Facts:

The appellant, M/s Meena Devi Jindal Medical Institute and Research Centre, challenged the land acquisition proceedings initiated under Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, for the construction of Yamuna Expressway. The acquisition included land for various purposes complementary to the expressway's development. The appellant argued that there was no public purpose behind the acquisition, the notification lacked specificity, and the enquiry under Section 5A was improperly conducted.

Issues:

Whether the acquisition served a public purpose, whether the notification was specific enough, and whether the enquiry under Section 5A was conducted properly.

Held:

The Court held that the acquisition for planned development of Delhi, as per the zonal plan, served a public purpose, as defined under Section 3(f) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. The Court cited previous decisions, including Aflatoon vs. Lt. Governor of Delhi, to support its reasoning.

The Court rejected the argument that the notification lacked specificity, stating that once planned development of Delhi was specified, it was to be read in conjunction with the applicable zonal plan. The Court referred to previous cases to highlight the importance of adherence to legal procedures and the significance of public purpose in land acquisition proceedings.

Therefore, the Court dismissed the appeal, affirming the validity of the land acquisition proceedings.

Facts:

The case pertains to the sale and registration of vehicles not meeting the Bharat Stage-IV (BS-IV) emission standards, scheduled to take effect from April 1, 2017. Manufacturers argued for the continuation of sale and registration of vehicles compliant with Bharat Stage III (BS-III) emission standards until March 31, 2017, citing their entitlement to produce such vehicles until the aforementioned date.

Issues:

Whether commercial interests of manufacturers and dealers of non-BS-IV compliant vehicles outweighed the health hazards posed by increased air pollution to millions of people in India.

Held:

The Court, after considering the arguments presented, upheld the concerns regarding public health highlighted by the learned Amicus Curiae. It acknowledged that while the number of BS-III vehicles might be relatively small compared to the total vehicle population, the health of the public was of paramount importance and outweighed the commercial interests of manufacturers and dealers. The Court emphasized that manufacturers had adequate time to transition to BS-IV compliant vehicles but failed to do so, despite having the necessary technology and awareness since 2010.

Consequently, the Court directed that:

From April 1, 2017, vehicles not meeting BS-IV emission standards would not be sold in India by any manufacturer or dealer.

Vehicle registering authorities were prohibited from registering vehicles not meeting BS-IV emission standards, except those sold before March 31, 2017.

Facts:

The appellants-landlords sought eviction of the respondents-tenants under Sections 11(4)(iii) and 11(4)(iv) of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1965.

The Rent Control Court allowed eviction under Section 11(4)(iv) on the ground of demolition and reconstruction.

The landlords pursued eviction on the ground of Section 11(4)(iii) before the First Appellate Authority, which was granted.

The landlords took possession of the premises during execution proceedings before the decision of the First Appellate Authority.

The tenants appealed to the High Court, arguing that further proceedings for eviction on other grounds could not be pursued after possession had been taken.

The High Court set aside the First Appellate Authority's decision on Section 11(4)(iii) and restored the Rent Control Court's decision solely on the ground of demolition and reconstruction under Section 11(4)(iv).

Issues:

Whether possession taken on one ground for eviction renders surviving grounds non-est.

Held:

The Supreme Court held that possession taken on one ground for eviction does not render surviving grounds non-est. The Court set aside the High Court's decision and remitted the matter back to the High Court for consideration on merits. The surviving grounds for eviction should still be considered despite possession being taken on one ground.

The Court directed the High Court to consider the revision petitions filed by the tenants on merits, and urged for expeditious disposal of the matter within six months.

Facts:

The appellant, Himachal Pradesh Financial Corporation, sought recovery of loans granted to the respondent, Anil Garg, for the purchase of a truck and the establishment of a steel trunk manufacturing industry. The respondent failed to repay the loans, leading to legal proceedings. A suit was filed, but later withdrawn, with the intention to pursue more expedient remedies under the Himachal Pradesh Public Moneys (Recovery of Dues) Act, 1973. However, the High Court set aside the auction notice issued by the appellant, prompting the present appeal.

Issues:

The withdrawal of the suit, its impact on subsequent proceedings under the Act, and whether the appellant's right to recover the loans was preserved despite the withdrawal.

Held:

The Court held that the withdrawal of the suit did not constitute an abandonment of the claim by the appellant. The court emphasized that the withdrawal was intended to pursue remedies under the Himachal Pradesh Public Moneys (Recovery of Dues) Act, 1973, which provided a more expedient route for recovery. The court clarified that the bar under Order 23 Rule 1 of the Civil Procedure Code applied only to fresh suits and not to proceedings under the Act. Additionally, the court rejected the respondent's argument regarding the loans being time-barred, noting that the appellant had taken steps for recovery within the statutory limitations.

The court further emphasized the importance of timely repayment of loans, as they are disbursed from public funds and serve the larger societal interest. It stated that the doctrine of public policy cannot be invoked to prevent a loanee from repaying a loan unjustifiably abusing the law.

Therefore, the court allowed the appeal, set aside the High Court's order, and directed that the auction notice under Section 85 of the Act proceed in accordance with the law and be concluded expeditiously.

Facts:

Dispute between the deceased and accused over land access rights escalated into a physical confrontation leading to injuries and eventual death of the deceased.

Accused were acquitted by the Trial Court due to inconsistencies in evidence and lapses in investigation.

State appealed against the acquittal to the High Court, resulting in the conviction of some accused.

Appeals to the Supreme Court challenged the High Court's decision.

Issues:

Whether the High Court was justified in reversing the Trial Court's acquittal.

