Facts:

Don Ayengia, the appellant, entered an agreement with Nazimul Islam for building construction.

Ayengia paid Rs. 10,00,000 to Nazimul Islam, but the construction agreement was canceled.

A promissory note dated 13th August 2007 was executed, promising a refund within one month through post-dated cheques.

Cheques were dishonored twice, and Haren Mudoi acknowledged issuing them through an endorsement.

Mudoi later denied knowledge of dishonor and promised to pay the amount with fresh cheques.

Issues:

Whether the cheques issued were meant to discharge a debt or liability under Section 138.

Validity of Haren Mudoi's denial and promise to pay.

Held:

The execution of the promissory note and the endorsement by Mudoi were proven. Cheques were intended to discharge a debt or liability.( Para 10)

The existence of the debt/liability was acknowledged, and cheques were issued to give time for payment. The relationship between the liability and the cheques was direct.( Para 11)

The argument that Mudoi had no liability to liquidate the debt was rejected. Cheques were supported by consideration, and their presentation was logical upon non-payment.( Para 12)

The High Court erred in overturning the conviction without proper analysis. The Supreme Court allowed the appeals, setting aside the High Court's order and restoring the appellate court's decision.( Para 13)

Facts:

The appellant, the State of Rajasthan, appealed against the High Court's decision to alter the conviction of the respondent from Section 302 to Section 304 Part-I of the IPC.

The case involved the shooting of Mangla Ram, leading to his death, and subsequent legal proceedings against the accused-respondent.

Issues:

Whether the conviction of the respondent under Section 302 should be altered to Section 304 Part-I, IPC, as decided by the High Court.

The court also needed to consider the application of various sections of the Arms Act and the Penal Code.

Held:

The Supreme Court held that the Trial Court rightly convicted the respondent under Section 302, IPC, while the High Court erred in categorizing it as Section 304 Part-I, IPC.( Para 9)

The court criticized the High Court's reasoning, emphasizing the doctrine of transfer of malice and the importance of Section 301, IPC, in determining culpable homicide.( Para 10)

The court stated that the High Court failed to consider Section 301, IPC, and reiterated that the respondent knew his act was likely to cause death, rejecting the High Court's classification.( Para 11)

The Supreme Court, therefore, allowed the appeal, set aside the High Court's judgment, and restored the conviction and sentence passed by the Trial Court under Section 302, IPC, and other relevant sections of the Arms Act.( Para 12)

Referred Cases:

State of Andhra Pradesh Vs. Rayavarapu Punnayya, AIR 1977 SC 45

Facts:

The case involved appellants Tmt. Kasthuri Radhakrishnan and others as landlords and respondents M. Chinniyan and others as tenants.

Issues:

Differentiation of ownership in landlord-tenant litigation and title suits.

Interpretation of ownership in the context of rent control legislation.

Validity of an eviction petition under Sections 10(2) and 10(3)(a)(i) of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960.

Consideration of the necessity to implead all co-owners in an eviction petition.

Held:

The concept of ownership in a landlord-tenant litigation governed by rent control laws was distinguished from that in a title suit.

Ownership in rent control legislation was defined as the entitlement, in one's own legal right, to evict the tenant and retain control, hold, and use the premises for oneself.

It was clarified that proof of ownership in landlord-tenant litigation might not be sufficient to sustain a claim for ownership in a title suit.

The eviction petition filed by the appellants against the respondent was allowed, rejecting the High Court's assertion that the tenancy in relation to the suit premises was with an agent.

In the context of Sections 10(2) and 10(3)(a)(i) of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act 1960, it was held that it is not necessary to implead all co-owners in an eviction petition. The petition cannot be dismissed on the ground of non-joinder of the daughter of the deceased vendor.

The execution of a Power of Attorney was discussed, emphasizing that an agent always acts on behalf of the principal and does not receive any personal benefit. The appeal is accordingly allowed.

Referred Cases:

Christ Charitable Trust and Educational Charitable Society Vs. Ponniamman Educational Trust, (2012) 8 SCC 706

Dhannalal Vs. Kalawatibai, (2002) 6 SCC 16

Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Limited Vs. Dilbahar Singh, (2014) 9 SCC 78

Kanta Goel Vs. B.P. Pathak, (1977) 2 SCC 814

Pal Singh Vs. Sunder Singh, (1989) 1 SCC 444

Sheela Vs. Firm Prahlad Rai Prem Prakash, (2002) 3 SCC 375

Sri Ram Pasricha Vs. Jagannath, (1976) 4 SCC 184

State of Rajasthan Vs. Basant Nahata, (2005) 12 SCC 77

Suraj Lamp and Industries Private Limited 2 Vs. State of Haryana, (2012) 1 SCC 656

Facts:

The case involves a dispute between the Union of India and Mohanlal & Another regarding the procedures for the seizure, storage, and disposal of drugs and psychotropic substances under the National Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985.

