Facts:

The case involved the grant of excise licenses for liquor shops in Uttar Pradesh under various rules. An FIR had been lodged alleging fraud and forgery in opening a bank account, raising concerns about the eligibility of certain individuals for holding such licenses.

Issues:

The High Court, in response to a writ petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution, issued directions regarding the investigation process, training of investigating officers, establishment of forensic labs, and other matters related to law enforcement and administration.

Held:

The Supreme Court acknowledged the concerns raised by the High Court but found that some of the directions issued went beyond the scope of the case and encroached upon legislative and executive domains. The Court emphasized the separation of powers and the limitations of judicial review, cautioning against judicial overreach into policy matters or legislative functions.

The Court held that while the judiciary has a duty to ensure constitutional safeguards and protect individual rights, it cannot dictate policy or legislative changes. Instead, it is the responsibility of the executive to address issues related to law and order, investigation procedures, and infrastructure for forensic testing.

In conclusion, the Supreme Court set aside the impugned order of the High Court and directed it to reconsider the writ petition within the confines of the law and the specific issues raised in the case.

Facts:

The appellant, Dilbagh Singh, and a co-accused were intercepted by a patrol party while traveling in a car. Upon search, six bags of Poppy Husk were found in the car. The appellant challenged his conviction under Section 15 of the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (NDPS Act), alleging procedural irregularities in the search and seizure process.

Issues:

The main issues revolved around the compliance with Sections 50 and 57 of the NDPS Act, pertaining to search and seizure procedures, and whether the prosecution had provided sufficient evidence to prove the charge against the accused beyond reasonable doubt.

Held:

The Court held that Section 50 of the NDPS Act, which pertains to the search of a person, was inapplicable since the contraband was recovered from inside the car and not from the persons of the accused. Compliance with Section 57 was found to be satisfactory as the Investigating Officer promptly forwarded information about the arrest and seizure to his superior officer and the concerned Magistrate. The Court upheld the conviction, concluding that the prosecution had proven the charge against the accused beyond reasonable doubt based on the evidence, including the recovery of substantial amounts of Poppy Husk from the car and the proper handling of samples. Therefore, the appeal was dismissed.

Facts:

The respondents were prosecuted and convicted under various sections of the Indian Penal Code and the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961.

During the appeal process, their counsel focused solely on seeking release under the Probation of Offenders Act, 1958 (PO Act).

The appellant argued that because the defendants were convicted under sections prescribing a minimum sentence, they should not be eligible for probation under the PO Act.

Issues:

Whether the defendants, convicted under sections prescribing a minimum sentence, could be granted the benefit of probation under the PO Act.

Held:

The Court examined the relevant provisions of the PO Act and concluded that the absence of a specific minimum sentence in the relevant sections meant that the provisions of the PO Act could apply. (Para. 8)

The Court clarified that when a statute prescribes a minimum sentence without discretion, the court must impose that sentence without any reduction. However, if the statute grants discretion, the court may consider mitigating factors and choose not to impose the minimum sentence. (Para. 19)

The Court emphasized that the discretion to grant probation should be exercised considering the circumstances of the case, including the nature of the offense and the character of the offender. (Para. 23)

The Court allowed the appeal, setting aside the judgments of the High Court and the appellate court, and remitted the matter to the appellate court for further consideration in accordance with law. The defendants should be allowed to raise all relevant points, including seeking release under the PO Act, before the appellate court. (Para. 26)

Facts:

The case involved a deadly assault on Lalni @ Raj Kumar, resulting in his death. The incident occurred in 1982 after an altercation between the deceased and the appellants, who resided next door. The deceased's cattle had strayed into the fields of the accused persons, leading to abuse and confrontation earlier in the day. The altercation escalated, resulting in the fatal assault on the deceased by the appellants and others.

Issues:

The appellants challenged their conviction under Sections 147, 148, 149, and initially Section 302 IPC.

The primary issue was whether the evidence supported the conviction and the severity of the sentence.

Held:

The Supreme Court affirmed the conviction under Sections 147, 148, and 149 IPC but modified the conviction under Section 302 IPC to one under Section 304-Part I IPC. The court reduced the sentence for the offence under Section 304-Part I/149 IPC to seven years' rigorous imprisonment. Other sentences were affirmed. The court observed that while the accused were aware of the likely consequences of their actions, there was no pre-meditation or prior concert to commit murder. The incident occurred in a heated moment, and tensions were escalated by the deceased as well.

The court considered the lengthy time since the incident and the lack of a common object to eliminate the deceased. Therefore, the sentence was reduced based on the circumstances of the case. The appeal is thus partly allowed.

Facts:

The incident occurred on 16th June 2000, where the deceased, Debol Kumar Ghosh, was shot dead at the CPI(M) Party Office.

Appellant Anjan Dasgupta and co-accused Biswanath Paul were convicted under Section 302/34 IPC by the Calcutta High Court.

The prosecution case relied on eyewitness accounts and circumstantial evidence.

The appellant challenged his conviction on various grounds, including the alleged ante-timing and ante-dating of the FIR and delay in dispatching it to the Magistrate.

