Facts:

Respondent No.6, the Management of Church of South India, operated several schools in Kerala, including Samuel LMS High School, Parassala, and Light to the Blind School, Varkala.

The appellant was appointed as a Music Teacher at Samuel LMS High School, while the respondent, who applied for the same position, was not selected.

Respondent contended that due to the common management, she should have been promoted based on her seniority at Light to the Blind School.

Issues:

Whether the respondent, having participated in the selection process, could challenge it after being unsuccessful.

Whether the schools operated by Respondent No.6 were considered separate units.

Held:The Supreme Court held that the respondent, having participated in the selection process, was estopped from challenging it later. Additionally, the Court ruled that the schools operated by Respondent No.6 were distinct entities.

Therefore, the respondent's claim for promotion based on seniority was dismissed. The Court's decision was based on established legal principles, as evidenced in various precedents cited in the judgment.

Facts:

The appellant, Karan Singh, appealed against the Delhi High Court's judgment, which set aside the order of the Central Administrative Tribunal directing the Delhi Transport Corporation to pay him pension and other benefits.

Singh was initially appointed as a Conductor by the Corporation after completing training from March 15, 1983, to May 26, 1983. He was granted regular appointment from November 27, 1983, and subsequently opted for voluntary retirement under the Corporation's scheme.

Despite completing 10 years of service, Singh was denied pension benefits, leading to litigation.

Issues:

Whether the period of training and leave without pay should be counted towards Singh's qualifying service for pension.

Held:

The Tribunal and High Court had differing opinions on whether Singh's service qualified for pension.

The Tribunal initially ruled in Singh's favor, while the High Court reversed this decision.

The Court noted the appellant's argument regarding the inclusion of the training period and leave without pay in his qualifying service.

After considering the submissions, the Court found that Singh's service, adjusted for the training period and leave without pay, totaled 9 years, 10 months, and 11 days.

However, pending the decision on a reference made in another case, the Court decided to await the outcome before proceeding further.

The Court referenced the need for a larger bench to reconsider the issue of leave without pay and its impact on qualifying service, as highlighted in previous judgments.

Facts:

The High Court relied on a judgment (referred to as Swaran Singh's case) in determining compensation for land acquisition, where the exemplar of 1997 was used for an acquisition in 1999.

The appellant challenged this reliance, arguing that the High Court did not consider various transactions entered into before the issuance of Notification under Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act.

Issues:

Whether the High Court's reliance on the judgment in Swaran Singh's case was justified.

Whether the methodology used by the High Court in determining compensation was appropriate.

Whether previous awards or judgments should be blindly followed in determining compensation.

Whether dismissals of special leave petitions without reasons constitute binding precedents.

Held:

The High Court's reliance on Swaran Singh's case was deemed unjustified as it failed to consider other transactions and the nature of the transaction relied upon in that case.

While some increase in compensation may be warranted due to development, the High Court's cumulative increase of 15% was not justified. Instead, a flat increase of 12-13% should have been applied.

Previous awards or judgments cannot be blindly followed; they should be considered only as evidence, with due regard to the facts and circumstances of the case at hand.

Awards or judgments not involving the same parties are not binding precedents. Blindly following them may lead to injustice, as every case has unique circumstances.

The current value reflected by comparable sale deeds is more reliable for determining compensation. Previous awards or judgments, especially those relating to acquisitions made 5 to 10 years ago, may not provide an accurate basis for compensation.

Mistakes or illegalities in previous awards or judgments should not be perpetuated; instead, new evidence and circumstances of the current case should be considered.

To rely on a judgment or award not included in the evidence, an application must be made under the appropriate procedural rules. Such judgments or awards cannot be considered during arguments unless they form part of the recorded evidence.

Dismissals of special leave petitions without reasons do not constitute binding precedents.

Decision: The compensation determined by the High Court was deemed excessive. Instead, the compensation was fixed at Rs. 95 lakhs per acre, along with statutory benefits.