Issues:

Lack of uniform practice or procedure among states and central agencies regarding the drawing of samples during seizures.

Conflict between statutory provisions and standing orders concerning the sampling of seized contraband.

Failure of the Central and State Governments to establish notified storage facilities for seized drugs, as prescribed in Standing Order 1189.

Held:

Section 52A(1) empowers the Central Government to prescribe procedures for seizure, storage, and disposal. Standing Order 1189, issued by the Central Government, prescribes the procedure for conducting seizures.

There is no uniform practice regarding the drawing of samples during seizures. The issue needs to be addressed given the seriousness of the offenses under the Act.

Section 52A(2)(c) mandates that samples be drawn in the presence of the Magistrate. The Act does not require samples to be taken at the time of seizure.

A conflict exists between statutory provisions and the standing order on the sampling issue. The Central Government is directed to re-examine and resolve the matter.

Application for sampling and certification must be made without undue delay. Magistrates should promptly attend to such applications in compliance with Section 52A(3).

Seized substances must be forwarded to the officer in charge of the nearest police station. Sampling should be done under the supervision of the magistrate.

The Act does not make specific provisions for the storage of contraband substances. Standing Order 1189 specifies requirements for storage facilities.

Storage in safes and vaults, under the supervision of designated officers, is mandated by Standing Order 1189. The failure to establish adequate storage facilities is considered criminal negligence.

The statutory mechanism for storage is in place, but there is a failure to implement it effectively.

There is a complete failure by the Central Government and State Governments in providing proper storage facilities.

The neglect is evident from the absence of specific registers and periodic inspections, highlighting a complete failure by officers.

Directions are issued to set up adequate storage facilities with effective supervisory and regulatory controls.

The Central and State Governments are given six months to establish exclusive storage facilities for seized substances.

Multiple storage facilities may be set up based on district requirements.

Section 52A, as amended, provides for the disposal of seized contraband. Notification dated January 16, 2015, identifies officers and procedures for disposal.

The notification does not expressly supersede Standing Order 1189, but the latter is considered superseded to the extent of any conflicting procedures.

Specific directions are provided for the disposal of contrabands based on the stage of legal proceedings.

Facts:

The Appellants were owners and landholders of vacant lands in Gujarat.

The Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976 came into force in August 1976.

Appellants filed returns as required under Section 6 of the Act in 1976.

Notifications were issued under Section 10(1) and 10(3) of the Act, declaring certain lands as excess land.

Landholders filed appeals, and the Urban Land Tribunal dismissed the appeal in 1988.

A corrigendum was allegedly issued in 1989, substituting different plot numbers.

Possession of the land was claimed to be taken over based on the corrigendum.

Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Repeal Act, 1999 came into force in March 1999.

Landholders filed a petition challenging the dispossession in 2000.

Issues:

Whether the corrigendum effectively changed the status of the excess land.

Whether the dispossession complied with the mandatory requirements of the Act.

Effect of the Repeal Act, 1999 on the landholders' right to possession.

Held:

The State failed to establish voluntary surrender or forceful dispossession as required under Sections 10(5) and 10(6) of the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976.( Paragraph 23)

The handwritten corrigendum and panchnama were not given effect to, and the Respondent-State did not come with clean hands.( Paragraph 24)

Arithmetical and clerical mistakes cannot be corrected by a corrigendum without complying with statutory requirements.( Paragraph 25)

The mentioning of incorrect plot numbers in statutory notifications cannot be corrected by issuing a hand-written corrigendum.( Paragraph 26)

The writ petition is not barred by res judicata, as the previous petition did not address the issue of dispossession and the effect of the Repeal Act.( Paragraph 27)

The appeal is allowed, and the Appellants are entitled to retain possession of the land as it is not vested in the State.( Paragraph 28)

Referred Cases:

Mahendra Lal Jaini Vs. State of U.P., AIR 1963 SC 1019

Shiv Chander More Vs. Lieutenant Governor, (2014) 11 SCC 744

State of Kerala Vs. P.J. Joseph, AIR 1958 SC 296

State of U.P. Vs. Hari Ram, (2013) 4 SCC 280

Facts:

The Appellant filed a second complaint to the District Forum after the first complaint was dismissed for default or non-prosecution. The National Commission had initially held that the second complaint would not be maintainable.

