Court Fees – Declaratory Suits – Distinction between “cancellation” and “declaration” – Held: Where executant of deed seeks to annul it, ad valorem court fee on sale consideration is payable; but where a non-executant seeks declaration that deed is void or not binding, fixed court fee under Article 17(iii) applies if he is in possession – If non-executant also seeks possession, court fee to be computed under Section 7(iv)(c) on valuation stated in plaint, not necessarily ad valorem on sale consideration [Paras 6–7].

Interpretation – Section 7(iv)(c) & 7(v), Court Fees Act, 1870 – Second proviso to Section 7(iv)(c) mandates that where suit for declaration with consequential relief concerns property, valuation shall not be less than the value of the property computed under Section 7(v) – Court fee therefore depends on possession status and nature of relief sought, not automatically on consideration in sale deed [Paras 5–7].

Civil Procedure – Declaratory Relief – Plaintiff, not being executant of impugned sale deeds, sought declaration that deeds were not binding on co-parcenary and for joint possession – Such relief does not amount to cancellation of deeds – Trial Court and High Court erred in treating suit as one for cancellation and demanding ad valorem court fee on sale consideration [Paras 7–8].

Decision: Appeals allowed – Orders of Trial Court and High Court set aside – Held: Suit being for declaration by non-executant with consequential relief of possession, court fee to be computed under Section 7(iv)(c) read with Section 7(v) of the Court Fees Act, 1870 – Trial Court directed to recalculate court fee accordingly.

Service Law – Departmental Enquiry – Denial of Reasonable Opportunity – Principles of Natural Justice – Respondent-employee (Development Officer, LIC) dismissed after ex-parte enquiry – Inquiry report not furnished and no effective opportunity of cross-examination granted – Held: Entire enquiry and orders passed by Disciplinary Authority, Appellate Authority, and Chairman vitiated for violation of natural justice – Non-speaking dismissal order unsustainable – Reinstatement with consequential benefits justified [Paras 14–17, 30–33].

Civil Procedure Code, 1908 – Order 12 Rules 1 & 2 – Proof and Admission of Documents – Effect of Non-Compliance – Failure to serve notice to admit documents or prove them as per law – Mere production and marking of documents as exhibits does not amount to proof – Admission of documents not equivalent to admission of their contents or truth – Held: Documents not proved in accordance with Evidence Act cannot be relied upon – Findings of courts below justified [Paras 21–27, 31].

Evidence Act, 1872 – Proof of Documents – Admission vs. Proof – Mere filing or marking of documents does not establish contents – Contents must be proved by primary or secondary evidence – Burden of proof not discharged by mere exhibition of documents – Courts rightly ignored unproved documents filed by defendants [Paras 25–27, 31].

Civil Trial – Failure to Cross-Examine and Lead Evidence – Defence not Put in Cross-Examination – Effect – Defendant failed to confront plaintiff with pleaded defence in cross-examination – Held: Such unproved and untested defence cannot be accepted – Appellants failed to substantiate their case either orally or by admissible documentary evidence [Paras 19–20, 25].

Relief – Consequential Benefits – Respondent retired during pendency of proceedings – Reinstatement not possible – Entitled to monetary benefits for intervening period – No order for fresh enquiry at belated stage [Paras 34].

Decision: Appeal dismissed – Orders of all courts below upheld – Dismissal of respondent quashed – Respondent entitled to monetary and consequential benefits – Appellants to bear costs throughout – Counsel’s fee Rs.10,000 [Paras 35–36].

Service Law – University Employees – Promotion Criteria – Resolution of Executive Council dated 26.06.1995 prescribed seniority-cum-efficiency as basis for promotion of non-teaching staff – State Government granted approval only on 10.10.2002 – Held: Section 21(xiii) of Burdwan University Act requires “approval” but not “prior approval” – Hence, post-facto approval validates earlier promotions made under the resolution – Promotions made prior to 10.10.2002 upheld [Paras 7–11].

Statutory Interpretation – “Approval” vs “Prior Approval” – Distinction emphasized – Where statute requires mere approval (not prior approval or permission), action taken remains valid unless disapproved – Principle affirmed through precedents and Black’s Law Dictionary – Resolution effective from date of decision and validated by subsequent government approval [Paras 7–10].

