Facts:

Sheela, daughter of Ramesh, died on 28.04.1999, with Ramesh reporting it as suicide by hanging.

Prosecution argued Sheela was murdered based on medical evidence and witness testimonies.

Autopsy revealed injuries around Sheela's neck, indicating asphyxia.

Witnesses testified Ramesh slapped Sheela and took her inside the house on the night of her death.

Issues:

Whether Ramesh was guilty of culpable homicide not amounting to murder under Section 304 Part I IPC.

Held:

The Court found Ramesh guilty of culpable homicide not amounting to murder under Section 304 Part I IPC based on the evidence presented, overturning the High Court's decision to acquit him. The evidence, including medical reports and witness testimonies, proved Ramesh's involvement in Sheela's death beyond a reasonable doubt. Therefore, the appeal by the State of Rajasthan was allowed, and Ramesh was convicted for the culpable homicide of Sheela, with his sentence modified to ten years of rigorous imprisonment.

Facts:

The case revolves around allegations of unauthorized and illegal transfer of a plot against the appellants and others, who are public servants. It is alleged that they abused their official positions to transfer the plot illegally and obtain an undue pecuniary advantage. The process of transfer was initiated by the then Director of ICPO, based on a representation prepared by the Administrative Officer of ICPO. Final approval for the transfer was given by the appellant, the then Director General of ICMR. The allegations suggest a conspiracy by the appellants to commit offenses under Section 13(1)(d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988.

Issues:

Whether Section 197 of the CrPC, which mandates prior sanction for prosecution of public servants for offenses committed in discharge of official duties, is applicable to the facts of the case.

Held:

The FIR and the charge-sheet both contain references to the allegations made against the appellants, suggesting a conspiracy to commit offenses under Section 13(1)(d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988. Therefore, Section 197 of the CrPC is applicable to the facts of the case.

The allegations in the charge-sheet indicate that the appellants entered into an agreement to commit an illegal act, punishable under Section 120-B of the IPC. Hence, Section 197 CrPC is squarely applicable. Prior sanction of the Central Government was necessary before the Special Judge could take cognizance of the offense.

It is imperative that the alleged offense is committed in discharge of official duty by the accused for the application of Section 197 CrPC. Since the allegations made against the appellants suggest the offenses were committed in discharge of their official duty, previous sanction from the Central Government was necessary before the Special Judge could take cognizance and issue summons to the appellants.

The judgment and order of the High Court, which dismissed the application seeking quashing of proceedings, are set aside. The proceedings initiated by the Special Judge without prior sanction from the Central Government are quashed.

Facts:

The appeals concern the taxation of interest received by banks when bills of exchange, which they have discounted, are defaulted on, resulting in the payment of compensation.

The main issue is whether such compensation constitutes "interest" liable to tax under the Interest Tax Act, 1974.

There is a division of opinion among different High Courts on this matter.

Issues:

Whether the compensation received by banks on defaulted bills of exchange falls within the definition of "interest" under the Interest Tax Act, 1974.

Held:

The Supreme Court analyzed the definition of "interest" under the Interest Tax Act and concluded that it is narrow and exhaustive.

The Act defines interest primarily as interest on loans and advances made in India and includes specific types of charges, but excludes others.

Compensation received after the due date of a bill of exchange is not in the nature of interest under the Interest Tax Act.

The Act does not include service fees or other charges in respect of money borrowed or debt incurred, unlike the definition of interest under the Income Tax Act.

Consequently, the Supreme Court dismissed the appeals of the revenue authorities and allowed the appeals of the banks.

Facts:

The appellants, who were Grade-II Police Constables, sought parity in pay with another group of individuals who were promoted to Naik and Havaldar. The appellants' representation for parity in pay was rejected, leading to writ petitions before the High Court. The single judge initially allowed the writ petitions, but the Division Bench of the High Court set aside the order and dismissed the appellants' petitions.

Issues:

Whether the appellants were entitled to parity in pay with their counterparts and whether the excess amount paid to them during a certain period should be recovered.

Held:

The Court partly allowed the appeals. It directed the respondents not to recover any excess amount from the appellants in relation to the payment made towards stepping up of their pay scale.

The court applied the principle laid down in a previous case, Shyam Babu Verma and Others vs. Union of India, where it was held that excess payments made to employees due to no fault of theirs should not be recovered.

The court noted that the appellants did not commit any fault in seeking the benefits and rendered their services during the period in question.

Facts:

Dr. Ram Lakhan Singh, a retired member of the Indian Forest Service, alleged that he was unlawfully detained and implicated in false vigilance cases by the State Government of Uttar Pradesh.

The petitioner contended that the vigilance proceedings initiated against him were at the behest of the Chief Minister of Uttar Pradesh, following his refusal to comply with directives related to the denotification of a bird sanctuary.

Despite court orders directing proper procedures to be followed, the state allegedly conducted the vigilance enquiry unlawfully, leading to the petitioner's arrest and suspension from his official duties.

Issues:

Whether the petitioner's rights were violated by the State Government of Uttar Pradesh through unlawful detention and malicious prosecution.

Whether there were procedural lapses in the conduct of the vigilance proceedings against the petitioner.

Whether the petitioner is entitled to compensation for the harm suffered as a result of the actions of the state authorities.

Held:

The court found procedural lapses on the part of the state government, which caused significant harm to the petitioner.

Despite the state's argument that its actions were lawful and justified, the court noted the absence of substantial evidence to support the allegations against the petitioner.