Issues:

Whether a second complaint under the Consumer Protection Act could be filed when the first complaint had been dismissed for default.

Held:

The court, referring to New India Assurance Co. Ltd. v. R. Srinivasan, (2000) 3 SCC 242, observed that the relevant rules (Tamil Nadu Consumer Protection Rules) did not contain a provision similar to Order 9 Rule 9(1) of the Code of Civil Procedure, prohibiting a second suit on the same cause of action after dismissal in default.

The court held that the rule of prohibition in Order 9 Rule 9(1) of the Code of Civil Procedure could not be extended to proceedings before the District Forum or the State Commission. Since the first complaint was dismissed in default and not on merits, the court concluded that it would be permissible to file a second complaint explaining the reasons for non-pursuit of the earlier complaint.

Decision: The second complaint filed by the Appellant was deemed maintainable on the facts of this case.

Referred Cases:

New India Assurance Co. Ltd. Vs. R. Srinivasan, (2000) 3 SCC 242

Facts:

The 5th respondent worked in the appellant school for two months and 19 days in 1997-1998.

In 2010, a vacancy for the post of High School Assistant arose due to a teacher's retirement.

The 6th respondent was appointed to the position, and the 5th respondent challenged this appointment.

Issues:

Whether the 5th respondent is entitled to preferential appointment based on prior engagement in the school.

Impact of the amendment to Rule 7A(3) on the claim for preferential appointment.

Held:

Vested Right and Amendment: The court rejected the argument that the 5th respondent acquired a vested right after the amendment to Rule 7A(3). The amendment stipulated that a qualified teacher must be engaged in a vacancy lasting for one full academic year.

Principles of Interpretation: Emphasizing principles of interpretation, the court stated that a vested right must originate in a proceeding where it crystallized. Such a right can be taken away by a subsequent enactment if expressly provided.

Timing of Claim Initiation: The court noted that between 1998 and 2010, there was no opportunity for the 5th respondent to initiate a claim based on the unamended Rule 7A(3). Therefore, any claim of a vested right as of 1998 is not sustainable.

Requirement of Amended Rule 7A(3): Interpreting the amended Rule 7A(3), the court held that for preferential appointment, a qualified teacher must satisfy the requirement that the engagement lasted for one clear academic year. Since the 5th respondent did not meet this requirement, her claim is disallowed.

Conclusion: The relief granted by the High Court was set aside, and the order of the 1st respondent was also set aside. The law prevailing at the time of the 5th respondent's claim in 2010 (amended Rule 7A(3)) was upheld. The appeals stand allowed.

Referred Cases:

Abdurahiman Vs. Government of Kerala, (2009) 2 KLT 105

Commissioner of Income Tax Central-I, New Delhi Vs. Vatika Township Private Limited, (2015) 1 SCC 1

Garikapati Veeraya Vs. N. Subbiah Choudhry, AIR 1957 SC 540

Maya Vs. State of Kerala, (2010) 2 KLT 99

State of Kerala Vs. Sneha Cheriyan, (2013) 5 SCC 160

State of Maharashtra Vs. Vishnu Ramchandra, (1961) 2 SCR 26

Facts:

The appellant's husband, a sitting MLA of the U.P. State Assembly, was murdered in broad daylight. The appellant named respondent no. 5 as the assailant in the FIR, alleging a conspiracy involving respondent no. 4. The High Court dismissed the appellant's writ petition seeking a CBI investigation, leading to this appeal.

Issues:

Effectiveness of the ongoing investigation by state police.

Perceived involvement of state administration and police in the crime.

Allegations of a conspiracy to eliminate the appellant's husband.

