Landlord and Tenant – Lease to Government – Assessment of Rent – Premises leased by plaintiff to Government for Taluk Office use – Plaintiff claimed rent at Rs. 1,58,890 based on PWD assessment – Defendant contended agreement to pay Rs. 1,00,000 per month subject to Government approval – Held: Plaintiff’s letter (Ex. B1) offering rent of Rs. 1,00,000 forms basis of agreement – PWD later revised rent downward to Rs. 1,00,000 – Trial court rightly fixed rent at Rs. 1,00,000 per month – No evidence of agreement to pay higher amount – No interference warranted [Paras 14–16, 19]

Tenancy – Surrender – Implied Surrender – Whether government tenants vacated and surrendered possession – Defendants produced surrender letter (Ex. B3) and videographic evidence – Plaintiff refused to accept possession – Affixture of notice and evidence of new office functioning established – Held: Implied surrender proved under Section 111(f) of Transfer of Property Act – Tenancy period from 16.03.2015 to 31.03.2017 [Paras 10–13]

Arrears of Rent – Calculation – Lease period fixed at 24.5 months – Rent at Rs. 1,00,000 per month – Part payment of Rs. 4,00,000 – Balance arrears held to be Rs. 20,50,000 – Trial court decree affirmed [Paras 17–18]

Civil Procedure – Appeal under Section 96 CPC – Scope – Where findings of trial court are based on evidence and legally sustainable, appellate court will not interfere – Held: No perversity in findings – Appeal dismissed [Paras 19–20]

Decision: Appeal dismissed with costs – Judgment and decree dated 12.03.2019 in O.S. No. 82 of 2017 by II Additional District Judge, Chidambaram upheld – Arrears of Rs. 20,50,000 confirmed.

Criminal Procedure – Successive Anticipatory Bail Application – Maintainability – Petition under Section 482 BNSS filed for grant of pre-arrest bail by accused previously denied same relief – Held: Successive applications for anticipatory bail are maintainable in law if there is a material change in circumstances – However, they must be placed before the same Judge to maintain judicial propriety and avoid forum shopping – Cited principles from Shahzad Hasan Khan and G.R. Ananda Babu cases [Paras 11-15].

Change in Circumstances – Grant of Bail to Co-accused – Held: Arrest and subsequent bail of other co-accused, and partial progress in investigation, do not by themselves constitute a substantial change in circumstances – Petitioner still absconding and custodial interrogation necessary – Petitioner failed to demonstrate fresh grounds warranting grant of pre-arrest bail [Paras 16-22].

Judicial Discipline – Forum Shopping – Reiterated that successive bail applications should be heard by the same Judge who decided earlier application, if available – This practice upholds judicial decorum and prevents inconsistent orders – Cited Supreme Court rulings discouraging forum shopping and emphasizing procedural consistency [Paras 11-13].

Case Law – Applicability – Supreme Court’s ruling in G.R. Ananda Babu v. State of Tamil Nadu applied – Held: Mere passage of time, partial investigation, or grant of bail to other accused is insufficient for granting pre-arrest bail when serious allegations remain unresolved – No factual distinction shown from earlier rejection [Paras 23-24].

Decision: Petition dismissed – No substantial change in circumstances since previous rejection – Petitioner remains absconding – Serious allegations and custodial interrogation still required – Relief under Section 482 BNSS not justified.

Service Law – Transfer – Incident of Service – Judicial Review – Though transfer is an incident of service and ordinarily courts should not interfere – Held, interference justified where transfer is arbitrary, causes undue hardship and violates principles of good governance – Mass transfer of teachers in mid-academic session deprecated [Paras 30–32].

Transfer of Teachers – Mid-Academic Session – Educational Impact – Petitioner transferred within five months from one school to another at a distance of about 500 km – Transfer effected in September during running academic session – Held, such transfers disrupt teaching, examinations and students’ academic continuity – Action contrary to administrative prudence [Paras 18–21, 24–26].

