Criminal Law – Unlawful Assembly – Common Object – Conviction Upheld – Six accused including sole surviving appellant Chhotoo barged into informant's house at night armed with weapons — informant suffered gunshot injuries; wife and children suffered multiple injuries by sharp and blunt objects — Chhotoo assigned role of wielding lathi/danda — injured eye witnesses P.W.-1 and P.W.-2 and independent witness P.W.-3 consistently deposed about accused's presence and weapons — suggestion of dacoity rejected as no valuables taken — medico-legal reports of five injured fully corroborated the ocular testimony — Held: Prosecution established guilt beyond reasonable doubt; conviction under Sections 147, 323, 452, 324/149 and 307/149 IPC affirmed [Paras 14–28].

Sentence – Modification on Account of Passage of Time and Age – Reformative Theory of Punishment – Appeal pending for 40 years; five co-accused died during pendency; sole surviving appellant now 64 years of age with no criminal antecedents; was the youngest among the accused and assigned the role of lathi/danda only — Trial court had rightly sentenced him in 1986; bail granted by High Court on 30.01.1986 and maintained since — Sending appellant to serve remaining sentence after 42 years would not serve reformative purpose of punishment — Held: Sentence reduced to period already undergone; fine of Rs. 75,000/- imposed, to be disbursed as compensation equally to surviving injured; default in payment to result in serving remaining sentence [Paras 35–37].

Decision: Appeal dismissed — Conviction affirmed — Sentence modified — Sole surviving appellant Chhotoo directed to deposit Rs. 75,000/- as compensation within 60 days to be disbursed equally to surviving injured; bail bonds and sureties discharged.

Tort Law – Strict Liability – Electrocution – Unprotected Transformer – Child Aged 7 Years – Both Hands Amputated – Plaintiff, a 7-year-old child studying in Class II, was playing near a Primary School managed by Nagar Nigam, Agra, when he accidentally came in contact with the defendant's 11,000/400 Volts, 100 KVA transformer installed in the open, barely 3 feet from the school building, without any fencing, barricading or caging — He suffered severe electrocution burns and both hands were amputated — Trial court dismissed the suit holding that the accident occurred due to the plaintiff's own negligence — Held: In cases of electrocution from high tension electrical infrastructure, the principle of strict liability applies — The plaintiff was not required to prove negligence of the defendant; he was only required to prove that he suffered electrocution injuries from the defendant's high tension electrical equipment, which he successfully proved — The defendant admitted the electrocution in its written statement and had paid Rs. 1.25 lakhs as humanitarian compensation — Trial court's finding of plaintiff's contributory negligence perverse and legally unsustainable — Appeal allowed [Paras 36, 49–62, 66].

Strict Liability – Electricity as Hazardous Substance – No Defence of Contributory Negligence Against Child — Electricity transmitted at high voltage is a hazardous activity — The supplier of electric energy bears primary liability to compensate any person injured on account of its escape or failure of safety measures — In cases of strict liability, the defendant is liable irrespective of whether the harm could have been avoided by taking precautions — The concept of contributory negligence cannot be applied to a child of tender age who functions according to his own reasoning, impulse, instinct and innocence — It is not expected from a 7-year-old child to be aware of the imminent danger from an unprotected transformer installed near a primary school — The defendant, being aware of the existence of the school, was under a heightened duty to protect the transformer from accidental contact [Paras 44, 49, 58, 63].

Evidence – Adverse Presumption – Defendant Not Entering Witness Box – Section 114(g) Evidence Act — The defendant led neither oral nor documentary evidence to prove that the transformer was installed as per applicable rules and regulations or that requisite safety measures were adopted — No official of the defendant entered the witness box — Held: An adverse presumption must be drawn under Section 114(g) of the Evidence Act, 1872 that the defendant's case of proper installation and safety compliance is false — The defendant's plea that the transformer was adequately fenced or barricaded, never put to the plaintiff's witnesses in cross-examination, cannot be accepted [Paras 52–55, 59].

Section 33 of the Indian Electricity Act, 1910 – No Bar to Suit – Section 33 only obliges the electricity supplier to give notice of the accident to the Electrical Inspector — It does not provide that non-compliance bars the filing of a suit for compensation — The trial court erred in holding that absence of notice under Section 33 disentitles the plaintiff [Paras 64–65].

