Habeas Corpus – Child Custody – Jurisdiction of Writ Court – The Calcutta High Court dealt with a habeas corpus petition filed by the father seeking custody of his two minor children from the mother. The petition alleged that the mother had wrongfully removed the children from Kolkata to Bhopal and was unlawfully detaining them. The Court noted that the paramount consideration in such matters is the welfare of the children, and that habeas corpus is an extraordinary remedy only available in exceptional circumstances where the detention is illegal, and ordinary legal remedies are unavailable or ineffective. The Court declined to grant the relief sought, instead relegating the parties to the pending proceedings under the Guardians and Wards Act, 1890 and the Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act, 1956, which were transferred to the Principal Judge in Nagpur, Maharashtra by the Supreme Court. [Paras 1-23, 36-39]

Maintainability – Writ of Habeas Corpus in Custody Matters – The High Court held that a writ of habeas corpus in child custody cases is maintainable only if it is established that the child is unlawfully detained. The Court emphasized that it would not entertain a writ petition if detailed inquiry was required, which would be better suited for civil courts. In this case, no special circumstances were found that would justify intervention by the writ court. [Paras 18-22, 34-35]

Decision – Dismissal of Petition – Held – The writ petition was dismissed, and the parties were directed to continue the proceedings in the civil court. The Court vacated all interim orders and clarified that it had not decided on the merits of the custody dispute, leaving all issues open for determination by the civil court. [Paras 39-41]

Criminal Law – Abetment of Suicide – Quashing of FIR – Petitioners accused of abetting the suicide of the complainant's brother by refusing to repay money owed for construction work – FIR quashed – Court held that the mere non-payment of dues, without any positive act of instigation, does not constitute abetment under Section 306 IPC – Emphasized that there must be a proximate and live link between the accused's conduct and the deceased's suicide – Petitioners' conduct did not amount to instigation or aiding the suicide – FIR and subsequent proceedings quashed [Paras 14-19].

Test for Quashing – Court applied the test of an ordinary person’s reaction to harassment – Concluded that a person of ordinary prudence would not be driven to suicide in similar circumstances – Suicide attributed to the deceased's hypersensitive nature rather than the petitioners' conduct [Paras 15-17].

Decision: FIR No. 357 dated 15.07.2023, registered under Sections 306 and 34 IPC, and all subsequent proceedings arising therefrom, quashed.

Limitation Act Applicability – Section 31 of the State Financial Corporation Act – The appellant argued that the Limitation Act does not apply to enforcement against the surety under Section 31 of the State Financial Corporation Act, 1951 – Held: The court rejected this argument, stating that unless there is an express provision excluding the Limitation Act, it is applicable – The application under Section 31 is not a suit but a claim application, and Article 137 of the Limitation Act applies, which prescribes a three-year period – The appellant’s contention that Article 112 applied was also rejected, as the proceedings under Section 31 are not considered a suit [Paras 8-12].

Commencement of Limitation – Right to Sue and Enforcement Against Surety – The appellant sought to enforce the guarantee after selling the mortgaged property of the principal borrower – Held: The right to claim from the surety arises after the assets are sold, as per Article 55 of the Limitation Act – In this case, the sale occurred on 11.08.2003, and the application was filed on 07.12.2009, making it barred by limitation – The court referred to precedents, including Deepak Bhandari v. H.P. State Industrial Development Corpn. Ltd., and H.P. Financial Corpn. v. Pawna, to establish the three-year period [Paras 10, 13].

Provisions of the Limitation Act – Articles 136, 137, and 55 – The court analyzed the applicability of different articles of the Limitation Act – It concluded that Article 136, which applies to the execution of decrees, was not applicable to proceedings under Section 31, as established in Maharashtra State Financial Corpn. v. Ashok K. Agarwal – Article 137, which provides a three-year limitation period from the date the right to apply accrues, was applicable – The right to sue on a contract of indemnity arose after the sale of assets, making the claim barred [Paras 11-12].

Delay in Filing – Laches and Vigilance – The court found that the appellant corporation failed to act promptly and was not vigilant in enforcing its rights – The corporation took possession in 1996 but filed the application only in 2009, after several unsuccessful auction attempts – The court applied the principle “vigilantibus et non dormientibus jura subveniunt” (the law assists those who are vigilant with their rights and not those who sleep on them) to deny the appeal [Paras 13-14].

Decision – Appeal Dismissed – The court dismissed the appeal, upholding the trial court’s decision that the claim under Section 31 was barred by limitation – It held that the appellant corporation's application was filed beyond the permissible period under Articles 55 and 137 of the Limitation Act [Paras 15-16].

