Between ‘May Be True’ and ‘Must Be True’, There Exists a Long Distance: Karnataka High Court Upheld Acquittal in Child Sexual Assault Case

“Presumption of Innocence Strengthens Post Acquittal — Mere Suspicion Cannot Replace Proof” - In a significant judgment Karnataka High Court, comprising Justice Sreenivas Harish Kumar and Justice K.S. Hemalekha, dismissed a criminal appeal filed by the complainant, Ms. Suja Jones Mazurier, challenging the acquittal of her husband, Pascal Mazurier, accused of sexually assaulting their minor daughter. The Court, while refusing to interfere with the trial court’s acquittal, reaffirmed that “the presumption of innocence becomes even stronger once an acquittal is recorded and suspicion, however grave, can never take the place of legal proof.”

The judgment arose under Section 372 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, which empowers the victim to file an appeal against acquittal. The charges involved were under Sections 376(2)(f) and 377 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860, relating to rape of a minor and unnatural offences.

“Testimony of Victim Cannot Sustain Conviction When Found Tainted With Tutoring”

The High Court’s decision opened with a blunt observation on the unreliability of the victim’s testimony, noting — “The child herself admitted before the Court that she was tutored by her mother with promises of chocolates and picnics if she gave certain answers in Court.”

The Court elaborated that while it is a settled principle that the testimony of a victim of sexual assault can form the sole basis for conviction, “such testimony must be natural, spontaneous, truthful, and inspire confidence. When it is found to be influenced, coached, or inconsistent with material facts, the Court cannot rely upon it to convict.”

It further noted — “In this case, the victim’s testimony suffers from serious contradictions. Her recollection of the core incident was vague, yet she could remember irrelevant matters, such as vomiting salad or being hit with a stick, but failed to recollect critical life events like her school or friends.” This, the Court held, “is demonstrative of coached memory rather than an independent, truthful recollection.”

“Medical Evidence Fails To Corroborate Allegations – Symptoms Attributable to Non-Sexual Causes”

Dismissing the reliance on medical evidence, the Court highlighted — “The clinical findings reveal the presence of redness, Erythema, pustules, and bacterial infection — conditions frequently associated with common childhood ailments such as pinworms and urinary tract infections.”

The Court emphasized — “Doctors, including the pediatrician (PW-17) and gynecologist (PW-8), have unequivocally deposed that the absence of hymen could equally result from non-sexual causes like cycling, swimming, poor hygiene, or bacterial infections.”

It was further remarked — “The prosecution cannot ignore that medical practitioners themselves prescribed creams for bacterial and parasitic infections, and none of them made a conclusive statement associating these symptoms directly with sexual assault.”

“DNA Evidence Not Only Fails to Support Prosecution But Positively Contradicts It”

In one of the most damning observations against the prosecution’s case, the Court stated — “It is inexplicable that while the accused’s DNA was detected on the clothes and bedspreads, the victim’s DNA was entirely absent from the same items allegedly worn during the alleged act. If the child had indeed worn those clothes, the presence of her DNA in the form of epithelial cells, sweat, or skin particles is a scientific certainty. Its complete absence points to either manipulation or complete irrelevance of the materials seized.”

The Court underlined — “Moreover, the most relevant materials — the vaginal and anal swabs — tested negative for the accused’s DNA. This forensic conclusion irreparably shatters the prosecution’s theory of sexual assault.”

“Suppression Of Material Witness Geeta – Fatal To Prosecution’s Case”

Lambasting the failure of the prosecution to present the maid Geeta, the Court remarked — “The maid was present in the house at the relevant time and was privy to the events. The prosecution, despite having her statement recorded, chose not to examine her. This suppression cannot be overlooked. It attracts the adverse presumption under Section 114(g) of the Evidence Act — that if a party withholds the best available evidence, it is to be presumed that such evidence would have gone against them.”

In sharp terms, the Court observed — “When the only eyewitness capable of corroborating the mother’s version is kept away from the witness box, it amounts to a serious breach of prosecutorial obligation to assist the Court in reaching the truth.”

“Delayed Complaint And Pre-Litigation Consultation Suggest Motive Rooted In Custody Dispute”

The Court noted with disapproval — “The complainant met multiple NGOs, counselors, and advocates between 1st and 12th June 2012 — days before the alleged final incident on 13th June 2012 — seeking advice on the accused’s plan to relocate to South Africa with the children. This chain of pre-litigation consultations culminating in the drafting of a complaint even before the alleged crime points to a pre-meditated action aimed at securing custodial advantage rather than reporting a spontaneous grievance.”

The judgment remarked — “The delay from the first alleged abuse in April 2010 to filing a complaint in June 2012 remains unexplained except through the lens of ongoing marital discord and custody battles.”

“Suspicion, However Grave, Cannot Replace Proof — Trial Court’s Acquittal Fully Justified”

In concluding its findings, the Court firmly stated — “Suspicion, no matter how grave, can never be a substitute for legal proof. The prosecution is duty-bound to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt, failing which the accused is entitled to an acquittal as a matter of right, not charity.”

Referring to the Supreme Court’s pronouncement in Ranjit Hazarika v. State of Assam, (1998) 8 SCC 635, the Court reiterated — “The victim’s testimony, when found to be influenced, inconsistent, and unsupported by medical or forensic corroboration, cannot form the sole basis for conviction.”

The Court further emphasized — “Once a trial court records an acquittal, the presumption of innocence becomes doubly fortified, and interference by the appellate court is permissible only where the judgment of acquittal is perverse or wholly unsustainable in law. No such infirmity exists in this case.”

Delivering the operative part, the Court held — “For the foregoing reasons, we hold that the trial court was fully justified in acquitting the accused. We find no reason to interfere with the trial court’s judgment. Accordingly, the criminal appeal is dismissed.”

Date of Decision: 05th June 2025