Compensation – Permanent Disability – 100% Functional Disability – Child Below 15 Years – Multiplier 18 – Future Prospects – Attendant Charges – Loss of Marriage Prospects — Compensation to be assessed on the basis of minimum wages of a skilled workman prevailing at the time of the accident — Both hands of the plaintiff having been amputated, he has suffered 100% functional disability and is completely dependent on others for survival and daily activities — Plaintiff entitled to future prospects at 40% of income — Multiplier of 18 applied — Plaintiff additionally entitled to attendant charges (1 attendant at minimum wages of unskilled labour with 40% future prospects), future medical expenses for artificial limb of Rs. 3,00,000/-, loss of marriage prospects of Rs. 3,00,000/-, pain and suffering and loss of amenities of Rs. 5,00,000/-, treatment expenses, special diet and transportation — Total compensation determined at Rs. 27,90,000/-, less Rs. 1,25,000/- already paid, net compensation of Rs. 26,65,000/- awarded with interest at 6% per annum from the date of filing of the miscellaneous case i.e. 30.05.1997 till realisation [Paras 68–80].

Decision: Appeal allowed with costs — Impugned judgment and decree dated 29.10.2005 set aside — Suit of plaintiff decreed — Defendant directed to pay Rs. 26,65,000/- with pendentelite and future interest @ 6% per annum from 30.05.1997 till realisation, within one month — Compensation amount upon realisation to be deposited in fixed deposit in nationalised bank or post office; plaintiff entitled to draw monthly interest — Plaintiff permitted to withdraw principal with leave of court for medical treatment and special circumstances — District Legal Services Authority directed to assist plaintiff in execution.

POCSO Act – Aggravated Sexual Assault – Attempt – Charge – Conviction – Sentence Modified – Appellant convicted by trial court under Section 9(m) punishable under Section 10 of the POCSO Act for aggravated sexual assault on a minor girl aged 4½ years – Trial court sentenced him to rigorous imprisonment of 5 years – On appeal, High Court holds that the charge was framed only for attempt to commit aggravated sexual assault under Section 18 read with Section 9(m) and was never amended to commission of the offence – Though materials on record establish commission of aggravated sexual assault, accused cannot be convicted for an offence for which he was not charged – Conviction modified to attempt to commit aggravated sexual assault under Section 18 read with Section 9(m) punishable under Section 10 – Sentence modified to rigorous imprisonment of 3½ years, being half of the maximum term of 7 years under Section 10 – Appeal partly allowed [Paras 20–22].

Victim Testimony – Child Witness – Sole Testimony – Credibility – PW12, the victim aged approximately 4½ years, consistently narrated the incident in her Section 164 statement and before the trial court – Her version corroborated by PW11 (mother) in FIR lodged on the day of the incident and by PW9 (father) in examination – Defence plea of tutoring rejected; child denied tutoring and her testimony was found credible and reliable – Absence of bruises or abrasions in MLC held irrelevant as charge was not of penetrative sexual assault – Held: Sole testimony of victim, if credible, requires no corroboration and is sufficient to sustain conviction; following Ganesan v. State, (2020) 10 SCC 573 [Paras 15–18].

False Implication – Inconsistent Defence – Accused's plea of false implication on account of financial dispute was found inconsistent: suggestion to PW11 was that her husband owed money to the accused's father, whereas suggestion to PW9 was that accused was implicated to extort money, and in his Section 313 statement the accused simply denied involvement – Such contradictory defence versions not borne out by materials on record and hence rejected [Para 18].

Charge – Amendment – Section 232 CrPC – Non-compliance – Non-compliance of Section 232 CrPC by trial court does not ipso facto vitiate proceedings unless omission causes serious and substantial prejudice to the accused – No such prejudice alleged or shown in the present case [Para 7].

Section 7 POCSO Act – Sexual Assault – Act of undressing the child, climbing on top of her and lying over her with sexual intent and ejaculating constitutes "any other act with sexual intent involving physical contact without penetration" within the meaning of Section 7 – When committed upon a child below 12 years, the offence falls under Section 9(m) as aggravated sexual assault – However, as charge was only for attempt, conviction is confined to attempt under Section 18 read with Section 9(m) [Para 20].

Sentence – Section 18 POCSO Act – For attempt to commit an offence, punishment shall not exceed one-half of the longest term of imprisonment provided for the offence – Maximum imprisonment under Section 10 for aggravated sexual assault is 7 years; half thereof being 3½ years – Trial court's sentence of 5 years for an attempt offence was in excess of the statutory limit under Section 18 and is accordingly modified [Para 21].

