Murder — Dying Declaration — Conviction Affirmed — Appellant convicted under Section 302 IPC by the First Additional Sessions Judge, Dabra, for setting his wife Priya Dhanuk on fire by pouring kerosene oil on her on 04.12.2013 — Deceased died on 09.12.2013 due to 90% burn injuries — Prosecution relied upon two dying declarations (Ex. P.18C recorded by Dr. Vikrant Singh, PW-15, and Ex. P.11 recorded by Tahsildar Sharda Pathak, PW-8) — Both declarations consistent and identical in implicating the appellant — Parents of the deceased (PW-1 and PW-2) and other witnesses turned hostile — Trial court sentenced appellant to life imprisonment with fine of ₹500 — Held: Prosecution proved guilt beyond reasonable doubt; conviction and sentence affirmed [Paras 2, 6, 54, 58, 60].

Dying Declaration — Admissibility and Reliability — Sole Basis for Conviction — Law Restated — A dying declaration, if found voluntary, truthful and coherent, can form the sole basis for conviction without corroboration — Requirement of doctor's fitness certificate is a rule of caution and not a mandatory condition; satisfaction of the person recording the declaration as to the mental fitness of the declarant is sufficient — Percentage of burn injuries alone is not determinative of credibility; what matters is the degree of burns and whether the declarant's mental faculties remained intact — Both dying declarations in the present case recorded by independent witnesses (doctor and Tahsildar) with medical fitness certificates; no suggestion of tutoring; not challenged effectively in cross-examination — Held: Both dying declarations reliable and trustworthy [Paras 14–33, 37].

Dying Declaration — 90% Burn Injuries — No Bar to Making Statement — Degree vs. Extent of Burns — Relying upon Modi's Medical Jurisprudence, it is clarified that it is the degree of burns (first to sixth degree) and not the mere extent of surface area affected that determines the impact on a patient's state of mind — A person suffering 90%–100% burn injuries is not necessarily reduced to a state of unconsciousness — Held: Deceased was in a fit state of mind to make the declarations and mere extent of burns does not invalidate the same [Para 17].

Accidental Death — Defence Rejected — Kerosene Stove Burst Theory — Appellant contended that the deceased died due to accidental bursting of a kerosene stove — Spot map (Ex. P.5) showed no kerosene oil on floor or walls and burnt pieces of saree and blouse found near bedroom bed; stove found outside kitchen while pump and washer found inside kitchen — FSL report showed no smell of kerosene oil on pump and washer of the stove — Held: Theory of stove bursting not supported by any circumstance found on spot; defence is false and rejected [Paras 34–35, 50].

Conduct of Accused — Abscondence — Post-Incident Conduct — Absence of Injuries — Injured wife taken to hospital by her Jeth (Virendra Dhanuk, DW-2) and not by the appellant/husband — Arrest memo (Ex. P.20) showed no burn injuries on appellant's body — Appellant failed to explain how his wife suffered burn injuries, a fact within his special knowledge under Section 106 of the Evidence Act — Held: Post-incident conduct of the appellant, though not conclusive standing alone, forms an important link in the chain of circumstantial evidence establishing guilt [Paras 44–49].

Section 313 Cr.P.C. — Incriminating Circumstances — FSL Report — No Prejudice — Abscondence Not Put to Accused — The FSL report was not put to the appellant in his statement under Section 313 Cr.P.C. and no copy was shown to have been supplied; accordingly, the FSL report excluded from consideration — However, the omission to put the circumstance of abscondence to the appellant under Section 313 Cr.P.C. does not vitiate the trial, as the appellant himself raised the plea of alibi and was not caused any prejudice — Held: Omissions under Section 313 Cr.P.C. will not vitiate trial unless prejudice resulting in miscarriage of justice is established [Paras 47–51].

Section 302 IPC — Culpable Homicide — Contention Rejected — Appellant's contention that his act at most constituted culpable homicide not amounting to murder rejected — The act of pouring kerosene oil over his wife and setting her ablaze, coupled with making no attempt to save her and absconding, demonstrates clear intention and knowledge that death would result — Held: Act falls squarely within the definition of murder under Section 302 IPC; conversion to lesser offence not warranted [Paras 55–57].

Decision: Appeal dismissed — Conviction under Section 302 IPC and sentence of life imprisonment with fine of ₹500 affirmed — Appellant to undergo remaining sentence.

