Facts:

The case involved the clearance of instant tea by Nestle India Limited, a 100% EOU, to its sister units under excise duty notifications. The dispute arose when the Department issued a show cause notice, proposing to value the goods based on export prices rather than the cost of production due to the absence of actual sales.

Issues:

The correct method for valuing the goods for excise duty purposes, considering the specific notifications applicable to goods produced by 100% EOUs.

Held:

The Court held that the show cause notice was flawed as it disregarded the provisions of the notifications issued under Section 5A of the Central Excise Act. The Court emphasized that the notifications focused on goods "allowed to be sold" in India, not necessarily those actually sold. Therefore, the reliance on export prices for valuation was deemed incorrect. The Court dismissed the appeal, upholding the decision of the Tribunal.

Facts:

Sundararaja Naidu executed a registered will directing certain properties and charities.

Dispute arose over whether these charities were private or public trusts under the Tamil Nadu Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowment Act, 1959.

Initial rulings by the Deputy Commissioner and Commissioner differed on the nature of the trusts.

Legal proceedings ensued, leading to an appeal before the Division Bench of the High Court.

Issues:

Whether the charities mentioned in the will constitute private or public trusts under the Act.

Interpretation of relevant provisions of the Act in light of the specific charities mentioned in the will.

Held:

The Division Bench, after examining the relevant provisions of the Act and considering precedents, concluded that the charities mentioned in the will were public religious charities. They involved services rendered to deities in a temple and were associated with Hindu festivals. Therefore, the High Court's decision to frame a scheme under Section 64 of the Act was upheld.

"There are no merits in the appeal and the same is dismissed."

Facts:

ICAP India Pvt. Ltd., a stockbroker in the wholesale debt market segment, challenged SEBI's calculation of registration fees based on the aggregate sale and purchase prices of securities. ICAP argued that only brokerage earnings should be considered for calculating turnover. The dispute arose from a circular issued by the Reserve Bank of India (RBI) regulating the wholesale debt market.

Issues:

Interpretation of the term "annual turnover" as it pertains to the calculation of registration fees for stockbrokers.

Whether the turnover should include the aggregate sale and purchase prices of securities or only brokerage earnings.

Held:

The Court held that the term "annual turnover" should encompass both brokerage earnings and the aggregate sale and purchase prices of securities, including those transacted on behalf of clients.

The Court rejected ICAP's argument based on the RBI circular, emphasizing that brokers cannot be exempt from including the value of securities traded in their turnover calculations. Additionally, the Court referred to the legislative history and the recommendations of the Bhatt Committee, which led to a lower fee structure for transactions in government securities and bonds.

Therefore, the Supreme Court set aside the SAT's decision and remanded the case for further consideration of other grounds raised by ICAP, directing the SAT to decide these issues in accordance with the law within six months.

Facts:

The appellant, Shamsher Singh Verma, appealed against the rejection of their application to exhibit a compact disc containing a conversation between the father of the victim and the appellant's family members regarding a property dispute. The conversation was sought to be used as evidence in defense against charges under the Indian Penal Code and the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2015.

Issues:

Whether the denial of the application violated the appellant's right to present evidence in their defense.

Held:

The Court held that the compact disc containing the conversation was a document and its authenticity needed to be determined. While refraining from commenting on the merits of the case, the court concluded that the appellant had been denied the right to present evidence in their defense.

Therefore, it allowed the appeal, set aside the orders of the lower courts, and permitted the exhibition of the compact disc. However, it noted that the appellant would not be entitled to seek bail due to the delay in trial.

Facts:

The appellant, a steel rolling mill, challenged the imposition of interest for delayed payment of central excise duty under Section 3A of the Central Excise Act.

Additionally, the appellant contested the constitutional validity of Rules 96ZO, 96ZP, 96ZQ, which imposed penalties without discretion based on the time taken to deposit duty.

The relevance of the Chartered Engineer Certificate in determining the annual capacity of production for an induction furnace, as per Rule 3(2) of the Induction Furnace Annual Capacity Determination Rules, 1997, was also in question.

Issues:

Whether Section 3A of the Central Excise Act allows for the imposition of interest for delayed payment of central excise duty.

Whether Rules 96ZO, 96ZP, 96ZQ are constitutionally valid, considering their imposition of penalties without discretion based on deposit time.

Whether the Chartered Engineer Certificate is a relevant consideration in determining the annual capacity of production for an induction furnace, as per Rule 3(2) of the Induction Furnace Annual Capacity Determination Rules, 1997.

Held:

Section 3A does not provide for the levying of interest for delayed payment of central excise duty. Therefore, Rules 96ZO, 96ZP, 96ZQ cannot impose interest on this ground. This is the comprehensive scheme and general provisions in the Act and Rules are excluded.

Rules 96ZO, 96ZP, 96ZQ are unconstitutional as they impose penalties without discretion based on deposit time, violating Articles 14 and 19(1)(g) of the Constitution.

The Chartered Engineer Certificate is a relevant consideration for determining the annual capacity of production for an induction furnace, as per Rule 3(2) of the Induction Furnace Annual Capacity Determination Rules, 1997.

Decision: The appeals are dismissed, upholding the decision on points regarding the interpretation of Section 3A, the constitutionality of penalty imposition rules, and the relevance of the Chartered Engineer Certificate.

