Arbitration – Jurisdiction – Statutory Arbitration – National Highways Act – Section 3-G(5), Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 – Section 42 – Petitioner NHAI contended that Section 34 petition filed by landowners challenging award of arbitrator should lie before District Judge, Mandi, as arbitrator was Divisional Commissioner, Mandi – Held: Notification under Section 3-G(5) merely specifies territorial jurisdiction of arbitrator and does not designate “seat” of arbitration – Office location or venue of hearings at Mandi does not ipso facto constitute seat of arbitration – Neither parties nor arbitrator fixed seat – In absence of designated seat, court where first application under Part I was filed (Bilaspur) would have exclusive jurisdiction under Section 42 – District Judge Bilaspur rightly retained jurisdiction [Paras 11–16, 22–23].

Arbitration – Seat vs Venue – Interpretation of “Place” under Section 20 – Juridical Seat – Mandi not fixed as seat – Mere fact that arbitrator holds office or conducts hearings in Mandi does not confer status of “seat” – Reference made to Bharat Aluminium Co. v. Kaiser Aluminium and BGS SGS SOMA JV v. NHPC – Held: Seat of arbitration is the legal anchor of arbitration, and once chosen, confers exclusive jurisdiction – In present case, no agreement or determination regarding seat made – Thus, “Mandi” was only the venue and not the seat of arbitration [Paras 12–16].

Arbitration – Section 42 – First Application Rule – Exclusive Jurisdiction – Where Section 34 petition filed first – Respondents (landowners) filed Section 34 petitions before District Judge, Bilaspur prior in time to petitions filed by NHAI before District Judge, Mandi – As per Section 42, once an application is made in a “court” under Part I of the Act, that court alone has jurisdiction for all subsequent applications – Held: Bilaspur court has exclusive jurisdiction – Petitions by NHAI seeking transfer to Mandi court are devoid of merit [Paras 17–23].

Arbitration – Court under Section 2(1)(e) – Principal Civil Court of Original Jurisdiction – Applicability of Section 42 – District Judge, Bilaspur is a “court” under Section 2(1)(e) – Once Section 34 application was validly filed there, no subsequent application could be filed before Mandi court – Petitioner’s Section 34 application before Mandi filed after respondents’ application in Bilaspur – Held: District Judge Bilaspur had valid and exclusive jurisdiction [Paras 21–23].

National Highways Act – Section 3-G Arbitration – Applicability of Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 – Section 3-G(6) expressly applies Arbitration Act, 1996 to arbitrations under National Highways Act – Section 2(4) of Arbitration Act also deems statutory arbitrations under any enactment, including National Highways Act, to be governed by Part I of the Arbitration Act – Hence, Section 34 and Section 42 apply in full to such statutory arbitrations [Paras 2–7].

Decision: All petitions dismissed – Impugned order dated 28.06.2025 passed by District Judge, Bilaspur upheld – District Judge, Bilaspur has exclusive jurisdiction to entertain and decide all applications arising out of the arbitral proceedings – Mandi court has no jurisdiction in view of first application rule under Section 42 – Miscellaneous applications also dismissed. [Para 24]

Land Acquisition – LDP Act – Application of LA Act and 2013 Act – Proceedings under the West Bengal Land Development and Planning Act, 1948 are not governed by the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 or the 2013 Act – Held: Acquisition under the LDP Act is a self-contained code – Section 11-A of the LA Act and Section 24 of the 2013 Act not applicable – Repeal of LA Act by 2013 Act does not affect incorporated provisions in LDP Act [Paras 45–50, 62–68, 96].

Possession and Vesting – Validity of Acquisition – Possession of land taken in 1950 under urgency clause of Section 8 of LDP Act – Held: Once possession is taken, land vests absolutely in the State – Subsequent declarations or delays in compensation do not vitiate vesting – Subsequent acts by the State cannot divest land once vested – Acquisition process deemed complete [Paras 70–82].

Waiver – Estoppel against Challenge to Acquisition – Predecessor-in-interest accepted 80% ad hoc compensation in 1956 and consistently sought balance compensation – Held: Such conduct amounts to waiver of right to challenge acquisition – Petitioners cannot now seek to invalidate the process or claim lapse [Paras 83–88].

Compensation – Modality of Determination – Compensation to be determined under Section 8 of the LDP Act by applying Section 23(1) of LA Act – Date of valuation fixed as the date of notification (May 19, 1950) – Additional compensation at 15% under Section 23(2) of LA Act applicable as per LDP Act amendment of 1978 – Interest at 6% per annum awarded from December 1950 till date of award for equity – Section 23(1A) or amended Section 23(2) (30%) of LA Act not applicable [Paras 93–101].