Decision: Appeal partly allowed – Conviction modified to attempt to commit aggravated sexual assault under Section 18 read with Section 9(m) punishable under Section 10 of the POCSO Act – Sentence modified to rigorous imprisonment of 3½ years – Fine of ₹5,000/- maintained [Para 22].

Excise Law – Liquor Licences – E-Auction – Reservation – Forfeiture of Lapsed Licences – Karnataka Excise (Sale of Indian and Foreign Liquors) (Second Amendment) Rules, 2025 – Respondents, holders of CL-9 licences (bar and restaurant), challenged the amended Rules 5 and 5-A of the Karnataka Excise (Sale of Indian and Foreign Liquor) Rules, 1968 – The impugned amendments introduced e-auction as the mode of grant for CL-2A and CL-9A licences with government-fixed reservation norms, and deemed CL-2, CL-9 and CL-11(C) licences unrenewed as on 03-11-2025 as lapsed and forfeited, to fall into the auction pool – Single Judge stayed the amended Rules 5 and 5-A on a prima facie finding that the reservation-based eligibility and automatic forfeiture travelled beyond the enabling provisions of the Excise Act – On appeal, held: (i) the impugned rules did not exceed rule-making power conferred under Section 71 of the Excise Act, which is wide in scope; (ii) the provision for renewal of licence being a creature of the Rules, the Rules could equally curtail the same; (iii) proviso to Rule 5-A does not effect forfeiture of licence but curtails the right of renewal, which is within the State's competence; (iv) grant of licence through e-auction is not outside the State's domain; (v) adopting the State Government's own reservation policy by reference in the Rules does not constitute impermissible sub-delegation since the delegator and delegate are the same entity; (vi) singling out certain categories of licences does not offend Article 14 as the State is entitled to vary terms and conditions across licence categories; (vii) subordinate legislation carries a presumption of constitutional validity and a strong case of invalidity must be established before its operation is stayed – Appeal allowed – Impugned stay order set aside [Paras 1–77].

Liquor Licence – Nature of Licence – Privilege of State – No Vested Right of Renewal – The manufacture, distribution and sale of intoxicants is an exclusive privilege of the State – No citizen has a fundamental right under Article 19(1)(g) to carry on trade in liquor – A licensee has no indefeasible right of renewal beyond the term of the licence; the right to renewal is governed by the Rules as they exist at the time of renewal and not at the time of grant – Applications filed prior to the amendment of Rules do not confer vested rights to be considered under the pre-amendment Rules – The State's power to grant, refuse, curtail or modify renewal is an incident of its exclusive privilege and is within its rule-making power under Section 71 of the Excise Act [Paras 46–65].

Delegated Legislation – Sub-delegation – Reservation Norms – Principle of Delegatus Non Potest Delegare – The proviso to Rule 5 of the Rules enables the State Government to adopt its own policy as to reservation norms for e-auction licences – This does not constitute impermissible sub-delegation since the delegatee (State Government framing the Rules) and the sub-delegatee (State Government fixing reservation norms) are one and the same – Principle of sub-delegation is inapplicable where the delegator and delegatee are identical – Furthermore, the Excise Act's rule-making power under Section 71 being couched in wide terms, the State Government has ample room to determine terms and conditions of the auction including reservation – Learned Advocate General undertook that reservation norms would be specifically incorporated in the Rules to obviate objection [Paras 53–58].

Subordinate Legislation – Presumption of Constitutional Validity – Courts cannot lightly stay delegated legislation – Tests for striking down executive action do not automatically apply to delegated legislation, which requires proof of manifest arbitrariness – Courts must make every effort to uphold constitutional validity, and if two views are possible, the one favouring validity must be preferred – In the present case, the writ petitioners had not surmounted the presumption of constitutionality; the Single Judge's order disregarded these settled principles and was therefore liable to be set aside [Paras 68–74].

Division Bench Precedent – B. Govindraj Hegde – Misapplication – The impugned order relied on the earlier Division Bench decision in State of Karnataka v. B. Govindraj Hegde, WA 3374/2016, which invalidated a relaxation of minimum room-capacity requirements for reserved-category hotel licences – However, that decision expressly held that reserving a quota of licences for reserved categories would be permissible – The impugned Rules introduce e-auction with reservation of a quota and do not relax any restrictive condition imposed in the public interest – Therefore, the said precedent did not support the petitioners' case [Paras 17–19].

Decision: Appeal allowed – Ad interim stay order dated 25-11-2025 passed by the Single Judge in W.P. No. 35227/2025 set aside – Liberty reserved to parties to advance submissions on the challenge to the proviso to Rule 12 of the Rules before the Single Judge in the pending writ petition.