Negotiable Instruments Act – Section 138 – Dismissal in Default – Singular Default – Complaint dismissed in default by ACJM, Shimla on 08.04.2025 for non-appearance of complainant and her counsel — Appellant-complainant submitted unavoidable circumstances prevented appearance and counsel was expected to seek adjournment — Matter repeatedly called throughout the day but neither complainant nor counsel appeared — Held: Trial court ought not to have straightway dismissed complaint; a single default in appearance does not justify dismissal with its serious consequence of acquittal — Appeal allowed; complaint restored [Paras 4, 11–13].

"Section 279 BNSS — Discretion Must be Exercised Judicially" – Section 279 of BNSS (erstwhile Section 256 CrPC) confers discretion on Magistrate to either acquit accused or adjourn the matter — Magistrate may also dispense with personal attendance where complainant is represented by advocate — Dismissal and consequent acquittal under Section 279 BNSS becomes final in view of Section 403 BNSS which bars courts from altering signed judgments — Held: Power under Section 279 BNSS must be exercised judicially and fairly; court could have issued fresh notice, adjourned, or proceeded on the basis of evidence already on record [Paras 5–6, 11].

"One Default Not Enough — Complainant's Track Record Relevant" – No prior default in prosecution of complaint shown on record — Held: Where complainant has no history of default, a single absence does not justify axing the complaint; court should adjourn to do substantial justice — Ratio of Associated Cement Co. Ltd., Mohd. Azeem, S. Anand and N.K. Sharma applied [Paras 7–11].

Decision: Appeal allowed — Order dated 08.04.2025 quashed and set aside — Criminal Complaint No.1351/2023 restored to its original number — Trial court directed to proceed from the stage at which complaint was dismissed — Parties directed to appear before trial court on 06.05.2026.

Criminal Law - Double Murder and Attempt to Murder - Indian Penal Code 1860 - Sections 302, 307, 452 and 120B - Appellants Dalchand and Padam Singh were convicted for the murder of two persons and causing gunshot injuries to three others at their residence - Incident occurred in broad daylight due to prior enmity - Appellants challenged conviction on grounds of delay in FIR registration - non-recording of Section 161 CrPC statements promptly - misidentification of appellant Padam Singh - and lack of weapon recovery - High Court observed that delay in FIR was justified as the family was prioritizing medical treatment for five critically injured members across different cities - Delay in recording statements was explained by the transfer of investigation to the CBI - Identification was established as Padam Singh was known by the alias mentioned in the FIR and acknowledged the same in court - Held - Conviction of appellants is sustainable - Sentence modified from alternative conviction to joint liability under Sections 302/34 and 302/120B IPC - [Paras 1-22].

Criminal Law - Appeal against Acquittal - Code of Criminal Procedure 1973 - Section 378(3) - Principles of interference - Victim challenged the acquittal of two female co-accused allegedly involved in inflicting lathi blows - Trial Court found no medical corroboration for lathi-related injuries on the specified victims - Witnesses made material improvements regarding the presence of the said accused - High Court held that an appellate court can interfere with acquittal only if the trial court's view is not a possible view or suffers from patent perversity - Presumption of innocence is strengthened by acquittal - Held - No perversity found in the trial court's findings - Acquittal upheld - [Paras 23-28].

Criminal Law - Enhancement of Sentence - Code of Criminal Procedure 1973 - Sections 372 and 377 - Maintainability of victim's appeal for enhancement - Victim preferred appeal seeking enhancement of life imprisonment to death penalty - High Court examined the proviso to Section 372 and compared it with Section 377 - Victim's right to appeal is restricted to acquittal - conviction for lesser offence - or inadequate compensation - Right to appeal for enhancement of sentence on the ground of inadequacy is exclusively conferred upon the State Government under Section 377 - Held - Appeal for enhancement of sentence at the instance of a victim is not maintainable - [Paras 29-33].

Criminal Law - Suo Motu Revision - Code of Criminal Procedure 1973 - Section 401 - Enhancement of sentence - Although victim's appeal for enhancement was not maintainable - High Court considered exercising suo-motu revisional jurisdiction - Power to enhance sentence should be exercised only in the rarest of rare cases where punishment shakes the conscience of the court - Court noted that double murder alone is not the sole criteria for capital punishment - Mitigating circumstances included 16-year duration since incident - satisfactory jail conduct - and absence of proof regarding lack of reformative tendencies - Held - Not a fit case for enhancement to death penalty - [Paras 33-35].

