Taxation Law – Central Sales Tax Act, 1956 – Dispute over classification of transactions as Inter-State Sales or Stock Transfers – Challenge to assessment by State of Haryana imposing tax on transactions treated as inter-State sales – High Court examines whether movement of goods from Haryana to Bihar under an agreement constituted a sale or stock transfer – Held: Supply of goods pursuant to a prior contract with the Government of Bihar constituted an inter-State sale under the CST Act – Petitioners already assessed for local sales tax in Bihar cannot claim exemption from inter-State tax in Haryana – Dismissal of writ petitions, affirming the validity of Haryana’s tax demand. [Paras 1-16]

Inter-State Sales vs. Stock Transfer – High Court relies on precedents to determine that movement of goods occasioned by a contract of sale constitutes an inter-State sale – Reliance on Supreme Court’s ruling in Sahney Steel and Press Works Ltd. vs. Commercial Tax Officer, and Bharat Electric Ltd. vs. Union of India – The issuance of Form F by Bihar for stock transfer did not absolve the petitioner from the obligation to pay inter-State sales tax in Haryana – Tax Tribunal’s findings upheld – Claims of double taxation refuted. [Paras 8-14]

Decision – Dismissal of Writ Petitions – Held: Petitioner’s arguments regarding double taxation and erroneous classification as inter-State sales rejected – Haryana entitled to impose Central Sales Tax on transactions – Refund claims to be pursued per Tata Motors Ltd. vs. CST Appellate Authority ruling – Interim orders vacated – Final judgment dismisses all petitions and pending applications. [Paras 15-19]

Civil Law - Public Premises – Eviction of Tenant – Petition under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution – Petitioner challenged the eviction orders, claiming tenancy rights over land owned by the Municipal Committee, Mahendergarh, since 1963-64, and argued that eviction based on non-payment of rent was unjustified as he was willing to pay the arrears. The Court dismissed the petition, holding that no registered lease existed in favor of the petitioner, and his tenancy could be terminated without formal notice under the Public Premises Act – Petitioner’s long-standing possession at a meager rent of ₹150 per year, without payment of arrears, deemed insufficient to challenge the eviction. The Municipal Committee’s right to initiate eviction proceedings was upheld [Paras 1-11].

Termination of Tenancy – Public Premises Act Prevailing over Rent Act – The Court reaffirmed that under the Public Premises Act, tenancy could be terminated without prior notice, and mere filing of eviction proceedings sufficed as notice to quit. The petitioner's plea of being a lawful tenant was rejected, with the Court emphasizing that continued possession at such low rent for decades was prejudicial to the Municipal Committee’s right to recover prevalent market rent [Paras 6-10].

Decision: Petition dismissed – Eviction order upheld – No interference by the Court in the impugned orders, with the Municipal Committee entitled to recover possession and collect prevalent rent from the property.

Civil Procedure – Second Appeal – Scope of Interference – Court reiterated the limited scope of interference in second appellate jurisdiction under Section 100 CPC – Findings of fact by lower courts cannot be disturbed unless there is clear perversity – Appeal dismissed as no substantial question of law arose [Paras 16-22].

Specific Performance – Registered Agreement – Execution and Validity – Defendant's plea that the agreement was fraudulently executed was rejected due to lack of sufficient evidence – Registered agreement and payment endorsements made by the Sub-Registrar were presumed correct under law – Concurrent findings of lower courts upholding the specific performance decree were affirmed [Paras 8-14].

Decision: Second Appeal dismissed at the stage of admission. The concurrent judgments and decrees of the lower courts were upheld, and no substantial question of law was found to warrant interference.

Taxation Law – Central Sales Tax – Inter-State Sales – The petitioner, a public sector undertaking, entered into an agreement with the Government of Bihar to supply energy food. The Sales Tax Tribunal upheld the assessment of the transactions as inter-state sales liable to tax under the Central Sales Tax Act, despite the petitioner's contention that these were stock transfers and not sales. The Tribunal relied on the principles laid down in Sahney Steel and Press Works Limited v. Commercial Tax Officer, where it was held that movement of goods pursuant to a contract of sale qualifies as inter-state sales [Paras 8-11].

