NDPS Act – Recovery of Poppy Straw – Acquittal – Prosecution story based on secret information received by Investigating Officer PW-17 at Bhugrani Chowk, followed by search of the house of appellant Angrejo Devi, yielding 16 bags of alleged contraband in the presence of both appellants – Trial Court convicted both appellants under Section 15 of the NDPS Act and sentenced them to 10 years rigorous imprisonment with fine of Rs. 1,00,000/- – Earlier acquittal by Division Bench set aside by Supreme Court and matter remanded for fresh consideration in light of State of H.P. v. Nirmal Kaur @ Nimmo, 2022 SCC Online SC 1462 – Held on remand: Despite application of the correct legal standard, prosecution case fails on account of material contradictions and hostile independent witnesses; appellants acquitted [Paras 1–5, 37–38].

Independent Witnesses Turning Hostile – Corroboration of Parallel Story – Both independent witnesses PW-1 Harpal Singh and PW-2 Gulsher denied the prosecution case in its entirety, stating that the police transported material in a vehicle to the flour mill, weighed it there, took them to the police station and thereafter brought them back to the village, where bags were placed in the room and flour mill for the purpose of photography – This parallel story corroborated by prosecution witness PW-16 Gulsher Ahmed (photographer) and PW-9 Ram Swaroop – Though conviction on police testimony alone is permissible, where independent witnesses put forth a credible parallel version corroborated by other prosecution witnesses, the prosecution case becomes doubtful on material particulars [Paras 13–15, 31, 35].

Contradictions in Police Testimony – Mode of Receiving Secret Information – PW-17 stated secret information was received from an informer who approached him at Bhugrani Chowk in person; PW-3 stated information was received on PW-17's personal mobile phone while standing at road diversion; PW-4 stated it was received on mobile while vehicle was moving; PW-5 stated all alighted from vehicle and SHO received information on mobile – These accounts are irreconcilable and go to the genesis of the prosecution story – Further contradiction as to whether authorization letter was handed over loose or in an envelope between PW-5, PW-11 and PW-17 [Paras 16–23].

Integrity of Seized Samples – Chain of Custody Not Established – Samples (Ex. P-1 to P-32) and bags (Ex. P-33 to P-48) were never physically opened or their seals checked during examination of prosecution witnesses at trial – No record by Trial Court of the seals affixed at the time of recovery or by the chemical laboratory – In absence of physical verification, the link connecting the exhibits with the appellants is missing; chemical examiner's report therefore of no assistance to the prosecution [Paras 24, 36].

Consent Memos – Fabrication Doubted – Consent memos obtained from uneducated appellants recorded consent in first person singular, inconsistent with the appellants' stated illiteracy – In Dula Ram's consent memo, the pronoun used was 'she' instead of 'he' – Signatures of Angrejo Devi appear below those of independent witnesses rather than below her consent, suggesting documents were not prepared contemporaneously – PW-17's signatures appear to have been inserted later in Ex. PW-1/B and were absent altogether in Ex. PW-1/C [Paras 25–27].

Decision: Both appeals allowed – Judgment of Special Judge-II, Sirmaur convicting and sentencing appellants under Section 15 of the NDPS Act set aside – Appellants acquitted – Bail bonds, if any, discharged [Para 38].

Service Law — Pay Parity — University Teacher vs. School Teacher — Central University — Visva-Bharati Act, 1951 — Respondent appointed as Assistant Lecturer (redesignated Assistant Professor) in Siksha Satra, a school unit of Visva-Bharati, on 15.06.1989 — Granted pay and benefits at par with University Assistant Professors through successive Pay Commission revisions up to 5th CPC — Upon implementation of 6th CPC w.e.f. 01.01.2006, University denied Academic Grade Pay of Rs.6000/- and Ph.D. increments, seeking to bring respondent under KVS school teacher pay structure pursuant to MHRD memo dated 31.12.2008 and UGC direction under threat of lapse of grant — Held: Differentiation of pay scales for posts having no difference in degree of responsibility is not a valid classification — The distinction between Assistant Professors of school units and University departments is not founded on legitimate basis in the University's own conceptual framework — Denial of Academic Grade Pay arbitrarily altered respondent's vested and accrued teaching status — Single Judge direction to maintain pay as prior to KVS scales upheld [Paras 13–14].