Service Tribunal – Inconsistent Orders – Discrimination – Tribunal dismissed stay application of petitioner relying on Shilpi Bose while granting stays in identical matters on same dates – Different benches and even same bench adopting pick-and-choose approach – Held, such inconsistency reflects arbitrariness and judicial impropriety [Paras 14–17, 29, 32].

Service Tribunal – Reliance on Precedent – Shilpi Bose Case – Tribunal selectively relied on Shilpi Bose to deny relief while ignoring same precedent in other similar cases – Held, Tribunal must maintain uniformity and adhere to binding precedents – Selective application of law disapproved [Paras 15–17, 29].

Good Governance – Education Administration – National Education Policy, 2020 – Court emphasized duty of State to align administrative actions with educational calendar and NEP-2020 objectives – Mass transfers during academic session undermine quality of education and student welfare [Paras 19–23, 26–28].

Writ Jurisdiction – Interference with Tribunal Orders – Where Tribunal failed to consider petitioner’s case on merits and acted arbitrarily, High Court justified in setting aside Tribunal’s order and granting interim protection [Paras 32–33].

Decision: Writ Petition partly allowed – Order dated 04.11.2025 passed by Rajasthan State Civil Services Appellate Tribunal in Appeal No. 4387/2025 set aside – Transfer order dated 22.09.2025 and consequential relieving order stayed till final disposal of appeal – Tribunal directed to decide appeal on merits preferably within two months – Copy of order directed to be sent to Department of Personnel and Chairman of Tribunal for compliance

Arbitration – Section 8 Referral – Prima Facie Standard – Alleged Forgery of Arbitration Agreement – Commercial Court exceeded jurisdiction by undertaking detailed evidence review – Allegations of fraud/forgery in contracts between parties do not bar arbitration – Formal validity under Section 7 satisfied – Substantive validity to be examined by Arbitral Tribunal under Section 16 – Appeal allowed, suit dismissed, parties referred to arbitration [Paras 56, 60–71, 72–74].

Arbitration Law – Section 8 Referral – Scope of Prima Facie Review – Limits of Judicial Scrutiny – Held that Courts at the referral stage may only examine the prima facie existence and formal validity of an arbitration agreement – The Commercial Court conducted a “mini-trial” and exceeded its jurisdiction by deeply analysing evidence and circumstances, contrary to Vidya Drolia, Cox & Kings, SBP & Co., and Re: Interplay – Referral courts must filter only “deadwood” or ex facie non-arbitrable matters; all other issues must be left to the Arbitral Tribunal [Paras 49–54, 63–66].

Arbitration Agreement – Allegations of Forgery/Fraud – Arbitrability – Allegations of forgery of signatures on the MOU do not, by themselves, render the dispute non-arbitrable – In line with K. Mangayarkarasi, Vidya Drolia, and Pravin Electricals, disputes involving fraud/forgery arising out of commercial relationships remain arbitrable – The necessity of expert evidence strengthens the case for arbitration rather than exclusion of arbitral jurisdiction [Paras 56–58, 60–62, 68–69, 72–73].

Arbitration Agreement – Requirement of Signature – Formal Validity under Section 7 – Section 7 requires only that an arbitration agreement be in writing; signature is not a mandatory requirement – Glencore International v. Shree Ganesh Metals applied – Clear intention to arbitrate can be inferred from written documents and conduct – Therefore, denial of signature could not justify refusal of reference [Paras 58–59, 71].

Competence-Competence – Section 16 – Substantive Validity to be Determined by the Arbitral Tribunal – Determining whether the MOU was forged requires substantive findings, expert evidence and cross-examination – As per Re: Interplay and Cox & Kings, such matters fall squarely within the Arbitral Tribunal’s jurisdiction and cannot be adjudicated at the referral stage [Paras 53, 65–67].

Section 8(2) Compliance – Production of Original Arbitration Agreement – Non-production of the original/certified copy of the MOU is a triable issue and does not defeat arbitration – Objections under Section 8(2) are procedural and fall within the Arbitral Tribunal’s domain under Section 16 – Exemption application filed; issue cannot bar referral [Para 70].

