Sole Eye-Witness Not Wholly Reliable, Conviction Cannot Stand: Orissa High Court Acquits Accused in Alleged Witchcraft Double Murder Case

“Where Evidence Falls in the Third Category, Corroboration Is Indispensable” In a significant ruling reaffirming the principles governing conviction on the basis of solitary testimony, the Orissa High Court has set aside the conviction of two appellants in a 1997 double murder case allegedly committed on suspicion of witchcraft.

A Division Bench comprising Justice Manash Ranjan Pathak and Justice Sashikanta Mishra held that the prosecution had failed to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt. The Court found the testimony of the sole eye-witness riddled with material contradictions and lacking corroboration, rendering it unsafe to sustain conviction under Sections 148, 302/149 and 120-B/149 IPC.

Alleged Double Murder on Suspicion of Witchcraft

The prosecution case alleged that on the midnight of 11.02.1997, the accused persons went to the house of deceased Asadu Munda and asked for ‘handia’. When Asadu opened the door holding a ‘dibiri’, he, his wife Budhini Munda, and their child were allegedly attacked. Asadu and Budhini succumbed to injuries, while the child survived.

The prosecution further alleged that the accused suspected the deceased couple of practising witchcraft and had conspired to eliminate them.

The trial court convicted six accused persons for offences under Sections 148, 302/149 and 120-B/149 IPC, sentencing them to life imprisonment. During pendency of the appeal, some accused died or were released, leaving the present appeal confined to two surviving appellants.

Law on Sole Witness: “Wholly Reliable or Corroboration Required”

The High Court began by reiterating the settled position that conviction can indeed be based on the testimony of a solitary witness, relying on Vadivelu Thevar v. State of Madras and Jose v. State of Kerala.

However, referring to Lallu Manjhi v. State of Jharkhand, the Court recalled the classification of oral testimony into three categories: “wholly reliable”, “wholly unreliable”, and “neither wholly reliable nor wholly unreliable.”

In the third category, corroboration in material particulars becomes necessary.

The Bench held that the present case squarely fell into the third category.

Material Contradictions Between FIR and Deposition

The prosecution’s case hinged almost entirely on the testimony of the informant (P.W.1), who claimed to be the sole eye-witness.

However, the Court found glaring discrepancies:

In the FIR, there was no mention of any actual assault. It merely stated that someone asked for ‘handia’, that a person holding a knife stood outside, and that villagers did not respond to calls for help.

In contrast, in Court, P.W.1 introduced an improved version alleging specific acts of assault and naming particular accused.

The Court noted that these omissions were material and were confronted through the Investigating Officer (P.W.13), who confirmed that such statements were not made earlier.

“Patently Unbelievable” Conduct Attributed to Deceased

The Bench found the conduct described by P.W.1 inherently improbable.

According to P.W.1, the deceased had initially shut the door after an attempted assault, but reopened it upon being assured by the accused that no harm would be caused.

The Court observed:

“It militates against normal human conduct that a person attempted to be assaulted by deadly weapons… would open the door again after managing to avert the assault.”

Similarly, the claim that P.W.1 escaped to the jungle while the accused were armed and present at the door was found doubtful.

The Court concluded that the trial court had “overlooked the aforementioned material contradictions and embellishment.”

Motive of Witchcraft: “Vague and Insufficient”

The prosecution attempted to establish motive through the testimony of P.W.2, P.W.3 and the Gramarakhi (P.W.9), alleging that the accused suspected the deceased of practising witchcraft.

However, the Court found that the evidence merely indicated vague discussions about witchcraft without establishing a definite nexus to a plan to murder.

The Bench noted that even P.W.9 stated that the issue had been “settled in the village,” thereby undermining the prosecution’s theory of motive.

Without a clear and convincing motive, and in absence of reliable eye-witness testimony, the prosecution case remained doubtful.

Conviction Set Aside: Benefit of Doubt Extended

The High Court held:

“The evidence of P.W.1, not being free from doubt and without corroboration, the trial Court was not correct in placing such heavy reliance on it.”

The prosecution was found to have failed in proving the case beyond reasonable doubt.

Accordingly, the appeal was allowed. The conviction and sentence under Sections 148, 302/149 and 120-B/149 IPC were set aside. Appellant No.2 (Jamadar @ Jayaprakash Laguri) and Appellant No.5 (Harish Laguri) were acquitted and directed to be released forthwith, if not required in any other case.

The judgment is a reaffirmation of a fundamental principle of criminal jurisprudence: while conviction can rest on a solitary witness, such testimony must be wholly reliable. Where the evidence is tainted by contradictions, improvements, and improbabilities—and remains uncorroborated—the benefit of doubt must necessarily go to the accused.

The ruling also underscores judicial caution in cases arising out of allegations of witchcraft, where social tensions and suspicions can cloud evidentiary clarity.

Date of Decision: 12 February 2026