming the property.

Held:

The court establishes the concept of a juristic person, recognizing entities as such to serve the needs and faith of society. Juristic persons, like natural persons, are conferred with rights and obligations.

Endowment for charitable purposes can create institutions like a church, gurdwara, etc. The recognition of a juristic person depends on societal acceptance.

Faith and belief are beyond judicial scrutiny, leading to the creation of juristic persons based on changing societal needs.

It's not necessary for Guru Granth Sahib to be equated with an idol to be declared a juristic person.

Guru Granth Sahib is recognized as a juristic person, distinct from idol worship in Sikhism.

No error in declaring Guru Granth Sahib a juristic person; it holds a unique position in Sikhism.

The absence of a manager does not negate the existence of a juristic person; court intervention is possible for proper management.

Gurdwara and Guru Granth Sahib are inseparable; the former exists because of the latter.

Every Guru Granth Sahib cannot be a juristic person unless installed in a recognized public place.

Guru Granth Sahib is revered differently from other sacred books, holding a special place in a Gurdwara.

Sikhism's rejection of idolatry does not negate Guru Granth Sahib's status as a juristic person.

The mutations in revenue records were not solely due to Farman-i-Shahi but followed a detailed inquiry.

Respondents' claim to the disputed land lacks merit; the mutation was made in 1928, and the property was given in trust.

Facts:

Accused No. 1, a Fair Price shop dealer, faced suspension due to irregularities. Grudge against the deceased who complained.

Witnesses (P.Ws. 1, 5, 10) traveled to Rayachoti, engaged in official activities related to Fair Price shop, and returned on the night of the incident.

Witnesses boarded a bus, accompanied by the deceased, in the last trip from Rayachoti. On the next morning, P.W. 1 boarded the same bus and informed the conductor about the murder.

Issues:

Credibility of the witnesses' testimony.

Identification of assailants.

Treatment of witnesses as hostile.

Held:

Bus conductor (P.W. 8), an independent witness, confirmed the presence of witnesses on the bus. His evidence deemed reliable.

Variations in testimonies about the attack's details considered natural, not undermining overall credibility.

High Court justified in reversing acquittal; Sessions Court's treatment of a witness as hostile found unjustified.

Light conditions not hindering identification, given that assailants correctly identified the victim.

Failure to cry out or intervene by P.W. 1 explained by shock and instinctive avoidance.

Presence of P.W. 1 corroborated by related witnesses and independent bus conductor.

Decision: The appeal is dismissed, affirming the High Court's decision to reverse the acquittal.

Facts:

Appellant constructed a bakery in a purely residential locality.

Plaintiffs sought an injunction against operating the bakery, citing potential nuisance.

Municipal Corporation granted a license during the suit.

Trial Court decreed against the appellant, but the appellate court set it aside.

High Court reinstated the trial court's decision based on health concerns and emitted substances.

Issues:

Whether the action initiated by the plaintiffs was a quia timet action, premature on the date of initiation.

Whether the operation of the bakery posed an imminent or likely nuisance to warrant a preventive injunction.

Held:

The action was a quia timet action, preventive in nature, and premature on the date of initiation.

A future nuisance must be imminent or likely to cause irreparable damage for preventive injunction.

Nuisance actually in existence differs from a future nuisance; a clear cause of action must be established.

The High Court's findings were oscillating and lacked specificity; no clear case for quia timet action.

Dismissal of the suit against the Municipal Corporation was justified, and plaintiffs were advised to seek relief through appropriate legal avenues.

Facts:

The appellant-landlady filed an application under the United Provinces (Temporary) Control of Rent and Eviction Act, 1947, seeking permission to file an eviction suit against the tenant based on bonafide requirements. Subsequently, a suit was instituted on the basis of the granted permission but was later withdrawn without liberty to file a fresh suit. A subsequent application under the U.P. Urban Building (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972, was filed for eviction. Both the Prescribed Authority and District Judge rejected the application.

Issues:

The applicability of Section 43(2)(rr) and Section 43(2)(r), the relationship between permissions granted under the old Act and grounds specified in the new Act, and the interpretation of the proviso in the context of Section 21.

Held:

When a suit is filed for the eviction of a tenant based on permission granted by the District Magistrate and if such a suit is pending on the date of the U.P. Urban Building (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972, the said suit is to be continued and concluded as per Section 43(2)(r) of the United Provinces (Temporary) Control of Rent and Eviction Act, 1947.

The landlord may apply to the prescribed authority for tenant eviction even if a suit based on permission was filed or not filed. The prescribed authority shall order eviction if conditions under Section 43(2)(rr) are satisfied. If the permission granted under the old Act aligns with grounds specified in Section 21(1) & (2) of the new Act, the prescribed authority need not be satisfied afresh.

Section 43(2)(r) applies when the ground for permission granted is not covered by Section 21(1) and Section 21(2) of the new Act. In such cases, the suit, if filed on that permission, continues under the old Act, which is fictionally kept alive despite its repeal.

If an application for eviction is based on the ground that the tenant's residential building is required for business purposes or commercial activity, it is not a ground for eviction under the third proviso to Section 21(2) of the new Act. Therefore, an application under Section 43(2)(rr) will not be entertained.

The proviso to Section 21 serves to except something out of the enactment or qualify something enacted therein. It is crucial to give the enacting part a construction that makes the exceptions carved out by the proviso necessary, avoiding redundancy.

Decision: The application for eviction under the U.P. Urban Building (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972, is not maintainable in this case.

Facts:

The plaintiff filed a suit for recovery of possession and mesne profits, claiming the defendant was a trespasser, never legally inducted as a tenant. The plaintiff alleged the defendant unlawfully occupied the property, intended for use by the National Cadet Corps (NCC).

Issues:

Validity of the defendant's tenancy.

Existence of a power of attorney permitting letting out of the premises.

Plaintiff's entitlement to possession and mesne profits.

Held:

The court considered the defendant's claim of tenancy based on a receipt and the power of attorney held by D.K. Chadha. The court observed that the letter from the defendant to the plaintiff, dated 28.10.1977, negated the existence of a power of attorney for letting out the premises. The court held that the defendant trespassed without a proper lease agreement and noted the plaintiff's denial of granting any such power to D.K. Chadha. The court rejected the argument that the plaintiff withheld the power of attorney, stating it was not proven to be in her possession. The court reinstated the decision of the Single Judge, ordering the defendant to vacate the premises. (Para 7-12)

Facts:

The appellant, whose marriage was dissolved, sought enhanced maintenance for two minor children. Both parents were employed, and the appellant claimed maintenance from the date of application under Section 26 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955. The salaries of both parents increased over time.

Issues:

Whether both parents are obligated to contribute to the maintenance of minor children?

How should the maintenance amount be determined, considering the financial status of both parents?

Held:

The court examined the provisions of the Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act, 1956, particularly Sections 18, 20, and 3(b). It emphasized that maintenance includes provisions for food, clothing, residence, education, and medical attendance for minor children. Section 20 establishes the obligation of both parents to maintain a minor child. The court determined that, regardless of the mother's financial status, both parents are responsible for the maintenance of their children.

The court, considering the salaries of both parents, established a proportional contribution for maintenance. If the husband's salary is approximately twice that of the wife, they are obligated to contribute to the children's maintenance in that proportion. The court directed the respondent to pay a specified amount for each child from different dates.