Non-Signatory and Group of Companies Doctrine – Commercial Court erred in holding that the defendant partnership firm was not a party to the MOU and hence could not be referred to arbitration – Cox & Kings clarified that non-signatories may still be bound based on conduct, intention and group of companies doctrine – Hyper-technical objections cannot defeat arbitration [Para 71].

Appeal – Section 37 – Interference Justified – Commercial Court’s refusal was unsustainable as it travelled beyond the permissible prima facie scope under Section 8 – The dispute is not ex facie non-arbitrable; Civil Court’s jurisdiction stood ousted by a valid written arbitration clause requiring deeper inquiry by Arbitral Tribunal [Paras 72–74].

Decision – Impugned order dated 28.08.2024 set aside – Application under Section 8 allowed – Parties referred to arbitration – Civil Suit dismissed as not maintainable – Liberty to initiate appointment of Arbitral Tribunal as per the Act [Para 74–75].

Service Law – Coast Guard Officers – Superannuation Age – Rule 20(1) and (2) of 1986 Rules Struck Down – Discrimination Unjustified – Petitioners challenged constitutionality of differential retirement ages: 57 years for officers of rank of Commandant and below, and 60 for senior ranks – Held: All officers are similarly situated within the same force – No rational nexus shown to justify the differentia – Rule violates Articles 14 and 16 of Constitution – Court found lack of empirical data or logical justification in Union's reasoning – Mere references to young age profile, operational command, or training structure were vague and unsubstantiated – Disparate age of retirement adversely affects morale and serves no legitimate purpose [Paras 35–39.9].

Armed Forces – Article 33 of Constitution – Judicial Review of Service Conditions – Limits on Invocation – Article 33 allows Parliament to modify or restrict fundamental rights of Armed Forces members – However, such restriction must relate to discharge of duty or discipline – Held: Rule 20(1)-(2) fails to meet this test – No evidence that disparity in retirement age furthers discipline or functional efficiency – Invocation of Article 33 to justify Rule is unconvincing and arbitrary – Court has power to review such measures if the justification is colourable or lacking in nexus [Paras 37–38.8].

Service Law – Paramilitary Forces – Parity with CAPFs – Dev Sharma Case Extended to Coast Guard – Though Dev Sharma judgment applied to CAPFs (CRPF, BSF, ITBP, SSB), Coast Guard also functions as a paramilitary force – Madras and Kerala High Courts previously recognised parity – Supreme Court dismissed SLPs against Dev Sharma – Held: Coast Guard not shown to be fundamentally different in operational structure or purpose – Parity in retirement age mandated to uphold constitutional equality [Paras 21, 23, 36].

Administrative Law – Reasonableness of Executive Policy – Failure to Provide Valid Justification – Judicial Scrutiny Warranted – MOD’s justifications such as age-related ailments, training infrastructure, command issues, or supersession found speculative and unsupported – Respondents failed to demonstrate any data-based or reasoned basis for fixing lower retirement age – Such vague assertions insufficient to meet constitutional muster – Held: Court cannot defer to executive if discrimination is shown to be irrational or unsupported [Paras 38.3–39.8.10].

Remedy – Relief Granted – Notional Continuity and Arrears of Benefits – Petitioners, though already superannuated at 57, held entitled to be deemed in service till age 60 – Notional benefits including pay, increments, and revised retiral dues to be granted – Direction to disburse benefits within 12 weeks [Paras 41–44].

Decision: Writ Petitions allowed – Rule 20(1) and 20(2) of the Coast Guard (General) Rules, 1986 declared unconstitutional to the extent they fix superannuation age at 57 for Commandant and below – All officers in Coast Guard entitled to retire at 60 – Respondents directed to recalculate and disburse revised benefits within 12 weeks.

