Facts:

The case concerned the constitutional validity of Section 115-O of the Income Tax Act, 1961, inserted by the Finance Act of 1997, which imposed an additional tax on the dividend distributed by a company. The tea companies involved argued that the income from which the dividend was distributed was agricultural income to the extent of 60%.

Issues:

Whether the imposition of an additional tax on dividend distribution by domestic companies fell within the legislative competence of the Parliament, considering the argument that such income was agricultural income, subject to the exclusive power of the State Legislature.

Held:

The court interpreted the legislative powers of the Union Parliament under Entry 82 of List I of the Seventh Schedule of the Constitution of India, which deals with "Taxes on income other than agricultural income." It held that the imposition of additional tax on dividend distribution fell within the legislative competence of the Parliament (para 22).

The court clarified that the income from which the dividend was distributed did not necessarily retain the character of agricultural income when distributed as dividends to shareholders (para 24).

It was emphasized that any limitation imposed on Section 115-O would alter the provision and was not warranted (para 27).

Decision: The court upheld the constitutional validity of Section 115-O and ruled that any limitation imposed on the provision would be unwarranted (para 34).

Facts:

The arbitral tribunal, appointed with the consent of the parties, directed the respondent-claimant to file its statement of claim.

However, the respondent failed to file the statement of claim within the stipulated time.

Consequently, the arbitral tribunal terminated the proceedings as per Section 25(a) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996.

The respondent subsequently filed an application before the arbitral tribunal, seeking the recall of the order terminating the proceedings, citing reasons for the non-filing of the statement of claim.

The appellant contested the maintainability of the application, arguing that the arbitral tribunal had become functus officio after terminating the proceedings under Section 25(a).

Issues:

Whether the arbitral tribunal has the jurisdiction to recall its order terminating the proceedings under Section 25(a)?

Whether the termination of proceedings under Section 25(a) can be treated as covered by Section 32(2)(c) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996?

What is the nature of arbitration proceedings, and does the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, apply to such proceedings?

Held:

The arbitration process is quasi-judicial and equitable in nature, differing from litigation in a court. The power and functions of the arbitral tribunal are statutorily regulated. The tribunal is empowered to recall its order terminating proceedings under Section 25(a) if sufficient cause is shown by the respondent.

The termination of proceedings under Section 25(a) cannot be treated as covered by Section 32(2)(c) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. Section 32(2)(c) contemplates different grounds for termination, distinct from the situation arising under Section 25(a).

The arbitral tribunal has the power of procedural review, akin to a quasi-judicial authority. While the tribunal is not bound by the procedural rules of the Civil Procedure Code, it can draw sustenance from its fundamental principles. The principles underlying Order 9 Rule 13 of the Code of Civil Procedure can be invoked by the arbitrator unless parties agree otherwise.

Decision: The appeal is dismissed, affirming the decision of the High Court. The arbitral tribunal is directed to reconsider the application filed by the respondent for the recall of the order terminating the proceedings, taking into account the principles outlined in this judgment.

Facts:The case involves allegations against individuals who received confidential information about impending trades of their company and traded on it, leading to substantial profits. The practice under consideration is 'front-running' in the securities market.

Issues:

Whether non-intermediary front-running constitutes a prohibited practice under relevant securities regulations.

Held:Discuss the definition of fraud, the evolution of regulations, and the elements necessary to establish fraudulent practices under the Securities and Exchange Board of India (Prohibition of Fraudulent and Unfair Trade Practices Relating to Securities Market) Regulations, 2003.

Analyze Regulation 2(c) of the 2003 Regulations and emphasize the broad and expansive nature of the definition of fraud. Paragraphs 6 to 14 discuss the application of this definition to the facts of the case, including the involvement of the accused individuals in trading based on confidential information.

Decision:The court concludes that non-intermediary front-running constitutes a prohibited practice under the relevant securities regulations. The accused individuals, by trading on confidential information, were found to have committed fraud, inducing others to deal in securities. Consequently, they are held liable for breaching securities market integrity.