Criminal Law – Petition under Section 482 Cr.P.C. for quashing of defamation charges – Accusations against the petitioners (including the Chief Minister of Delhi) for imputing that BJP had orchestrated deletion of voter names from specific communities – The High Court examined the validity of summoning orders issued by the Magistrate and upheld by the Sessions Court – Court found that the statements made by the petitioners were prima facie defamatory, targeting a determinable and identifiable group (BJP and its Delhi Pradesh unit) – Court emphasized that political parties are identifiable entities under law, capable of being defamed – Held that the allegations against BJP were made without factual basis, potentially swaying public opinion, and harming BJP's reputation – The petition under Section 482 Cr.P.C. was dismissed. [Paras 14-33].

Defamation Law – Evaluation of Evidence for Defamation – The Court held that even though the initial evidence was derived from newspaper reports and video clippings (generally considered hearsay), it was supported by certificates under Section 65B of the Indian Evidence Act, making it admissible – Summoning orders were based on sufficient prima facie evidence, and the absence of witness testimony at the pre-summoning stage did not invalidate the summoning order – The scope of inquiry under Sections 202 and 204 Cr.P.C. was limited to determining if there was sufficient ground to proceed, not to ascertain the truth of the allegations conclusively – Reliance was placed on precedents that allowed the continuation of defamation proceedings even when initial evidence was not fully established at the pre-summoning stage – Petition dismissed. [Paras 23-26].

Decision – Dismissal of Petition – Held – The High Court dismissed the petition, confirming the maintainability of defamation charges against the petitioners – The Court found that the tweets and public statements made by the petitioners were defamatory, particularly as they accused BJP of engaging in unethical practices without factual support – The petitioners' defense that their statements were made in good faith and for public good was reserved for trial – The Court emphasized that reputation, particularly of political entities, is protected under law, and defamatory imputations without factual basis cannot be shielded under the guise of free speech – The Court directed the continuation of proceedings before the Trial Court. [Paras 32-42].

Wills – Conflicting Wills – Validity and Proof – The appeal dealt with the validity of two wills executed by Bangaru Viswanadham. The plaintiffs supported the will dated March 17, 1994, which was registered, while the defendants supported an unregistered will dated April 25, 1994. The court held that the will dated March 17, 1994, was validly executed in accordance with the law. The defendants failed to prove the genuineness of the will dated April 25, 1994, due to suspicious circumstances, lack of corroboration, and non-compliance with Section 68 of the Indian Evidence Act.

Additional Evidence – Admissibility – Appellate Stage – The appellants filed an application under Section 151 CPC to admit additional evidence at the appellate stage. The court dismissed the application, stating that the correct procedure under Order XLI Rule 27 of CPC was not followed. The evidence sought was not newly discovered and could have been presented during the trial with due diligence. The court emphasized that inadmissible photocopies cannot be accepted as additional evidence.

Civil Procedure – Fraud and Undue Influence – Burden of Proof – The court reiterated that the burden of proving fraud and undue influence lies on the party alleging it. The defendants, who claimed that the plaintiffs obtained the will dated March 17, 1994, through fraud, failed to substantiate their allegations with concrete evidence. Mere allegations without proof do not invalidate a duly executed and registered will.

Decision:

Appeal dismissed. The court upheld the trial court’s decree and judgment, affirming the validity of the will dated March 17, 1994. The application for additional evidence was rejected due to procedural and substantive shortcomings.

Criminal Law – Quashing of FIR under Sections 498A, 406, 420, 506(2), 114 IPC and Sections 3, 7 of the Dowry Prohibition Act – High Court quashed the FIR and all consequential proceedings against the accused (father-in-law and mother-in-law) under Section 482 CrPC – The complainant filed a case alleging harassment after marriage, but the Court found the allegations to be general and unsubstantiated – The Court held that the complainants had falsely implicated the applicants in order to pressure the family into a settlement – Court observed the applicants, aged 90 and 80, had no involvement in the alleged offences [Paras 1-7, 17].

Abuse of Process – Court found that the FIR was an abuse of the legal process, aimed at harassment rather than the pursuit of justice – Referring to multiple precedents, including Preeti Gupta v. State of Jharkhand and Geeta Mehrotra v. State of Uttar Pradesh, the Court emphasized caution in matrimonial disputes, especially when extended family members are implicated without specific evidence – It was noted that the marriage had dissolved via divorce, and there was no substantial proof of harassment against the in-laws [Paras 6-7, 13].