Service Law - Family Pension – Son's entitlement – Condition of marriage – M.P. Civil Services (Pension) Rules, 1976 – Held: Marriage of a son does not render him ineligible for family pension; entitlement continues until age 25 or earning livelihood, as per Rule 47(6) which is the substantive provision, overriding any ambiguity in the definition clause Rule 47(14)(b)(ii) [Paras 19-20].

Preliminary Objection – Misrepresentation – Affidavit – Petitioner's marital status – Respondents alleged petitioner furnished incorrect information about his marital status in an affidavit – Held: Furnishing incorrect information in an affidavit regarding marital status is not a relevant factor for determining the petitioner's statutory right to family pension if the rules themselves do not make marriage a disqualification for a son [Para 7].

Pension Law – Family Pension – Son's Entitlement – M.P. Civil Services (Pension) Rules, 1976 – Petitioner, son of deceased employee, sought family pension – Rule 47(6)(ii) states a son is entitled to family pension until he attains 25 years – Rule 47 Explanation (b) explicitly applies marriage criteria only to daughters – Held: Rule 47(6)(ii) is clear and unambiguous; a son's entitlement to family pension is not contingent on his marital status, only on attaining 25 years or starting to earn livelihood [Paras 9-11, 19].

Statutory Interpretation – Harmonious Construction – Definition Clause vs. Substantive Provision – Rule 47(14)(b)(ii) defines 'family' and uses the term 'his/her marriage/remarriage' which creates ambiguity regarding a son's entitlement upon marriage – Rule 47(6) is the substantive provision governing the period of family pension – Held: A definition clause must be construed harmoniously with the main enactment; where the substantive provision (Rule 47(6)) is clear and unambiguous, the definition clause (Rule 47(14)(b)(ii)) cannot be interpreted to restrict the scope of the main provision, especially when the opening words of Rule 47(14)(b)(ii) also support the interpretation that the marriage condition applies to daughters only [Paras 13, 15-16, 18].

Statutory Interpretation – Proviso/Definition Clause – Scope and Function – Court referred to principles from CIT v. Ajax Products Ltd. and DMRC v. Tarun Pal Singh regarding the function of a proviso or a definition clause – Held: A proviso or definition clause qualifies the generality of the main enactment or clarifies terms but cannot be read to make the main provision nugatory or inconsistent; it must be construed harmoniously with the main enactment and cannot introduce a restriction not present in the substantive provision [Paras 15, 17].

Decision – Writ Petition Allowed – Family Pension – Petitioner's father was a Line Helper, drawing pension until his death – Petitioner applied for family pension, which was sanctioned with a condition of marriage as an ineligibility factor – Held: The condition of marriage inserted in the sanction order dated 09.08.2023 is invalid and de-hors Rule 47(6) of the Pension Rules – Petitioner is entitled to family pension until he attains 25 years or starts earning or death, whichever is earlier – Respondents directed to disburse arrears of family pension from 16.05.2021 with 6% interest per annum within 90 days [Paras 19-20].

Narcotic Drugs – Conviction under NDPS Act – Recovery of contraband ganja – Accused A1 and A2 apprehended while in possession of 1.5 kg ganja – Trial court convicted both under Section 8(c) r/w 20(b)(ii)(B) NDPS Act – Acquitted under Sections 25 and 29(1) – A3 absconded and later acquitted – On appeal, A1 reported dead, appeal abated against him – Conviction of A2 upheld based on presumption of conscious possession as he was found accompanying A1 at scene [Paras 2, 3, 26, 27, 31].

Search and Seizure – Validity of Search Procedure – Defence challenged absence of independent witnesses and presence of printed arrest memos at scene – Court held that refusal of witnesses did not vitiate search – Explanation given that laptop was used and arrest memos printed nearby – Seizure, arrest and recovery held in compliance with procedural safeguards under NDPS Act [Paras 14, 21-24].

Identification – Sufficiency of Informant Detail – Argument raised that Ex.P1 did not mention detailed description of accused – Court held that physical description was provided orally and PW1 identified the accused at the scene based on those details – Identification found reliable [Paras 13, 20].

