Facts:

The case involves a dispute between the Board of Control for Cricket in India (BCCI) and Kochi Cricket Pvt. Ltd. regarding the interpretation of certain provisions of the Arbitration and Conciliation (Amendment) Act, 2015.

Issues:

The application of Section 26 of the Amendment Act, particularly concerning the prospective application of the Act to arbitral and court proceedings related to arbitration.

Held:

The scheme of Section 26 of the Arbitration and Conciliation (Amendment) Act, 2015 is analyzed. The provision is construed to be prospective in nature, applying only to arbitral proceedings commenced on or after the commencement of the Amendment Act and to court proceedings related to arbitration initiated after the Amendment Act came into force.

Section 26 is dissected into two distinct parts, with an emphasis on the word "but" which separates them. The first part deals with exceptions to the application of the Amendment Act, while the second part applies the Amendment Act to specific proceedings.

The absence of specific references in the second part of Section 26 to Section 21 of the 1996 Act indicates that arbitral proceedings before a tribunal are not contemplated in that part. Instead, it refers to court proceedings in relation to arbitral proceedings.

The court clarifies the application of the Amendment Act to arbitral proceedings commenced before its enactment, noting that parties may agree otherwise. The intention of the legislature is to apply the Amendment Act prospectively.

The court addresses the application of Section 36, both in its original form and as amended, particularly focusing on the meaning of "enforcement" in the context of arbitral awards.

It is determined that Section 36 deals with the execution of arbitral awards, and its amended form should apply even to pending Section 34 applications filed before the commencement of the Amendment Act.

The court rejects the argument that there is a corresponding right for the judgment debtor to stay the execution of an award. It emphasizes the procedural nature of Section 36.

The interpretation of "enforcement" in Section 36 is discussed further, affirming that it treats the arbitral award as a decree to be enforced under the Code of Civil Procedure.

The court reflects on potential anomalies arising from the prospective application of the Amendment Act but emphasizes the importance of adhering to the legislative intent.

The court comments on the proposed Section 87, cautioning against its potential impact on delaying arbitration proceedings and increasing court interference.

Despite potential legal inaccuracies in the High Court's judgment, the court decides not to interfere with it in the interest of justice, considering the specific circumstances of the case.

Facts:

The case involved a dispute regarding the interpretation and implementation of the Pre-conception and Pre-natal Diagnostic Techniques (Prohibition of Sex Selection) Act, 1994, along with the associated rules. The Union of India appealed against a judgment of the Delhi High Court, which questioned the statutory authority to prescribe qualifications and training for individuals employed in genetic counselling centres, laboratories, and clinics.

Issues:

The legality and validity of the qualifications and training requirements prescribed under the Pre-conception and Pre-natal Diagnostic Techniques (Prohibition of Sex Selection) Act, 1994, and the associated rules, particularly in light of the Delhi High Court's judgment challenging their statutory basis.

Held:

The Parliament has conferred rule-making authority upon the Central government under the Pre-conception and Pre-natal Diagnostic Techniques (Prohibition of Sex Selection) Act, 1994, to specify minimum qualifications for persons employed at genetic counselling centres, laboratories, and clinics. The Court emphasized that the specifications of qualifications and training should be interpreted purposively to fulfill the objectives of the Act.

The judgment of the Delhi High Court, which questioned the statutory authority to prescribe qualifications and training, was stayed during the pendency of the proceedings. The Supreme Court directed strict enforcement of its earlier directions issued in a previous case related to the effective implementation of the Act's provisions.

Facts:

The case involves the interpretation of the Advocates Act, 1961, particularly regarding the practice of law by foreign law firms and lawyers in India.

Issues:

Whether foreign law firms/companies or foreign lawyers can practice law in India, both in litigation and non-litigation aspects.

Whether foreign lawyers can conduct arbitration proceedings in India.

Whether the Advocates Act applies to the customized and integrated services provided by Business Process Outsourcing (BPO) companies.

Held:

The practice of law encompasses both litigation and non-litigation activities, including giving opinions, drafting instruments, and participating in legal discussions. This applies to both Indian and foreign law. (Para 39)

Advocates enrolled with the Bar Council alone are entitled to practice law, and this includes non-litigation work. The regulatory mechanism for advocates applies to non-litigation activities as well. Foreign law firms/companies or lawyers cannot practice law in India without subjecting themselves to the Bar Council's regulatory mechanism. (Para 40 and 44)

Whether a visit by a foreign lawyer amounts to practicing law depends on the frequency and nature of the visit. Regular visits may constitute practice, while casual visits for advice may not. The determination of whether a visit amounts to practice is a question of fact. (Para 41 and 44)

Foreign lawyers may conduct arbitration proceedings related to international commercial arbitration if governed by specific rules or the Arbitration Act. However, they must adhere to the code of conduct applicable in India. (Para 45)

The applicability of the Advocates Act to BPO companies providing services potentially amounting to the practice of law depends on the substance of the services offered. If the services indeed constitute the practice of law, foreign law firms or lawyers are not allowed to engage in such activities. (Para 43 and 46)

Decision: The court upholds the prohibition on foreign law firms and lawyers from practicing law in India without subjecting themselves to the regulatory mechanism of the Bar Council. The court also modifies certain directions regarding the conduct of arbitration proceedings and the applicability of the Advocates Act to BPO companies, emphasizing a case-by-case determination based on the substance of the services provided.