Emphasizing the importance of maintaining a balance between prosecuting guilty officers and protecting innocent ones from malicious prosecution, the court awarded a lump sum compensation of Rs. 10 lakhs to the petitioner.

The state government was directed to pay this compensation within three months.

The writ petition stands disposed of accordingly.

Facts:

The appellant, Pawan Kumar Agarwala, was accused of involvement in filling a loan application for a borrower and influencing another branch manager to sanction a loan, despite knowing that the borrower had previously taken a loan from his own branch.

In the disciplinary proceedings, the appellant received a harsher penalty of dismissal compared to the minor penalty imposed on the manager of the other branch.

The appellant challenged this decision through a writ petition, citing unfairness in the inquiry process due to the lack of provision of witness lists and document copies.

Issues:

The fairness of the disciplinary proceedings against the appellant, including whether there was a violation of procedural requirements and principles of natural justice.

Held:

The Court found that there was a denial of fair opportunity to the appellant, in gross violation of procedural requirements and principles of natural justice.

The inquiry officer's finding on the charges was vitiated due to non-compliance with statutory rules.

The order of reinstatement without full back wages was deemed unjustified due to insufficient evidence.

The High Court should have deducted the amount of pension received by the appellant from the back wages for the relevant period.

Consequently, the order of the Division Bench was set aside, and the order of the single judge was restored, with modification to award full back wages upon reinstatement.

Decision: The Court held that the appellant was entitled to reinstatement with full back wages due to the denial of fair opportunity and procedural violations in the disciplinary proceedings.

Facts:

The Court delivered a judgment on April 10, 2015, convicting Respondent No. 1 under Section 376(1) of the Indian Penal Code and imposing a seven-year imprisonment term along with a fine. However, the Court confirmed Respondent No. 1's acquittal for another offence.

Despite repeated notices, no representation was made on behalf of Respondent No. 1 during the appeal proceedings.

The Court appointed an amicus to represent Respondent No. 1.

Neither the State nor the Appellant informed the Court that Respondent No. 1 had passed away before the appeal hearings.

It later came to light that Respondent No. 1 had died on October 14, 2012.

Issues:

Whether the judgment delivered on April 10, 2015, could be implemented given the subsequent revelation of Respondent No. 1's death before the appeal was heard.

Held:

The Court recalled the judgment and order dated April 10, 2015, upon learning about Respondent No. 1's death prior to the appeal proceedings. The Court stated that since this fact was not known during the hearings and was not brought to the attention of the Court by any party, including the State, the judgment could not be implemented.

Consequently, the appeal was deemed to have become abated. The Court dismissed the criminal appeal based on this information.

Facts:

The case involves an appeal concerning the maintainability of a second revision entertained by the State Government under the Maharashtra Land Revenue Code, 1966.

Issues:

Whether the State Government has jurisdiction as the supreme revenue authority in revenue matters under the Maharashtra Land Revenue Code, 1966.

Whether the State Government can entertain a second revision despite the decision of a subordinate revenue officer.

Held:

The State Government is established as the supreme revenue authority in revenue matters under the Maharashtra Land Revenue Code, 1966. The language and wording of Section 257 of the Code indicate that its jurisdiction is concurrent with that of other revenue officers in deciding revisions. Therefore, even if one party seeks revision from the Commissioner, the State Government can still be approached under Section 257 for revision.

Revenue officers, including the Commissioner, are appointed by the State Government and are subject to its superintendence, direction, and control as per Section 11 of the Code. Additionally, Section 5 of the Code further emphasizes the State Government's authority over revenue officers. The State Government also has the power under Section 259 of the Code to call for and examine the record and proceedings of subordinate officers, even if their decisions are considered final.

There is no restriction in the Code suggesting that if revisional powers are exercised by a Revenue officer with jurisdiction, they cannot be further exercised by a superior Revenue officer or the State Government. Thus, if revisional powers are initially exercised by a Revenue officer, further revisional power can be exercised by a superior officer or the State Government.

In the present case, it was deemed within the jurisdiction of the State Government to entertain the second revision to assess the legality and propriety of the order passed by the Revenue Officer.

Decision: The Court dismissed the appeal, affirming the authority of the State Government to entertain the second revision under the Maharashtra Land Revenue Code, 1966.

Facts:

The case involves a Will executed in 1920 by 'SR', in which he outlined his family composition and described his properties. He specifically provided for his third wife, 'V', to enjoy a certain tiled house for her lifetime, along with access to water from a well. The Will acknowledged 'V's pre-existing right to maintenance.

Issues:

Whether 'V's limited right under the Will became an absolute right by virtue of Section 14(1) of the Hindu Succession Act.

Held:

The court observed that under Hindu Law, a husband has a personal obligation to maintain his wife, and if he possesses properties, his wife is entitled to maintenance out of those properties. This entitlement is not a mere formality but a valuable and moral right. The Hindu Married Women's Right to Separate Maintenance and Residence Act, 1946, gives statutory recognition to this right (Para 15).

The court further noted that the genuineness of the Will and 'V's continuous possession of the property were not disputed. 'SR' recognized 'V's right to maintenance, his own physical weakness, and the likelihood of his death. Therefore, he decided to distribute his properties among family members, including 'V'. Since no one disputed the arrangements made in the Will, and 'V' continued to enjoy the property, her limited right under the Will became an absolute right by virtue of Section 14(1) of the Hindu Succession Act (Paras 21, 31 to 34).

Decision: Consequently, the court dismissed the appeal, upholding 'V's absolute right to the suit property, considering her pre-existing right to maintenance and the arrangements made in the Will by 'SR'.