Decision: Appeal No. 397/2018 dismissed with modification of conviction sections – Appeal No. 450/2018 dismissed – Appeal No. 330/2023 dismissed as not maintainable.

Criminal Law – Murder – Acquittal – Section 302 IPC – Appellant convicted by the Trial Court for allegedly pouring kerosene oil on the deceased and pushing her onto a burning stove, causing 90% burns from which she died the following morning – Conviction based on two dying declarations and circumstantial evidence, as all three purported eye witnesses turned hostile – High Court finds dying declarations unreliable, mutually contradictory and not corroborated by circumstantial evidence – Held: Prosecution failed to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt; appellant entitled to benefit of doubt – Conviction and sentence set aside; appellant acquitted [Paras 39, 54, 59].

Dying Declaration – Reliability – MLC Entry as Dying Declaration – First purported dying declaration contained in MLC (Ex.PW-13/A) recorded by PW-13/Dr. Upender Sharma described appellant as "her new lover" – Expression appears to be personal observation of the doctor and not the deceased's own words – Doctor admitted that the word "kerosene" was written on the basis of smell noticed by him and not on account of the deceased uttering it – Word "Informant" appearing misaligned in the MLC raises doubt whether the narration was given by the deceased or by her neighbour PW-2/Nirmala – Absence of deceased's signature or thumb impression further undermines its evidentiary value – Held: Document cannot be regarded as a reliable dying declaration [Paras 44, 45].

Dying Declaration – Second Declaration – Procedural Infirmities – Second dying declaration (Ex.PW-15/C) recorded by Investigating Officer PW-15/S.I. Vijay Singh contained unusually detailed particulars including precise parentage and address of appellant, rendering it inherently improbable for a person with 90% burns – No cogent evidence of deceased being in fit condition to make the statement; certificate of medical fitness not proved; SDM or doctor not involved during recording – Held: Veracity of the said statement is highly doubtful [Para 46].

Dying Declaration – Mutual Inconsistency – Three Conflicting Versions – MLC records that appellant poured oil from the stove onto the deceased while she was pouring kerosene; Ex.PW-15/C records that appellant poured kerosene from a can and pushed her towards the burning stove; Brief Facts (Ex.PW-15/DA) recorded by the same Investigating Officer states that deceased fell on the stove during a scuffle and appellant got burnt while trying to save her – Three materially inconsistent versions not only cast doubt on the manner of occurrence but also on the veracity of both dying declarations – Third alleged dying declaration before PW-4/Ran Singh not mentioned in his Section 161 statement and held to be hearsay [Paras 47, 48, 50].

Circumstantial Evidence – Incomplete Chain – Presence of Appellant at Spot Insufficient – Defence of appellant attempting to save the deceased corroborated by burn injuries on his person, Brief Facts recorded by the Investigating Officer, statements of eye witnesses who turned hostile, and defence witnesses – Motive attributed not supported by substantive evidence – Unaccounted matchbox found in sealed pullanda not reflected in seizure memo; liquor bottle not mentioned in site plan; hospital documents from Meerut not traced – Held: Circumstances do not form a complete chain consistent only with guilt of the appellant; mere suspicion cannot substitute proof [Paras 51, 52, 53].

Dying Declaration – Legal Principles Restated – Dying declaration if voluntary, truthful and made in fit state of mind can form sole basis of conviction without corroboration – Court must first satisfy itself that the declaration is reliable and truthful – Where dying declaration suffers from inconsistencies, procedural infirmities and improbabilities, Court must exercise caution – Multiple dying declarations: Court to assess which is believable – Physical and mental fitness of declarant to be established from evidence on record; medical certification aids but is not always indispensable – Recording by Judicial Magistrate adds credence but dying declarations recorded by police are not inadmissible per se – Relied upon: Irfan v. State of Uttar Pradesh; Sanjay Kumar Sharma v. State of Bihar [Paras 41, 42, 55, 56].

Criminal Law – Quashing of Charges – Sections 420, 406 and 120B IPC – Property Sale Dispute – Petitioners Discharged – Complainant entered into agreement dated 04.01.2007 for purchase of flat and adjoining land for Rs. 9.21 lakhs – Paid only Rs. 4,76,000/- within one month against stipulated payment within 8 days – Accused executed sale deed in favour of Dr. Sushila Verma (co-petitioner) on 21.02.2007 – Charges framed by trial court affirmed by Revisional Court – Held: Since complainant failed to perform her part of the agreement, no case of criminal breach of trust or cheating is made out – Remedy available to complainant was civil in nature, which she had already availed by filing a suit for specific performance [Paras 7–10].

