Right to Education – Constitutionality – The Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the Right of Children to Free and Compulsory Education Act, 2009, as it applies to government schools, aided schools (including aided minority schools), and unaided non-minority schools. The Act imposes a reasonable restriction on the rights of private schools under Article 19(1)(g) by mandating admission of 25% of students from weaker sections and disadvantaged groups [Paras 1-20].

Unaided Minority Schools – Exemption – The court held that Sections 12(1)(c) and 18(3) of the Act infringe upon the fundamental freedom guaranteed to unaided minority schools under Article 30(1). Consequently, these provisions shall not apply to unaided minority schools, preserving their right to administer educational institutions of their choice without state interference [Paras 14-19].

Reasonableness and Public Interest – The court emphasized that the obligation on unaided non-minority schools to admit students from weaker sections under Section 12(1)(c) is a reasonable restriction in the interest of the general public, aimed at promoting inclusiveness and equality in education [Paras 9-11].

Dissenting Opinion – Justice K.S. Panicker Radhakrishnan dissented, expressing concerns over the obligations imposed on unaided schools, including administrative and financial burdens, potentially impacting their autonomy and quality of education [Paras 23-30].

Decision – The Act is constitutionally valid and applies to all schools except unaided minority schools. The judgment will operate from the academic year 2012-13, and admissions made prior to the judgment will not be affected [Paras 20-22].

Education Law – Inspection and Recognition – The Supreme Court addressed whether inspections of recognized teacher education institutions, necessary for withdrawal of recognition under Section 17(1) of the NCTE Act, 1993, must be conducted in accordance with Section 13 or if the Regional Committee can proceed independently. The Madhya Pradesh High Court mandated inspection under Section 13 before any action under Section 17, while the Delhi High Court permitted independent action by the Regional Committee under Section 17 [Paras 5-7].

Harmonious Construction – The court harmonized Sections 13 and 17, stating that if the Regional Committee deems inspection necessary before proceeding under Section 17, it must follow the procedure outlined in Section 13. However, if satisfaction can be reached without inspection, Section 13 need not be invoked [Paras 28-30].

Administrative Process – The court emphasized that inspections should follow the procedure in Rule 8 of the 1997 Rules, ensuring fairness and transparency. It rejected the argument that following Section 13 would cause unnecessary delays, highlighting that guidelines could be framed for expeditious inspections [Paras 24-25].

Decision – The appeals were disposed of, directing the National Council for Teacher Education to conduct inspections within six weeks as per Section 13 for all concerned institutions. If deficiencies are found and rectified, recognition should be restored. If not, the withdrawal of recognition would stand [Paras 30-32].

Criminal Law – Procedure – The appellant challenged the High Court's dismissal of his revision petition against the rejection of his discharge application under Section 239 CrPC. The appellant contended that the prosecution initiated by the respondent was invalid without a court's complaint as required by Sections 195 and 340 CrPC for offenses alleged to have been committed in relation to judicial proceedings [Paras 1-5].

False Information and Fabrication of Evidence – The court held that the offenses under Sections 177 and 182 IPC, involving furnishing false information and causing a public servant to use his lawful power to the injury of another person, were not confined to acts within the court. Thus, the procedural safeguards of Sections 195 and 340 CrPC were not applicable to these offenses, even if related to court proceedings [Paras 8-9].

Precedents and Abuse of Process – The court dismissed the appellant's reliance on Abdul Rehman vs. K.M. Anees-ul-Haq, highlighting that the case did not consider the larger bench decision in Sachida Nand Singh vs. State of Bihar, which clarified the applicability of Sections 195 and 340 CrPC. The appellant was found to have suppressed material facts, amounting to an abuse of the judicial process by filing successive petitions [Paras 10-12].

Decision – The petition was dismissed, with the court upholding the prosecution's validity for the composite offenses and denying interference with the impugned orders. The appellant's failure to disclose the prior rejection of his Section 482 CrPC application further weakened his case [Paras 6-7, 13].

Municipal Law – Unauthorized Structures – The appeal concerns the legality of notices issued under Sections 314 and 354A of the Mumbai Municipal Corporation Act, 1888, and subsequent actions taken by the Municipal Corporation of Greater Mumbai to demolish unauthorized structures erected by the respondents on road margins [Paras 1-4].

