Facts:

The respondent-plaintiff filed a suit for possession by way of redemption against the appellants, claiming ownership of land mortgaged for 99 years. The trial court decreed the suit, and the appellate courts upheld the decision, finding the mortgage period to be a clog on the equity of redemption.

Issues:

Whether the 99-year period in the mortgage deed is a clog on the equity of redemption.

Whether the plaintiff has the right to redeem the mortgaged property before the stipulated period.

Held:

The courts below held that the 99-year mortgage period was a clog on the equity of redemption, considering the financial position of the mortgagor. The appellants were deemed to be in an advantageous position, deriving usufructs for over 26 years on payment of a meager sum.

Decision: The appeal was dismissed, affirming the findings that the 99-year mortgage period constituted a clog on the equity of redemption.

Facts:

The landlord sought eviction of the tenant under Items (i) and (ii) of Sub-clause (3) of Clause 13 of The Central Provinces and Berar Letting of Houses and Rent Control Order, 1949, alleging habitual default in rent payments. The tenant contested, asserting rent payments were as per convenience.

Issues:

Whether the tenant's sporadic rent defaults qualify as "habitual" under Clause 13 of the Order.

The impact of a civil court order directing rent payment to the court on the tenant's liability.

Held:

The term "habitual" was not defined in the Order. Citing legal dictionaries, the court interpreted it as repetitive and persistent default. A single default does not establish habit. The court considered the tenant's history of repeated defaults and rejected the argument that a civil court order suspended the tenant's legal obligation to pay rent.

Decision: The court upheld the lower authorities' findings that the tenant, by repeatedly and continuously defaulting, qualified as a habitual defaulter. The appeal was dismissed, with each party bearing its costs.

Facts:

On March 2, 1960, the respondent, a tailor, occupied premises in Delhi.

An arrangement between the landlord's father and the respondent led to litigation.

The trial court decreed in favor of the landlord in 1974; the appellate court reversed in 1979.

The High Court in 1991 modified the rent to Rs. 140 per month.

In 1992, the landlord issued a notice demanding rent from 1960 to 1992.

The tenant paid rent for three years before September 1992.

Issues:

The interpretation of "legally recoverable arrears of rent" and whether the arrears from 1960 to 1989 are barred by limitation.

Held:

The court determines that the arrears of rent became legally recoverable from the inception of the tenancy.

The court rejects the argument that rent only became due after the High Court determined the rent in 1991.

It holds that the cause of action to recover rent arose when the true state of affairs was declared by the court.

The court emphasizes that the appellant's attempt to circumvent the law rebounded against her.

Decision: The judgment of the High Court, dated November 28, 1996, is deemed legal. The appeal is dismissed, and there are no costs.

Facts:

The appellant, Nirmal Singh, was convicted for murder and attempted murder based on a shooting incident. The trial court awarded the death penalty, which was later commuted to life imprisonment by the High Court.

Issues:

Applicability and compliance with Section 299 CrPC for the use of witness statements in the absence of the accused.

Adequacy of evidence and procedural irregularities in the trial.

Held:

The court examined the compliance with Section 299 CrPC, focusing on the circumstances justifying the use of witness statements. While there was no explicit order by the trial judge, the High Court found evidence of the accused's absconding and the deaths of witnesses. The court held that the statements could be admitted as evidence.

Decision: The appeals were dismissed, affirming the conviction and sentence of the appellant for offenses under Sections 302, 307 IPC, and Sections 25 and 27 of the Arms Act.

Facts:

Raipur Development Authority (Appellant) vs. Anupam Sahkari Griha Nirman Samiti and Others (Respondent).

The case involves the quashing of a draft scheme for the development, published under Section 50(3) of the Madhya Pradesh Town and Country Development Act, 1973.

The respondent sought deemed permission under Section 30(5) of the Act, claiming the appellant's failure to communicate a decision on their application within 60 days.

The respondent purchased land based on a government policy encouraging housing societies.

Issues:

Validity of the deemed permission claimed by the respondent.

Timeliness of the draft scheme publication under Section 50(3).

Interpretation of Rule 18(2) regarding the simultaneous publication in the Gazette and local newspaper.

The necessity and legality of the application for a no objection certificate.

Held:

The court rejects the claim of deemed permission under Section 30(5), citing the closure of the case by the authority due to the respondent's failure to provide requested information.

The publication of the draft scheme is deemed valid within the two-year period from the date of the second declaration under Section 50(2).

Simultaneous publication in the Gazette and local newspaper is not mandatory for the validity of the draft scheme.

The rejection of the application for a no objection certificate is deemed lawful, considering the existence of the published development scheme.