Civil Remedy vs. Criminal Proceedings – Concurrent Proceedings – Held: Although there is no absolute bar to institution of criminal proceedings in respect of a dispute for which a civil suit is pending, the present is not a case where both remedies could be availed simultaneously – Where the ingredients of the alleged offences are not made out even on face value of the FIR and complaint, it would be unjust to relegate the petitioners to face trial [Paras 10–11].

Bona Fide Purchaser – Dr. Sushila Verma – Even assuming knowledge of the prior agreement, the sale deed was executed on 21.02.2007, i.e., 47 days after the agreement, and after the stipulated 8-day period for payment had expired – Possession had already been handed over to the complainant, indicating absence of dishonest intention from the outset – Petitioner rightly held to be a bona fide purchaser not liable for criminal prosecution [Para 9].

Inherent Powers of High Court – Section 482 Cr.P.C. – Delay in Proceedings – Petition pending for 15 years – Earlier order of 01.04.2014 recalled on complainant's application – Complainant examined in trial court on 22.01.2025 during pendency – Held: Delay was procedural and systemic, not attributable to petitioners – Subsequent examination of complainant in trial court does not fetter the inherent powers of the High Court or disentitle the petitioners from seeking quashing – Legality of every criminal case must be tested on its own merits [Paras 11–12].

Decision: Both petitions allowed – Orders dated 16.03.2011 (Revisional Court) and 17.09.2010 (framing of charges) set aside – Petitioners discharged of offences under Sections 420, 406 and 120B IPC.

Default Bail – NDPS Act – Computation of 60-Day Remand Period – Indefeasible Right – Petitioner arrested on 02.11.2025 for possession of 4632.80 grams of hydroponic cannabis, remanded on 03.11.2025 – Charge sheet filed on 05.01.2026 (64th day) at 1:00 p.m. – Default bail application filed at 12:30 p.m. on the same date – 60th day fell on 01.01.2026, which was a court holiday – Special Judge dismissed the application condoning delay in filing charge sheet – Held: Right to default bail under Section 187(2) BNSS is indefeasible; filing of charge sheet after expiry of 60-day period does not extinguish the accrued right, particularly where bail application was filed prior to charge sheet – Revision allowed; petitioner directed to be released on bail [Paras 2–3, 6–7, 16–17].

Computation of Remand Period – Date of Remand Included – Holidays Not Excluded – General Clauses Act Inapplicable – Period of 60 days under Section 187(3)(ii) BNSS runs from date of remand, with date of remand included in the count – Provisions of General Clauses Act and Limitation Act have no application to Section 187 BNSS – Last day falling on Sunday or holiday is to be counted as the 60th day itself and not extended to the next working day – Court holidays between 60th and 64th day cannot be excluded from the remand period – Filing of charge sheet on 61st day or later constitutes non-compliance of the mandatory provision [Paras 8(i)–(iv), 9, 13, 15(i)–(iv)].

Charge Sheet – Filing Before Remand/Duty Magistrate Permissible – To avoid non-compliance of the mandatory period, prosecution may file charge sheet before remand/duty magistrate even when Special Court is closed – Oral application for grant of default bail before remand/duty magistrate is sufficient, provided accused is prepared to furnish bail – Merits and demerits of the case are irrelevant while considering default bail; right is absolute and discretion-free [Paras 8(v)–(vii), 11, 15(v)–(vii)].

Criminal Revision – Maintainability – Order on Default Bail Not Interlocutory – Order passed on an application for grant of default bail is not an interlocutory order – Criminal revision against such an order is maintainable – Special Judge criticised for failing to follow settled and binding legal position and for condoning delay on oral prayer of prosecution despite accrual of indefeasible right in favour of accused [Paras 16–17].

Decision: Criminal revision allowed – Impugned order of Special Judge, NDPS, Bhopal set aside – Petitioner Armaan Hussain directed to be released on bail on furnishing bail bond of Rs. 50,000/- with one solvent surety of like amount to the satisfaction of the Trial Court – Conditions under Section 480(3) BNSS imposed.