Administrative Law – Post-facto Sanction – Executive Council’s resolution determining service terms of non-teaching staff valid once State Government approved it – No requirement for prior approval under the statute – Promotions based on such resolution cannot be nullified merely for want of earlier approval [Paras 9–11].

University Autonomy – Statutory Interpretation – Section 21(xiii) empowers Executive Council to determine service conditions with approval of the State – Use of phrase “with the approval” allows action pending approval and validates it upon subsequent sanction – Challenge to applicability of resolution prior to approval date rejected [Paras 10–11].

Decision: Appeal dismissed – Resolution of 26.06.1995 validly applied to promotions made before 10.10.2002 – Approval by State Government validated past actions – No order as to costs.

Administrative Law – Change of Land Use – Industrial to Residential – Validity of Government Refusal – PSIEC sought to convert surplus industrial land in Phases VIII-A and VIII-B, Mohali into residential plots under “Industrial Housing Scheme” – State Government, owner of the land, refused permission citing larger public interest and industrial policy – Held: Under Sections 79 and 81 of the 1995 Act, any change of land use must be sanctioned by the competent authority – Government’s refusal was within its statutory and policy domain and not arbitrary or mala fide [Paras 18–21, 33].

Doctrine of Mala Fides – Allegations against State Functionaries – Burden of Proof – Mere notings in official files and discussions by Allotment Committee regarding possible commercial use (multiplex projects) do not establish bad faith – Courts should not infer mala fides on vague or speculative grounds – High Court erred in quashing the policy decision on suspicion – No tangible evidence of extraneous consideration shown – Decision upheld [Paras 19–20].

Doctrine of Promissory Estoppel – Applicability – No enforceable promise made to applicants – Application form expressly stated that acceptance of form and earnest money would not oblige the Corporation to allot plots – Draw of lots was provisional – No representation inducing applicants to alter their position – Doctrine cannot compel the Government or PSIEC to act contrary to statutory provisions or without approval under the 1995 Act [Paras 22–25].

Doctrine of Legitimate Expectation – Scope – Mere participation in a provisional draw of lots or past allotments under a similar scheme does not create a legally protectable expectation – Expectation must be based on consistent practice or representation within lawful authority – Absence of approval for change of land use negates any claim of legitimate expectation [Paras 27–31].

Public Policy – Industrial Development vs. Housing Schemes – Judicial Review – Refusal to divert industrial land for residential use justified in the interest of employment generation and revenue – Judicial review of policy decisions confined to testing arbitrariness or mala fides – Courts cannot compel Government to act contrary to industrialization policy [Paras 21, 33].

Discrimination – Equal Treatment – Allotments made in Patiala and Ludhiana focal points under separate factual circumstances cannot form the basis of parity – No violation of Article 14 established [Para 32].

Decision: Appeals dismissed except the one filed by the State of Punjab – High Court’s finding of mala fides set aside – Writ petitions dismissed – Parties to bear their own costs [Para 33].

Service Law – Voluntary Retirement – Withdrawal of Option – Statutory Scheme – Development Officers opted for Special Voluntary Retirement Package under a statutory scheme framed under Section 17A of the General Insurance Business (Nationalisation) Act – Respondents sought to withdraw option before written acceptance – High Court permitted withdrawal treating scheme as contractual relying on Swarnakar – Held: SVRP under 2003 Amendment Scheme is statutory in nature and binds employees – Clause 5(4) bars withdrawal once option is exercised – General contract law including Section 5 of Contract Act not applicable to statutory schemes – Option, once exercised, cannot be withdrawn regardless of employer’s acceptance status [Paras 6–12].

Delegated Legislation – Binding Effect – Scheme framed under Section 17A held to be delegated legislation with statutory force – Sub-section (6) of Section 17A gives overriding effect to such schemes over any law or contract – Held: Clause 5(4) barring withdrawal of option is valid and enforceable – Clauses 5(3) and 5(5) govern effectuation of retirement, not the right to withdraw [Paras 6–9].

Contract Law – Applicability to Statutory Scheme – Section 5 of Contract Act permits withdrawal before acceptance – Held: Inapplicable where retirement governed by a statutory scheme which explicitly bars withdrawal – Clause 5(4) not void for lack of consideration – High Court erred in applying contractual principles to a statutory scheme – Swarnakar distinguished on basis of statutory vs contractual nature of schemes [Paras 10–12].