Vested Service Conditions — Contract of Service — Status — Alteration to Disadvantage — Roshan Lal v. Union of India, AIR 1967 SC 1889 applied — A contract of service pertains not only to contract but also to status; conditions of service followed since appointment cannot be altered to the incumbent's disadvantage arbitrarily — University's compelled alteration of status on threat of lapse of UGC grant and without any allegation of fraudulent misrepresentation against the respondent, does not justify denial of benefits — Discretion exercised in favour of respondent by single Judge affirmed — No patent error of law warranting appellate interference [Para 14].

Definition of 'Adhyapaka' — Section 3(c) Visva-Bharati Act, 1951 — The definition includes professor, reader, lecturer and any other person imparting instruction in any learning process — No artificial distinction can be drawn between Assistant Professors in school units and Assistant Professors of the University — The two classes cannot be segregated within the University's own statutory framework [Para 11].

Decision: Appeal dismissed — No order as to costs — Judgment of the single Judge affirmed.

POCSO Act — Age Determination — Proof of Minority — Sections 27 POCSO Act, 164-A CrPC, Section 94 JJ Act, Rule 12 JJ Rules 2007 — Appellant convicted by Special Judge for offences under Section 376(2)(i)(n) and 313 IPC and Section 6 of the POCSO Act — Trial court held victim to be a minor relying on School Admission Register (Ext-4) and School Leaving Certificate (Ext-5) produced by P.W.4, an Assistant Teacher of the school where the victim was studying — Said documents pertained to the school where victim had taken admission on transfer, not the school first attended — Author of Ext-4 and Ext-5 not examined as a prosecution witness — Parents (P.W.2 and P.W.3) admitted ignorance of victim's date of birth — Medical examination by P.W.10 placed victim's age between 16 to 18 years — Held: Determination of minority not in compliance with the hierarchy of documents under Rule 12(3) JJ Rules 2007 and Section 94 JJ Act; Ext-4 and Ext-5 cannot be relied upon to hold the victim a minor; conviction under Section 6 POCSO Act set aside [Paras 3.2–5.4].

Age Determination — Hierarchy of Documents — Probative Value of School Records — School Admission Register is admissible under Section 35 of the Indian Evidence Act but its evidentiary value depends on proof of authenticity and examination of the person who made the entry or who supplied the date of birth — Where neither the author of the entry nor the parents vouched for the information in Ext-4 and Ext-5, reliance thereon to prove minority is impermissible — Entry from school of first admission, not a school where victim was admitted on transfer, is the relevant document under Rule 12(3)(a)(ii) — Ossification test indicating 16 to 18 years raises reasonable doubt as to minority; benefit must go to the accused [Paras 3.3–3.18, 5.2–5.4].

Rape — Promise to Marry — Section 376(2)(n) IPC — Consensual Relationship — Victim's own testimony revealed a love affair of one and a half years, with consent admitted in cross-examination — Statement in 164 CrPC recording further establishes that victim voluntarily accompanied the appellant — FIR allegation of non-consensual physical relationship contradicted by victim's deposition and Section 164 statement — Mere refusal to honour a promise of marriage, absent proof that the promise was false at inception and had a direct nexus with the victim's consent, does not constitute rape under Section 376(2)(n) IPC — Contradictions across FIR, Section 161 statement, Section 164 statement and court deposition render victim's testimony unreliable as a sterling witness [Paras 3.22–3.33, 5.5–5.6].

Causing Miscarriage — Section 313 IPC — Contradictory Evidence — Victim's account of the number of tablets administered (one in 164 statement; five in court deposition), the timeline of discovering pregnancy (six months in 161 statement), and circumstances of delivery of the dead child (in field, child later found in a well) were materially contradictory — Prosecution failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt that the appellant intentionally caused the miscarriage — Conviction under Section 313 IPC not sustainable [Paras 3.27–3.36, 5.5–5.6].

Decision: Appeal allowed — Conviction and sentence under Sections 376(2)(i)(n) and 313 IPC and Section 6 of the POCSO Act set aside — Appellant acquitted of all charges — Appellant to be released from custody immediately if not required in any other case.

Land Acquisition – National Highways Act, 1956 – Section 3A Notification – Brief Description – Plan Not Attached – Compliance – Petitioners challenged Notifications dated 30.11.2009, 27.07.2010 and 20.01.2012 issued under Section 3A(1) of the National Highways Act, 1956 for acquisition of land in Martur village, Prakasam District, for six-laning of NH-5, on the ground that no plan was attached to the notifications published in newspapers and description of land was absent – Held: Section 3A(2) requires only a "brief description" of the land and not names of land owners or detailed plans – Notifications contained brief description of land and specifically stated that land plans and other details were available for inspection at the office of the Competent Authority – This constitutes substantial compliance with Section 3A(2) – Notifications upheld [Paras 9, 15, 16, 19].