Facts:

The case involved a heinous crime of rape committed by the respondent, a married man of 49 years, on a girl aged 7/8 years. The trial court imposed a sentence of 10 years rigorous imprisonment (R.I.), emphasizing the cruel nature of the act. However, the High Court reduced the sentence to 4 years R.I. citing factors such as the accused's social status, illiteracy, and family dependence.

Issues:

The appropriateness of the sentence imposed by the High Court, considering the gravity of the offense and the factors influencing the reduction of the sentence.

Held:

The court emphasized the duty of sentencing courts to operate the system judiciously, imposing sentences that act as deterrents for similar offenses.

Socio-economic status, religion, race, caste, or creed of the accused or the victim should not influence sentencing policy. The focus should be on the conduct of the accused, the age of the victim, and the gravity of the crime.

The court criticized the High Court's reasoning for reducing the sentence, stating that the factors presented were neither special nor adequate. The court held that mercy in the case of such a heinous crime would be a travesty of justice.

The sentence was enhanced from 4 years R.I. (as imposed by the High Court) to 10 years R.I. for the offense under Section 376 of the IPC. The fine and default clause were maintained.

Facts:

The prosecutrix, a 15-year-old girl, alleged rape by the accused-respondent.

Prosecution based on the victim's testimony, medical examination reports, and her father's account.

Trial court convicted the accused; High Court acquitted citing doubts about age, absence of injuries, and delay in lodging FIR.

Issues:

Validity of the High Court's interference with the trial court's judgment.

Examination of the prosecutrix's age and the relevance of consent.

Consideration of medical evidence, absence of injuries, and societal factors causing a delay in reporting.

Held:

The High Court erred in interfering; accused-respondent found guilty under Section 376 IPC.

Lack of visible injuries doesn't imply consent, especially considering the young age of the prosecutrix.

Sensitivity required in handling sexual assault cases; societal factors justify delay in reporting.

Decision: The appeal is allowed; the accused-respondent is sentenced to the period already undergone in jail, a fine, and further imprisonment in default of payment.

Facts:

Long-standing enmity between the families of the appellants and the deceased.

Appellants allegedly murdered the deceased in the presence of witnesses.

Incident reported to the police at 7 A.M., and investigation commenced.

Appellants sentenced to life imprisonment under relevant sections and Acts.

Issues:

Credibility of eyewitnesses.

Time of occurrence and information to the Investigating Officer contradicted.

Presence of eyewitnesses at the scene of occurrence not proved.

Held:

Under Section 174 read with Section 178 Cr.P.C., the Inquest Report is limited to determining the prima facie nature of injuries, possible weapons used, and the possible cause of death. Citing relevant precedents ([1975) Supp. SCR 84], [1998) 4 SCC 605], [1987) 3 SCR 59], [1991) SCR 1], [1992) Supp. 3 SCC 1]).

Names of the appellants were introduced after the Inquest Report due to bitter enmity, indicating a tainted investigation. Appellants implicated based on the collective mischief of the informant and the Investigating Officer.

Investigating Officer contradicted the statement of the informant regarding the time and manner of reporting the incident. The informant did not know the assailant's name, undermining the credibility of the information.

Eyewitnesses claimed to be present while scraping grass, but the Investigating Officer found no evidence of grass scraping. The conduct of eyewitnesses was deemed unnatural, casting doubt on their presence at the scene.

Discrepancies in the time of occurrence stated by witnesses raise questions about the reliability of their testimonies. One witness, not an eyewitness, appears to have been produced to establish the place of occurrence.

Decision: The appeal is allowed based on the lack of credible evidence, contradictions in statements, and the possibility of false implication.

Facts:

A post of Deputy Conservator fell vacant in November 1994.

Appellant and respondent No. 4 Captain Subhash Kumar applied for the position.

Captain Kumar was selected and appointed as Deputy Conservator.

The appellant challenged the appointment, claiming that Captain Kumar did not possess the required experience.

Issues:

Whether the experience gained as a Master and as a Pilot can be clubbed together to meet the criteria for the post of Deputy Conservator.

Held:

The post of Deputy Conservator requires varied experience, and the Regulations stipulate 10 years' experience as Master or in pilot age or dredging in a Major Port Trust.

The court accepts the interpretation that the experience gained as a Master and as a Pilot can be combined, as consistently implemented by the Central Government.

The court rejects the contention that Captain Kumar suppressed material information, finding no merit in the assertion.

The Division Bench upholds the appointment of Captain Kumar.

The court dismisses the appeals, leaving the parties to bear their own costs.