Decision: Appeal allowed – Judgment of High Court set aside – Writ Petition dismissed.

Contempt of Court – Quasi-criminal nature – Standard of proof – Proceedings under the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 are quasi-criminal in nature and demand the same standard of proof as in criminal trials – Punishment can be imposed only for wilful disobedience proved beyond reasonable doubt – Benefit of doubt must go to the alleged contemnor [Paras 9, 13, 20].

Procedure – Framing of Charges – Rules 5 & 6, Allahabad High Court Rules, 1952 – Mandatory requirement – In suo motu criminal contempt, the High Court must frame precise charges and furnish all relevant documents along with the notice – Failure to do so vitiates proceedings – Absence of specific charges or disclosure of material deprives contemnor of opportunity to defend – Violation of principles of natural justice [Paras 21–24, 27].

Natural Justice – Right to Notice and Hearing – Notice issued by the High Court was defective and failed to indicate the nature of accusation or attach the inquiry report or evidence relied upon – Held: The notice was incomplete, inaccurate, and misleading; thus, conviction could not stand [Paras 22–24].

Presumption of Death – Section 108, Evidence Act – A person missing for less than seven years cannot be presumed dead – High Court erred in presuming death of detenu Tej Veer Singh when only four and a half years had elapsed [Para 8].

Scope of Contempt Jurisdiction – Article 215, Constitution of India – Powers of the High Court under Article 215 and the Contempt of Courts Act must be exercised strictly in accordance with procedure prescribed by law – Non-observance of statutory procedure renders trial void [Paras 14–15, 20].

Delay in Contempt Proceedings – Object of summary procedure defeated when proceedings remained pending for over three years – Held: Long pendency contrary to the spirit of expeditious disposal inherent in contempt jurisdiction [Para 26].

Decision: Appeals allowed – Judgment and order dated 20.12.2001 of the Allahabad High Court convicting appellants in Criminal Contempt No. 69 of 1997 set aside – Contempt proceedings held vitiated for non-compliance with mandatory procedural rules and violation of natural justice – No disciplinary action to be taken against appellants pursuant to impugned order [Para 27].

Service Law – Pension – Work Charged Service – Inclusion – Respondent had rendered long service as work charged employee under Government of Punjab before joining Punjab State Electricity Board (PSEB) – PSEB denied pension on ground that his Board service was under 10 years and prior State service was non-pensionable – Held: Once PSEB adopted State Government’s policy (vide Circular dated 25.11.1985) to count prior temporary State service for pension, such service could not be excluded merely due to its work-charged character – Full Bench in Kesar Chand had already struck down exclusion of work-charged service under Rule 3.17(ii) as violative of Article 14 – Rejection by PSEB was unjustified [Paras 2, 3, 5, 6, 7, 9].

Administrative Law – Policy Adoption – Legal Effect – PSEB voluntarily adopted Central and Punjab Government pension liability sharing policy (Circulars dated 31.03.1982 and 20.05.1982) – Held: Once adopted, the policy was binding on PSEB – Board employees could claim benefit of counting prior service under Central or State Government for pension purposes – Board's later rescission of policy (in 2004) had no retrospective effect – Respondent’s entitlement unaffected [Paras 4, 6, 9, 10].

Civil Procedure – Additional Evidence in Appellate Stage – Respondent produced new documents at appellate stage before Division Bench – Board objected – Held: Respondent’s applications to place documents on record were allowed unopposed – Board reconsidered claim on that basis – No prejudice caused – Objection not sustainable [Paras 2, 12].

Service Law – Interruption Between Two Employments – Respondent retrenched from State service in 1978, joined PSEB in 1982 – Board argued gap of over 4 years violated Rule 4.23 – Held: Policy adopted by Board (via Circular dated 25.11.1985) permitted interruption between retrenchment and new employment – Respondent entitled to benefit of prior service [Paras 11].

Interpretation of Rules – Rule 3.17(ii) Punjab CSR – Struck down – Work-charged employees, once regularised, entitled to count entire service towards pension – Reference to Board’s internal definition under Regulation 2.58 rejected – Punjab Civil Service Rules held applicable [Paras 5, 6].