Facts:

Raghuwar Pal Singh was appointed as a Veterinary Compounder.

His appointment was made without the required prior approval of the competent authority, as mandated by the Central Cattle Breeding Forum (Class III and IV Post) Recruitment Rules, 1969, and executive instructions.

Issues:

Whether the appointment made without prior approval of the competent authority was valid.

Whether termination of service without affording an opportunity of hearing was justified.

Held:

The recruitment procedure for the post of Veterinary Compounder was governed by the Central Cattle Breeding Forum (Class III and IV Post) Recruitment Rules, 1969, and executive instructions. These rules necessitated the issuance of appointment letters only by an authorized officer and after obtaining prior approval of the competent authority.

The appointment of Raghuwar Pal Singh lacked prior approval of the competent authority, rendering it null and void.

The Ministry concluded that the appointment was illegal due to various irregularities, including the unconstitutional constitution of the Selection Board and the Director Incharge nominating himself as the Chairman of the Board despite being related to the candidate.

Since the appointment was a nullity, there was no requirement to observe principles of natural justice before terminating Raghuwar Pal Singh's service.

The subject office order terminating Raghuwar Pal Singh's service was justified based on the illegality of his appointment, and it did not necessitate affording him the opportunity of a hearing.

The High Court's decision to interfere with the subject office order solely on the ground of lack of opportunity to the respondent was deemed incorrect.

Decision: The Court upheld the termination of Raghuwar Pal Singh's service due to the illegal nature of his appointment, which lacked prior approval from the competent authority.

Facts:

The notification under Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 was issued on August 27, 2004.

Various objections were raised under Section 5A, and a declaration under Section 6 was issued on August 25, 2005.

Sale deeds were executed by landholders in favor of builders/private entities after the initiation of acquisition proceedings.

The acquisition proceedings were dropped by the state on August 24, 2007, with plans for a fresh notification.

Issues:

Whether the decisions to drop the acquisition proceedings were consistent with relevant policies and public interest.

Whether there was a fraud on power in the decisions dated August 24, 2007, and January 29, 2010.

What relief should be granted in light of the fraudulent exercise of power.

Held:

The decisions dated August 24, 2007, and January 29, 2010, were inconsistent with relevant policies, regional plans, and public interest.

There was a clear fraud on power in the decisions to drop the acquisition proceedings, which were not bona fide exercises of power.

The relief granted must aim to rectify the fraudulent exercise of power, protect the interests of affected parties, and ensure public purpose.

The decisions dated August 24, 2007, and January 29, 2010, are set aside as being brought about by a mala fide exercise of power.

An award is deemed to have been passed on August 26, 2007, for lands covered by the acquisition declaration and those transferred by landholders during the relevant period.

Lands not transferred by landholders during the specified period are not affected by these directions.

The lands covered under the deemed award shall vest in the relevant authorities.

The period between August 24, 2007, and the date of this judgment shall not be counted for the purposes of Section 24(2) of the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013.

All transactions entered into during the period from August 24, 2007, till January 29, 2010, shall be subject to the directions issued herein.

The sale consideration paid by the builders/private entities to the landholders shall be treated towards compensation under the award.

The builders/private entities will be entitled to refund/reimbursement of any payment made to the landholders or the amounts spent on land development, subject to verification.

Third parties from whom money had been collected by the builders/private entities will be entitled to refund or allotment of plots/apartments, subject to verification.

The CBI is directed to investigate transactions involving "middlemen" and recover unlawfully obtained sums for the benefit of the state.

Pending writ petitions related to the acquisition in the Gurgaon-Manesar Urban Complex should be disposed of expeditiously by the High Court.

Facts:

M/S. Fortune Infrastructure (now known as M/S. Hicon Infrastructure) launched a residential housing project named 'Hicons Onyx', later renamed 'Fortune Residency'.

Trevor D'Lima booked a flat in this project but had not received possession due to delays in construction.

The appellants transferred the project to another company due to cost escalation beyond expectations.