Sales Tax Tribunal – Misconception in Classification of Transactions – The petitioner argued that sales tax had already been paid in Bihar and U.P., and thus, Haryana could not levy the tax again. The Tribunal rejected this claim, asserting that the payment of local sales tax in other states does not preclude the imposition of Central Sales Tax on inter-state sales [Paras 12-14].

Refund and Double Taxation – In light of Tata Motors Limited v. Central Sales Tax Appellate Authority, the court recognized the issue of double taxation and allowed the petitioner the liberty to seek a refund of the amount already paid to the concerned states. However, the petition was dismissed, upholding the imposition of Central Sales Tax by Haryana [Paras 15-17].

Decision: Writ petitions dismissed. The court granted the petitioner the right to claim a refund for taxes paid to other states but upheld the tax demand by Haryana.

Criminal Law – Quashing of FIR under Sections 498A, 406, 420, 506(2), 114 IPC and Sections 3, 7 of the Dowry Prohibition Act – High Court quashed the FIR and all consequential proceedings against the accused (father-in-law and mother-in-law) under Section 482 CrPC – The complainant filed a case alleging harassment after marriage, but the Court found the allegations to be general and unsubstantiated – The Court held that the complainants had falsely implicated the applicants in order to pressure the family into a settlement – Court observed the applicants, aged 90 and 80, had no involvement in the alleged offences [Paras 1-7, 17].

Abuse of Process – Court found that the FIR was an abuse of the legal process, aimed at harassment rather than the pursuit of justice – Referring to multiple precedents, including Preeti Gupta v. State of Jharkhand and Geeta Mehrotra v. State of Uttar Pradesh, the Court emphasized caution in matrimonial disputes, especially when extended family members are implicated without specific evidence – It was noted that the marriage had dissolved via divorce, and there was no substantial proof of harassment against the in-laws [Paras 6-7, 13].

Decision – FIR Quashed – Held – The application under Section 482 CrPC was allowed – The Court quashed the FIR and all subsequent proceedings against the petitioners, ruling that their implication in the case was motivated by personal grievances rather than actual evidence of wrongdoing [Paras 15-17].

Criminal Law – Petition under Section 482 Cr.P.C. for quashing of defamation charges – Accusations against the petitioners (including the Chief Minister of Delhi) for imputing that BJP had orchestrated deletion of voter names from specific communities – The High Court examined the validity of summoning orders issued by the Magistrate and upheld by the Sessions Court – Court found that the statements made by the petitioners were prima facie defamatory, targeting a determinable and identifiable group (BJP and its Delhi Pradesh unit) – Court emphasized that political parties are identifiable entities under law, capable of being defamed – Held that the allegations against BJP were made without factual basis, potentially swaying public opinion, and harming BJP's reputation – The petition under Section 482 Cr.P.C. was dismissed. [Paras 14-33].

Defamation Law – Evaluation of Evidence for Defamation – The Court held that even though the initial evidence was derived from newspaper reports and video clippings (generally considered hearsay), it was supported by certificates under Section 65B of the Indian Evidence Act, making it admissible – Summoning orders were based on sufficient prima facie evidence, and the absence of witness testimony at the pre-summoning stage did not invalidate the summoning order – The scope of inquiry under Sections 202 and 204 Cr.P.C. was limited to determining if there was sufficient ground to proceed, not to ascertain the truth of the allegations conclusively – Reliance was placed on precedents that allowed the continuation of defamation proceedings even when initial evidence was not fully established at the pre-summoning stage – Petition dismissed. [Paras 23-26].

Decision – Dismissal of Petition – Held – The High Court dismissed the petition, confirming the maintainability of defamation charges against the petitioners – The Court found that the tweets and public statements made by the petitioners were defamatory, particularly as they accused BJP of engaging in unethical practices without factual support – The petitioners' defense that their statements were made in good faith and for public good was reserved for trial – The Court emphasized that reputation, particularly of political entities, is protected under law, and defamatory imputations without factual basis cannot be shielded under the guise of free speech – The Court directed the continuation of proceedings before the Trial Court. [Paras 32-42].

