A Promise That Law Itself Forbids Cannot Vitiate Consent: Supreme Court Quashes Rape Case Arising From Consensual Relationship With Married Woman

“Consent Does Not Vanish Merely Because a Relationship Turns Bitter”, Supreme Court of India, speaking through a Bench of Justice B.V. Nagarathna and Justice Ujjal Bhuyan, delivered a significant ruling in Pramod Kumar Navratna v. State of Chhattisgarh & Others, decisively addressing the growing misuse of rape provisions in cases of failed consensual relationships. The Court allowed the criminal appeal and quashed the FIR, charge-sheet, and entire criminal proceedings initiated under Section 376(2)(n) IPC, holding that the allegations, even if taken at face value, disclosed no offence of rape.

The judgment sends a strong message that criminal law cannot be weaponised to settle personal scores, particularly where the relationship was consensual and the prosecutrix herself was legally incapable of marriage due to a subsisting marriage.

The prosecutrix, an advocate by profession, was married in 2011 and had a son aged about ten years. Divorce proceedings initiated by her husband were dismissed in November 2024, and an appeal against that dismissal remained pending. Thus, her marriage was subsisting in law at all relevant times.

In September 2022, she came into contact with the appellant, also an advocate, at a social event. A relationship developed, and they remained in contact for over two years. In February 2025, she lodged FIR No. 213/2025 alleging that the appellant had repeatedly raped her on a false promise of marriage, leading to pregnancy and a forced abortion.

The appellant, asserting that the relationship was consensual and that he was being blackmailed into marriage, sought quashing of the FIR. While the High Court granted anticipatory bail, it refused to quash the proceedings, holding that questions of consent required trial. This refusal brought the matter before the Supreme Court.

“A Married Woman Cannot Be Deceived by a Promise the Law Prohibits”

At the heart of the case lay a critical question: Can consent be said to be vitiated by a promise of marriage when the prosecutrix herself was legally incapable of marrying?

The Supreme Court answered this in the negative, relying squarely on Section 5(i) of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 and Section 4(i) of the Special Marriage Act, 1954, both of which categorically prohibit marriage when a spouse is living.

The Court observed:

“Even for the sake of argument, if the contention of a false promise of marriage is accepted, such a promise would not be legally enforceable or even capable of being acted upon as the victim herself was not eligible for marriage.”

The Bench emphasised that the prosecutrix was fully aware of her marital status, had disclosed it to the appellant at the very inception, and being an advocate, could not claim ignorance of the statutory bar against bigamy.

“False Promise Is Not the Same as Breach of Promise”

Consent Under Section 90 IPC

Reiterating settled jurisprudence, the Court drew a sharp distinction between a false promise and a mere breach of promise, relying on Naim Ahamed v. State (NCT of Delhi) and Mahesh Damu Khare v. State of Maharashtra.

Justice Nagarathna, speaking for the Bench, underscored:

“For a promise to be a false promise amounting to misconception of fact, it must be shown that the promise was made from the very beginning with an intention to deceive the woman to persuade her to have a physical relationship.”

On facts, the Court found no material whatsoever indicating that the appellant never intended to marry from the inception or that sexual relations were obtained by fraud. On the contrary, the relationship extended over a considerable period and bore all the hallmarks of voluntary intimacy between consenting adults.

“Section 376(2)(n) Is Not Meant for Prolonged Consensual Relationships”

Scope of “Repeated Rape”

The Court gave a crucial interpretation to Section 376(2)(n) IPC, clarifying that the expression “repeatedly” contemplates multiple distinct acts of sexual assault, typically involving coercion, captivity, fear, or continued deception.

The Bench held:

“The provision is intended to address aggravated instances of sexual assault and not prolonged consensual relationships between adults which subsequently turn acrimonious.”

In the present case, the Court found no element of force, fear, or deception continuing from the inception, rendering Section 376(2)(n) wholly inapplicable.

“Criminal Law Cannot Be Used as a Tool of Vengeance”

Abuse of Process and Bhajan Lal Principles

Invoking the celebrated principles laid down in State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal, the Court concluded that the case fell squarely within the categories warranting quashment. Even accepting the FIR and charge-sheet at face value, no offence was made out, and continuation of the prosecution would amount to a gross abuse of the process of law.

The Court was particularly stern in cautioning against the growing tendency to criminalise failed relationships:

“To convert every soured relationship into an offence of rape not only trivialises the seriousness of the offence but also inflicts upon the accused indelible stigma and grave injustice.”

In a forthright and principled ruling, the Supreme Court set aside the High Court’s order dated 03.03.2025, and quashed FIR No. 213/2025, Charge-sheet No. 269/2025, and Sessions Case No. 89/2025. The Court reaffirmed that rape law is meant to punish sexual violence, not to adjudicate personal heartbreaks, and that consent between adults does not evaporate merely because expectations fail.

The judgment stands as a strong reminder that while the law must zealously protect genuine victims, it must also shield individuals from vindictive prosecutions that erode the credibility of criminal justice itself.

Date of Decision: 05 February 2026