Facts:

The appellant was charged with the murder of Shantabai, a widow residing with her son. The prosecution alleged that the appellant, who frequently visited Shantabai, was last seen with her before her disappearance. Later, Shantabai's decomposed body was found in a dry well.

Issues:

The reliability of circumstantial evidence, including the recovery of silver ornaments from the appellant's house and the timing of events leading to Shantabai's death.

Held:

The court found various discrepancies and contradictions in the prosecution's case, including errors in the timing of events and inconsistencies in witness testimonies. Despite strong suspicion against the appellant, the court held that suspicion alone is insufficient to establish guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Therefore, considering the material contradictions and failure to establish a complete chain of circumstances, the court granted the appellant the benefit of doubt and set aside his conviction under Section 302 of the IPC. This decision was in line with established legal principles regarding circumstantial evidence and the requirement for a complete chain of circumstances to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. We accordingly allow the appeal.

Facts:

The case pertains to the interpretation of Section 9(5) of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016, concerning the time limit for rectifying defects in the application for the initiation of the corporate insolvency resolution process.

Issues:

Whether the time limit mentioned in the proviso for subsection (5) of Section 9 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016, is mandatory or directory in nature.

Held:

The court found that the provision for removing defects within seven days is directory, not mandatory (Para 20).

It was discussed whether the rejection of the application due to failure to rectify defects should be considered a rejection on merits or an administrative action. The court concluded that such rejection should be viewed as administrative, allowing the applicant to file a fresh, complete application (Para 21).

The court outlined three stages of the application process: filing, scrutiny, and adjudication. It emphasized that while time limits are important during the adjudication stage, they are less so during the pre-adjudication stage (Para 22).

It was noted that it's in the applicant's best interest to rectify defects promptly, as an incomplete application will not be entertained (Para 23).

The court suggested a balanced approach where the time limit is seen as directory but failure to adhere to it requires the applicant to provide a sufficient explanation for the delay. The adjudicating authority will then decide whether the explanation is acceptable before proceeding with the application (Para 24 and 25).

Decision:

The court held that the proviso to Section 9(5), providing for removing defects within seven days, is directory in nature. However, failure to remove objections within this time frame requires the applicant to provide a sufficient explanation. The decision to entertain the application on merits will depend on the adjudicating authority's satisfaction with the explanation provided (Para 25).

Fact:

The Municipal Corporation of Delhi issued a notice under Section 126 of the Delhi Municipal Corporation Act, 1957, proposing to enhance the rateable value of a property owned by Dharma Properties Pvt. Ltd. The notice was received by the respondent after the specified period.

Issues:

Whether the notice received after the specified period would be invalid.

Whether the assessment for subsequent/future periods could be based on such a notice, even if it was invalid for the initial assessment year.

Held:

The Court held that the notice was indeed time-barred as it was received after the specified period. The Court agreed with the High Court's decision on this issue, emphasizing that the giving of notice requires communication or informing the recipient, and mere dispatch does not suffice (Para. 12-14).

However, the Court disagreed with the High Court's decision regarding subsequent assessment years. It held that the notice, though invalid for the initial assessment year, could still be valid for subsequent years if received within the Assessment Year. The Court emphasized the scheme of assessment under the Act, where assessment for property tax is demanded only from the ensuing year in which the assessment is finalized. The appeal is accordingly allowed. (Para. 15-21)

Facts:

The case involved the acquisition of part of a building without acquiring the land underneath by the State of Maharashtra. The owner of the building was different from the owner of the land, which belonged to the government.

Issues:

Whether it is permissible for the State to acquire part of a building without acquiring the land underneath, where the ownership of the land lies with the government.

Whether such acquisition would amount to overreach of the State's power of eminent domain or violation of Article 300A of the Constitution.

Held:

The definition of 'land' under Section 3(a) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 is broad and inclusive, encompassing benefits arising from land and things permanently attached to the earth or to anything attached to the earth.