Evidence and Procedural Compliance – The court emphasized the appellant's failure to substantiate its claims with documentary evidence before the trial court and the High Court. The appellant’s lack of procedural diligence and failure to address amendments to the plaint weakened its position. The court criticized the Municipal Corporation for not presenting critical ownership documents in earlier proceedings, highlighting procedural lapses and omissions [Paras 6-7].

Alternative Relief – The High Court’s modification of the trial court’s decree included a directive for the Municipal Corporation to provide an alternative site for the respondents to reconstruct their demolished structures. The Supreme Court upheld this direction, granting the appellant six months to comply, failing which the respondents could execute the High Court’s modified judgment [Para 7].

Decision – Appeal dismissed – The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal due to the appellant's procedural failures and affirmed the High Court's order with a six-month compliance period. Costs of Rs. 25,000 were awarded to the first respondent, Thomas Mathew, payable by the Municipal Corporation within eight weeks [Paras 8].

Land Acquisition – Limitation for Reference – The core issue was whether the appellant’s application under Section 18(1) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, for enhancement of compensation was filed within the prescribed period. The appellant received the notice under Section 12(2) on February 22, 1985, and subsequently filed the application on April 8, 1985. The Reference Court dismissed the application as time-barred, a decision upheld by the High Court [Paras 1-7].

Provision of Notice and Copy of Award – The Supreme Court noted that the notice issued under Section 12(2) did not include a copy of the award, which is essential for the appellant to effectively exercise the right to seek a reference. This procedural lapse by the Collector meant that the appellant was unable to ascertain the relevant particulars of the award, thereby justifying the delay [Paras 10-11, 15].

Precedent and Fair Play – The Court referenced its earlier decisions, highlighting the need for actual or constructive knowledge of the award’s contents to trigger the limitation period. The principles laid down in cases like Raja Harish Chandra Raj Singh v. The Deputy Land Acquisition Officer and State of Punjab v. Mst. Qaisar Jehan Begum were reaffirmed, emphasizing that knowledge of the award must include its essential contents [Paras 12-14].

Decision – Appeal allowed – The Supreme Court set aside the judgments of the Reference Court and the High Court. The respondents were directed to pay enhanced compensation at the rate of Rs. 450 per Are for irrigated land and Rs. 280 per Are for non-irrigated land, along with other statutory benefits including solatium and interest, within three months [Paras 16-17].

Exercise of Article 142 – The Court extended the benefit of enhanced compensation to other similarly placed landowners who had not appealed, invoking its power under Article 142 of the Constitution. This ensured uniform relief, consistent with the principles of equity and justice [Para 17].

Public Employment – Eligibility Criteria – The appellants contested their exclusion from the revised merit list for police drivers due to their lack of a heavy motor vehicle driving license. They argued that the original advertisement did not stipulate this requirement [Paras 3-4].

Interpretation of Advertisement – The advertisement specified candidates needed a driving license for "heavy and light/heavy vehicles" issued at least two years before the advertisement date. The appellants argued this did not exclusively require a heavy vehicle license. However, the court interpreted the advertisement as requiring either a heavy vehicle license or a combined light and heavy vehicle license, effectively excluding candidates with only a light vehicle license [Paras 4, 10-11].

Recruiting Authority's Discretion – The court emphasized the discretion of the recruiting authorities to determine eligibility based on job requirements, which in this case involved driving heavy vehicles. It found no deviation from the advertisement in the authorities' decision to prioritize candidates with heavy vehicle licenses [Paras 9, 11].

Decision – Appeal dismissed – The court upheld the Jharkhand High Court’s judgment, finding no merit in the appellants' contention that the recruitment process was flawed or deviated from the advertised criteria. No costs were awarded [Paras 12-13].