Issues:

Whether the FIR was ante-timed and ante-dated, leading to adverse inferences against the prosecution.

Whether the delay in dispatching the FIR to the Magistrate affects the authenticity of the prosecution's case.

Whether the eyewitness accounts are credible and sufficient to establish the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt.

Held:

The Court held that:

The FIR was not ante-dated or ante-timed, as there was evidence to suggest prompt registration after the incident. The delay in dispatching it to the Magistrate did not undermine its authenticity. (Para 22-23)

The eyewitness accounts were consistent and corroborative, despite minor discrepancies. The High Court's re-appreciation of evidence was proper, leading to a finding of guilt. (Para 31-36)

The judgment of the High Court was upheld, and the appeal was dismissed. (Para 37)

Referred Cases

Apren Joseph Alias Current Kunjukunju Vs. State of Kerala, (1973) 3 SCC 114

Pala Singh Vs. State of Punjab, (1972) 2 SCC 640

Rabindra Mahto Vs. State of Jharkhand, (2006) 10 SCC 432

Facts:

The appellant, a contractor licensed by Nagar Nigam, Jaipur, has been using minerals purchased from the open market for construction work.

Various Government Orders by the State of Rajasthan were issued regarding the deduction of 2% royalty from bills of contractors for the use of minerals in construction work.

The appellant challenged these orders through a writ petition, primarily contesting a letter dated 26.03.2002 that sought compliance with existing circulars requiring the payment of royalties for minerals used in construction work.

Issues:

Whether the courts adequately considered the specific issues raised by the appellant in the writ petition.

Whether the liability to pay royalty rests solely with holders of mining leases or permits.

Whether the appellant should be required to pay royalty for minerals used in construction work, considering they were purchased from the open market.

Held:

The Supreme Court held that the disposal of the writ petition did not fully consider the specific issues raised by the appellant. The Court found that the appellant primarily challenged the letter dated 26.03.2002, which emphasized compliance with existing circulars, rather than the circulars themselves. As the appellant did not directly challenge the circulars, the Court declined to adjudicate on broader policy issues related to royalty payments. Instead, the appellant was directed to approach the mining engineer with evidence to establish that royalties were paid for the minerals used in construction work. The mining engineer was instructed to consider the representation and make a decision, preferably within three months.

Facts:

UCO Bank issued a sale notification under the SARFAESI Act for properties mortgaged by members of Scheduled Tribes in Tripura.

Respondents contested the sale notification, citing Section 187 of the Tripura Act of 1960, which prohibited banks from transferring mortgaged properties to non-members of Scheduled Tribes.

Issues:

Whether the provisions of the SARFAESI Act prevail over the Tripura Act of 1960 in the context of sale of mortgaged properties.

Whether the sale notification complied with the Security Interest (Enforcement) Rules, 2002.

Held:

The Court held that the provisions of the SARFAESI Act prevailed over those of the Tripura Act of 1960 regarding the sale of mortgaged properties. The Court reasoned that the SARFAESI Act, being a central legislation, superseded the state legislation, and its provisions did not contain any restriction on the category of buyers for such properties (para. 18).

The Court also found that the sale notification complied with the Security Interest (Enforcement) Rules, 2002, as the bank had obtained valuation reports and fixed reserve prices before the auction sale (para. 21).

Thus, the Court set aside the High Court's decision and allowed the appeals filed by UCO Bank (para. 22).

Facts:

The case involved a dispute between Mahanagar Telephone Nigam Ltd. and M/s. Applied Electronics Ltd. regarding arbitration proceedings.

Issues:

Whether the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 is applicable to appeals under Section 37 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996.

Whether cross-objections by respondents are maintainable in such appeals.

Held:

The Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, provides restrictions for challenging awards and emphasizes expeditious disposal, as evident from Section 37(3) and Section 5 of the Act.

On comparison with the Arbitration Act, 1940, it is noted that while the former Act intentionally excludes any provision for the applicability of the Code of Civil Procedure, the latter explicitly stated such applicability. Section 5 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, reinforces this exclusion and establishes the Act as a complete code, barring the application of other laws like the CPC.

The provisions of the 1996 Act, particularly Section 5, indicate that no judicial authority shall interfere except where specifically provided in Part I of the Act. This further solidifies the understanding that the CPC cannot be invoked in matters governed by the 1996 Act, and consequently, cross-objections cannot be entertained.

Facts:

The deceased first respondent filed a suit for partition, claiming a share in the family properties.

The trial court accepted the execution of certain wills, but the High Court overturned this decision.

The High Court ruled on the devolution of property under the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, and the partition of the family dwelling house.

The appellants challenged the High Court's decision before the Supreme Court.

Issues:

Validity of the wills under Section 68 of the Indian Evidence Act.

Applicability of Section 6 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, to the devolution of property.

Partition of the family dwelling house.

Held:

The Supreme Court upheld the High Court's decision, emphasizing the importance of proper proof of wills and the application of relevant statutory provisions. It affirmed the increase in the share of the deceased coparcener's daughter under Section 6 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, and the partition of the family dwelling house based on evidence of its partial occupation. The appeals were dismissed, with each party bearing its respective costs.