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by sayum
03 October 2026 8:36 AM
"The mere fact that the transport was not accompanied by any documents cannot lead to a presumption that the transport was for slaughter. The absence of documents to validate the transportation, if it is in violation of any statute, then the consequences should flow from that statute and cannot lead to an assumption of violation of the provisions of the Act." Supreme Court held that the reverse burden of proof under the Chhattisgarh Agricultural Cattle Preservation Act, 2004, cannot be invoked without first establishing the essential ingredients of the offence.
A bench of Justices J.B. Pardiwala and K. Vinod Chandran observed that the mere lack of transit documentation for cattle does not inherently establish an intent or knowledge that the animals were being transported for slaughter.
Strict Interpretation Of Statutory Offences
The appellant had challenged his conviction under Section 6 of the Act, which prohibits the transport of cattle for the purpose of slaughter, and Section 10, which prescribes the penalty. While the Trial, Appellate, and Revisional courts had previously upheld the conviction, the Supreme Court found the prosecution's case fundamentally lacking in the necessary evidence to sustain a criminal conviction under this specific statute.
Establishing The Threshold For Prosecution
The core legal issue before the Court was whether the prosecution could rely on the reverse burden under Section 11 of the Act without first proving that the cattle were being transported specifically for the purpose of slaughter. The Court sought to determine if the presumption of guilt could be triggered merely by the fact of transport and the absence of accompanying documentation.
Section 11 Reverse Burden Requirements
The Supreme Court clarified that the reverse burden cast upon the accused under Section 11 is not absolute and does not operate in a vacuum. It applies only after the prosecution successfully establishes the essential ingredients of the alleged offence before the Trial Court. Without evidence linking the transport to the act of slaughter, the burden of proof cannot be shifted to the accused.
Prosecution Fails To Prove Intent To Slaughter
"Section 6 specifically indicates the offence of transportation of cattle for the purpose of slaughter or knowledge that such cattle are likely to be slaughtered. But for a mere presumption of such intention, by the Head Constable, PW3, there is nothing on record to show that the cattle were carried for slaughter."
The bench emphasized that the mere interception of a vehicle by police, even when accompanied by the seizure of cattle, does not automatically constitute a violation of the Act. The prosecution failed to provide substantial evidence to establish that the cattle were intended for slaughter, relying instead on assumptions derived from the circumstances of the seizure.
Agricultural Fitness Of Cattle Confirmed
The Court placed significant weight on the expert testimony provided during the trial. A Veterinary Doctor confirmed through a formal report that the animals were fit and suitable for agricultural purposes such as ploughing, which was further corroborated by the President of the local Gaushala Committee.
"We find absolutely no reason to uphold the conviction especially when a Veterinary Doctor and the President of Gaushala Committee categorically stated before Court that the cattle seized by PW3 were fit and good for use in agriculture like for ploughing."
Consequences Must Flow From The Relevant Statute
The Court held that if the transportation was deficient in documentation, any legal consequence must flow from the specific statute governing such documentation. It cannot be used as a shortcut to infer a violation of the Cattle Preservation Act, as the law requires a distinct link to the act of slaughter for an offence to be made out under the Act.
Setting Aside The Conviction
Finding no legal basis to sustain the conviction, the Supreme Court set aside the impugned order of the High Court, as well as the orders of conviction and sentence passed by the Trial Court and the First Appellate Court. The appeal was accordingly allowed, resulting in the acquittal of the appellant.
Date of Decision: 29 September 2026