Objections – Section 3C(1) – Scope – Non-Filing of Objections – Right to Object Not Defeated – Section 3C(1) of the National Highways Act, 1956 confers a limited right to object, confined only to the utility of the land for the notified purpose, unlike the wider enquiry under Section 5A of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 – Petitioners admittedly did not file objections within the stipulated period of 21 days – In a project involving large-scale acquisition where the majority of landowners accepted the proceedings, objections of a minority cannot stall the entire scheme – Contention of procedural non-compliance rejected [Paras 20, 25].

Post-Award Notices – Sections 3E(1) and 3H(2) – No Description Required – Notices issued under Section 3E(1) for delivery of possession and under Section 3H(2) intimating compensation details are issued after the Award is passed and are not required to contain description of the land – Contention that such notices are defective for absence of land description is untenable [Para 22].

Scope of Judicial Review – National Highway Projects – Courts are not equipped to assess viability or feasibility of highway projects or the choice of alignment – Scope of judicial review is very limited in such matters – Acquisition can be invalidated only if it is ex facie contrary to the mandate of law or tainted by mala fides – Neither violation of the Act nor malice is established in the present case [Para 24].

Market Value – Section 3G(7) – Date of Reckoning – Income Tax Deduction – Competent Authority fixed market value based on sales statistics for three years preceding the Section 3A(1) Notification date, with 9% annual increase for time lag – Petitioners contended that market value prevailing as on 30.11.2009 (date of Notification) was not correctly adopted and that deduction of Income Tax at source from compensation was contrary to law and adverse judgments of the Supreme Court – Court finds ambiguity as to whether market value as on the date of Section 3A(1) Notification was correctly applied – Issues of market value and income tax deduction require reconsideration by the Competent Authority – Petitioners given liberty to submit representations within eight weeks – Competent Authority to decide within eight weeks thereafter [Paras 26, 27].

Decision: Writ Petitions dismissed – No order as to costs – Petitioners granted liberty to submit representations to the Competent Authority on market value fixation and income tax deduction within eight weeks – Competent Authority directed to consider and decide the same in accordance with law within eight weeks of receipt – Miscellaneous petitions, if any, stand closed [Paras 27, 28].

Civil Procedure – Local Commissioner – Appointment under Order XXVI Rule 9 CPC – Scope and Limitations – Petitioner filed a suit for permanent prohibitory injunction restraining the defendants from interfering with or raising construction over Khasra No. 722, on which a Kuhl (water channel) exists between the lands of the parties – Trial Court dismissed the application for appointment of a Local Commissioner on the ground that it cannot be used to collect or create evidence for a party – Held: Order XXVI Rule 9 CPC is not a panacea to be invoked by litigants who are unable to prove their case; the satisfaction for ordering a local investigation must be that of the Court, not of the parties – Petition dismissed [Paras 21–29].

Burden of Proof – Encroachment – Plaintiff Must Stand on Own Legs – It is a basic principle of law that he who alleges must prove – The plaintiff alleged encroachment over Khasra No. 722 by the defendants but failed to lead any independent or reliable evidence to substantiate the same – No steps were shown to have been taken before revenue authorities for demarcation prior to filing the application – The Court cannot lend a helping hand to a party to prove its own case through the mechanism of a Local Commissioner [Paras 20, 25, 29].

State Land – Necessary Party – Plaintiff's Locus – DW 2, the Revenue Officer, stated in cross-examination that Khasra No. 722 is owned by the State of H.P. – In the absence of the State as a party, no relief on the application could be granted to the petitioner – Even if encroachment were assumed, the affected party would be the State and not the plaintiff, who has failed to establish any right over the said Khasra [Para 19].

Decision: Petition dismissed – Impugned order of the trial Court dated 23.06.2025 dismissing the application under Order XXVI Rule 9 CPC upheld – No jurisdictional error found – Pending applications, if any, also disposed of.

GST – Consolidated Show-Cause Notice – Multiple Financial Years – Sections 73 and 74 of the CGST Act, 2017 – Reference to Larger Bench – Petitioners challenged single consolidated show-cause notices issued under Sections 73/74 of the CGST Act clubbing multiple financial years as being without jurisdiction — Contention based on co-ordinate Bench decision in Milroc Good Earth Developers v. Union of India holding no provision exists in CGST Act to club various tax periods — Revenue contended that the Delhi High Court in Mathur Polymers v. UOI & Ors. and Ambika Traders v. Commr. upheld consolidated notices, and the Supreme Court dismissed SLPs against both decisions, with the dismissal in Mathur Polymers being by a speaking order — Held: Significant legal issues not expressly considered in Milroc deserve consideration by a Larger Bench — Matter referred accordingly [Paras 9–31].