Intellectual Property Law - Trademark Infringement - Film Titles - The plaintiff, co-owner of the film franchise "Aashiqui," sought to prevent the defendant from using the title "Tu Hi Aashiqui" for its proposed film. The court examined whether the title "Aashiqui" is generic or common to trade and found that the term, while suggestive of romance, has acquired distinctiveness and secondary meaning through its association with the Aashiqui Franchise. The court held that "Aashiqui" is not generic and deserves protection under trademark law. [Paras 19-24].

Deceptive Similarity - Likelihood of Confusion - The court applied the test of deceptive similarity and concluded that the defendant's proposed film title "Tu Hi Aashiqui" was deceptively similar to the plaintiff's trademark "Aashiqui." The use of the word "Aashiqui" in the title was likely to cause confusion among the public, leading them to believe that the film was part of the Aashiqui Franchise. The court emphasized that slight variations in the title do not sufficiently differentiate it from the plaintiff's mark, especially given the identical nature of the goods (films). [Paras 25-30].

Jurisdiction and Contractual Obligations - Despite the defendant's challenge to the jurisdiction based on clauses in the agreements between the parties, the court held that it had the jurisdiction to entertain the suit since the claims of trademark infringement and passing off are tortious in nature and not purely contractual. The court also noted that the plaintiff's office and significant actions related to the alleged infringement were within its territorial jurisdiction. [Paras 16-18].

Injunction - Balance of Convenience - Irreparable Harm - The court found that the balance of convenience favored the plaintiff, as allowing the defendant to use the title "Tu Hi Aashiqui" would cause irreparable harm to the plaintiff's established brand. The court granted an interim injunction restraining the defendant from using the title "Tu Hi Aashiqui" or any other name containing the word "Aashiqui." [Paras 39-44].

Decision: An interim injunction was granted in favor of the plaintiff, restraining the defendant from using the title "Tu Hi Aashiqui" or any other title containing the word "Aashiqui" for their proposed film. [Paras 44-45].

Service Law – Pay Scale Parity – Appellants challenged the Single Judge’s order granting higher pay scales and benefits to the respondents, similar to those awarded to another set of petitioners in a prior case – Appellants argued the respondents were “fence sitters” and their claims were time-barred due to delay, waiver, and acquiescence – High Court set aside the impugned order, holding that the respondents failed to approach the court in a timely manner and were not entitled to claim benefits granted in previous proceedings involving different parties – Appeal allowed, writ petition dismissed [Paras 1-27].

Delay and Laches – Applicability of Arvind Kumar Srivastava Principle – Court held that although similarly situated employees should normally be treated alike, the respondents’ significant delay in approaching the court disqualified them from claiming benefits granted to others in earlier judgments – Cited Tarsem Singh and T.T. Murali Babu to emphasize the importance of promptness in seeking legal redress [Paras 20-27].

Decision: Appeal allowed – Impugned judgment and order set aside – Writ petition dismissed – No costs awarded [Paras 27-28].

Income Tax Law – Reopening of Assessment – Sections 147 and 148 of the Income Tax Act, 1961 – Whether reopening based on "change of opinion" without new tangible material is valid – Held, reopening was invalid due to lack of new material. The Court referred to CIT v. Kelvinator of India Ltd., noting that mere change of opinion cannot justify reopening an assessment under Section 147 without tangible material – [Paras 29-31]​.

Reassessment and Change of Opinion – Difference Between Short-Term Capital Gain and Adventure in the Nature of Trade – The Assessing Officer initially treated the income as short-term capital gain, but later classified it as "adventure in the nature of trade" without any fresh notice or valid reasoning – The Court found this change arbitrary and unsustainable as there was no new material to substantiate the reassessment – [Paras 35-40]​.

Constitutional Law – Article 226 – The Court exercised its discretion to entertain the writ petition under Article 226 despite the existence of an alternative remedy, as the reassessment proceedings were arbitrary and without jurisdictional basis. The alternative remedy rule does not apply when reassessment is based on procedural irregularity or arbitrary exercise of power – [Paras 14-16]​.

Decision: Writ petition allowed – Reassessment proceedings quashed – All orders dated 29.09.2021, including the demand notice, were set aside – [Paras 41-42]​.