Facts:

The dispute arose concerning the demand for the employment of certain workers, including Shri Arjun Paswan and 87 others, who were engaged as 'Tyndals' at the Kenduadih Colliery. Legal proceedings ensued, including a Reference to the Industrial Tribunal in 1993 and subsequent challenges in the High Court.

Issues:

The entitlement of the workers to reinstatement or compensation based on previous judgments and the circumstances of the case.

Held:

The court noted the previous judgments and the finality of the High Court's decision in this case. Despite the unequal treatment of workers, reinstatement was not deemed practicable, given the passage of time and other factors (para. 6).

Considering the skilled nature of the work and the lack of vacancies, the court ordered the respondent to deposit an amount of Rupees four lakhs each per workman before the Central Government Industrial Tribunal in full settlement of all claims (para. 8).

The Civil Appeal is allowed. (para. 9)

Facts:

The case involved a review of the deficiencies within the adjudicatory fora responsible for consumer protection under the Consumer Protection Act, 1986. A committee chaired by Justice Arijit Pasayat submitted an interim report highlighting issues such as poor organizational setup, inadequate infrastructure, and a lack of trained manpower, hindering the effective functioning of consumer fora.

Issues:

Inadequacies in infrastructure within consumer adjudicatory bodies.

Lack of response from the Central and State Governments to address the deficiencies highlighted in the interim report.

Need for systemic overhaul to prevent the Consumer Protection Act, 1986 from becoming ineffective.

Held:

The interim report of the Committee reveals significant deficiencies in the functioning of consumer fora, necessitating immediate intervention to prevent the Consumer Protection Act, 1986 from becoming ineffective.

The absence of clarity in administrative and disciplinary control contributes to the problems faced by district fora and State Commissions.

The delegation of rule-making power to State Governments may lead to inconsistencies and subjectivity, requiring the Union Government to frame model rules for adoption by State Governments.

The National Commission is empowered to frame regulations to ensure effective administrative control over State Commissions and district fora.

The proposed expansion of pecuniary limits of district fora necessitates strengthening the quality of adjudication and ensuring accountability among members.

Directions are issued for the appointment of President and Members of State Commissions, as well as disciplinary action against non-judicial members for unauthorized absence.

State Governments are directed to implement the recommendations of the Committee within three months.

The Union Government is tasked with framing model rules and regulations to standardize the functioning of consumer adjudicatory bodies across the country.

Decision: The court issued several directions to address deficiencies in infrastructure and ensure effective implementation of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986.

Facts:

The case involved the appeal by the in-laws of the deceased, who were initially acquitted by the Trial Court but convicted by the High Court under Sections 498A and 304B of the Indian Penal Code (IPC) in connection with the death of the deceased, Saroj Bai. The prosecution alleged that the deceased was subjected to cruelty and harassment by her husband and in-laws, including demands for dowry, ultimately leading to her death.

Issues:

Whether the prosecution had proved beyond reasonable doubt that the accused were responsible for the deceased's death through cruelty or harassment in connection with dowry demands.

Held:

The court found that the prosecution failed to establish the crucial component of cruelty or harassment for or in connection with dowry demands. The demand for a motorcycle, which was the focal point of the allegations, was not adequately supported by evidence. Given the lack of conclusive evidence and the failure to establish the cause of death definitively, the accused were entitled to the benefit of doubt. Thus, the conviction by the High Court was set aside, and the appellants were acquitted. The court emphasized the necessity for the prosecution to prove cruelty or harassment in connection with dowry demands to invoke statutory presumptions. The Trial Court's assessment of evidence was deemed valid, while the High Court's reliance on presumptive inferences divorced from factual evidence was criticized and deemed unsustainable.

The appeal is allowed.

Facts:

The case involves allegations of willful absence from official duty and disobedience of orders against Maresh Dahiya, an employee of H.P. State Electricity Board Ltd. Following these allegations, Dahiya was compulsorily retired from service, prompting him to file a writ petition.

Issues:

Whether there was a violation of the principles of natural justice in the disciplinary proceedings against Maresh Dahiya.

Held:

The court observed that the delinquent employee has the right to receive a copy of the inquiry officer's report before the Disciplinary Authority arrives at conclusions regarding the guilt or innocence of the employee. This right is essential for the employee to defend himself properly (Para 26).

It was noted that the Disciplinary Authority had formed an opinion to punish the respondent without forwarding the inquiry report to him or obtaining his comments on the report, which constituted a violation of the principle of natural justice (Para 26).