Mandamus – Direction to PSEB – High Court rightly issued mandamus directing PSEB to count respondent’s State work-charged service towards pension – No merit in challenge to that direction – Direction upheld [Paras 8, 13, 14].

Decision: Appeal dismissed – High Court judgment affirmed – PSEB directed to implement pensionary benefits within 3 months – No order as to costs [Paras 14–15].

Negotiable Instruments Act – Section 141 – Vicarious liability – Directors and officers of company – Mere designation as Director insufficient to attract criminal liability under Section 141 – Complaint must contain specific averments showing how and in what manner the accused was in charge of and responsible for the conduct of company’s business – Bald, mechanical or omnibus statements do not satisfy statutory requirement – Penal statutes imposing vicarious liability must be strictly construed [Paras 9–15, 25].

Corporate Criminal Liability – Managing Director and Signatory – Presumption of responsibility – Managing Director or Joint Managing Director deemed to be in charge of and responsible for conduct of business by virtue of position – Similarly, signatory of dishonoured cheque is directly liable – No need for specific averment in such cases [Paras 19, 25(v), (vi)].

Director’s Liability – Strict compliance mandatory – No deemed liability – Directors not involved in day-to-day affairs or those who ceased to hold office at the time of offence cannot be prosecuted – Liability arises only if they were in charge of business at time of offence – Resignation or cessation from office prior to issuance of cheque absolves liability [Paras 26–27].

Section 141(2) – Consent, Connivance or Neglect – Separate requirement – For liability under Sub-section (2), complaint must contain averments of specific acts of consent, connivance or neglect leading to offence – Mere reproduction of Section 141(1) language insufficient [Para 24].

Principles summarised – Criminal liability of company officers under Section 141 NI Act –

(i) Complainant must make specific factual averments showing how accused was responsible for conduct of company’s business.

(ii) There is no presumption that every Director knows about the transaction.

(iii) Only those who were in charge at the time of offence are liable.

(iv) Vicarious liability must be pleaded and proved, not inferred.

(v) Managing Director/Joint Managing Director are deemed liable.

(vi) Signatory of cheque liable under Section 141(2).

(vii) Other Directors liable only if complaint contains specific factual role [Para 25].

Decision: High Court rightly quashed summoning orders – Complaints lacked necessary averments showing specific role or responsibility of respondents – Respondents had ceased to be Directors when cheques were issued – No vicarious liability could be fastened – Appeals dismissed [Paras 26–27].

NDPS Act – Search and Seizure – Section 50 – Applicability limited to “personal search” – Search of a bag carried by accused does not attract Section 50 – Expression “search of person” excludes baggage, briefcase, or container – Constitution Bench ruling in State of Punjab v. Baldev Singh and subsequent cases (Madan Lal v. State of Himachal Pradesh, Pawan Kumar v. State of Himachal Pradesh) reaffirmed – Held: Compliance with Section 50 not required where contraband recovered from bag and not person [Paras 13–15].

Evidence – Official Witnesses – Independent corroboration not mandatory – Testimony of police officers trustworthy and consistent – Efforts to include public witnesses proved but none were willing – Absence of independent witness not fatal – Courts must evaluate police evidence cautiously but not reject it mechanically – Conviction can rest on reliable official testimony [Para 16].

Criminal Procedure – Section 313 CrPC – Statement of accused properly recorded – Accused given opportunity to explain incriminating evidence – Plea of false implication rejected – Prosecution proved conscious possession and recovery beyond reasonable doubt [Paras 3–5, 16].

Sentencing – Principle of Parity – Distinction between co-accused tried separately – Benefit of parity not available as co-accused Randhir Singh was tried in separate FIR and proceedings – Principle applies only where co-accused are tried jointly for same offence and circumstances identical – Mere coincidence of being searched on same date before same officer insufficient – No ground for reduction of sentence [Paras 17–23].

Constitution of India – Article 21 – Fair Trial – Compliance with statutory safeguards under Sections 42 and 50 NDPS Act ensures fairness – No violation of Article 21 established [Paras 10–12].

Decision: Appeal dismissed – Conviction and sentence of 10 years’ rigorous imprisonment with ₹1,00,000 fine under Section 20 NDPS Act upheld – No interference warranted [Para 24].