Representing Advocates:

Shekhar Prit Jha, Vikrant Bhardwaj, Sumit Kumar, Kumari Supriya, and Danish Zubain Khan for the Appellant

Ratan Kumar Choudhuri, Ambhoj Kumar Sinha, and Dharmendra Kumar Sinha for the Respondent

Election Law – Substitution of Petitioner – The appellant, elected to the Maharashtra Legislative Assembly, faced an election petition filed by Yadavrao, whose nomination was rejected. Yadavrao withdrew his petition, and subsequently, the respondent Bhagwat sought to substitute himself as the petitioner, despite not being a candidate in the election. The High Court allowed the substitution under Section 110(3)(c) of the Representation of the People Act, 1951, prompting the present appeal [Paras 2-6].

Eligibility for Substitution – The court examined whether Bhagwat, not having filed a nomination or alleged corrupt practices, qualified as "a person who might himself have been a petitioner" under Section 110(3)(c). The court concluded that this provision did not apply to anyone indiscriminately but was context-specific, focusing on individuals with a direct and similar interest as the original petitioner [Paras 7-10, 15].

Distinction from Section 116 – The court differentiated between Section 110, dealing with withdrawal of petitions, and Section 116, concerning substitution in case of death or non-opposition by the respondent. Section 116 uses broader language ("any person") compared to Section 110 ("a person"), emphasizing the need for context-specific interpretation [Paras 8-9].

Decision – Appeal allowed – The Supreme Court set aside the High Court's decision, holding that Bhagwat did not meet the criteria for substitution under Section 110(3)(c). The original petitioner's specific grievance regarding the rejection of his nomination could not be continued by Bhagwat, who lacked a similar vested interest [Paras 16-18].

Criminal Procedure – Summoning Order – The appellants challenged the summoning order issued by the Metropolitan Magistrate under Section 204 CrPC in a property dispute involving allegations of cheating under Section 420 IPC. The Delhi High Court rejected their petition under Section 482 CrPC to quash the summoning order, prompting the present appeals [Paras 3-4].

Cognizance and Summoning – The court clarified that taking cognizance of an offense and issuing a summoning order are distinct actions. While taking cognizance involves judicial notice of an offense, summoning requires the Magistrate to be satisfied that there are sufficient grounds for proceeding. Explicit reasons for issuing summons are not mandated under Section 204 CrPC [Paras 7-10].

Precedent and Reasoning – The court referred to several judgments, including S.K. Sinha, Chief Enforcement Officer vs. Videocon International Ltd., and Kanti Bhadra Shah vs. State of West Bengal, emphasizing that detailed reasons are not required when issuing summons if the Magistrate has applied judicial mind to the allegations [Paras 11-15].

Maintainability of Petition under Section 482 CrPC – The court affirmed the maintainability of petitions under Section 482 CrPC, referencing precedents such as Pepsi Foods Ltd. vs. Special Judicial Magistrate and Dhariwal Tobacco Products Ltd. vs. State of Maharashtra [Para 18].

Decision – Appeals dismissed – The court upheld the Delhi High Court's order, confirming that the summoning order issued by the Magistrate was valid. The Metropolitan Magistrate, Patiala House, New Delhi, was directed to proceed in accordance with the law, unaffected by observations in these appeals [Paras 19].

Motor Vehicles Act – Compensation – The appellants, dependents of the deceased Ritesh Bhanu Shali, challenged the High Court's reduction of compensation awarded by the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, Raipur. The Tribunal had determined compensation based on the deceased’s income, but the High Court applied a different multiplier and reduced the compensation amount [Paras 1-3].

Dependency and Multiplier – The court addressed the appropriate deductions for personal expenses of the deceased and the correct multiplier to be applied. It reiterated that the selection of the multiplier should be based on the age of the deceased, not the dependents, as per the guidelines established in Sarla Verma v. Delhi Transport Corporation [Paras 15-18].

Personal and Living Expenses – For a bachelor, the general deduction is 50% of income for personal and living expenses. However, in cases where the family is large and dependent on the deceased’s income, the deduction may be restricted to one-third [Para 16].

Decision – Appeal allowed – The Supreme Court set aside the High Court’s judgment and restored the compensation as calculated by the Tribunal, with minor modifications. The compensation was recalculated to Rs. 954,000 with 6% interest per annum from the date of filing the claim petition. The appellants were entitled to this amount, and the insurance company was directed to adjust any amount already received by the claimants [Paras 19-20].