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by sayum
23 February 2026 11:09 AM
"The Ratio In Ravindra Kumar Extends Only To The Illegality of The Search and Not To Automatic Quashing of The Complaint", Today, On February 23, 2026, the Supreme Court of India delivered a ruling of significant jurisprudential importance — not merely for cases under the Pre-Conception and Pre-Natal Diagnostic Techniques (Prohibition of Sex Selection) Act, 1994, but for the broader law of precedent in India.
A bench of Justice Manoj Misra and Justice Ujjal Bhuyan, while following the coordinate bench decision in Ravindra Kumar vs. State of Haryana (2024 SCC Online SC 2495) on the illegality of a search ordered by a single member of the District Appropriate Authority, held that the final relief of quashing granted in Ravindra Kumar was not part of its ratio decidendi — it was a fact-specific direction that cannot be mechanically transplanted to every case where a similar search illegality is found. The Court held that in the present case, independent evidence of statutory violations existed beyond the tainted search, making quashing of the complaint impermissible.
Dr. Naresh Kumar Garg, a radiologist at Vatika Medicare, Gurugram, was subjected to a sting operation on September 17, 2015, following which both an FIR and, subsequently, a statutory complaint under the PCPNDT Act were lodged against him. The complaint alleged violations of Sections 4, 5, 6, and 29 of the PCPNDT Act read with Rules 9 and 10 of the PCPNDT Rules — principally the failure to maintain mandatory Form F records during ultrasonography conducted on a decoy pregnant patient. After being discharged from the FIR proceedings, Dr. Garg challenged the complaint before the Punjab and Haryana High Court under Section 482 CrPC. The High Court dismissed the petition, and he appealed to the Supreme Court.
The central plank of his challenge before the Supreme Court was the decision in Ravindra Kumar vs. State of Haryana — a coordinate bench decision of the Supreme Court — which had quashed both an FIR and a complaint in a strikingly similar PCPNDT sting operation in Gurugram, also ordered by the very same Civil Surgeon, under the very same notification constituting the District Appropriate Authority. The appellant argued that Ravindra Kumar was on all fours with his case and compelled the same result — quashing of the complaint.
What exactly did Ravindra Kumar decide, and what is its binding ratio?
The Court undertook a careful and analytical reading of Ravindra Kumar to extract its true ratio decidendi — a question that goes to the heart of how Indian courts identify and apply precedent. In Ravindra Kumar, the Supreme Court had held, after examining Section 30(1) of the PCPNDT Act, that the decision to authorize a search must be that of the District Appropriate Authority collectively and not of any individual member including the Chairperson. "If a single member of the appropriate authority authorizes a search, it will be completely illegal being contrary to sub-section (1) of Section 30." This was the legal principle — the ratio — established in that case.
However, the two-judge bench in Ravindra Kumar had gone further. After finding the search illegal, it had examined the FIR and the complaint and concluded that these were "based entirely on the materials seized during the search" and that "except for what was found in the search and the seized documents, there was nothing to connect the appellant accused with the offence under Section 23 of the PCPNDT Act." On that factual finding — that there was no evidence independently connecting the accused to the offence beyond the tainted search — the bench had quashed both the FIR and the complaint.
The present bench drew a precise and important distinction between these two components of the Ravindra Kumar decision. It held: "The ratio in Ravindra Kumar, which is a two-Judge Bench decision of this Court, is that the decision to authorize a search under sub-section (1) of Section 30 must be that of the appropriate authority collectively. If a single member of the appropriate authority, and that includes the Chairperson, authorizes a search, it will be illegal being contrary to sub-section (1) of Section 30. Such a decision would vitiate the search rendering the same illegal. This is the ratio in Ravindra Kumar. The relief granted or the final directions issued are on the facts of the case and are not part of the ratio decidendi."
What distinguishes the present case from Ravindra Kumar on facts?
Having identified the true ratio of Ravindra Kumar as confined to the illegality of the search, the Court proceeded to examine whether the present case was factually identical in the one crucial respect that had led to the quashing in Ravindra Kumar — namely, whether the entire case against the accused rested exclusively on materials seized during the illegal search, with nothing independent connecting him to the statutory violation.
The Court found that the present case was materially different. Unlike in Ravindra Kumar, the present case involved independent and uncontested evidence of statutory violations under the PCPNDT Act. It was not disputed that Dr. Garg had conducted ultrasonography on the decoy patient. The allegations of non-maintenance of Form F, non-signing of the ultrasound report, and the absence of any register entry for the patient were corroborated not merely by seized documents but also by the accounts of witnesses and the police's own discharge application — which had itself acknowledged the record maintenance discrepancies and pointed towards the PCPNDT complaint mechanism. The violations of Rules 9 and 10 and the proviso to Section 4(3) of the Act were, therefore, matters of independent evidence not wholly dependent on the legality or illegality of the search.
