Section 125 CrPC | Adverse Finding Of Adultery Cannot Be Recorded Against Specifically Named Co-Adulterer Without Giving Opportunity Of Hearing: Allahabad High Court

 "A judicial finding attributing an adulterous relationship to a specifically identified person cannot be regarded as an inconsequential observation. Such a finding may have consequences extending beyond the determination of the maintenance claim and may cause prejudice to the reputation and dignity of the person concerned." Allahabad High Court, in a significant ruling delivered on October 13, 2026, held that a court adjudicating a maintenance petition under Section 125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure cannot record an adverse finding of adultery against a specifically identified third person without giving them an opportunity of hearing.

A single bench of Justice Lakshmi Kant Shukla observed that natural justice and the constitutional guarantee of the right to reputation under Article 21 mandate that no person be condemned unheard, emphasizing that "justice is not merely in the decision that is reached, but also in the fairness with which it is reached."

The revisionist husband had approached the High Court challenging an order dated March 19, 2025, passed by the Additional Principal Judge, Family Court, Court No. 3, Kanpur Nagar, directing him to pay monthly maintenance of Rs. 20,000 to his estranged wife and Rs. 10,000 to their minor son under Section 125 CrPC. The husband resisted the maintenance claim under Section 125(4) CrPC, alleging that his wife was living in adultery with a specifically named individual and relied on electronic records and photographs to substantiate his plea.

The primary legal questions before the court were whether electronic evidence could be received under Section 14 of the Family Courts Act without a certificate under Section 65-B of the Indian Evidence Act, whether an opportunity of hearing must be afforded to a specifically named co-adulterer before deciding proceedings under Section 125 CrPC, and whether additional evidence can be entertained at the revisional stage under Section 391 read with Section 401 CrPC.

Admissibility Under Section 14 Family Courts Act Distinct From Authenticity

The High Court considered the scope of Section 14 of the Family Courts Act, 1984, which empowers a Family Court to receive any report, statement, document, or matter that may assist it in effectively dealing with a dispute, irrespective of whether the same would otherwise be relevant or admissible under the Indian Evidence Act, 1872.

The court clarified that while Section 14 confers procedural flexibility to receive electronic records without being strictly fettered by technical modes of proof, the mere power to receive material cannot be equated with substantive proof of its authenticity or correctness.

Addressing the precedents in Himanshu Chordia v. State of Rajasthan, Praveen Kumar Singh v. State of U.P., and the Madhya Pradesh High Court's ruling in Lumeshwari @ Pinky v. Rajesh Dubey, the bench observed that these decisions do not dispense with judicial scrutiny. The court underscored that the question of admissibility is entirely distinct from the question of evidentiary weight, source verification, and reliability.

Finding that the photographs placed on record appeared composite and lacked primary source verification or testimony from the person who captured them, the court refused to treat the unauthenticated electronic material as conclusive proof of adultery.

Audi Alteram Partem And The Constitutional Right To Reputation

Examining the husband's plea that his wife was living in adultery with a named individual, the bench turned to the core principles of natural justice and ancient jurisprudence. Drawing inspiration from the Katyayana Smriti, the court observed that no person ought to be condemned unheard, a principle deeply embedded in the maxim audi alteram partem.

The bench noted that although maintenance under Section 125 CrPC is a measure of social justice designed to prevent destitution, as affirmed in Chaturbhuj v. Sita Bai and Rajnesh v. Neha, Section 125(4) CrPC explicitly bars a wife living in adultery from claiming maintenance. Consequently, courts are frequently invited to examine specific imputations of illicit conduct.

Relying on the Supreme Court's decisions in Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India, Neeraj Garg v. Sarita Rani, and Subramanian Swamy v. Union of India, the bench held that reputation constitutes an integral facet of the right to life and personal liberty guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution.

The bench observed that an adverse judicial finding of sexual misconduct against an identifiable individual carries severe stigmatizing consequences, which cannot be brushed aside as an inconsequential observation merely because it arises within summary maintenance proceedings.

Guidance From Order 1 Rule 10(2) CPC And Matrimonial Precedents

Borrowing conceptual guidance from civil jurisprudence, the bench referred to Order 1 Rule 10(2) CPC, noting the established distinction between a necessary party and a proper party whose presence enables the court to completely adjudicate the controversy.

The High Court drew support from the Karnataka High Court's ruling in Arun Kumar Agrawal v. Radha Arun and Bhaktvatsal Singh Rajput v. Vandana Rajput, which acknowledged that an alleged adulterer is at least a proper party entitled to defend their character against damaging judicial findings.

The court extensively analyzed Rule 6(a) of the Hindu Marriage and Divorce Rules, 1956 framed by the Allahabad High Court, as well as Rule 12 of the Delhi High Court Hindu Marriage Rules, 1979, and Rules 16 to 18 of the Hindu Marriage Rules, 1956 under the Patna High Court Rules. Under these rules, impleading the alleged adulterer as a co-respondent is mandatory in matrimonial causes alleging adultery.

Citing the landmark judgment in Udai Narain Bajpai v. Smt. Kusum Bajpai, the bench observed that recording a finding destroying a third party's character without notice violates natural justice, and this rationale applies equally when the identical imputation is adjudicated under Section 125 CrPC.

The bench held that the revisionist, having specifically named the third party but made no effort to have notice issued to him or bring him before the court, could not be permitted to sustain the allegation of adultery to deny statutory maintenance.

Revisional Powers Under Sections 391 And 401 CrPC Are Discretionary

Dealing with the revisionist's prayer to introduce additional evidence at the revisional stage, the court held that powers under Section 401(1) read with Section 391 CrPC are purely discretionary. Such powers cannot be claimed as an automatic or unrestricted right to bring fresh documents on record.

Referring to Bhagwan Swaroop v. State of U.P., the bench remarked that the mere filing of unauthenticated documents alongside a revision petition does not elevate them to evidence on record, particularly when the named co-adulterer was never granted an opportunity to rebut the material.

Finding no jurisdictional infirmity or perversity in the Family Court's assessment of the husband's financial capacity, the High Court held that its revisional jurisdiction could not be invoked merely because an alternative view of the evidence might be conceivable.

Direction To Frame Rules For Impleading Co-Adulterer Under Section 125 CrPC

Highlighting an acute procedural void in the criminal procedure framework, the bench pointed out that while Section 125 CrPC penalizes adulterous conduct, it contains no explicit statutory machinery prescribing how an identified co-adulterer should be impleaded or notified.

To prevent Family Courts from operating in a procedural vacuum, the court directed the Registrar General to place the judgment before the Chief Justice of the Allahabad High Court for appropriate administrative consideration.

The bench recommended either framing comprehensive rules governing the impleadment or issuance of notice to named co-adulterers in Section 125 CrPC proceedings, or extending the foundational principles of Rule 6(a) of the Hindu Marriage and Divorce Rules, 1956, with necessary modifications, to maintenance litigation.

Affirming the maintenance award of Rs. 30,000 per month in favour of the wife and child, the High Court dismissed the criminal revision for lack of merit. The ruling decisively establishes that a husband cannot defeat a maintenance claim on the ground of adultery by specifically naming a third person without affording that person an opportunity of hearing.

Date of Decision: October 13, 2026