Held:

The court emphasizes that if an investigation is neither effective nor purposeful nor fair, it is the solemn obligation of the courts to order further investigation. No inflexible guidelines are set, and the decision depends on the facts and circumstances of each case.(Paragraph 76)

Fair trial includes fair investigation, and if the investigation lacks fairness, the court can order further investigation to prevent a miscarriage of justice. No rigid rules are prescribed; the decision depends on the advancement of justice. (Paragraph 79)

The court acknowledges the gruesome assassination of the appellant's husband, attempts on his life prior to the incident, and representations made for additional protection. The appellant sought CBI investigation due to imputations, including police indifference and political pressure. (Paragraph 90)

Pleaded imputations include the replacement of security officers, high police officials' presence, and hasty conduct of post-mortem. The court notes the terrorizing impact on society and media coverage. (Paragraph 91)

Witnesses cited by the investigating agency have resiled from their statements, casting doubt on the efficiency of the investigation. The court stays the trial and emphasizes that the pendency of the trial is not a disarming factor for ordering a CBI investigation. (Paragraph 92)

The court discusses the choice of letting the ongoing trial drift or embarking on a de novo investigation to prevent the offense going unpunished. Exceptionally agonizing incidents warrant extra-ordinary attention for justice.(Paragraph 93)

Notwithstanding the trial's pendency, the court deems it imperative to entrust the investigation to the CBI to rule out denial of justice and instill confidence. The court emphasizes its role in the quest for truth.(Paragraph 94)

The CBI is entrusted with a de novo investigation due to exceptional features of the case. The court clarifies that this decision is made in view of the demonstrated necessity.(Paragraph 95)

The CBI is given six months to submit its report, and the trial court is instructed to conduct and conclude the trial within six months after receiving the CBI report. The interim order staying the ongoing trial is made absolute.(Paragraph 96)

Referred Cases:

Abdul Rehman Antulay Vs. R.S. Nayak, (1992) 1 SCC 225

Babubhai Vs. State of Gujarat, (2010) 12 SCC 254

Bharati Tamang Vs. Union of India, (2013) 15 SCC 578

Common Cause, A Registered Society Vs. Union of India, (1999) 6 SCC 667

Disha Vs. State of Gujarat, (2011) 13 SCC 337

Gudalure M.J. Cherian Vs. Union of India, (1992) 1 SCC 397

Hussainara Khatoon Vs. Home Secretary, State of Bihar, (1980) 1 SCC 81

Inder Singh Vs. State of Punjab, (1994) 6 SCC 275

Jennison Vs. Baker, (1972) 1 All ER 997

Jones Vs. National Coal Board, (1957) 2 All ER 155 CA

K. Saravanan Karuppasamy Vs. State of Tamil Nadu, (2014) 10 SCC 406

K.V. Rajendran Vs. Superintendent of Police, CBCID South Zone, Chennai, (2013) 12 SCC 480

Karnel Singh Vs. State of M.P., (1995) 5 SCC 518

Kartar Singh Vs. State of Punjab, (1994) 3 SCC 569

Kashmeri Devi Vs. Delhi Administration, (1988) Sup SCC 482

Manohar Lal Sharma Vs. Principal Secretary, (2014) 2 SCC 532

Manu Sharma Vs. State NCT of Delhi, (2010) 6 SCC 1

Maria Margarida Sequeira Fernandes Vs. Erasmo Jack De Sequeira dead through L.Rs, (2012) 5 SCC 370

Mohd. Hussain alias Julfikar Ali Vs. State Government of NCT of Delhi, (2012) 9 SCC 408

National Human Rights Commission Vs. State of Gujarat, (2009) 6 SCC 767

P. Ramachandra Rao Vs. State of Karnataka, (2002) 4 SCC 578

Punjab and Haryana High Court Bar Association, Chandigarh through its Secretary Vs. State of Punjab, (1994) 1 SCC 616

Ram Bihari Yadav Vs. State of Bihar, (1998) 4 SCC 517

Rattiram Vs. State of Madhya Pradesh, (2012) 4 SCC 516

Ritesh Tewari Vs. State of U.P., (2010) 10 SCC 677

Rubabbuddin Sheikh Vs. State of Gujarat, (2010) 2 SCC 200

Samaj Parivartan Samudaya Vs. State of Karnataka, (2012) 7 SCC 407

Secretary, Minor Irrigation & Rural Engineering Services, U.P. Vs. Sahngoo Ram Arya, (2002) 5 SCC 521

State of Bihar Vs. JAC Saldanha, (1980) 1 SCC 554

State of M.P. Vs. Bhooraji, (2001) 7 SCC 679

State of West Bengal Vs. Committee for Protection of Democratic Rights, West Bengal, (2010) 3 SCC 571