Excise Law – Liquor Licences – E-Auction – Reservation – Forfeiture of Lapsed Licences – Karnataka Excise (Sale of Indian and Foreign Liquors) (Second Amendment) Rules, 2025 – Respondents, holders of CL-9 licences (bar and restaurant), challenged the amended Rules 5 and 5-A of the Karnataka Excise (Sale of Indian and Foreign Liquor) Rules, 1968 – The impugned amendments introduced e-auction as the mode of grant for CL-2A and CL-9A licences with government-fixed reservation norms, and deemed CL-2, CL-9 and CL-11(C) licences unrenewed as on 03-11-2025 as lapsed and forfeited, to fall into the auction pool – Single Judge stayed the amended Rules 5 and 5-A on a prima facie finding that the reservation-based eligibility and automatic forfeiture travelled beyond the enabling provisions of the Excise Act – On appeal, held: (i) the impugned rules did not exceed rule-making power conferred under Section 71 of the Excise Act, which is wide in scope; (ii) the provision for renewal of licence being a creature of the Rules, the Rules could equally curtail the same; (iii) proviso to Rule 5-A does not effect forfeiture of licence but curtails the right of renewal, which is within the State's competence; (iv) grant of licence through e-auction is not outside the State's domain; (v) adopting the State Government's own reservation policy by reference in the Rules does not constitute impermissible sub-delegation since the delegator and delegate are the same entity; (vi) singling out certain categories of licences does not offend Article 14 as the State is entitled to vary terms and conditions across licence categories; (vii) subordinate legislation carries a presumption of constitutional validity and a strong case of invalidity must be established before its operation is stayed – Appeal allowed – Impugned stay order set aside [Paras 1–77].

Liquor Licence – Nature of Licence – Privilege of State – No Vested Right of Renewal – The manufacture, distribution and sale of intoxicants is an exclusive privilege of the State – No citizen has a fundamental right under Article 19(1)(g) to carry on trade in liquor – A licensee has no indefeasible right of renewal beyond the term of the licence; the right to renewal is governed by the Rules as they exist at the time of renewal and not at the time of grant – Applications filed prior to the amendment of Rules do not confer vested rights to be considered under the pre-amendment Rules – The State's power to grant, refuse, curtail or modify renewal is an incident of its exclusive privilege and is within its rule-making power under Section 71 of the Excise Act [Paras 46–65].

Delegated Legislation – Sub-delegation – Reservation Norms – Principle of Delegatus Non Potest Delegare – The proviso to Rule 5 of the Rules enables the State Government to adopt its own policy as to reservation norms for e-auction licences – This does not constitute impermissible sub-delegation since the delegatee (State Government framing the Rules) and the sub-delegatee (State Government fixing reservation norms) are one and the same – Principle of sub-delegation is inapplicable where the delegator and delegatee are identical – Furthermore, the Excise Act's rule-making power under Section 71 being couched in wide terms, the State Government has ample room to determine terms and conditions of the auction including reservation – Learned Advocate General undertook that reservation norms would be specifically incorporated in the Rules to obviate objection [Paras 53–58].

Subordinate Legislation – Presumption of Constitutional Validity – Courts cannot lightly stay delegated legislation – Tests for striking down executive action do not automatically apply to delegated legislation, which requires proof of manifest arbitrariness – Courts must make every effort to uphold constitutional validity, and if two views are possible, the one favouring validity must be preferred – In the present case, the writ petitioners had not surmounted the presumption of constitutionality; the Single Judge's order disregarded these settled principles and was therefore liable to be set aside [Paras 68–74].

Division Bench Precedent – B. Govindraj Hegde – Misapplication – The impugned order relied on the earlier Division Bench decision in State of Karnataka v. B. Govindraj Hegde, WA 3374/2016, which invalidated a relaxation of minimum room-capacity requirements for reserved-category hotel licences – However, that decision expressly held that reserving a quota of licences for reserved categories would be permissible – The impugned Rules introduce e-auction with reservation of a quota and do not relax any restrictive condition imposed in the public interest – Therefore, the said precedent did not support the petitioners' case [Paras 17–19].

Decision: Appeal allowed – Ad interim stay order dated 25-11-2025 passed by the Single Judge in W.P. No. 35227/2025 set aside – Liberty reserved to parties to advance submissions on the challenge to the proviso to Rule 12 of the Rules before the Single Judge in the pending writ petition.