Facts:

The marriage between the appellant and respondent occurred in 1994, with two children born in 1995 and 2003. Since 2008, the parties had been living separately, and disputes led to civil and criminal proceedings. Eventually, a settlement was reached in April 2017, seeking divorce by mutual consent, with the appellant agreeing to provide permanent alimony to the respondent. A petition was filed before the Family Court seeking waiver of the statutory six-month waiting period for the second motion, citing long separation and no possibility of reconciliation.

Issues:

Whether the six-month waiting period under Section 13B(2) of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, could be waived by the court in exceptional circumstances.

Held:

The Supreme Court, after examining various precedents, held that the waiting period mentioned in Section 13B(2) is not mandatory but directory. The Court outlined factors to consider before granting waiver, including the length of separation, efforts at mediation, settlement of issues between parties, and the likelihood of reconciliation. The Court emphasized the need to consider the interests of justice and the objective of providing a chance for reconciliation while avoiding prolonging the parties' agony.

The Court's decision was based on several paragraphs of the judgment, including Paragraphs 18 to 23, which specifically address the interpretation of Section 13B(2) and the factors guiding the court's discretion in granting waiver.

Additionally, the Court mentioned the possibility of conducting proceedings via video conferencing and allowing representation through close relations in cases where personal appearance is not possible.

The parties were granted the liberty to move the concerned court for fresh consideration in light of the Supreme Court's order, and the appeal was disposed of accordingly.

Facts:

The case involved a dispute between Aravali Power Company Pvt. Ltd. (APCPL) and Era Infra Engineering Ltd. (EIEL) regarding a contract for constructing a permanent township for a thermal power project. APCPL appointed its Chief Executive Officer (CEO) as the sole arbitrator. EIEL later challenged the constitution of the arbitral tribunal, alleging potential bias due to the arbitrator's employment with APCPL.

Issues:

Whether the appointment of an employee of a party as an arbitrator raises justifiable doubts about their independence and impartiality?

Whether the High Court erred in setting aside the appointment of the arbitrator?

Whether the arbitration should proceed in accordance with the law despite the challenge to the arbitrator's appointment?

Held:

The mere fact that the arbitrator is an employee of one of the parties does not ipso facto raise a presumption of bias or lack of impartiality. (Para 1.1)

In this case, there was no evidence to suggest that the appointed arbitrator, being the CEO of APCPL, lacked independence or impartiality. (Para 1.2)

The principles governing appointments under the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, both before and after the 2015 Amendment, were outlined. (Para 1.3)

The procedure for challenging an arbitrator under Section 12 of the Act mandates disclosure of circumstances likely to affect independence or impartiality. EIEL failed to raise objections within the prescribed time and procedure. (Para 1.4)

The High Court erred in interfering with the arbitration process without sufficient cause. The arbitration should proceed in accordance with the law. (Para 1.4)

Decision: The appointment of the arbitrator by APCPL was upheld, and the arbitration was directed to proceed in accordance with the law. (Para 1.4)

Facts:

The case involves a Writ Petition (Civil) No. 728 of 2015 filed seeking a ban on the use of fireworks in the NCR.

An interim order was passed on November 11, 2016, suspending all licenses permitting the sale of fireworks within the NCR.

Manufacturers and suppliers of fireworks sought a modification of the interim order.

Issues:

The main issue was to balance public health concerns with the interests of those holding valid licenses to sell fireworks.

Another issue was to determine the extent of the contribution of fireworks to air pollution in the NCR.

Held:

The residents of the NCT of Delhi and the entire NCR are entitled to breathe unpolluted air, and the right to clean air is a recognized constitutional right. While health concerns must take precedence, a balanced approach is necessary to address both public health and the interests of those holding valid licenses. (Para 65-68)

A complete ban on the sale of fireworks may not be fully warranted, but there is a need for regulation to gradually reduce air pollution caused by fireworks. The court recognized the need to regulate the availability and sale of fireworks in Delhi and the NCR. (Para 69-70)

The health of the people in Delhi and the NCR must take precedence over any commercial or other interests, necessitating a graded regulation that would eventually result in a prohibition. (Para 71)

Decision: The court issued several directives to regulate the sale and use of fireworks, enforce safety standards, reduce the number of temporary licenses granted, and encourage community participation in display fireworks.