Section 49 of the Act allows for the acquisition of part of a building or house, with the owner having the option to express whether the whole building should be acquired. The court has the power to decide whether the land proposed to be taken forms part of the building or not, and whether it is reasonably required for the full and unimpaired use of the building.

In cases where the owner of the building is different from the owner of the land, and the land belongs to the government, the government can acquire a portion of the building for public purpose without acquiring the land. The government acquires only the private interest belonging to the owner, as it already owns the land .

The purpose of the Land Acquisition Act is to compensate owners adequately for acquisitions made for public purposes. Acquisition of parts of buildings is permissible if the rights in those parts are capable of being acquired, even if the underlying land is not acquired.

Article 300A of the Constitution prohibits deprivation of property without compensation. However, when only a building or a part thereof is acquired, and not the underlying land, the rights of the owner are not infringed as they do not own the land. The acquisition is legally justified as it is done in accordance with the law and for a public purpose.

While land and building become one unit after being married, the valuation of a particular floor or part of the building can still be determined, taking into account various factors including the support provided by the land and the value of the land in the locality.

Facts:

The respondent's sales tax assessment for the assessment year 1998-99 was completed under the Haryana General Sales Tax Act, 1973, with a refund ordered on 12.05.2000.

The Act of 1973 was repealed by the Haryana Value Added Tax Act, 2003, on 01.04.2003.

A show cause notice was issued to the respondent on 07.06.2004 regarding the earlier refund, invoking suo-moto revisional powers under Section 40 of the Act of 1973, leading to an order on 12.07.2004 holding the respondent liable for recovery.

The respondent challenged this order before the High Court, contending that the exercise of revisional power under Section 40 of the Act of 1973, after the enforcement of the Act of 2003, was unsustainable.

Issues:

Whether the exercise of revisional power under Section 40 of the Act of 1973, after its repeal by the Act of 2003, is sustainable.

Interpretation of Section 61 of the Act of 2003 and its implications on pending proceedings under the repealed Act.

Held:

The Court analyzed the provisions of Section 61 of the Act of 2003 and emphasized that the saving clause saved only pending proceedings under the repealed Act. Since there were no pending proceedings against the respondent under the Act of 1973 when the Act of 2003 came into force, the exercise of suo-moto revisional powers after repeal was unsustainable. The Court also noted that the legislative wisdom recognized this limitation and amended Section 61 in 2010.

In conclusion, the Court dismissed the appeals, holding that the exercise of revisional power under Section 40 of the Act of 1973, after its repeal, was unsustainable, and the orders of the High Court did not warrant interference.

Facts:

The case stemmed from a letter by (Retd.) Chief Justice R. C. Lahoti highlighting unnatural deaths in prisons, which was treated as a public interest litigation. The focus was on addressing the alarming number of unnatural deaths, particularly suicides, in prisons across India.

Issues:

Defining natural and unnatural deaths.

Addressing suicides in prisons and implementing prevention strategies.

Need for prison reforms to ensure dignity and rights of prisoners.

Compensation for custodial deaths and recognition of victims' rights.

Custodial deaths of children in child care institutions under Juvenile Justice Acts.

Held:

On the issue of defining natural and unnatural deaths, the court referred to guidelines by the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC).

Regarding suicides in prisons, the court emphasized the importance of implementing prevention strategies outlined by the National Human Rights Commission (NHRC) and distributing relevant documents.

The court highlighted the need for prison reforms to prioritize reformation and rehabilitation over retribution and deterrence.

Compensation for custodial deaths was deemed essential, recognizing the victims' rights regardless of their status as criminals.

The court raised concerns about custodial deaths of children in child care institutions and urged authorities to address this issue with greater concern.

Decision: The court issued several directions, including the registration of public interest petitions by High Courts, circulation of relevant documents to prison authorities, training programs for police officials, appointment of counselors for prisoners, and the establishment of oversight mechanisms.