While setting aside the punishment order, the court directed that the Disciplinary Authority should be permitted to proceed with the inquiry from the stage where the fault was noticed, which is under Rule 15 of the CCS (CCA) Rules, 1965 (Para 27).

A time frame should be fixed for completing the proceedings from the stage of Rule 15 of the CCS (CCA) Rules, 1965. As there was a violation of natural justice after the submission of the inquiry report, all proceedings taken by the Disciplinary Authority afterward were to be set aside (Para 28).

Decision: The court partly allowed the appeal, maintaining the order of the High Court setting aside the punishment order. However, it directed the Disciplinary Authority to proceed with the inquiry from the stage where the fault was noticed and to ensure compliance with the principles of natural justice.

Facts:

The debtor defaulted on loan repayment to the bank, leading to recovery proceedings. An award was passed for the recovery of the money owed. Despite multiple opportunities, the debtor failed to pay the awarded amount. The mortgaged property was auctioned, and the appellant emerged as the highest bidder. The competent authority confirmed the auction sale in favor of the appellant, and a sale certificate was issued.

Issues:

Whether the debtor followed the proper procedure for setting aside the auction sale?

Whether the appeal by the debtor to the Deputy Registrar was maintainable under Section 106 of the Karnataka Cooperative Societies Act?

Whether the Deputy Registrar had jurisdiction to set aside the auction sale?

Whether the High Court erred in dismissing the writ petition filed by the auction purchaser?

Held:

The debtor did not follow the proper procedure for setting aside the auction sale under Section 89A of the Act and Rule 38 of the Rules (para 23).

The appeal by the debtor to the Deputy Registrar was not maintainable under Section 106, as it did not pertain to a provision referenced in that section (para 24).

The Deputy Registrar's order to set aside the auction sale was without jurisdiction (para 29).

The High Court erred in dismissing the writ petition filed by the auction purchaser, as the Deputy Registrar had no jurisdiction to entertain the appeal (para 36).

Decision: The court allowed the appeals by the auction purchaser and dismissed the appeals by the debtor, affirming the validity of the auction sale and emphasizing adherence to proper legal procedures.

Facts:

The case involves a review petition concerning the conflict between the Jallikattu Act, 2009, and the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals Act, 1960. The petitioners argued that the 2009 Act, being associated with Entries 14 and 15 of List II of the Seventh Schedule, cannot be repugnant to the 1960 Act. Additionally, they contended that Jallikattu, being a socio-cultural event associated with religion, is protected under Article 25 of the Constitution.

Issues:

Whether the Jallikattu Act, 2009, is repugnant to the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals Act, 1960, and if Jallikattu can be considered as falling within the ambit of religious freedom under Article 25.

Held:

The Court analyzed the provisions of the Tamil Nadu Regulation of Jallikattu Act, 2009, and observed that while the event may include taming of bulls, cruelty to the bulls cannot be ruled out during Jallikattu events (Para 17).

Upon juxtaposing the provisions of the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals Act, 1960, and the Jallikattu Act, 2009, the Court noted a fundamental inconsistency. Taming bulls for entertainment purposes contradicts the welfare of animals, the very foundation of the 1960 Act (Para 25).

The Court concluded that neither Entry 14 nor Entry 15 of List II of the Seventh Schedule covers the Jallikattu Act, 2009. Jallikattu squarely falls under Entry 17 of List III, making it subject to the test of repugnancy (Para 31).

Jallikattu cannot be associated with the right to freedom of religion guaranteed under Article 25, as it lacks a religious flavor and is not protected under this provision (Para 32).

Decision: The Court dismissed the review petitions, affirming its previous decision that the Jallikattu Act, 2009, is repugnant to the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals Act, 1960, and does not enjoy protection under Article 25 of the Constitution.

Facts:

The case revolves around the selection process initiated in August 2008 for filling up the posts of Additional District Judges in the Jharkhand Superior Judicial Services. The selection process involved a combination of promotions based on merit-cum-seniority and recruitment through Limited Competitive Examination and direct recruitment from the Bar.

Issues:

The contention was the interpretation of the rules governing the selection process, particularly regarding the allocation of vacancies between promotees and direct recruits.

Held:

The amended Rules, specifying the ratio between promotees and direct recruits, had prospective application from August 20, 2004. Therefore, the factual position as of that date became relevant in determining the validity of the selection process.