Relief – Fresh acquisition denied – Only relief granted is declaration of award under LDP Act and payment of balance compensation with interest – High Court cannot notionally shift notification date to apply current market value – Article 142 invoked in Bernard Vaz not available to High Court [Paras 92–104].

Decision: Appeal allowed – Judgment of Single Judge set aside – Writ petition partly allowed – Fresh acquisition denied – Collector directed to compute compensation and declare award under Section 8 of LDP Act read with Sections 11 and 23 of LA Act (as incorporated) – Interest at 6% p.a. granted from December 1950 till award date – To be completed preferably by April 30, 2026 [Paras 93–105].

Real Estate – RERA Registration – Ongoing vs. Completed Project – Completion Certificate Issued Pre-RERA – Appellant’s project had received a valid completion certificate on 17 March 2015 – Tribunal wrongly held project as ongoing due to absence of fire safety certificate – Held: Under Regulation 67 of BDA Regulations, fire NOC suffices at completion stage – Completion certificate valid – Project not registrable under RERA [Paras 10–19]

Statutory Interpretation – Completion Certificate vs. Occupancy Certificate – Occupancy certificate (Sec. 2(zf)) and completion certificate (Sec. 2(q)) have distinct legal purposes – RERA registration depends on completion certificate – Absence of occupancy certificate does not render a project ongoing under the Act [Paras 12–13]

Fire Safety – Compliance Requirements – Regulation 67 of BDA Regulations requires fire NOC, not fire safety certificate, for completion – Fire safety certificate required only at occupancy stage – Tribunal’s reliance on fire safety certificate to invalidate completion certificate is legally incorrect – Project completed before Fire Safety Rules came into force [Paras 14–19]

Binding Effect of BDA Determination – BDA’s 2022 order confirming no need for fresh completion certificate after revised plan was final – Not challenged – Tribunal erred in disregarding binding decision of competent authority under Section 2(p) RERA – Project to be treated as complete [Paras 18–19]

Applicability of RERA – Retroactivity – Supreme Court in Newtech Promoters and Developers Pvt. Ltd. clarified that RERA applies only to ongoing and future projects – Project completed before 1 May 2017 falls outside the purview of the Act – Tribunal misapplied settled law [Paras 10, 14, 20]

Decision: Appeals allowed – Orders of the OREAT dated 27 September 2024 in Appeal Nos. 96 and 97 of 2023 and review orders dated 13 November 2024 in Review Petition Nos. 15 and 16 of 2024 are set aside – Project held to be completed prior to commencement of RERA – Complaints held non-maintainable – No order as to costs.

Election Law – Panchayat Elections – Corrupt Practice – Disqualification – Declaration of Returned Candidate as Void – Declaration of Another Candidate as Elected – Non-disclosure of criminal antecedents by returned candidate amounts to corrupt practice and election liable to be declared void – However, declaration of an unelected candidate as elected can be made only if statutory conditions are fulfilled – In absence of allegation or finding that but for corrupt votes the election petitioner would have secured majority of valid votes, declaration of another candidate as elected is impermissible – Tribunal erred in law in declaring respondent No.4 as elected [Paras 11–13].

Punjab State Election Commission Act, 1994 – Sections 89 and 90 – Distinction Between Disqualification and Corrupt Practice – Section 89(1)(a) relates to disqualification existing on date of election – Section 89(1)(b) concerns corrupt practices affecting election – In cases of disqualification, votes polled by disqualified candidate cannot automatically be treated as “thrown away” – Law does not permit presumption as to voting pattern had the disqualified candidate not contested – Ratio reiterated from Supreme Court precedents [Paras 10–12].

Election Tribunal – Procedural Lapses – Mandatory Duty to Follow CPC Procedure – Election petition decided without framing issues, without calling for written response and without recording evidence – Tribunal devised its own procedure ignoring mandatory statutory framework – Election petitions are akin to civil trials and strict adherence to procedure under CPC is mandatory – Failure to frame issues and conduct trial vitiates entire proceedings [Paras 14–15].

Framing of Issues – Importance – Democratic Rights at Stake – Settlement of issues is foundational stage of election trial – Issues determine scope of evidence and adjudication – Tribunal’s casual approach in deciding election petition without issues reflects non-application of mind – Election disputes affect fate of constituency and democratic process, hence require strict procedural compliance [Paras 14–15].

