Facts:

The petitioner, a medical college, applied for the renewal of permission for its MBBS course batch for the academic year 2017-18.

Assessors found deficiencies during an inspection, leading to the Medical Council of India (MCI) recommending against renewal to the Central Government.

Despite a favorable opinion from the Central Government's Hearing Committee, the matter was referred back to the MCI for further review.

The MCI's Compliance Verification Assessment identified additional deficiencies, resulting in another recommendation against renewal.

The Central Government, through an order, rejected the renewal of permission, prompting the petitioner to challenge the decision under Article 32 of the Constitution.

Issues:

Whether the power of the MCI can be restricted in its assessment when sent back by the Central Government for compliance verification.

Whether the decision of the Central Government was reasoned and fair.

Held:

The power of the MCI cannot be restricted by laying down an absolute principle that limits the scope of assessment to only the mentioned items during compliance verification .

The Central Government's direction for compliance verification should not be interpreted as a limited remand .

It is obligatory for the Central Government to provide reasons for its decisions, ensuring fairness in the process .

The Central Government is directed to afford a further opportunity of hearing to the petitioner-college and to take assistance from the newly constituted Oversight Committee .

Decision: The Court directed the Central Government to afford a further opportunity of hearing to the petitioner-college and emphasized the importance of providing reasoned decisions and ensuring fairness in the process.

Facts:The case involves an appeal against the acquittal of respondent no. 2 in a murder case. The appellant, Rajkishore Purohit, brother of the deceased, contested the acquittal of respondent no. 2, who was initially convicted under Section 302/34 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC) by the Sessions Judge but later acquitted by the High Court.

Issues:

The determination of whether there was sufficient evidence to establish the common intention among the accused to commit the crime, particularly in light of respondent no. 2's acquittal by the High Court.

Held:

The Supreme Court held that the acquittal of respondent no. 2 by the High Court was erroneous and ordered the restoration of his conviction under Section 302/34 IPC. The court concluded that the evidence, including the conduct of respondent no. 2 before, during, and after the incident, pointed towards the existence of common intention among the accused to commit the crime. It emphasized that the absence of overt acts or possession of weapons by respondent no. 2 did not necessarily negate his involvement or common intention. This decision was supported by established legal principles regarding common intention and relevant precedents, as cited in the judgment.

The court further directed respondent no. 2 to surrender immediately to serve the remaining period of his sentence, considering the time he had already spent in custody.

Facts:

The dispute arose from a PIL filed in the Bombay High Court questioning concessions granted for building development in Mumbai.

The High Court issued various orders, including directing re-examination of concessions by the Municipal Commissioner.

Challenges and appeals were filed by both parties against the High Court's orders, with subsequent legal proceedings initiated.

Issues:

Whether PIL No.17 of 2017 should be transferred from the Bombay High Court to the Supreme Court for joint consideration with pending Special Leave Petitions.

Whether interim orders passed by the High Court should be upheld or modified in light of the transfer of PIL No.17 of 2017.

Held:

The Supreme Court held that the transfer of PIL No.17 of 2017 to the Supreme Court was necessary for joint consideration with pending Special Leave Petitions. The Court observed that the issues raised in the PIL were already under scrutiny in the Special Leave Petitions, and early resolution of these disputes was in the interest of public safety and the parties involved. Therefore, the Transfer Petition was allowed, and PIL No.17 of 2017 was transferred to be heard along with pending Special Leave Petitions.

Regarding the interim orders passed by the High Court, the Supreme Court dismissed the Special Leave Petitions subject to the observation that parties could seek alteration or modification of the interim orders before the Supreme Court. The Court emphasized that the concerns raised by both parties, including the financial burden on respondent No.6, were significant but should be addressed within the context of the transferred PIL and pending Special Leave Petitions.

In result, Transfer Petition is allowed and the SLPs are dismissed subject to observations as made above.

Facts:

The appellants sought execution of a decree for permanent injunction. They applied for police protection in the execution proceedings under Section 151 of the CPC. The Execution Court granted the application, but the High Court intervened, claiming the application should have been filed under Order XXI, Rule 32 of the CPC.