Civil Law – Rejection of Plaint – Order VII Rule 11 CPC – Scope – Triable Issues – Appeal Allowed – Appellants filed suit in 2022 for partition and declaration of 1/3rd share each in suit property on the basis of an unregistered Will dated 17.02.2002 allegedly executed by deceased father, superseding an earlier registered Will dated 23.05.1997 – Single Judge rejected the plaint under Order VII Rule 11(a) and (d) finding the suit vexatious, devoid of cause of action and barred by limitation – Division Bench holds that the Single Judge committed grave error by drawing adverse inferences based on the 1997 Will and arriving at premature conclusions beyond the scope of Order VII Rule 11 – Plaint raises triable issues requiring adjudication on evidence – Appeal allowed; suit restored [Paras 22–30].

Order VII Rule 11 CPC – Principles – At the stage of Order VII Rule 11, the court must assume the averments in the plaint to be true and cannot embark upon an inquiry into their correctness – Court must examine whether a real cause of action has been set out or whether clever drafting has created an illusion of one – No compartmentalisation, dissection or isolation of passages in the plaint is permissible; the plaint must be read as a whole – Following Popat and Kotecha Property v. State Bank of India Staff Assn., (2005) 7 SCC 510 [Paras 16, 28].

Limitation – Article 58 of the Limitation Act – Fraud – Mixed Question of Law and Facts – Single Judge held the suit barred by limitation as cause of action arose in 2003 upon death of the testator – Division Bench holds that where the plaint specifically pleads lack of knowledge of the earlier Will and fraudulent procurement of Mutation and Conveyance Deed, limitation becomes a mixed question of law and facts requiring evidence – Such question cannot be summarily decided without trial; continuously accruing cause of action also pleaded [Paras 25–29].

Will – Subsequent Will Prevailing Over Earlier Will – Validity of earlier registered Will dated 23.05.1997 becomes immaterial if the later unregistered Will dated 17.02.2002 is held valid, since the latter, being subsequent in time, prevails – Finding of Single Judge that appellants did not dispute the 1997 Will is ex facie contrary to the pleadings in paragraph 32 of the plaint [Paras 23–24].

Cause of Action – Fraud – Knowledge – Where appellants pleaded that they first came to know about the Mutation dated 15.04.2021 and Conveyance Deed dated 26.08.2021 fraudulently obtained by respondent No. 1 on the basis of the 1997 Will only in November 2021 through a local property dealer, the cause of action for the suit is stated to have arisen in 2021 and not in 2003 – This raises a triable issue which cannot be rejected at threshold [Paras 8–9, 26–28].

Decision: Appeal allowed – Impugned judgment and decree dated 02.04.2025 rejecting the plaint set aside – Suit restored to its original number – Parties directed to appear before the learned Single Judge (Roster Bench) on 28.04.2026 – No observations to affect the merits of the case [Paras 30–33].

Welfare Scheme – Mukhymantri Kisan Evam Sarvhit Bima Yojna – Accidental Death – Scope of Eligibility – Petitioner's wife died on 06.10.2016 due to knife wound inflicted by unknown assailants while cutting grass in the field – Claim rejected on the ground that petitioner did not fall within the eligibility criteria of the Scheme – Held: The eligibility clause of the Mukhymantri Yojna specifically enumerates the events covered and benefit is available only if the deceased falls within the said enumerated criteria – Death by murder cannot be extended to fall within the definition of accidental death as envisaged under the Scheme – Petition dismissed [Paras 7, 8, 9, 10].

Ejusdem Generis – Interpretation of Welfare Scheme – The Mukhymantri Yojna covers accidental deaths arising from railways, roadways, air travel and other enumerated events – Application of the principle of ejusdem generis indicates that events not specifically enumerated but sought to be included must be of the same genus as those expressly listed – Murder or homicidal assault by unknown persons is not of the same genus as the accidents enumerated and cannot be treated as an accident under the Scheme – The object of the Scheme is to provide relief for uncertain and unfortunate events of the nature specifically described therein [Para 8].

Precedent – Distinguishability – Division Bench judgment in Smt. Bindu Devi vs. State of U.P. and 2 Others (WRIT-C No. 35148 of 2017, decided 15.02.2019) relied upon by petitioner, wherein a death caused by knife wound was allowed under the Samajwadi Kisan and Sarvhit Bima Yojana – Held: The present Mukhymantri Yojna is a distinct scheme from the Samajwadi Yojana interpreted in Smt. Bindu Devi – The said Co-ordinate Bench judgment does not come to the aid of the petitioner [Para 7].