Supervisory and Appellate Interference – Election Matters – High Court justified in setting aside Tribunal’s order where it suffers from patent illegality and procedural impropriety – Tribunal’s order held unsustainable both in law and procedure – Matter remanded for fresh adjudication in accordance with law [Paras 15–16].

Decision: Appeal allowed – Impugned order dated 06.03.2025 passed by Election Tribunal, Sri Muktsar Sahib set aside – Matter remanded to Tribunal for fresh decision after framing issues and recording evidence – Tribunal directed to decide election petition expeditiously, preferably on or before 30.06.2026.

Criminal Law – Bail – Cancellation – Anticipatory bail granted by Sessions Judge and confirmed by ACJM in serious offence of abduction and murder – Opposite party, a WBCS officer, allegedly masterminded the act using official vehicle and position – High Court held that anticipatory bail was granted without considering gravity of offence and role of accused – Bail cancelled [Paras 12-17]

Criminal Procedure – Section 438 CrPC and Section 483 BNSS – Jurisdiction of Court – Objection raised by accused that the matter was not listed before the correct Bench – Held: Issue of cancellation of bail rightly referred to Court exercising powers under Section 439 CrPC, as anticipatory bail stands exhausted once the accused surrenders and is granted bail – Court competent to adjudicate [Paras 15-16]

Evidentiary Material – Ocular and Electronic Evidence – Case diary revealed multiple eyewitnesses identifying accused in act of abduction, assault, and concealment of body – CCTV footage and post-mortem report corroborate – Affidavit by injured eyewitness recorded under Section 164 CrPC – Role of accused held to be principal and premeditated [Paras 11-13]

Judicial Discretion – Exercise of Bail Jurisdiction – Sessions Court granted anticipatory bail solely on the ground that accused is a government officer – ACJM mechanically followed Sessions order without independent reasoning – Held: Bail orders passed without application of mind and in ignorance of relevant facts are perverse and liable to be set aside [Paras 14, 17]

Court Procedure – Affidavit Irregularity – Affidavit submitted by State was blank in material parts and still affirmed by Commissioner – Court imposed cost of ₹10,000 on Oath Commissioner for gross negligence – Registrar directed to recover the same [Para 18]

Decision: Impugned orders dated 26.11.2025 (Sessions Court) and 29.11.2025 (ACJM) set aside – Bail cancelled – Accused directed to surrender within 72 hours – Cost imposed on Oath Commissioner.

Criminal Law – Compromise after Conviction – Non-Compoundable Offences – Sections 324, 148, 149 IPC – Accused convicted and sentenced to rigorous imprisonment up to two years – During pendency of appeal parties entered into voluntary compromise – Trial Court verified compromise and reported it to be genuine and without coercion – Held: High Court can quash proceedings and set aside conviction in exercise of inherent powers to secure ends of justice even in non-compoundable offences [Paras 4–8, 14–17].

Criminal Procedure – Section 482 CrPC – Scope – Distinction between Compounding and Quashing – Though offences are not compoundable under Section 320 CrPC, inherent jurisdiction of High Court not barred – Power under Section 482 can be exercised to prevent abuse of process and to promote peace and harmony where dispute is predominantly private in nature [Paras 8–12].

Offences against Society – Test of Public Interest – FIR involved offences under Sections 307 and 326 IPC but appellants already acquitted of those charges – Remaining offences under Sections 324/148/149 IPC arose from village dispute – Held: Incident did not affect public peace, moral turpitude or public policy – Continuation of proceedings would serve no fruitful purpose [Paras 7–8, 16].

Settlement – Post-Conviction Stage – Pendency of Appeals – Compromise permissible even after conviction where offence is non-heinous and private in nature – Object of criminal jurisprudence is reformatory and to restore peace – Rejection of compromise may perpetuate hostility [Paras 7, 14–16].

Effect of Death of Accused – Abatement – One appellant (Gurpreet Singh @ Gopi) expired during pendency of appeals – Appeal abated qua deceased accused – Remaining appellants entitled to benefit of compromise [Para 5, 18].

Decision: Appeals by accused allowed – Conviction and sentence set aside – Appellant-convicts acquitted – Appeal filed by State dismissed in view of compromise – Proceedings abated qua deceased accused – Bail bonds discharged – All pending applications closed [Paras 17–18].

Arbitration Law – Section 37 Appeal – Scope of Appellate Interference – Appeal against order setting aside arbitral award under Section 34 A&C Act – Appellate Court’s jurisdiction confined to examining whether Section 34 Court acted within its limited mandate – No reappreciation of evidence permissible – Interference justified only if arbitral award suffers from patent illegality or perversity [Paras 26–31].