Issues:

Whether the application for police protection in execution proceedings, filed under Section 151 of the CPC, was valid.

Whether the High Court's interference with the Execution Court's order was justified.

Held:

The Supreme Court held that the exact provision invoked is not crucial as long as the Execution Court has jurisdiction and follows the proper procedure. The Court cited previous cases where technicalities in filing applications were not grounds for rejection if the court had jurisdiction. Therefore, the High Court's interference was deemed unjustified. The execution of the decree would not prevent a suit for specific performance from being tried separately. Pending applications were disposed of, and no costs were awarded.

Facts:

Beena R. appealed against the Kerala Public Service Commission's decision regarding her qualification for the position of Lower Division Typist.

She possessed an equivalent qualification to KGTE Typewriting but lacked a separate certificate in Computer Word Processing, as required by the Notification.

The initial objection regarding the equivalence of her qualification was recalled, and she was included in the Rank List at Rank No. 7. However, a subsequent objection was raised concerning her lack of a Computer Word Processing certificate.

Issues:

Whether Beena R. fulfilled the qualification requirement for Lower Division Typist.

Interpretation of the Notification's requirement for a separate certificate in Computer Word Processing.

Held:

The Court noted that Note 1 of the Notification required individuals who passed KGTE Typewriting before January 2002 to produce a separate certificate in Computer Word Processing. The term 'produce' implied submission during record verification, written examination, or at the time of appointment.

Beena R. submitted her certificate before the written examination and obtained Rank No. 7 based on her marks, thus fulfilling the requirement.

The Court emphasized the background behind the introduction of the note, addressing the absence of Computer Word Processing in the curriculum before 2002.

The appeals were allowed, the High Court's judgment was set aside, and Beena R. was directed to be appointed according to her position in the Rank List within three months from the date of the judgment.

In case of delays, Beena R. would be deemed to be in actual service from November 1, 2017.

No costs were awarded in the matter.

Facts:

The appellant (Union of India) challenges the High Court's order granting bail to the respondents (accused in an NDPS case).

The respondents are charged under Section 22/23 of the NDPS Act.

The High Court, in its order, considered various factors such as duration of custody, completion of investigation, and seizure of the consignment, and granted bail to the respondents.

Issues:

Whether the High Court properly considered the special conditions specified in Section 37 of the NDPS Act regarding bail for certain enumerated offences.

Whether the High Court satisfied the additional conditions mandated by Section 37 when granting bail.

Held:

The Supreme Court holds that the matter needs to be considered afresh by the High Court as the special conditions specified in Section 37 of the NDPS Act were not properly considered. The impugned order is set aside, and the matter is remitted to the High Court for fresh consideration.

The High Court is directed to consider all available contentions from both sides and pass orders within six months. Pending the disposal of the matter, and considering that charges have not been framed yet, the Supreme Court orders interim bail for Niyazuddin S.K. until further orders are passed by the High Court.

Facts:

The appellant challenged an order of the High Court that overturned findings regarding the bonafide requirements of the appellant made by the Rent Controller and upheld by the Appellate Authority. The High Court re-evaluated the evidence as if it were a first appeal.

Issues:

Whether the High Court exceeded its jurisdiction by re-evaluating evidence in a revisional jurisdiction matter.

Whether the principles outlined in Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Ltd. v. Dilbahar Singh, (2014) 9 SCC 78, apply to the present case.

Held:

The appellant before this Court is aggrieved by order passed by the High Court wherein concurrent findings on facts with regard to the bonafide requirements of the appellant have been upset holding that "the court can re-appreciate the evidence to test whether the findings of the Rent Controller are correct". We are afraid, the High Court has misdirected itself and exceeded its jurisdiction.

The Supreme Court held that the High Court had exceeded its jurisdiction by re-evaluating the evidence as if it were a first appeal. The Court referred to the principles outlined in the case of Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Ltd. v. Dilbahar Singh, (2014) 9 SCC 78, which emphasized that revisional power is narrower than appellate jurisdiction and cannot be used to re-evaluate facts unless there are substantial legal errors.