State of West Bengal Vs. Sampat Lal, (1985) 1 SCC 317

Sudipta Lenka Vs. State of Odisha, (2014) 11 SCC 527

Union of India Vs. Sushil Kumar Modi, (1998) 8 SCC 661

Vakil Prasad Singh Vs. State of Bihar, (2009) 3 SCC 355

Vinay Tyagi Vs. Irshad Ali @ Deepak, (2013) 5 SCC 762

Vineet Narain Vs. Union of India, (1996) 2 SCC 199

Vinod Kumar Vs. State of Punjab, (2015) 3 SCC 220

Zahira Habibulla H. Sheikh Vs. State of Gujarat, (2004) 4 SCC 158

Facts:

The appellant, BUSSA OVERSEAS & PROPERTIES (P) LTD. & ANR., filed a refund claim under Section 27 of the Customs Act. The claim was dismissed by the department, citing non-compliance with formalities under the said provision. The appellant then pursued legal remedies, including a writ petition in the High Court, which was dismissed, and a subsequent review petition, which was also dismissed.

Issues:

The dismissal of the appellant's refund claim by the department, leading to subsequent legal challenges. The issues include the maintainability of a Special Leave Petition (SLP) against the order passed in the review petition.

Held:

The court held that the SLP was not maintainable. Reference was made to Order 47 Rule 7 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, and Article 136 of the Constitution of India. The court clarified that when the prayer for review is dismissed, there is no merger, and the main order remains valid. The principle was established that if the basic judgment is not contested, and the challenge is only against the order passed in review, the court may not entertain such an SLP.

Decision: The court, in dismissing the appeal, emphasized that if the primary judgment is not challenged, and the review order is the only subject of challenge, the court may not entertain a Special Leave Petition. The decision underscores the importance of challenging the primary judgment rather than focusing solely on the order passed in review.

Referred Cases:

Abhishek Malviya Vs. Welfare Commr, (2008) 3 SCC 108

Alcatel Modi Net Works Systems Vs. Commissioner of Customs, (2000) 117 ELT 522 Tribunal

Caledonian Railway Co. Vs. Walker's Trustees, (1882) 7 App Cas 259 : 46 LT 826 HL

Collector of Central Excise Vs. India Tyre and Rubber Co. Ltd., (1997) 94 ELT 495 Mad

Durga Shankar Mehta Vs. Thakur Raghuraj Singh, AIR 1954 SC 520

Eastern Coalfields Limited Vs. Dugal Kumar, (2008) 14 SCC 295

Government of Andhra Pradesh Vs. A.P. Jaiswal, AIR 2001 SC 499

Green View Tea & Industries Vs. Collector, (2004) 4 SCC 122

Hindustan Metal Pressing Works Vs. Commissioner of Central Excise, (2003) 153 ELT 15 SC

K. Rajamouli Vs. A.V.K.N. Swamy, (2001) 5 SCC 37

Krishena Kumar Vs. Union of India, (1990) 4 SCC 207

Kunhyammed Vs. State of Kerala, (2001) 129 ELT 11 SC

M.N. Haider Vs. Kendriya Vidyalaya Sangathan, (2004) 13 SCC 677

Mafatlal Industries Ltd. Vs. Union of India, (1997) 89 ELT 247 S.C

Mahendra Saree Emporium II Vs. G.V. Srinivasa Murthy, (2005) 1 SCC 481

New India Industries Vs. Union of India, (1990) 1 B.C.R. 515

Quinn Vs. Leathem, (1901) AC 495

Ravi alias Ravichandran Vs. State represented by Inspector of Police, (2007) 15 SCC 372

S.P. Sampath Kumar Vs. Union of India, (1987) 1 SCC 124

Sandhya Educational Society Vs. Union of India, (2014) 7 SCC 701

Shanker Motiram Nale Vs. Shiolalsing Gannusing Rajput, (1994) 2 SCC 753

Shiv Charan Singh Vs. State of Punjab, (2007) 15 SCC 370

State of Assam Vs. Ripa Sarma, (2013) 3 SCC 63

Surya Dev Rai Vs. Ram Chander Rai, (2003) 6 SCC 675

Suseel Finance & Leasing Co. Vs. M. Lata, (2004) 13 SCC 675

Thungabhadra Industries Ltd. Vs. Government of Andhra Pradesh, AIR 1964 SC 1372

Union of India Vs. Jain Spinners Ltd., (1992) 61 ELT 321 SC

Union Carbide Corpn. Vs. Union of India, (1991) 4 SCC 584

Vinod Kapoor Vs. State of Goa, (2012) 12 SCC 378