Decision: Writ petition disposed of – Claim under Mukhymantri Kisan Evam Sarvhit Bima Yojna not maintainable – Petitioner at liberty to avail any other Government scheme applicable on the date of death of the deceased in accordance with law [Paras 10, 11].

Matrimonial Law – Divorce – Unsoundness of Mind – Medical Examination – Order XXXII Rule 15 CPC – Section 13(1)(iii) Hindu Marriage Act – Respondent-husband filed for divorce alleging petitioner-wife's abnormal behaviour, refusal of physical relationship, secret medication, and suppression of mental illness by her parents – Trial Court allowed application directing petitioner to undergo psychiatric examination at Civil Hospital, Dhule – Held: While matrimonial courts possess power to direct medical examination in proceedings under Section 13(1)(iii) of the Hindu Marriage Act, such power cannot be exercised casually without prima facie material on record establishing the necessity for such reference – Impugned order set aside [Paras 7-8].

Judicial Discretion – Application of Mind – Requirement of Prima Facie Case – Court's power to order medical examination is discretionary and must be exercised only where applicant has a strong prima facie case and sufficient material is placed before the Court – If such order is passed without any prima facie material, it amounts to abuse of discretionary power – Impugned order was bereft of sufficient reasons and failed to reflect application of mind to pleadings and material on record [Paras 7-8].

Liberty Reserved – Respondent at liberty to reiterate prayer for medical examination after leading necessary evidence to establish prima facie case – Trial Court directed to reconsider fresh application, if filed, and pass a well-reasoned order [Paras 9-10].

Decision: Writ petition allowed – Impugned order dated 02.08.2025 set aside – Respondent granted liberty to file fresh application supported by necessary material – Rule made absolute.

Menstrual Leave Policy – Constitutional Foundations – Enforcement – Unorganized Sector – Karnataka – Petitioner, a woman hotel worker engaged in arduous manual labour, sought enforcement of the State's Menstrual Leave Policy enunciated vide Gazette Notification dated 12-11-2025 and Government Order No. LD 466 LET 2023 dated 20-11-2025, and further sought issuance of guidelines for its uniform implementation, particularly across the unorganized sector – State affirmed the policy's progressive intent but projected practical impediments in monitoring the unorganized sector – The Karnataka Menstrual Leave and Hygiene Bill, 2025, placing the policy on a legislative footing, was also tabled before the Legislature – Court placed on record the historical and global evolution of menstrual leave, the constitutional basis of the policy rooted in Articles 15(3), 21, 39(e) and 42, and the affirmative obligation of the State to translate policy into meaningful implementation – Held: State directed to strictly and faithfully implement the existing policy pending enactment of the proposed legislation; upon enactment, Rules to be framed without undue delay; in the interregnum, the State to issue suitable guidelines, circulars and administrative instructions ensuring uniform and rigorous implementation across all sectors including the unorganized sector – Article 14 cannot be invoked to resist such a policy, as acknowledging biological difference between men and women in matters of health, dignity and bodily autonomy gives substantive meaning to equality, not derogates from it [Paras 1–23].

Menstrual Leave – Constitutional Right – Article 21 – Right to Dignity – Right to Health – The Supreme Court in Jaya Thakur (Dr.) v. Union of India, 2026 SCC OnLine SC 133, unequivocally held that the right to dignified menstrual health forms an integral part of the right to life under Article 21 – Menstrual Hygiene Management (MHM) is inseparable from the right to live with dignity, bodily autonomy, decisional privacy and reproductive health – State bears a positive obligation not merely to refrain from discrimination but to take affirmative measures to secure MHM for menstruating persons – Denial of adequate MHM facilities compels individuals to manage their bodies in a manner dictated by circumstance rather than choice, violating their autonomy [Paras 10–12].

Menstrual Leave – Policy – Historical and Global Perspective – The Soviet Union (1922/1931), Japan (1947), Indonesia (1948/2003), South Korea (2001), Taiwan (2002), Vietnam (2015) and Zambia (2015) have variously recognized and institutionalized menstrual leave through legislation – In India, Bihar introduced paid menstrual leave for Government employees; the Menstruation Benefits Bill, 2017 did not attain legislative fruition – Supreme Court in Shailendra Mani Tripathi v. Union of India, 2024 SCC OnLine SC 1694, directed formulation of a model menstrual leave policy at the Union level, clarifying that State Governments remain free independently to act – Taking cue therefrom, Karnataka constituted a Committee, obtained Law Commission recommendations, and formulated the present policy – The Karnataka Government Order of 20-11-2025 grants one day of paid menstrual leave per month (maximum 12 days per year) to all permanent/contract/outsourced women employees aged 18–52 years in establishments registered under specified labour legislations, without requirement of a medical certificate [Paras 7–9, 17–18].