Possession – Conscious Possession – A2 found accompanying A1 who was in possession of contraband – No recovery from A2 – However, trial court and appellate court held that A2 was in conscious possession by virtue of association and presence – Presumption under NDPS Act attracted [Paras 26, 27].

Sentence – Reduction on Mitigating Grounds – Appellate court considered A2’s young age (21 years), no prior criminal record, no direct recovery from him, 90 days custody already undergone, and death of A1 – Sentence of one year rigorous imprisonment reduced to period already undergone – Fine enhanced from Rs. 15,000 to Rs. 50,000 – In default of fine payment, three months’ simple imprisonment imposed [Paras 28-30].

Decision: Appeal dismissed as abated against A1 (Yasin) – Conviction of A2 (Mohamed Hussen) under Section 8(c) r/w 20(b)(ii)(B) of NDPS Act upheld – Sentence reduced to period already undergone – Fine enhanced to Rs. 50,000 to be paid within four weeks, failing which A2 shall undergo 3 months simple imprisonment – Confiscation of vehicle confirmed.

Prevention of Corruption Act – Demand and Acceptance – Trap Case – Acquittal Upheld – Accused government servant alleged to have demanded ₹2000 as bribe for effecting mutation entry – Complainant approached ACB, trap laid, and accused caught with tainted money – Trial court acquitted the accused on ground that demand was not proved – Held: Mere inquiry “whether the money is brought” does not constitute demand in law – Initial demand alleged by PW-1 not found in his police statement and proved to be a material omission by PW-5 (Investigating Officer) – Evidence of PW-2 (Panch) and PW-3 (complainant’s son) also suffered from contradictions and omissions – Presence of all three key witnesses at the spot found doubtful – Acquittal justified [Paras 11–14].

Sanction for Prosecution – Application of Mind – Valid Sanction Mandatory – Sanction order (Exh. 56) issued by PW-4 (Sanctioning Authority) found to be based on a pre-drafted proforma sent by ACB – No independent evaluation of documents or service records – Held: Sanction was granted without application of mind – Invalid sanction vitiates prosecution under Section 19 of PC Act – Acquittal cannot be interfered where foundational legal requirement not met [Paras 15–17].

Suppression of Material Evidence – Non-filing of Accused’s Post-Trap Explanation – Adverse Inference – Though accused’s statement was recorded immediately after trap, prosecution did not place it on record or include it in charge-sheet – Held: Suppression of post-trap statement violates fair trial principles – Court entitled to presume that withheld evidence was adverse to prosecution – Material defect fatal to case [Paras 18–19].

Criminal Jurisprudence – Appeal Against Acquittal – Limited Scope – Interference Only if Findings Perverse – Reaffirmation of principles from P. Somaraju v. State of A.P., 2025 SCC OnLine SC 2291 – Appellate court must respect double presumption of innocence in acquittal cases – Reversal only warranted where trial court’s view is manifestly illegal or unjust – Held: Trial court’s view was a possible and plausible one based on evidence and omissions – No interference warranted [Paras 6, 20].

Decision: Appeal dismissed – Acquittal confirmed – Accused exonerated of all charges under Sections 7, 13(1)(d) read with Section 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988.

Trademark Law – Interim Injunction – 'TESLA' Mark – Plaintiff (Tesla Inc.) sought injunction against Defendants (Tesla Power India Private Limited & Ors.) for using 'TESLA POWER' / 'TESLA POWER USA' marks for batteries and EVs – Held: Plaintiff established prior user, overwhelming goodwill, trans-border reputation, and likelihood of confusion; Defendants' adoption was dishonest, and delay in filing suit was not a ground to deny injunction in cases of dishonest adoption [Paras 42-46].