Consolidated Show-Cause Notice – Sections 73(1) and 73(3)/74(1) and 74(3) – Plain Reading – Held: Prima facie, on a plain reading of Sections 73 and 74 read conjointly, sub-section (3) specifically uses the words "for any period under sub-section (1)" and "such periods other than those covered under sub-section (1)", indicating legislative awareness and permission for notices covering different periods — To restrict sub-section (1) to a single financial year would amount to reading something into the provision which the legislature deliberately avoided — Sub-section (10) prescribes limitation only for passing of orders under sub-section (9) and does not in any manner restrict or create an embargo on issuance of a show-cause notice under sub-section (1) — A limitation to pass an order cannot be construed as a limitation on issuance of a show-cause notice — The two are independent statutory concepts [Paras 17–28].

Cleavage of Opinion – High Courts – Milroc vs. Mathur Polymers – Co-ordinate benches of the Bombay High Court at Goa and Nagpur as well as the High Courts of Kerala, Madras and Karnataka held consolidated notices impermissible — Delhi High Court and Allahabad High Court held such notices permissible — Supreme Court dismissed SLP against Mathur Polymers by speaking order — Held: Decision of Supreme Court dismissing SLP by speaking order constitutes a declaration of law under Article 141 of the Constitution binding as per Kunhayammed and Ors. — Milroc may not lay down the correct position in law as it relied on Madras High Court decisions which in turn misapplied the Supreme Court judgment in State of Jammu & Kashmir v. Caltex India, which dealt with validity of parts of a combined assessment order and not prohibition on consolidated notices [Paras 4, 24–26].

GST Policy Wing Clarification – Dated 16.09.2025 – Noticees' Rights Preserved – Clarification issued by the GST Policy Wing categorically states that consolidation of proceedings does not extend or alter the limitation period prescribed for each individual financial year — Each year stands independently for calculation of limitation — Held: Noticees are always entitled to raise objections that demand for a particular period is time-barred and the proper officer is bound to consider such objection and confine determination to periods within limitation [Para 27–28].

Questions of Law Referred to Larger Bench: (1) Whether sub-section (10) of Sections 73/74 controls sub-section (1) so as to prohibit consolidated show-cause notices for different years; (2) Whether sub-section (10) per se prohibits issuance of a single consolidated show-cause notice for multiple financial years/tax periods; (3) What is the effect of Section 160 of the CGST Act on proceedings initiated under Sections 73/74 by consolidated show-cause notice; (4) Whether Milroc Good Earth Developers lays down the correct position in law; (5) What is the legal position brought about by the Supreme Court's speaking order in Mathur Polymers under Article 141 of the Constitution [Para 30].

Decision: Matter referred to the Larger Bench for decision on five questions of law — Registry directed to place papers before the Hon'ble the Chief Justice for constitution of Larger Bench — Interim orders in all matters to continue till decision by Larger Bench.

Service Law — Posting of Senior Resident Doctors — Standard Operating Procedure — Merit-cum-Counselling Based Appointment — Petitioner secured Rank 24 in merit list for Anesthesiology and was allotted Howrah District Hospital in the counselling held on 27.02.2025 — After completing first year, petitioner was posted to Gazole State General Hospital, Malda, a hospital that did not feature in the original vacancy matrix and had been upgraded only by Memo dated 20.03.2025 — Gazole not equipped with an operational surgical setup; not a single surgery performed from the date of petitioner's joining till 19.03.2026 — At least one vacancy at Howrah District Hospital remained unfilled — Held: The posting is not a transfer but a fresh posting governed by the SOP — Transfer is not a matter of right applies to service transfers and cannot be equated with merit-cum-counselling based posting — Posting at Gazole set aside [Paras 23–38].

Standard Operating Procedure — Binding Nature on State — Arbitrariness — Article 12 Constitution of India — The SOP at clauses 6, 7a, 7b and 7c prescribes a merit-and-counselling based mechanism for posting for all years of residency, not merely the first year — State bound by SOP of its own making — Deviation from SOP followed for all other 777 out of 778 candidates, only for the petitioner (and one other), is ex facie discriminatory and arbitrary — Any deviation from the SOP constitutes procedural impropriety touching the parameters of illegality and irrationality warranting judicial review — Tata Cellular v. Union of India, (1994) 6 SCC 651, applied — State cannot unilaterally create a vacancy at an unequipped hospital and post a merit-ranked candidate there in derogation of the SOP [Paras 28–36].