Civil Law – Rejection of Plaint – Order VII Rule 11 CPC – Scope – Triable Issues – Appeal Allowed – Appellants filed suit in 2022 for partition and declaration of 1/3rd share each in suit property on the basis of an unregistered Will dated 17.02.2002 allegedly executed by deceased father, superseding an earlier registered Will dated 23.05.1997 – Single Judge rejected the plaint under Order VII Rule 11(a) and (d) finding the suit vexatious, devoid of cause of action and barred by limitation – Division Bench holds that the Single Judge committed grave error by drawing adverse inferences based on the 1997 Will and arriving at premature conclusions beyond the scope of Order VII Rule 11 – Plaint raises triable issues requiring adjudication on evidence – Appeal allowed; suit restored [Paras 22–30].

Order VII Rule 11 CPC – Principles – At the stage of Order VII Rule 11, the court must assume the averments in the plaint to be true and cannot embark upon an inquiry into their correctness – Court must examine whether a real cause of action has been set out or whether clever drafting has created an illusion of one – No compartmentalisation, dissection or isolation of passages in the plaint is permissible; the plaint must be read as a whole – Following Popat and Kotecha Property v. State Bank of India Staff Assn., (2005) 7 SCC 510 [Paras 16, 28].

Limitation – Article 58 of the Limitation Act – Fraud – Mixed Question of Law and Facts – Single Judge held the suit barred by limitation as cause of action arose in 2003 upon death of the testator – Division Bench holds that where the plaint specifically pleads lack of knowledge of the earlier Will and fraudulent procurement of Mutation and Conveyance Deed, limitation becomes a mixed question of law and facts requiring evidence – Such question cannot be summarily decided without trial; continuously accruing cause of action also pleaded [Paras 25–29].

Will – Subsequent Will Prevailing Over Earlier Will – Validity of earlier registered Will dated 23.05.1997 becomes immaterial if the later unregistered Will dated 17.02.2002 is held valid, since the latter, being subsequent in time, prevails – Finding of Single Judge that appellants did not dispute the 1997 Will is ex facie contrary to the pleadings in paragraph 32 of the plaint [Paras 23–24].

Cause of Action – Fraud – Knowledge – Where appellants pleaded that they first came to know about the Mutation dated 15.04.2021 and Conveyance Deed dated 26.08.2021 fraudulently obtained by respondent No. 1 on the basis of the 1997 Will only in November 2021 through a local property dealer, the cause of action for the suit is stated to have arisen in 2021 and not in 2003 – This raises a triable issue which cannot be rejected at threshold [Paras 8–9, 26–28].

Decision: Appeal allowed – Impugned judgment and decree dated 02.04.2025 rejecting the plaint set aside – Suit restored to its original number – Parties directed to appear before the learned Single Judge (Roster Bench) on 28.04.2026 – No observations to affect the merits of the case [Paras 30–33].

Environmental Law – Air (Prevention and Control of Pollution) Act – Vicarious Liability of Directors – Summoning Order – Quashing Refused – Applicants/Directors of M/s Simplex Infrastructures Limited were impleaded in complaint filed by U.P. Pollution Control Board for operating construction activities at Panki Thermal Power Plant without obtaining consent under the Air Act — applicants contended they had ceased to be Directors w.e.f. 15.03.2014 and 20.09.2016 respectively, i.e. prior to commencement of project — Board had verified directorship through Ministry of Corporate Affairs website at time of filing complaint in 2021, which showed applicants as Directors — complaint contained specific averments that applicants were in-charge and responsible for day-to-day business — Held: Whether applicants were in-charge at relevant time is a disputed question of fact that cannot be decided in Section 482 proceedings; no illegality or infirmity in summoning order; applications rejected [Paras 5–6, 17–21].

Section 40 of Air Act – Liability of Board of Directors – Collective Responsibility – Obtaining consent under pollution control legislation is not an individual act but a collective function of the Board of Directors — entire Board is responsible for running the unit without consent; it cannot be said that one or two Directors had no knowledge of or connection with non-compliance — Directors are duty-bound to set up treatment plants and obtain consent; deliberate violation renders the entire Board vicariously liable — case of Sunita Palita (pertaining to Sections 138/141 NI Act) held inapplicable to pollution law offences [Paras 12–15, 17–20].

Section 482 CrPC – Scope – No Mini Trial – At the stage of summoning, court is only required to form a prima facie opinion that the case is fit to be committed for trial — defence of cessation of directorship or absence of day-to-day control raises disputed questions of fact that must be decided by the trial court — applicants are at liberty to seek discharge before the trial court — this Court cannot weigh evidence or conduct a mini trial in Section 482 proceedings [Paras 16, 19–20].

Decision: Both applications rejected — Summoning order dated 14.03.2022 upheld — Interim order, if any, vacated.