Decision – FIR Quashed – Held – The application under Section 482 CrPC was allowed – The Court quashed the FIR and all subsequent proceedings against the petitioners, ruling that their implication in the case was motivated by personal grievances rather than actual evidence of wrongdoing [Paras 15-17].

Civil Law - Public Premises – Eviction of Tenant – Petition under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution – Petitioner challenged the eviction orders, claiming tenancy rights over land owned by the Municipal Committee, Mahendergarh, since 1963-64, and argued that eviction based on non-payment of rent was unjustified as he was willing to pay the arrears. The Court dismissed the petition, holding that no registered lease existed in favor of the petitioner, and his tenancy could be terminated without formal notice under the Public Premises Act – Petitioner’s long-standing possession at a meager rent of ₹150 per year, without payment of arrears, deemed insufficient to challenge the eviction. The Municipal Committee’s right to initiate eviction proceedings was upheld [Paras 1-11].

Termination of Tenancy – Public Premises Act Prevailing over Rent Act – The Court reaffirmed that under the Public Premises Act, tenancy could be terminated without prior notice, and mere filing of eviction proceedings sufficed as notice to quit. The petitioner's plea of being a lawful tenant was rejected, with the Court emphasizing that continued possession at such low rent for decades was prejudicial to the Municipal Committee’s right to recover prevalent market rent [Paras 6-10].

Decision: Petition dismissed – Eviction order upheld – No interference by the Court in the impugned orders, with the Municipal Committee entitled to recover possession and collect prevalent rent from the property.

Income Tax – Final Assessment Order – Draft Assessment Order Requirement – Petitioner contended that the final assessment order passed by the Assessing Officer (AO) was invalid as it was not preceded by a draft assessment order, violating Section 144C of the Income Tax Act, 1961 – Court held that the failure to issue a draft assessment order during remand proceedings as mandated by Section 144C rendered the final assessment order invalid – Assessment and demand notices quashed [Paras 1-6, 14].

Jurisdictional Error – Procedural Compliance – Court emphasized the mandatory nature of the procedural requirement under Section 144C, underscoring that any final assessment order passed without adherence to this process, particularly in remand cases, is legally untenable [Paras 4-5, 51-52].

Procedure under Section 144C – Scope of "In the First Instance" – The respondents argued that the expression "in the first instance" in Section 144C obviates the need for a draft assessment order upon remand – The Court rejected this argument, affirming that the draft order requirement is mandatory regardless of whether the proceedings are initiated anew due to remand by the Tribunal [Paras 14-16, 19-23].

Comparative Analysis – Section 144B vs. Section 144C – The Court found that Section 144C establishes a distinct and comprehensive assessment regime for eligible assessees, which differs fundamentally from the earlier Section 144B. Section 144C involves multiple levels of review and corrective mechanisms that are not merely procedural but essential to ensuring a fair assessment process [Paras 36-45].

Limitation and Remand – Statutory Period – The Court rejected the respondents' contention that the assessment could be remanded for fresh proceedings despite the lapse of the statutory period under Section 153. The Court held that extending the limitation period or condoning the delay in such cases would be impermissible [Paras 54-60].

Decision:
Writ Petition allowed. The impugned final assessment orders and consequent demand and penalty notices were quashed due to non-compliance with Section 144C. The petitioners were entitled to all consequential reliefs.
 

Criminal Procedure – Quashing of Criminal Proceedings – Petition under Section 482 CrPC seeking quashing of a complaint filed by the Drug Inspector against the directors of Tidal Laboratories Private Ltd. for manufacturing drugs of substandard quality – Held that for criminal proceedings to continue against directors, the company must also be arraigned as an accused – Prosecution without impleading the company is unsustainable – Complaint quashed [Paras 1-50].

Directors' Liability – Drugs and Cosmetics Act – No allegations in the complaint that the petitioners, as directors, were in charge of the day-to-day affairs of the company – Impleadment of the company is mandatory for prosecution of its directors – Mere appointment as directors without specific involvement in the offence does not attract criminal liability under Section 18(a)(i) of the Drugs and Cosmetics Act [Paras 35-40].

Inherent Powers of High Court – Exercise of inherent powers under Section 482 CrPC justified to prevent abuse of process where the complaint does not disclose any material connecting the accused to the offence – Continuation of trial against the directors without arraigning the company would be an abuse of process of law [Paras 20-30].

Decision: Petition allowed – Complaint and order issuing process quashed – Petitioners acquitted of all charges.