Arbitral Award – Patent Illegality – Test for Interference – Domestic arbitral award can be set aside if findings are perverse, irrational, based on no evidence, or ignore vital evidence – Award cannot be interfered with merely because another view is possible – Courts cannot substitute their own view for that of arbitrator [Paras 28–29].

Partnership Dispute – Retirement of Partner – Burden of Proof – Appellant admitted signatures on Retirement Deed dated 19.01.2010 and Form V filed before Registrar of Firms – Case of appellant founded on allegation of signing blank papers – Arbitrator failed to return categorical finding that blank documents were signed and later fabricated – Absence of such finding fatal to appellant’s claim [Paras 33–37].

Evidence – Signed Documents – Allegation of Fabrication – Retirement Deed executed on stamped paper purchased on same date – Form V being pre-printed statutory form – No finding of manipulation, fabrication, fraud or printing after signatures – Arbitrator misdirected himself by relying on extraneous circumstances instead of deciding core issue [Paras 36–37].

Partnership Deed – Clause on Determination – Misinterpretation by Arbitrator – Clause requiring three months’ notice applicable to dissolution of partnership at will – Not applicable to consensual retirement of partner through Retirement Deed – Arbitrator’s finding treating notice as mandatory for retirement held erroneous and contrary to contract [Paras 49–50].

Arbitration – Reappreciation of Evidence – Limits – Learned Single Judge correctly held that arbitrator ignored admitted documents and proceeded on conjectures – Arbitrator’s approach found patently illegal and perverse – Setting aside of award under Section 34 upheld [Paras 36–38].

Decision: Appeal dismissed – Impugned order dated 20.05.2022 setting aside arbitral award sustained – No patent illegality in Section 34 order – No order as to costs.

Criminal Law – Appeal against Acquittal – Scope of Interference – State challenged acquittal of respondents for offences under Sections 323/427/308/506/34 IPC – High Court reiterated that interference with acquittal is permissible only when findings are perverse or manifestly illegal – Trial Court’s view found to be a plausible view based on evidence – Held: No ground made out to interfere with acquittal [Paras 20, 52, 60–61].

Criminal Trial – Identity of Accused – Doubtful Identification – Incident occurred at night and complainant and eye-witness were under the influence of alcohol – Names of assailants not known immediately and disclosed only subsequently on suggestion of third person – DD entry recorded assault by 4–5 persons whereas FIR named only two accused – Serious doubt regarding identity of assailants – Benefit of doubt rightly extended to accused [Paras 41–52].

Evidence – Testimony of Injured and Eye-witness – Contradictions and Inconsistencies – PW-3 and PW-4 gave inconsistent versions regarding arrest of accused, preparation of documents, and presence at spot – Arrest memos did not bear signatures of eye-witnesses – Site plan not signed by complainant – Prosecution version rendered unreliable on material particulars [Paras 30, 53–55].

Investigation – Non-Examination of Material Witnesses – PCR officials were first to reach the spot and allegedly apprehended one accused – PCR officials neither cited nor examined as prosecution witnesses – Failure to examine best available witnesses caused serious dent in prosecution case [Paras 39–40].

Medical Evidence – MLC – Limited Corroborative Value – MLC recorded history of “assault” without naming assailants or specifying number of attackers – Smell of alcohol noted on injured – Medical evidence did not corroborate prosecution case regarding identity of accused [Paras 47–48, 54].

Recovery of Weapon – Doubtful Seizure – Injured claimed to have kept alleged weapons of offence and handed them over to police next day – No seizure effected from spot despite immediate police presence – Recovery found unnatural and suspicious – Use of alleged weapons not proved beyond reasonable doubt [Paras 56–57].

Investigation Lapses – Seizure and Removal of Vehicle – Damaged vehicle removed from spot without any contemporaneous record – IO unable to explain who drove vehicle to police station or how it was secured – Absence of evidence regarding removal and seizure weakened prosecution case [Paras 58–59].

Effect of Death of Co-Accused – Abatement – During pendency of appeal, Respondent No.1 died – Appeal survived only against Respondent No.2 – Acquittal of surviving respondent upheld on merits [Paras 32–33].

Decision: Leave to Appeal granted – Criminal Appeal dismissed – Judgment of acquittal dated 15.12.2016 upheld – No perversity or illegality found in appreciation of evidence by Trial Court – Appeal dismissed.