Unorganized Sector – Menstrual Leave – Need for Inclusive Implementation – The existing Government Orders, in their present form, are confined to the organized sector – Unorganized sector comprises broadly: enterprises engaging fewer than 10 workers and daily wage labourers – Apex Court in Municipal Corporation of India v. Female Workers (Muster Roll) and Hamsaanandini Nanduri v. Union of India, 2026 SCC OnLine SC 402, recognized the importance of extending social security benefits including maternity benefit to women in the unorganized workforce – While organized sectors are amenable to regulatory intervention, the unorganized sector requires a more facilitative and sensitization-oriented mechanism to bring women workers within the ambit of the policy [Paras 19–22].

Decision: Writ petition disposed of – State of Karnataka directed to strictly implement the Menstrual Leave Policy pending enactment of the Karnataka Menstrual Leave and Hygiene Bill, 2025 – Upon enactment, Rules to be framed without undue delay – In the interregnum, State to issue guidelines, circulars and administrative instructions for uniform implementation across organized and unorganized sectors.

Matrimonial Law – Cruelty – Section 13(1)(ia) HMA – Divorce Decree Set Aside – Marriage solemnized on 11.11.1997; parties separated from 11.04.2004; husband filed for divorce in January 2006 alleging cruelty; wife filed for restitution of conjugal rights in August 2008 – Family Court allowed the divorce petition and dismissed the restitution petition by judgment dated 28.11.2011 – On appeal, the Division Bench finds that none of the three primary incidents of cruelty alleged by the respondent-husband (dated 11.05.2003, 11.04.2004 and 05.07.2005) were established by cogent, corroborated evidence – Held: Divorce decree set aside; respondent's subsequent remarriage does not deter the Court from passing the order [Paras 1–53].

Cruelty – Proof – Cumulative Effect – Burden of Proof on Petitioner – Cruelty under Section 13(1)(ia) HMA must be of such gravity that it makes it reasonably impossible for the aggrieved spouse to live with the other – Instances of cruelty are to be considered in their cumulative effect and not in isolation – Mere trivial irritations and ordinary wear and tear of married life do not constitute cruelty – The burden of proving cruelty lies on the petitioner who alleges it; the standard of proof is preponderance of probability and not proof beyond reasonable doubt – Held: Family Court erroneously shifted the burden of proof onto the appellant-wife and drew adverse inferences against her without compelling reasons [Paras 26–47, 51].

Section 73 Evidence Act – Handwriting Comparison – Procedural Fairness – Natural Justice – The Family Court invoked Section 73 of the Evidence Act at the conclusion of final arguments, asking the parties to write lines for comparison purposes without informing them of the purpose or the provision being invoked – Adverse inference was then drawn against the appellant for her hesitance in providing her handwriting – Held: Exercise of power under Section 73 requires that parties be informed as a prerequisite of procedural fairness; comparison must be undertaken sparingly and supplemented by expert opinion where the document is of substantial consequence; conducting comparison covertly and drawing adverse inference for resistance, without informing the party that the handwriting will be used for comparison, is against the principles of natural and fair justice and cannot be sustained – Such exercise was an attempt to support the view already taken by the Court rather than a fair procedure to reach the truth [Paras 33–37].

Medical Evidence – Cruelty – Insufficient Proof – The MLC issued by AIIMS in respect of the incident dated 05.07.2005 was silent on the identity of the assailant and the manner of assault – Medical records at best established that the respondent suffered injuries due to an assault, but did not establish that the injuries were inflicted by the appellant or her family members – No police investigation reports, police call records or independent witness supported the respondent's version – Self-serving testimony of the petitioner alone, without corroboration, is insufficient to establish cruelty – Held: Reasoning of the Family Court based solely on the respondent's testimony and medical documents is improper and inadequate [Paras 38–42].

Decision: Appeal allowed – Impugned judgment and Decree of Divorce dated 28.11.2011 passed by the Family Court, Rohini Courts, Delhi set aside – No relief sought in respect of the disposal of the restitution petition under Section 9 HMA; findings thereon not disturbed – Pending applications disposed of.