Assessment of the evidence provided by prosecution witnesses.

Evaluation of the lapses in investigation.

Consideration of medical evidence and its consistency with oral testimony.

Held:

The Supreme Court emphasized the principle of proving guilt beyond reasonable doubt and evaluated inconsistencies in witness testimony.

Contradictions in eyewitness accounts, variations in statements, and discrepancies in the timing of events raised doubts about the reliability of evidence.

Lapses in investigation, including non-sealing of seized items, failure to explain injuries on accused, and omission of crucial details, were deemed fatal to the prosecution's case.

In light of these factors, the Court held that the High Court's conviction was erroneous and reaffirmed the Trial Court's acquittal.

The Court emphasized the importance of finding truth in criminal cases while safeguarding against miscarriage of justice by ensuring innocence is not punished.

The appeals were allowed, and the accused were to be set at liberty, provided they were not required in any other case.

Facts:

The appellant, M/S Berger Paints India Ltd., is a limited company engaged in the manufacture and sale of paints.

For the Assessment Year 1996-97, the appellant filed its income tax return, declaring its total income.

The appellant claimed a deduction under the head "preliminary expenses" based on the capital employed in the business, including the premium amount received on share capital.

The Assessing Officer challenged this claim, stating that the premium amount did not constitute part of the capital employed in the business.

The Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeals) initially allowed the deduction, considering the share premium account as part of the capital base of the company. However, the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal reversed this decision.

Issues:

Whether the premium collected by the appellant-Company on its subscribed share capital qualifies as "capital employed in the business of the Company" under Section 35D(3) of the Income Tax Act.

Held:

The Court, after considering the arguments and examining the relevant provisions of the Income Tax Act and the Companies Act, dismissed the appeals.

The Court held that the premium amount collected by the company on its subscribed share capital could not be considered part of the capital employed in the business of the company for the purpose of claiming deduction under Section 35D(3) of the Act. This conclusion was based on the legislative intent, which did not include the premium amount within the definition of capital employed.

The Court affirmed the decision of the High Court, emphasizing that the absence of specific provisions in the relevant sections of the Acts indicated the legislative intent. This interpretation was in line with the decision in Commissioner of Income Tax, West Bengal v. Allahabad Bank Ltd. (1969) 2 SCC 143, where it was held that the inclusion of the premium amount was permissible only when explicitly provided for in the legislation.

Facts:

The appellants were accused in a sessions case for various offenses under the IPC, including murder. They had filed multiple applications for bail, which were rejected by the trial court and the High Court. Despite these rejections, they continued to file successive bail applications. The trial judge eventually granted bail to the appellants, but the High Court later canceled the bail after considering the severity of the allegations and the conduct of the accused.

Issues:

Whether the trial judge erred in granting bail to the appellants.

Whether the High Court was justified in canceling the bail granted by the trial judge.

Held:

The Court held that the trial judge had erred in granting bail to the appellants, as he failed to consider the gravity of the crimes and the fact that previous bail applications had been rejected, including by the Supreme Court. The Court emphasized that bail should not be granted arbitrarily and must consider various factors including the nature of the offense and the likelihood of the accused tampering with evidence or influencing witnesses. Therefore, the High Court was justified in canceling the bail granted by the trial judge.

The appeal was dismissed, and the appellants were ordered to surrender to custody immediately. The trial judge was directed to proceed with the trial impartially based on the evidence presented during proceedings.

Facts:

A.T. Sivaperumal, the appellant, was accused of dishonoring a cheque issued to Mohammed Hyath. The Trial Court acquitted the appellant, but the High Court reversed the acquittal and convicted him under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, imposing a fine and directing compensation to Mohammed Hyath's legal representatives. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal. During the hearing, the parties agreed to a settlement.

Issues:

Whether the appellant's acquittal should be upheld or reversed, considering the settlement reached between the parties.

Held:

The Supreme Court set aside the High Court's judgment, acquitted the appellant of the charge under Section 138, and allowed withdrawal of the deposited amount by Mohammed Hyath's legal representatives. The appellant was granted three months to pay the remaining sum to Mohammed Hyath's legal representatives, failing which contempt proceedings would ensue. All pending applications were disposed of accordingly.

Facts:

Perumal Naidu, a male Hindu, owned extensive properties and executed a will in 1923, bequeathing his properties to his heirs, including his daughters Alamelu Ammal and Ramanujatha Ammal.

Alamelu Ammal executed a will in 1987, bequeathing her share of the properties to Ramanujatha Ammal and the appellant.

A dispute arose between Seetharama Naidu and Sagunthala, representing one branch of the family, and Ramanujatha Ammal's legal representatives, representing another branch, regarding the extent of each heir's share and the devolution of shares.

Issues:

The extent of each heir's share in the properties.

The devolution of shares.

The applicability of Section 15(2)(a) of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956.

Held:

The Supreme Court held that the High Court had erred in applying Section 15(2)(a) without framing substantial questions of law or considering the law applicable at the time of succession in 1987.

The plaintiffs' category of heirs was added to the Schedule of the Act only in 2005, and thus, they couldn't claim any rights based on this provision retroactively to 1987. Moreover, Perumal Naidu's daughters had acquired absolute ownership rights in the properties through the will, allowing them to alienate the property as they saw fit. Therefore, Alamelu Ammal's bequest to Ramanujatha Ammal was legally permissible.

The Court concluded that the High Court's reliance on Section 15(2)(a) was unjustified, and the plaintiffs had no legal right to claim shares in the properties. Thus, the appeal was allowed, and the trial court's decision, dismissing the suit filed by the plaintiffs, was restored.