Trademark Law – Infringement – Registered Proprietor Rights – Plaintiff, registered proprietor of 'TESLA' mark since 2013 for automobiles and structural parts (Class 12 & 37) and inverters (Class 09), sought injunction against Defendants using 'TESLA POWER' for lead acid batteries, inverters, UPS – Held: Plaintiff's registrations are prima facie evidence of validity; batteries are structural automobile parts for EVs (Class 12) and inverters are covered (Class 09), making Defendants' goods allied and cognate, thus constituting infringement [Paras 11-14].

Trademark Law – Well-Known Mark – Trans-Border Reputation – Plaintiff demonstrated significant global revenue ($98.6 billion in 2023), extensive website traffic from India, and media coverage – Held: Plaintiff's 'TESLA' mark has overwhelming goodwill and trans-border reputation extending to India, making it a well-known mark entitled to protection even if goods are not directly sold in India [Paras 15, 39-40].

Trademark Law – Dishonest Adoption – Awareness of Prior Mark – Defendants adopted 'TESLA POWER USA' despite knowing Plaintiff's 'TESLA' mark since February 2021 (from trademark registry citations) and having no client base in USA – Held: Defendants' adoption was prima facie dishonest, intended to mislead consumers into believing a connection with the US-based Plaintiff, and to ride on Plaintiff's goodwill and reputation [Paras 16-18, 28-29].

Trademark Law – Likelihood of Confusion – Identical Marks and Allied Goods – Defendants' use of 'TESLA POWER' for batteries and inverters, which are allied/cognate to Plaintiff's EVs and inverters, with 'TESLA' as the dominant feature – Held: High likelihood of confusion among average consumers with imperfect recollection, as 'TESLA' is identical and goods are allied; descriptive additions like 'POWER' or 'USA' do not sufficiently distinguish the marks [Paras 19-21, 36-37].

Trademark Law – Initial Interest Confusion – Test Application – Court applied the initial interest confusion test – Held: Even transient confusion at the preliminary stage, before actual purchase, is sufficient to establish deceptive similarity under Section 29 of the Act, as the infringer's objective may be served by diverting initial attention [Paras 22-23].

Trademark Law – Passing Off – Goodwill and Actual Confusion – Plaintiff demonstrated substantial goodwill and actual instances of confusion (media reports, consumer complaints, FIRs) where Defendants were mistaken for Plaintiff's subsidiary – Held: A prima facie case of passing off is established, as Plaintiff is likely to suffer loss of reputation due to Defendants' goods being passed off as Plaintiff's [Paras 20, 24, 7.17].

Trademark Law – Delay in Filing Suit – Dishonest Adoption – Plaintiff filed suit in 2024, aware of Defendants since 2022, particularly after Defendants entered EV space – Held: Delay in filing suit is not a ground to deny interim injunction when the adoption of the impugned mark is dishonest; injunction must follow in cases of trademark infringement [Paras 25-27, 7.11].

Trademark Law – Approbate and Reprobate – Estoppel – Defendants applied for registration of 'TESLA POWER' and 'TESLA USA' marks, but then argued 'TESLA' is common to trade and generic – Held: Defendants cannot approbate and reprobate by seeking registration for a mark and simultaneously claiming it is common to trade; this constitutes an abuse of process [Paras 30-31, 5.34, 7.5, 7.9].

Trademark Law – Third-Party Use – Defense – Defendants cited third-party registrations and use of 'TESLA' (e.g., NVIDIA Corporation for computer hardware) to argue a 'crowded market' – Held: Third-party use is not a valid defense against infringement, especially when such uses are not for identical or allied goods (automobiles/batteries) in India, or are subsequent to Plaintiff's adoption; Plaintiff is not expected to sue every small infringer [Paras 33-35, 5.35, 7.5, 7.8].

Decision – Interim Injunction Granted – Application for interim injunction allowed – Held: Defendants are restrained from using 'TESLA POWER' / 'TESLA POWER USA' or any deceptively similar marks/trade names/domain names for EVs, promotional advertisements for EVs, and from using registered device/logos of 'TESLA' – This injunction also extends to Lead Acid Batteries for all automobiles, Inverters, and UPS [Paras 45-47].