Facts:

Haffkine Bio-Pharmaceutical Corporation Ltd., a Government of Maharashtra undertaking, issued a tender for the supply of bulk drugs, including Monovalent Bulk of Poliomyelitis Type 1 (Oral) Sabin Strain and Monovalent Bulk of Poliomyelitis Type 3 (Oral) Sabin Strain.

Nirlac Chemicals, a registered partnership firm, protested against the issuance of the tender but participated in it.

During the tender opening process, the bid of one of the parties, Bionet, was not opened in the presence of the representatives of Nirlac, contrary to CVC guidelines.

The High Court quashed the tender and directed the government to float a fresh tender. However, it allowed Haffkine to procure the bulk drug from Bionet until a fresh tender was finalized.

Issues:

Whether the tender process complied with CVC guidelines.

Whether Nirlac was qualified to be awarded the tender.

Interpretation of tender conditions, specifically condition 'j'.

Held:

The Supreme Court held that the tender process violated CVC guidelines as the bid of Bionet was not opened in the presence of Nirlac's representatives (Para 10).

It found that Nirlac was aware of the rejection of their bid on the same day as the bid opening and failed to follow up on the matter, thus disqualifying them from being awarded the tender (Para 11).

Regarding the interpretation of tender conditions, the Court interpreted condition 'j' to require the bidder to generate business for the Corporation by selling a specified quantity of the finished product, a condition that Nirlac did not meet (Para 14).

The Court set aside the tender awarded to Bionet and directed Haffkine to place orders with Nirlac for the supply of bulk drugs required for the manufacture of 120 million doses of oral polio vaccine, based on the price quoted by Nirlac. Haffkine was restrained from purchasing further bulk drugs from Bionet. Additionally, Haffkine was directed to supply and Bionet to purchase 66 million doses of oral vaccine as per a confirmed order (Para 19).

The Court permitted Haffkine to float a fresh tender for the supply of bulk drugs, mandating that the tender process should be conducted as an e-tender to ensure transparency and avoid allegations of impropriety. The appeals are disposed of (Para 21-22).

Facts:

The Customs Department, at the behest of the Directorate of Revenue Intelligence (DRI), detained goods belonging to importers.

Mumbai Port Trust and the Shipping Line demanded demurrage and detention charges from the importers.

The importers challenged these demands, alleging mala fide actions by DRI officials.

The High Court ruled in favor of the importers, directing the Port Trust to waive demurrage charges and holding the Customs authorities liable for detention charges.

Issues:

Whether Mumbai Port Trust has the authority to levy demurrage charges despite actions by the Customs Department.

Who is liable for demurrage and detention charges - the importers or the Customs authorities?

Whether the importers can claim exemption or reimbursement for the charges.

Whether the High Court had the jurisdiction to direct the Customs authorities to pay detention charges to the Shipping Line.

Held:

The Mumbai Port Trust has the statutory power to levy rates, including demurrage, as per Section 47A of the Major Port Trusts Act, unaffected by the Customs Act or the 2009 Regulations (Para 30-31).

Importers are primarily liable for demurrage charges, even if not at fault, while detention charges are part of a private contract between the importer and the carrier. Importers may claim reimbursement from Customs authorities only if their actions are proven mala fide or a gross abuse of power, which was not established in this case (Para 34).

Importers had the option to take advantage of provisional assessment offers to reduce charges, which they did not utilize (Para 44).

Both delays by Customs authorities and importers contributed to the situation, and importers cannot evade liability for charges. Importers are free to seek remission or exemption from charges under Section 53 of the Act, and the Board may consider their case sympathetically (Para 46).

The High Court did not have jurisdiction to direct the Customs authorities to pay detention charges to the Shipping Line (Para 47).

Decision: The appeals were allowed, affirming Mumbai Port Trust's authority to levy demurrage charges and upholding the importer's liability for both demurrage and detention charges. Importers were advised to approach the Port Trust for exemption or remission under Section 53. The High Court's direction regarding payment of detention charges by Customs authorities to the Shipping Line was set aside.