With the above directions, I.A. No. 52448 of 2017 is disposed of.

Facts:

Complaint filed against the respondent for evasion of excise duty.

Omission of Rule 56A during the pendency of proceedings.

Application for discharge filed by the respondent based on the omission of Rule 56A.

High Court quashed the charge citing the omission of Rule 56A as a reason.

Issues:

Whether the omission of Rule 56A affects the charge of evasion of duty.

Whether the prosecution can continue despite the omission of the procedural rule.

Held:

The Supreme Court held that the omission of a procedural rule (Rule 56A) did not affect the charge of evasion of duty against the respondent. The Court emphasized that the prosecution should not be deprived of the opportunity to prove evasion, which is an offense in itself. Therefore, the High Court's decision to quash the charge based solely on the omission of Rule 56A was not justified. The Court allowed the appeal, set aside the High Court's order, and restored the trial court's order.

Facts:

The petitioner, Madha Medical College and Research Institute, challenged the Union government's order debarring it from admitting students for the MBBS course during the academic years 2017-18 and 2018-19. The college had faced deficiencies in faculty, residents, infrastructure, and other facilities as noted in assessment reports by the Medical Council of India (MCI). Despite efforts to rectify these deficiencies, subsequent inspections still found significant shortcomings.

Issues:

Whether the petitioner should be granted recognition under Section 11 of the Indian Medical Council Act, 1956, and whether it should be allowed to participate in the counseling process for MBBS admissions for the upcoming academic year.

Held:

The court ruled that there was no prohibition on conducting multiple inspections if deemed necessary by the MCI to ensure compliance with regulations. It affirmed the MCI's authority to conduct inspections and make recommendations based on its findings. (Para. 17)

Emphasizing the importance of maintaining standards in medical education and protecting public interest, the court upheld the MCI's authority to conduct inspections and make recommendations based on its findings. (Para. 19)

While allowing the petitioner an opportunity to rectify deficiencies for consideration in the subsequent academic year, the court granted the college an opportunity to rectify deficiencies for consideration in the academic year 2018-19. It directed the MCI to conduct a fresh inspection within two months and notify the college of any remaining deficiencies. The petitioner would have an opportunity to address these issues before the MCI made recommendations to the Union government. (Para. 21)

The court ordered that the bank guarantee of Rs. 2 crores provided by the petitioner would remain active during this period and should not be encashed. The court also directed the Union government to consider the MCI's recommendations in accordance with the law and provide the petitioner with a fair hearing before making a final decision. (Para. 22)

The court clarified that it found no grounds to interfere with the Union government's previous decisions regarding the petitioner. (Para. 23)

Facts:The petitioner, Major S.D. Singh Medical College and Hospital, challenged an order by the Union government prohibiting it from admitting students for the MBBS course during the academic years 2017-18 and 2018-19. The government authorized the Medical Council of India (MCI) to encash a bank guarantee of Rs. 2 crores. The case stemmed from deficiencies observed during various inspections, leading to permission denials for admitting new students.

Issues:

Whether the petitioner's explanations and submissions regarding deficiencies were adequately considered.

Whether the court can interfere with factual determinations made by expert statutory bodies like the MCI.

The appropriate course of action concerning the petitioner's situation for the academic year 2018-19.

Whether relief could be granted for the academic year 2017-18.

Held:

The court held that the petitioner's explanations and submissions regarding deficiencies raise factual issues best verified by the MCI as an expert statutory body. The court cannot re-evaluate factual situations regarding faculty availability and infrastructure adequacy.( Para 10)

The court directed the MCI to reevaluate the college's situation for the academic year 2018-19. A fresh inspection was mandated within two months, allowing the college an opportunity to rectify deficiencies. The bank guarantee would remain active during this period, and the Union government was directed to consider MCI's recommendations and issue a final decision after providing a hearing to the petitioner.( Para 11)

Relief for the academic year 2017-18 was declined, considering broader interests in medical education and a related judgment delivered the same day.( Para 12)