Temporary Residence Is Not A Fleeing Address: Calcutta High Court Reinstates Wife’s DV Case And Rebukes Hyper-Technical Jurisdiction Objection

“Second Part Of Section 482 Saves The Inherent Power To Secure The Ends Of Justice” – Calcutta High Court delivered a significant pronouncement clarifying the scope of Section 482 Cr.P.C. in proceedings under the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 and the true meaning of “temporary residence” under Section 27 of the Act.

Dr. Justice Ajoy Kumar Mukherjee set aside the appellate order of the City Sessions Court which had directed return of the wife’s application under Section 12 of the DV Act on the ground of lack of territorial jurisdiction. Restoring the Magistrate’s order, the Court held that the challenge was maintainable under Section 482 Cr.P.C. and that the wife’s Kolkata residence could not be dismissed as a mere “fleeing address.”

The judgment stands as a reminder that beneficial legislation cannot be frustrated by procedural technicalities.

Driven Out, Sheltered In Kolkata, Denied Jurisdiction

The petitioner-wife alleged that after her marriage in 2013, she was subjected to dowry-related cruelty and ultimately forced to leave her matrimonial home. She took shelter in a rented accommodation within Taltala Police Station, Kolkata, and initiated proceedings under Sections 498A/406/506/34 IPC as well as an application under Section 12 of the DV Act seeking protection, residence and monetary relief.

The Magistrate, upon considering documents such as Aadhaar Card, residence certificate, leave and licence agreement and evidence of service of court notices at the Kolkata address, upheld territorial jurisdiction.

However, the Sessions Court reversed this finding and directed return of the application, observing that the petitioner was actually a resident of Purba Medinipur and that the Kolkata address was merely arranged to attract jurisdiction.

Challenging this order, the wife invoked the inherent jurisdiction of the High Court.

“Not An Interlocutory Order” – Section 482 Cr.P.C. Held Maintainable

A preliminary objection was raised that proceedings under Section 12 of the DV Act are predominantly civil in nature and hence a petition under Section 482 Cr.P.C. was not maintainable.

Rejecting this argument, the Court relied on the Supreme Court decision in Sourabh Kumar Tripathi v. Vidhi Rawal, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1158, where it was held:

“The second part of Section 482 saves the inherent power of the High Court to prevent the abuse of the process of any Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice.”

The High Court observed that the impugned order directing return of the application substantially affected the petitioner’s rights and could not be termed an “interlocutory order.” Referring to Amar Nath v. State of Haryana and Madhu Limaye v. State of Maharashtra, the Court reiterated that an order which touches vital rights of the parties falls outside the bar of Section 397(2) Cr.P.C.

The Court categorically held that the present challenge attracted the second limb of Section 482, since the issue involved prevention of abuse of process and securing the ends of justice.

“Temporary Residence” Means A Real Shelter, Not A Casual Visit

The central controversy revolved around Section 27 of the DV Act, which permits filing of proceedings where the aggrieved person “permanently or temporarily resides” or where the cause of action arises.

Relying on Sarod Kumar Pandey v. Mamta Pandey, the Court noted:

“A temporary residence… must be a temporary dwelling place of the person who has for the time being decided to make the place as his home… this cannot be considered a place where the person has gone on a casual visit, or a fleeing visit… simply for the purpose of filing case.”

Applying this test, the Court found that the petitioner had placed material on record showing she had received court notices at the Kolkata address and had furnished documentary proof of residence. There was no evidence to show that she visited the address merely to institute litigation.

The Court found no basis to brand the address as a “fleeing address” and held that the materials did not indicate any artificial creation of jurisdiction.

“Economic Abuse” Is A Continuing Wrong – Cause Of Action Persists

Significantly, the Court examined the concept of “cause of action” under Section 27(1)(c). The wife had alleged that despite sufficient income, the husband had failed to maintain her and their child.

Quoting Section 3 of the DV Act, the Court observed that “economic abuse” includes deprivation of financial resources and maintenance. The Court held:

“‘Economic abuse’ inter alia includes deprivation of financial or economic resources… and such claim is a continuing one which continues from day to day.”

The judgment clarified that continuity of shared residence is not a sine qua non where economic abuse persists. Even if certain documents supporting temporary residence were subsequent, the recurring deprivation of maintenance constituted a continuing cause of action within the jurisdiction of the Kolkata court.

Appellate Court’s Interference Held Perverse

The High Court noted that the Magistrate had passed a reasoned order after examining documentary evidence. The Sessions Court, however, substituted its own view without cogent or overwhelming circumstances.

The impugned order was declared to be “based on perverse finding” and liable to be set aside.

The High Court restored the Magistrate’s order dated 14.07.2022 and directed the trial court to proceed with the application under Section 12 of the DV Act.

The Calcutta High Court’s ruling reinforces three vital principles. First, that the High Court’s inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 Cr.P.C. remains available to prevent abuse of process in DV proceedings. Second, that “temporary residence” under Section 27 of the DV Act must be interpreted pragmatically and not reduced to a technical barrier. Third, that “economic abuse” is a continuing wrong, generating a continuing cause of action.

By holding that temporary residence is not synonymous with a “fleeing address,” the Court has ensured that victims of domestic violence are not denied access to justice on hyper-technical jurisdictional grounds.

Date of Decision: 18 February 2026