Executing Deed Claiming Disputed Property Not 'False Document' Without Impersonation; Civil Disputes Can't Be Criminalised: Allahabad High Court

"When a document is executed by a person claiming a property which is not his, he is not claiming that he is someone else nor is he claiming that he is authorised by someone else. Therefore, execution of such document (purporting to convey some property of which he is not the owner) is not execution of a false document as defined under Section 464 of the Code." Allahabad High Court, in a significant ruling dated October 13, 2026, held that the mere execution of a deed or the setting up of a trust in respect of a disputed property does not constitute the offence of forgery under Sections 463, 464, and 467 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (IPC), unless the document is created by impersonation or false representation of authority.

Allowing a petition under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (CrPC), Justice Sandeep Jain observed that executing a document asserting rights over property does not amount to making a false document, cautioning that "the criminal process cannot be utilised for any oblique purpose" to settle ongoing civil title disputes.

The dispute arose after the complainant purchased a portion of house premises situated in Varanasi through a registered sale deed in 2014, following a compromise decree entered in a 2003 partition suit among family members. The complainant subsequently lodged an FIR alleging that the applicant, who remained in physical possession of the property, had fraudulently constituted and registered a trust deed in 2009 by designating the disputed house as the trust's registered office to obstruct delivery of possession. Following a reinvestigation, the police filed a charge-sheet against the applicant under Sections 419, 420, 467, 468, and 471 of the IPC, which was challenged before the High Court.

The primary question before the court was whether the execution of a registered trust deed describing the disputed property as its office, despite contested ownership, constitutes the making of a "false document" under Section 464 IPC to attract forgery charges. The bench was also called upon to determine whether criminal proceedings under Sections 419, 420, 467, 468, and 471 IPC can be sustained when the core grievance arises from an ongoing civil suit regarding title and possession.

Scope Of 'False Document' Under Section 464 IPC

Examining the statutory definitions of forgery, the court observed that to sustain a prosecution under Section 467 or Section 471 IPC, the foundational requirement of making a "false document" under Section 464 IPC must be satisfied. Relying on the Supreme Court's ruling in Sheila Sebastian v. R. Jawaharaj, the bench reiterated that an offence of forgery cannot lie against a person who has neither fabricated an instrument nor created it by claiming to be someone else.

The court extensively cited the landmark decision in Mohd. Ibrahim v. State of Bihar, underscoring the distinction between a person who executes a deed asserting ownership over a property that does not belong to them, and an executant who impersonates the rightful owner or falsely claims authority on the owner's behalf.

"There is a fundamental difference between a person executing a sale deed claiming that the property conveyed is his property, and a person executing a sale deed by impersonating the owner or falsely claiming to be authorised or empowered by the owner, to execute the deed on owner's behalf."

No Forgery Without Impersonation Or Deceptive Alteration

Applying the principles from Mir Nagvi Askari v. CBI, the bench noted that a document can be termed false only if it is falsified with the intention of causing it to be believed that it was made by or under the authority of another person, or if it is altered after execution, or executed by someone lacking mental capacity. The court noted that when an executant signs in their own name asserting a disputed claim, no false document comes into existence within the meaning of penal law.

"If what is executed is not a false document, there is no forgery. If there is no forgery, then neither Section 467 nor Section 471 of the Code are attracted."

Absence Of Cheating And Dishonest Inducement Under Section 420 IPC

Turning to the allegations of cheating under Sections 415 and 420 IPC, the court referred to the Supreme Court's decisions in Vishal Noble Singh v. State of U.P. and Mariam Fasihuddin v. State By Adugodi Police Station. The bench held that to establish cheating, the prosecution must show that the accused harboured a fraudulent or dishonest intention from the very inception of the transaction, resulting in dishonest inducement of property delivery.

The court noted that mere execution of the trust deed did not involve any inducement or deception practiced upon the complainant, who had acquired his purported title five years subsequent to the execution of the trust deed.

"For the offence of cheating, fraudulent and dishonest intention must exist from the inception when the promise or representation was made."

Merely Locating Trust Office Does Not Divest Ownership

Scrutinising the contents of the registered trust deed of 'Jagriti Trust', the bench found that the deed merely recited the disputed property address as the registered office and contemplated receiving future donations. The court remarked that the trust deed nowhere declared that the applicant was the absolute owner of the premises, nor did it extinguish or divest the rights of the contesting co-owners.

The court observed that because the applicant was already in physical possession of the property and claimed rights under an oral agreement to sell, the mere operation of an office from the premises could not be deemed a criminal offence.

"Prima-facie, the trust deed does not create any right title and interest in the disputed property in favour of the accused applicant, hence it cannot be presumed that by the execution of the above trust deed, the contesting private respondents have been divested of their ownership rights in the disputed property."

Criminal Law Cannot Be Used As Lever In Civil Disputes

The court highlighted that an original civil suit between the parties concerning title and specific performance is already pending adjudication before the competent civil court. Invoking Madhavrao Jiwajirao Scindia v. Sambhajirao Chandrojirao Angre and State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal, the bench reiterated that criminal proceedings cannot be weaponised to resolve disputes that are purely civil and commercial in nature.

The bench stressed that courts must actively curb the misuse of criminal machinery by litigants attempting to exert undue pressure in property battles where chances of ultimate conviction are bleak.

"The court must ensure that criminal prosecution is not used as an instrument of harassment or for seeking private vendetta or with an ulterior motive to pressurize the accused."

Allowing the Section 482 CrPC petition, the High Court quashed the charge-sheet, the cognizance order, and all consequential proceedings pending against the applicant before the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Varanasi. The bench clarified that the trial court seized of the pending original title suit shall adjudicate the property rights strictly on its own merits, completely uninfluenced by the observations made in this judgment.

Date of Decision: 13 October 2026