Prior to the amendment of August 20, 2004, appointments were governed by different rules where the direct recruit quota was 33% of the total posts, exceeding the 25% specified in the amended Rules. The affidavit filed by the State of Jharkhand confirmed the absence of vacancies against the direct recruit quota as of August 20, 2004. This fact was crucial in understanding the selection process initiated in 2008.

Since no vacancy existed against the direct recruit quota as of April 30, 2008, the selection process for promotion through Limited Competitive Examination was found to be proper. The High Court's oversight of the effect of filling vacancies in a 25:25 ratio, exceeding the direct recruit quota, was noted as impermissible.

Candidates eligible for direct recruitment alone and not promotion had no standing to challenge the 2008 selection process, as vacancies against the direct recruit quota were unavailable at that time.

Decision: The leading Civil Appeal was allowed, and the connected writ petitions were dismissed. The Court emphasized the importance of considering the factual background and relevant rules in determining the validity of the selection process.

Facts:

Late Ramabhakta started a business of manufacture and sales of 'Beedi' under the name 'M/s Neo Subhash Beedi Works'. After his demise, his six sons constituted the partnership firm.

Several changes occurred in the partnership due to retirements, deaths, and admissions of new partners over the years.

A Suit No. 5 of 2014 was filed by three Plaintiffs against six Defendants, seeking permanent prohibitory injunction and possession and enjoyment of 'A' schedule property.

The Defendants filed I.A.No.IV under Section 8(1) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, praying to refer the parties to arbitration.

Original retirement deed and partnership deed were not initially filed with the application but were later produced by the Defendants.

Issues:

Whether non-filing of original or certified copies of the retirement deed and partnership deed along with application I.A.No. IV dated 09.05.2014 entailed dismissal of the application under Section 8(2) of the 1996 Act.

Whether the fact that all parties to the suit were not parties to the retirement deed/partnership deed precluded the court from making a reference relying on the arbitration agreement.

Whether a dispute pertaining to an unregistered partnership deed could be referred to arbitration despite there being an arbitration agreement.

Held:

The Court shall not entertain any application under Section 8(1) unless it is accompanied by the original arbitration agreement or a duly certified copy thereof. However, the filing of the application without such original or certified copy, but bringing the original arbitration agreement on record at the time when the Court is considering the application, shall not entail rejection of the application under Section 8(2) (para. 22).

Since all parties to the suit, except Defendant No. 6, were parties to the arbitration agreement, and Defendant No. 6 did not inherit any share or rights in the partnership, the dispute could still be referred to arbitration (para. 26).

There is no statutory provision prohibiting the reference of a dispute concerning an unregistered partnership deed to arbitration. Therefore, the argument that such disputes cannot be referred to arbitration is not valid (para. 29).

In conclusion, the appeal was dismissed as the Court found no merit in it (para. 30).

Facts:

The appellant, IDBI Trusteeship Services Ltd., filed a summary suit against the respondent, Hubtown Ltd., based on the invocation of a Corporate Guarantee. The guarantee was issued by the respondent on behalf of its subsidiary 'V' in favor of the appellant. The respondent raised the defense that the investment made by 'V' in Optionally Partially Convertible Debentures (OPCDs) was to circumvent FEMA Regulations.

Issues:

Whether the principles established in Mechelec's case regarding the grant of leave to defend in summary suits still hold post-amendment of Or. XXXVII, r.3?

Whether the defendant's defense regarding FEMA Regulations raised a substantial defense to the claim made in the suit?

Held:

Relevance of Mechelec's case: The Court acknowledged the importance of determining whether the principles laid down in Mechelec's case continue to be the law post-amendment of Or. XXXVII, r.3. (Para 9)

Change in Law: The Court recognized that there has been a change in the law regarding summary suits after the amendment of Or. XXXVII, r.3 in 1976. The discretion of the trial judge is emphasized to ensure justice in each case. (Para 17)

Supersession of Previous Case Law: The Court held that the principles stated in Mechelec's case no longer govern summary suits under Or. XXXVII, r.3. Instead, the guidelines provided in the Milkhiram case, which followed the amended provision, prevail. (Para 18)

Application to the Present Case: The Court considered the defense raised by the respondent regarding FEMA Regulations. Despite the triable issue raised, the Court found doubt about the defendant's good faith and the genuineness of the defense. Therefore, the defendant was granted leave to defend the suit only upon depositing the principal sum invested by FMO or providing security for the said amount. (Para 20)