Leave Without Pay Is Not Condonation Of Misconduct: Punjab & Haryana High Court Restores Dismissal Of Absentee Constable

“Adjustment Of Absence For Record-Keeping Does Not Dilute Dismissal” – In a significant pronouncement reaffirming strict discipline in police service, the Punjab and Haryana High Court has held that treating a period of unauthorised absence as “leave without pay” or “non-duty period” does not amount to condonation of misconduct and cannot invalidate an order of dismissal.

Justice Virinder Aggarwal allowed the Regular Second Appeal filed by the State, set aside the judgment of the First Appellate Court, and restored the Trial Court’s decision upholding dismissal of a Constable who had remained wilfully absent for 4 months and 19 days.

The Court also rejected the plea of double punishment under Article 20(2) of the Constitution, holding that denial of wages on the principle of “no work no pay” is not a disciplinary penalty.

Four Months And Nineteen Days Of Wilful Absence

The respondent, a Constable in Punjab Police, remained unauthorisedly absent for 4 months and 19 days without prior sanction. A departmental enquiry was conducted under the Punjab Police Rules, 1934, and the charge of wilful absence was proved.

The Senior Superintendent of Police, Bathinda, passed an order dated 15.01.1992 dismissing the respondent from service. In the same order, the authority directed that the absence period be treated as “non-duty period, without pay,” keeping in view pensionary entitlements.

While the Trial Court dismissed the Constable’s civil suit challenging the dismissal, the First Appellate Court reversed the decision, holding that once the absence period had been treated as leave without pay, the misconduct stood condoned, rendering dismissal unsustainable.

The State challenged this finding in second appeal.

Scope Of Second Appeal Under Punjab Courts Act

At the outset, the High Court clarified that in Punjab and Haryana, second appeals are governed by Section 41 of the Punjab Courts Act, 1918, and not Section 100 CPC.

Relying on Pankajakshi v. Chandrika and subsequent Supreme Court rulings, the Court held that no substantial question of law is required to be framed and interference is permissible where findings are perverse or based on misapplication of law.

“Leave Without Pay Is Administrative Regulation, Not Forgiveness”

Rejecting the reasoning of the First Appellate Court, Justice Aggarwal held that the treatment of absence as non-duty without pay was not an act of condonation but merely an administrative adjustment.

The Court observed that leave without pay serves a limited dual purpose: it denies wages for the period not worked and ensures correct maintenance of service records for pensionary or statutory benefits.

The Court categorically held:

“Leave without pay is thus neither an act of forgiveness nor an act of exoneration. It is an administrative regularisation for record-keeping, not a disciplinary condonation of misconduct.”

Reading the dismissal order as a whole, the Court found no indication that the disciplinary authority intended to continue the employee in service or condone the misconduct. The operative portion clearly stated dismissal from service, followed by treatment of absence as non-duty without pay.

The Court rejected the artificial distinction drawn by the First Appellate Court between contemporaneous and subsequent adjustment of leave, holding that “the timing of such adjustment whether in the same order or subsequently is immaterial. What is relevant is the intent, which is administrative and not condonatory.”

Supreme Court Precedents Misapplied By First Appellate Court

The High Court relied heavily on State of M.P. v. Harihar Gopal, where the Supreme Court held that post-termination adjustment of leave does not invalidate termination and is intended only to maintain correct service records.

Quoting the Apex Court, Justice Aggarwal reiterated that an order granting leave after termination does not imply withdrawal or invalidation of dismissal.

The Court further noted that the principle laid down in Harihar Gopal has been reaffirmed in Maan Singh v. Union of India and State of Punjab v. Charanjit Singh.

The precedents relied upon by the First Appellate Court, including Om Parkash and Ram Phal, were held distinguishable, as those cases involved subsequent conduct amounting to conversion or withdrawal of dismissal, which was not the situation in the present case.

The High Court concluded that the First Appellate Court had “misread and misapplied the binding precedent” and its findings were legally unsustainable.

Rule 16.2(1) Of Punjab Police Rules: Police Discipline On Higher Pedestal

Emphasising the special discipline required in police service, the Court examined Rule 16.2(1) of the Punjab Police Rules, 1934, which permits dismissal for the gravest acts of misconduct, even on the basis of a single act.

Relying on State of Punjab v. Ram Singh, the Court held that prolonged and wilful unauthorised absence strikes at the root of discipline and operational readiness.

Justice Aggarwal observed that police discipline stands “on a higher pedestal than ordinary civil service” and that leniency in cases of wilful absenteeism would undermine public confidence and operational efficiency.

Once the departmental enquiry established wilfulness, the misconduct stood complete, and dismissal could not be termed disproportionate.

No Double Jeopardy: “No Work No Pay” Is Not A Penalty

The respondent argued that treating the absence period as non-duty without pay, coupled with dismissal, amounted to double punishment in violation of Article 20(2).

Rejecting this plea, the Court held that declaration of absence as non-duty is not a disciplinary penalty but a natural consequence of the principle of “no work no pay.”

Citing State of U.P. v. Madhav Prasad Sharma, the Court reiterated:

“Denial of salary on the ground of ‘no work no pay’ cannot be treated as a penalty… There is no question of awarding two punishments in respect of one charge.”

The doctrine of double jeopardy applies only where two distinct penalties are imposed under disciplinary rules. In the present case, only one punishment—dismissal—was imposed.

Liberty To Seek Conversion To Premature Retirement

While upholding the dismissal, the Court clarified that it does not sit as a disciplinary authority and cannot substitute the punishment unless it is shockingly disproportionate.

However, noting that the disciplinary authority had considered pensionary entitlements, the Court granted liberty to the respondent to submit a representation seeking conversion of dismissal into premature or compulsory retirement.

The competent authority was directed to consider such representation within three months, independently and objectively.

Administrative Adjustment Cannot Undermine Discipline

The ruling firmly settles that administrative treatment of absence for service record purposes does not amount to condonation of misconduct. Police discipline cannot be diluted by misconstruing record-keeping directions as acts of forgiveness.

By restoring the dismissal and terming the First Appellate Court’s findings as perverse and contrary to statutory mandate, the High Court has reinforced the principle that wilful absence in uniformed service is grave misconduct warranting strict consequences.

Date of Decision: 16 February 2026