Trevor D'Lima filed a complaint with the National Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission (NCDRC) seeking various reliefs, including possession of the flat or refund of the amount paid along with compensation for delay and inconvenience.

Issues:

Whether there was deficiency in service on the part of the appellants?

What is the appropriate quantum of compensation?

Held:

The Court affirmed the finding of deficiency in service on the part of the appellants. The court noted that the appellants failed to provide valid reasons for transferring the project to another company despite their contractual obligation to deliver the property to the respondent.

Regarding the quantum of compensation, the court noted that damages should be compensatory and awarded to place the aggrieved party in the same position as if the contract had been performed. The court fixed the market rate at Rs. 50,000 per square foot for the disputed property and adjusted the compensation accordingly.

The appellants were directed to refund the amount received from the respondent, pay compensation for delay, and cover the cost of litigation. The appellants were given six weeks to comply with the order, failing which they would be liable to pay interest.

Additionally, the court allowed the respondent to withdraw a certain amount deposited by the appellants before the NCDRC and adjusted it against the appellants' liability.

Facts:

The appellants owned land subject to acquisition by the State of Tamil Nadu in 1985.

They filed a writ petition challenging the acquisition proceedings.

The Single Judge of the High Court allowed the writ petition, quashing the acquisition.

The State appealed the Single Judge's decision before a Division Bench, which set aside the Single Judge's order and dismissed the writ petition.

The appellants filed a review application against the Division Bench's decision, which was dismissed.

Issues:

Whether the Division Bench erred in failing to address the issues raised by the parties and provide reasoned decisions.

Whether the Single Judge's order lacked reasoning and failed to address the issues adequately.

Held:

The Court found shortcomings in both the Single Judge's order and the Division Bench's decision.

The Single Judge's order lacked reasoning and failed to address the issues adequately.

The Division Bench, while setting aside the Single Judge's order, also failed to provide reasons for its decision and did not address the issues raised in the writ petition.

The Court emphasized that the appellate court's duty is to address all issues raised by the parties and provide reasoned decisions.

As a result, the Supreme Court set aside both the Division Bench's decision and the review application and remanded the case to the Division Bench for a fresh decision on the merits.

The Court instructed the Division Bench to consider all issues raised by the parties and provide a reasoned decision within six months.

Facts:

The case involved appeals regarding the taxation of certain receipts by cooperative societies, including non-occupancy charges, transfer charges, and common amenity fund charges. The question revolved around whether these receipts were exempt from income tax under the doctrine of mutuality.

Issues:

Whether the receipts in question qualified for exemption from income tax under the doctrine of mutuality, considering their utilization for the common benefit of society members.

Held:

The doctrine of mutuality, rooted in common law principles, asserts that a person cannot make a profit from themselves. Therefore, amounts received from oneself are not regarded as income and are not taxable. However, income derived from business activities by a cooperative society is taxable under Section 2(24)(vii) of the Income Tax Act, which stands excluded from the principle of mutuality.

The court found that the receipts in question, such as transfer charges and non-occupancy charges, were utilized for the common benefit of society members, including maintenance, repairs, and amenities. This utilization aligned with the principles of mutuality, as the contributors and beneficiaries were the same.

Regarding the applicability of a government notification dated 09.08.2001, it was determined that the notification only applied to housing societies and not to premises societies, which consist of non-residential premises. Therefore, the notification did not affect the taxation of receipts by premises societies.

In conclusion, the court dismissed the appeals by the revenue and allowed the appeal by the cooperative society, affirming the principle of mutuality in relation to the receipts in question.

Facts:

The appellant, Dev Kanya Tiwari, was convicted under Section 302/34 IPC for the murder of her son-in-law.

The case relied on circumstantial evidence as there was no direct evidence regarding the cause of death.

The postmortem report indicated death by asphyxia due to strangulation, but there were other indications such as blisters on the body and bluish nails which could suggest poisoning.

Witnesses provided conflicting testimonies, with some supporting the prosecution's case while others supported the appellant's claim that the deceased committed suicide.

The viscera, necessary for chemical analysis to confirm poisoning, was not preserved by the doctor.

Issues:

Whether the evidence presented is sufficient to establish guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.

Whether the conflicting testimonies and lack of conclusive evidence warrant a conviction.

Held:

The Supreme Court, after careful consideration of the evidence and circumstances, held that it was not safe to convict the appellant under Section 302 IPC. The Court observed discrepancies in the evidence presented, including conflicting testimonies and the lack of conclusive medical evidence. The Court emphasized the importance of establishing a complete chain of circumstances that excludes any reasonable doubt of the accused's guilt.

Therefore, the benefit of doubt was given to the appellant, and the appeal was allowed. The appellant was ordered to be released from custody forthwith if not required in any other case.