Judicial Review — Scope — Administrative Action — Posting Not a Transfer — Court is not to examine the correctness of an administrative action unless it is illegal, irrational, or tainted by procedural bias — In the present case the posting fails the test of rationality and procedural fairness — Dr. Aniket Mahata v. State of West Bengal (WPA 12496 of 2025, affirmed in MAT 1736 of 2025 and upheld by the Supreme Court on 11.12.2025) — Distinguished on the ground that petitioner herein was in the second year, whereas Dr. Mahata was in the first year; however, the principle of merit-and-counselling based entitlement held equally applicable to second year posting [Paras 29–35].

Decision: Writ petition allowed — Memo No. HF/O/HS(MA)/725/SF-11/2025 dated 26.05.2025 set aside — Respondents directed to allow petitioner to join as Senior Resident, Department of Anesthesiology, Howrah District Hospital in terms of original allotment — No order as to costs.

Service Law – Termination – Principles of Natural Justice – Temporary Employee – Petitioner serving as Shift Supervisor with HOMCO since 2012 on renewed contractual spells of 179 days – Terminated by Ext.P11 order solely on the basis of Managing Committee's decision dated 17.02.2026 without being afforded any opportunity of hearing – Held: Where termination is punitive in nature, attaches stigma and adversely affects livelihood and future employment prospects, principles of natural justice must be complied with regardless of the contractual or temporary nature of employment – Ext.P11 set aside [Paras 6-7].

Natural Justice – Punitive Action – Stigmatic Termination – Distinction between contractual termination and punitive action – Though no departmental enquiry may be mandatory in case of contractual/temporary employees, where the action amounts to punishment for alleged misconduct or negligence, even a temporary employee of long standing must be granted a reasonable opportunity to present her case and adduce evidence – Managing Committee, before taking the decision underlying Ext.P11, ought to have heard the petitioner [Paras 5-7].

Relief – Remand – Limited Period Contract – Since petitioner's contract subsists only till May 2026, Managing Committee directed to decide whether petitioner should be permitted to continue for the remaining period – If proceedings are to be continued, an unbiased hearing must be afforded and evidence of the petitioner duly considered before any decision is taken [Para 7].

Decision: Writ petition disposed of – Ext.P11 order of termination set aside – Managing Committee directed to afford proper opportunity of hearing to the petitioner before taking any fresh decision in the matter.

Review Jurisdiction — Scope and Limitations — Minimum Wages Act, 1948 — Appropriate Government — Review petition filed by workman challenging Division Bench judgment which held that State Government, and not Central Government, was the appropriate government under Section 2(b) of the Minimum Wages Act, 1948, where workman was employed by a private contractor and deployed at a nationalised bank — Division Bench had set aside the order of the Authority under the Act and remitted the matter to the Divisional Labour Commissioner — Held: None of the grounds urged in the review petition constitute an error apparent on the face of the record; contentions relating to appropriate government, employer's identity under Section 2(e), and scheduled employment under "watch and ward" were all considered and decided by the Division Bench and cannot be re-agitated in review — Review petition dismissed [Paras 22–29].

Review Petition — Change of Counsel — Maintainability — Review petitioner, a workman, appeared through a different advocate who was not part of the earlier Division Bench proceedings — Opposite Party No.1 objected relying on Tamil Nadu Electricity Board v. N. Raju Reddiar, (1997) 9 SCC 736 — Court took a lenient view given the difficulties faced by a workman in engaging earlier counsel — Principle that review petitions should not be filed routinely with change of counsel as a second attempt at hearing on merits, noted and applied [Paras 12–13].

Review Jurisdiction — Principles Governing — Error Apparent on Face of Record — Distinction from Appellate Power — Review maintainable only upon: (i) discovery of new and important matter not within knowledge despite due diligence; (ii) mistake or error apparent on the face of the record; or (iii) any other sufficient reason analogous to the foregoing — Review not maintainable where: grounds are mere repetition of rejected arguments; only an alternative view is possible; appreciation of evidence is sought to be reopened; or the petition is an appeal in disguise — Held: The grounds urged do not satisfy any of the maintainable parameters; they amount to re-arguments of rejected contentions and reappraisal of evidence — Khoday Distilleries Limited v. Sri Mahadeshwara Sahakara Sakkare Karkhane Limited, (2019) 4 SCC 376, distinguished as inapplicable to the present context [Paras 14–29].

Decision: Review application dismissed — No costs.