The Court observed: "While there is infraction of Section 30 of the PCPNDT Act qua the search carried out by the respondents on Vatika Medicare... we are however of the view that the evidence collected in the course of the search in the form of the seized record etc cannot be discarded altogether, like the baby with the bath water." The seized records, Form F non-compliance, and registration lapses remained admissible evidence subject to the rules of relevancy and the test of admissibility at trial.
What is the correct legal consequence of an illegal search under the PCPNDT Act?
The Court articulated a clear and graduated framework for understanding the consequences of an illegal search in the PCPNDT context. The illegality of the search has two established consequences under Indian law, as laid down in Radha Kishan vs. State of Uttar Pradesh (AIR 1963 SC 822): first, the search could have been resisted at the time by the person whose premises were being searched; second, the court may examine the seizure evidence with greater care at trial. "But beyond these two consequences no further consequence ensues."
The Court firmly refused to adopt the position that an illegal search automatically contaminates and renders inadmissible all evidence gathered during it — a position that would align Indian law with the American exclusionary rule under the Fourth Amendment. Instead, the Court applied the settled constitutional position under Indian evidence law, as laid down by the Constitution Bench in Pooran Mal vs. Director of Inspection (Investigation), New Delhi (1974) 1 SCC 345, that the Indian Evidence Act "does not exclude relevant evidence on the ground that it was obtained under an illegal search or seizure" and that "unless there is an express or necessarily implied prohibition in law, evidence obtained as a result of illegal search or seizure is not liable to be shut out."
This meant that the PCPNDT complaint, grounded in statutory violations of Form F and record-keeping obligations — violations that the seized documents and independent testimony bore witness to — could not be quashed merely because the search that led to their discovery was illegal. The complaint must proceed to trial, where all questions of admissibility and reliability of the evidence would fall to be determined by the Magistrate in accordance with law.
The Jurisprudential Significance — Ratio Decidendi vs. Relief Granted
The Court's analysis in this case makes a contribution of lasting value to Indian precedent law. The principle it articulates — that the "relief granted or the final directions issued are on the facts of the case and are not part of the ratio decidendi" — is a restatement of fundamental doctrine on what constitutes a binding precedent under Article 141 of the Constitution of India, but in the specific and practically significant context of PCPNDT enforcement.
The consequence of this ruling is profound for courts across the country. A mechanistic application of Ravindra Kumar — treating the quashing of the complaint as the inevitable and automatic consequence of any illegal search under Section 30 of the PCPNDT Act — would now be impermissible. Courts faced with such situations are required to apply the ratio (illegality of search) and then conduct an independent factual inquiry: is the complaint based entirely and exclusively on materials seized during the illegal search, with nothing else connecting the accused to the offence? If the answer is yes, Ravindra Kumar would apply in full. If the answer is no — if there is independent evidence of statutory violations — the complaint survives.
This nuanced approach preserves the integrity of PCPNDT enforcement while simultaneously insisting on the rule of law in the conduct of searches and sting operations by the Appropriate Authority. It sends a dual message: authorities must comply with the collective decision-making mandate of Section 30(1) when authorizing searches, but their failure to do so will not automatically gift impunity to those who violate the Act's record-keeping obligations.
The Broader Legal Principle and Its Application
The Court also addressed a related point of considerable importance regarding Rule 18A of the PCPNDT Rules. The appellant argued that guidelines contained in Rule 18A regarding the composition of the advisory committee and the conduct of appropriate authorities were mandatory in character, violations of which would render the entire complaint proceedings void. The Court rejected this, holding that Rule 18A lays down a "general code of conduct" for appropriate authorities, the provisions of which "can only be termed as directory being part of the general code of conduct." A violation thereof "may render a proceeding irregular but not illegal." The Court drew a clear distinction between mandatory statutory provisions whose breach renders proceedings void — such as Section 30(1) on the collective search authorization — and directory guidelines whose breach may make proceedings irregular but does not invalidate them.
This distinction between the mandatory and directory character of statutory provisions, and the corresponding difference between proceedings being "illegal" versus "irregular," adds another layer of doctrinal clarity to PCPNDT enforcement law.
The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal and declined to quash the complaint. In doing so, it delivered a precedent of enduring significance: the quashing of a complaint in Ravindra Kumar was a fact-specific relief granted because the entire case against the accused there rested exclusively on materials gathered in an illegal search. That relief is not the ratio of the case and cannot be mechanically applied wherever a search illegality is found. The ratio of Ravindra Kumar — that a search authorized by a single member of the District Appropriate Authority is illegal — remains fully binding and was applied in the present case. But where independent evidence of statutory violations exists beyond the tainted search, the complaint survives. Courts must carefully examine what a judgment truly holds as a matter of legal principle and what it directs as a matter of factual outcome — the two are not always the same, and confusing them can have grave consequences for the enforcement of vital social legislation like the PCPNDT Act.
Date of Decision: February 23, 2026