Facts:

Brij Bihari Singh, an Assistant General Manager at the Bihar State Financial Corporation, was accused of various instances of misconduct, including financial irregularities and negligence of duty. Disciplinary proceedings were initiated against him, following which he was dismissed from service.

Issues:

The procedural fairness and adherence to principles of natural justice in the disciplinary proceedings against Brij Bihari Singh.

Held:

The court held that the disciplinary proceedings against Singh were conducted in violation of principles of natural justice. It found serious procedural errors, including the absence of proper representation for the employer and the lack of recording of evidence. Additionally, it criticized the deviation from prescribed procedure, wherein the managing director referred the case to the Board of Directors instead of passing a final order. This arbitrary and discriminatory procedure deprived Singh of his right to appeal. Consequently, the dismissal order was set aside, and the court ordered a fresh disciplinary process to be conducted, starting from the stage of the enquiry. The Disciplinary Authority was directed to pass a reasoned order after providing Singh with a full opportunity for hearing. It also ensured Singh's right to appeal any subsequent order.

Facts:

The appellant challenged a detention order issued under Section 3(1) of the COFEPOSA Act.

The appellant's representation for legal representation before the Advisory Board was denied.

The Detaining Authority was represented by officers at the Advisory Board hearing, but the appellant was not allowed such representation.

The appellant sought relief through a writ petition under Article 32 of the Constitution.

Issues:

Whether denial of legal representation before the Advisory Board violated the appellant's rights under Article 14 of the Constitution.

Whether other grounds for challenging the detention order were necessary to be examined.

Held:

The Court held that denying the appellant the opportunity for legal representation before the Advisory Board violated Article 14 of the Constitution. The Court referred to the decision in A.K. Roy's case, stating that if the Detaining Authority or the Government takes the aid of a legal practitioner or legal advisor before the Advisory Board, the detenu must be allowed the facility of appearing before the Board through a legal practitioner. Since the appellant was denied this facility while the Detaining Authority was represented, it amounted to a breach of Article 14. The Court ruled that since one ground was sufficient to quash the detention order, it didn't examine other grounds raised by the appellant. Therefore, the detention order against the appellant was quashed, and the petition was allowed.

Facts:

The Municipal Corporation invited tenders for the replacement of existing street lights with LED fittings and the refurbishment of street light infrastructure on a BOT basis. Elektron Lighting Systems Pvt. Ltd. (the appellant), one of the bidders, offered to reduce its bid price if exclusive advertising rights were granted to it. The technical bid of the appellant was accepted, and negotiations were held for the price bid. Eventually, a work order was issued to the appellant. Subsequently, an unsuccessful bidder challenged the grant of the work order by filing a writ petition, leading to the High Court quashing the work order.

Issues:

Whether the High Court's decision to quash the work order was justified?

Whether the advertising rights offered by the appellant were severable from the main contract?

Held:

The High Court erred in holding that the work order was illegally granted to the appellant for the replacement of street lights by LED fittings and refurbishment of street light infrastructure on a BOT basis.

The High Court's adverse view regarding the non-submission of the MOU between the appellant and LED manufacturer was unwarranted, as it was not challenged by any of the writ petitioners and the MOU was part of the tender bid.

The High Court's criticism of the appellant for not providing attested copies of VAT returns was unfounded, as the statement of VAT returns for the relevant financial years was duly filed with the technical bid.

The process of awarding the contract was not hurried, as demonstrated by the exhaustive pre-bid meetings and extensions of the submission deadline. Therefore, the High Court's characterization of the process as rushed was incorrect.

The doctrine of severability, as contained in section 57 of the Contract Act, applies in this case. The proper test for deciding the validity of an agreement is "substantial severability," and the court must separate trivial and technical parts from the main or substantial part.

The advertising rights offered by the appellant were severable from the main contract and were not part of the tender floated by the Municipal Corporation. Therefore, the grant of advertising rights to the appellant without inviting tenders was unfair, and the contract regarding advertising rights was liable to be quashed.

Decision: The appeals stand disposed of. The work order for the replacement of street lights by LED fittings and refurbishment of street light infrastructure on a BOT basis was upheld. However, the contract regarding advertising rights was quashed due to the unfair manner in which they were granted to the appellant without proper tendering processes.

Facts:

The wife filed an application under Section 12 of the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005, seeking the seizure of her Stridhan articles from her husband's possession.

The application was dismissed on the grounds that the wife was no longer considered an 'aggrieved person' under Section 2(a) of the Act due to judicial separation between the parties. Additionally, it was held that the application was barred by limitation.

Issues:

Whether the wife, despite judicial separation, remains an 'aggrieved person' under the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005.

Whether the application for seizure of Stridhan is barred by limitation.

Held:

The court emphasized the purpose of the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005, which is to provide effective protection of women's rights guaranteed under the Constitution, especially in cases of domestic violence.

A more sensitive approach is expected from the courts when dealing with cases under this Act. Before dismissing a petition on grounds of maintainability, thorough deliberation on the raised issues is necessary.

The court clarified the distinction between divorce and judicial separation. In judicial separation, the marital relationship continues, and the aggrieved person's status is not severed.

The concept of 'continuing offence' applies to situations where Stridhan remains in the custody of the husband even after judicial separation. The wife can submit an application under Section 12 of the Act as long as the marital status remains.

Decision: The court allowed the appeal, emphasizing the importance of a sensitive approach towards cases under the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005.