Section 528 BNSS | High Court Cannot Exercise Inherent Powers To Circumvent Statutory Bar Against Second Revision: Delhi High Court

"It is trite that what is explicitly prohibited by law cannot be allowed backdoor entry by invoking inherent powers, but this principle is subject to a harmonious understanding that where the High Court, called upon to invoke inherent powers is satisfied that the impugned order is clearly without jurisdiction or abuse of process or there is gross injustice, the High Court would be justified in rarest of rare cases to invoke inherent powers and interfere," Delhi High Court, in a significant ruling dated September 23, 2026, held that a petitioner cannot invoke the inherent powers of the High Court under Section 528 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita (BNSS) to challenge an order that has already been subject to revisional scrutiny by the Court of Sessions.

Justice Girish Kathpalia observed that since Section 438(3) BNSS bars a second revision, the High Court must exercise extreme caution to prevent the "backdoor entry" of prohibited proceedings while ensuring that inherent powers are reserved only for instances of gross injustice.

The petitioner had filed a complaint against a hospital and its medical staff under Section 175(3) BNSS (erstwhile Section 156(3) CrPC), alleging medical negligence that led to the death of his wife during the Covid-19 pandemic. The Magistrate dismissed the application for a police-led investigation and instead proceeded to record pre-summoning evidence under Section 200 CrPC, a decision which was subsequently upheld by the Court of Sessions in its revisional jurisdiction.

The primary question before the court was whether a petition under Section 528 BNSS is maintainable when the party has already unsuccessfully availed of the remedy of revision under Section 438(3) BNSS. The court also examined whether the denial of a police investigation in cases of alleged medical negligence, where the complainant is already in possession of the facts, constitutes "gross injustice" warranting the invocation of inherent powers.

Court's Observations and Judgment

The Court emphasized that the legislative intent behind the bar on second revisions, as enacted in Section 438(3) BNSS, is to prevent procedural delays and the abuse of judicial processes. The bench noted that while the High Court’s inherent powers under Section 528 BNSS are wide, they are not untrammeled and must be exercised sparingly.

Scope of Inherent Powers

The court clarified that the principles governing the interplay between Section 397(3) and Section 482 of the erstwhile CrPC remain applicable to the BNSS framework. Citing the Supreme Court’s decision in Krishnan & Anr. vs Krishnaveni & Anr., the bench underscored that inherent powers cannot be utilized as a tool to circumvent statutory prohibitions. If exercised in a routine manner, the specific legislative bar against successive revisions would be rendered redundant.

"Grant of directions to register FIR and investigate here would be gross injustice to the accused persons, who would be arm-twisted on the basis of those directions and would be compelled to settle what appears to be only a civil dispute, synthetically tainted with criminality. Nothing can be more abuse of process."

No Gross Injustice Established

The court reasoned that the petitioner was not left without a remedy, as his original complaint remained pending before the Magistrate for pre-summoning evidence. Because the petitioner had full knowledge of the identity of the accused and the specific facts of the case, the refusal to order a mandatory police investigation did not constitute a failure of justice. The court noted that if the Magistrate requires further assistance during the trial, provisions under Section 225 BNSS remain available to direct police inquiry at a later stage.

The High Court held that since the petitioner failed to demonstrate a "rarest of rare case" or an instance of gross miscarriage of justice, the petition was not maintainable. Consequently, the challenge to the lower court's order was dismissed, reaffirming that the inherent jurisdiction of the High Court cannot be invoked as a substitute for a second revision petition.

Date of Decision: 23 September 2026