Mortgage – Redemption – Registered Mortgage Deed – Validity – Signature of Mortgagee – Section 59, Transfer of Property Act – Registered mortgage deed dated 11.11.1971 executed by mortgagors was discarded by courts below solely on ground that it was not signed by mortgagee – Held, Section 59 mandates signature only of mortgagor and attestation by two witnesses – No requirement in law for mortgagee’s signature – Registered mortgage deed carries statutory presumption of validity – Findings of courts below held contrary to law and perverse [Paras 29–31, 36–39].

Property Law – Mortgage and Redemption – Concurrent findings reversed in Second Appeal – Suit for possession by way of redemption initially dismissed by both Trial and First Appellate Courts – Courts below held that Mortgage Deed (Ex. P-1) was not proved as it was not signed by the mortgagee Karam Chand – Further held that defendant no.2 was inducted as tenant by Ishwar Dayal (mortgagor), not by mortgagee – Held: Findings of Courts below based on misreading of law and evidence – Mortgage Deed is valid under Section 59 of Transfer of Property Act even without mortgagee's signature – Execution proved by mortgagors and attesting witnesses – Rent Note (Ex. P-2) signed by tenant Ram Chander and proved by attesting witness – Defendant no.2 admitted tenancy under mortgagee in earlier proceedings – Courts below ignored presumption of truth attached to registered documents under Sections 68 and 90 of Evidence Act – Appeal allowed – Plaintiffs entitled to possession upon redemption [Paras 6, 26-27, 28-31, 32-39, 40-42, 43-46, 47, 49-51, 52-56, 60].

Documentary Evidence – Mortgage Deed – Validity of Unilateral Execution – Mortgage Deed Ex. P-1 disbelieved by Courts below for lacking mortgagee’s signature – Held: Under Section 59 of Transfer of Property Act, signature of mortgagee not required – Deed was registered, signed by mortgagors, attested by two witnesses – Legal presumption attached to registered documents – Also supported by Supreme Court judgments in Tarachand v. Sagarbai, Rattan Singh v. Nirmal Gill, Ishwar Dass Jain v. Sohan Lal – Courts below erred in law in discarding the Mortgage Deed [Paras 28-31, 32-34].

Documentary Evidence – Rent Note – Proof and Admissibility – Rent Note (Ex. P-2) rejected by Courts below based on handwriting expert report – Held: Defendant no.2 did not specifically deny signature in written statement, rather admitted signing “not consciously” – Attesting witness and scribe proved execution – Plaintiffs’ application to summon their own expert wrongly rejected – Rent note over 30 years old – Legal presumption under Section 90 of Evidence Act attracted – Rejection of document by lower courts unjustified [Paras 40-42, 43, 56].

Admissions – Statement before Rent Controller – Defendant no.2 tendered rent to mortgagee Mahender Kumar in earlier Rent Act proceedings – Held: This amounts to clear admission of tenancy under mortgagee – No protest or denial of relationship recorded at that time – Courts below ignored binding admission – Reliance placed on Thimmappa Rai v. Ramanna Rai, where earlier admission held relevant and binding [Paras 44-46, 47].

Tenancy – Creation by Mortgagee – Legal Effect Upon Redemption – Defendant no.2 claimed continued tenancy after redemption – Held: Tenancy created by mortgagee comes to end upon redemption unless expressly agreed otherwise – No such clause in mortgage deed – Reliance placed on Thakar Singh v. Mula Singh (2015) 5 SCC 209 – Further supported by All India Film Corporation Ltd. v. Raja Gyan Nath and Jadavji Purshottam v. Dhami Navnitbhai – Courts below erred in holding tenancy survived redemption – Proper remedy, if any, lies under Rent Act but not applicable here [Paras 57-59].

Presumption – Registered and Old Documents – Mortgage Deed and Rent Note were registered and over 30 years old at time of tendering – Held: Section 90 of Evidence Act presumes authenticity of documents 30 years old – Section 68 also presumes due execution of registered document unless specifically denied – Courts below failed to apply these legal presumptions properly – Findings reversed [Paras 36-39].

Witness Credibility – Testimony of DW3 and DW4 – Courts below relied on deposition of neighbours to hold that defendant no.2 was inducted by Ishwar Dayal – Held: DW3 and DW4 gave vague, inconclusive statements – Neither witnessed induction nor offered reliable timeline – Courts misread depositions to arrive at erroneous conclusion – Findings based on misappreciation of evidence [Paras 53-55].

Decision: Appeal allowed – Judgments and decrees of Trial Court and First Appellate Court set aside – Suit of plaintiffs decreed – Plaintiffs entitled to possession of suit shop on redemption upon payment of Rs. 2,000/- to defendant no.1 – Pending applications disposed of [Para 60].