DV Act | Right to Residence Not Right to Re-Entry into Every Past Home: Delhi High Court Declines Wife’s Claim Over Old Matrimonial Property

“Shared Household Must Exist in Praesenti, Not in Memory of Past Co-habitation” – No Residence Order for Re-entry Under DV Act When Voluntary Shift to Alternate Home Is Proven. In a ruling delivered on 9th February 2026, the Delhi High Court dismissed a petition filed by an 81-year-old woman seeking restoration of her residence in her former matrimonial home under the Domestic Violence Act, 2005, holding that she had consciously and voluntarily shifted to an alternate accommodation owned by her husband.

Justice Ravinder Dudeja, affirming concurrent findings of the Magistrate and the Sessions Court, held that “shared household” under Section 2(s) of the DV Act must be a subsisting and current arrangement, not merely a property once occupied.

“The premises at Green Park, though previously occupied by the petitioner after marriage, do not qualify as a ‘shared household’ in praesenti... She voluntarily and consciously shifted in April 2023 to an alternate residence... Consequently, the alleged denial of re-entry does not, in the facts of the case, constitute domestic violence,” the Court held.

Voluntary Shift to Alternate Accommodation Fatal to Claim Under Section 19

The petitioner, who had resided at the Green Park house since her marriage in 1964, claimed that her right to reside there could not be extinguished merely because she had moved out temporarily for medical reasons. However, the Court found that her shift to another house at Safdarjung Enclave was not temporary but conscious, voluntary and settled.

“If the shifting was only temporary, she would not have affixed the name plate showing her name outside the Safdarjung property,” observed the Court.

The petitioner had filed a complaint under Section 12 of the DV Act alleging mental and economic abuse, after she was denied re-entry into the Green Park house upon attempting to return in July 2023. However, both the Magistrate and the Appellate Court had found that the alternate property at Safdarjung Enclave, also owned by her husband, was suitable accommodation, and that she was not rendered shelterless, which is the core protective object of Sections 17 and 19 of the DV Act.

Statutory Scheme Protects Against Dispossession, Not Grants a Perpetual Right to Re-occupy

The Court referred to the Supreme Court’s ruling in Satish Chander Ahuja v. Sneha Ahuja (2021) 1 SCC 414, clarifying that “shared household” is a fact-sensitive concept that must exist in praesenti, and not survive merely in the memory of past cohabitation.

“The statute does not confer an indefeasible right to insist upon residence in a particular property when suitable alternate accommodation of the same standard is available,” held Justice Dudeja.

He further noted that even under Section 17, which confers a right to reside in the shared household, that right does not equate to a right of re-entry once the premises has been voluntarily left.

No Evidence of Domestic Violence or Economic Abuse – Protective Statute Cannot Be Weaponized

The Court strongly rebuked the attempt to convert a property dispute into a domestic violence proceeding, reiterating that the object of the DV Act is to prevent deprivation of shelter, not to enforce property rights.

“The DV Act secures protection against dispossession; it does not compel reinstatement into a residence abandoned by choice,” the Court observed.

It found no evidence of forcible dispossession, coercion, or economic abuse. On the contrary, the petitioner had filed multiple police complaints and court documents consistently showing her address as the Safdarjung property. The Court also took note of the photograph of a nameplate bearing her name affixed to the Safdarjung Enclave property.

Shared Household Requires Present and Substantive Co-residence

Drawing a clear distinction between past residence and present entitlement, the Court emphasized that:

“A shared household must be a subsisting sharehood in praesenti, not one surviving merely in historical memory.”

The petitioner’s reliance on her prior occupation of the Green Park home for over 30 years could not, by itself, entitle her to restoration, especially when she had willingly moved out and found alternate accommodation of equal status.

High Court Refrains from Interfering Under Section 482 Cr.P.C.

On the scope of interference, the Court reiterated the limited nature of jurisdiction under Section 482 Cr.P.C., citing the Supreme Court’s ruling in R.K. Vijayasarathy v. Sudha Seetharam (2019) 16 SCC 739.

“There is no perversity, illegality or jurisdictional error in the concurrent findings of the courts below… The petitioner is not roofless and the statutory object of the DV Act stands satisfied,” concluded the Court.

The judgment serves as a crucial precedent for determining when a woman’s right to residence under the DV Act ceases, especially in cases involving voluntary relocation and ongoing property disputes within families. It reinforces the principle that protective statutes must not be weaponized to achieve civil remedies, and residence rights under the DV Act are protective, not proprietary.

Date of Decision: 9th February 2026