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by sayum
13 July 2026 9:44 AM
"The offence under the Act is not established merely on the fact that the informant is a member of Scheduled Caste unless there is an intention to humiliate a member of Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe for the reason that the victim belongs to such caste." Gujarat High Court, in a significant judgment, has affirmed that mere use of abusive language against a member of the Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe community does not automatically constitute an offense under the Atrocities Act.
Justice Hemant M. Prachchhak observed that for such an offense to be made out, the prosecution must establish that the insults were specifically intended to humiliate the victim on the ground of their caste identity. The Court made these observations while dismissing an appeal filed by the State against a 2012 acquittal order.
The matter originated from a complaint lodged in August 2010 by Parthibhai Haribhai Senma, alleging that his wife and daughter were assaulted at a village dairy by the accused party. It was alleged that the accused used caste-related remarks and physical force, including a knife and a milk vessel, to injure the victims. A Special Court in Banaskantha acquitted all the respondents in April 2012, prompting the State of Gujarat to prefer the present appeal before the High Court.
The primary question before the court was whether the Trial Court committed any manifest error of law or fact in its appreciation of the evidence. The court was also called upon to determine whether the essential ingredients of Section 3(1)(10) of the Atrocities Act were satisfied, particularly regarding the intent to humiliate and the requirement of the incident occurring in a "public view."
Failure To Prove Intent To Humiliate Based On Caste
The Court emphasized that the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989, is intended to provide protection against offenses targeted at individuals due to their caste status. Justice Prachchhak noted that not every insult directed at an SC/ST member results in caste-based humiliation. The Court highlighted that the prosecution failed to demonstrate that the words used were specifically intended to malign the informant on the basis of his community.
Court Distinguishes Between General Abuse And Caste-Based Insult
The bench referred to the Supreme Court's ruling in Shajan Skaria vs. State of Kerala, noting that the legislative intent is clear: an offense is only established when the intimidation is "laced with casteist remarks" and targeted at the victim because of their specific identity. The Court observed that in the present case, there was no evidence that the accused used abusive words with the requisite intent to humiliate the informant on the ground of his caste.
"The mere fact that the person subjected to insult or intimidation belongs to a Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe would not attract the offence... unless it was the intention of the accused to subject the concerned person to caste-based humiliation."
Incident Did Not Occur In Public View
The Court further observed that for a conviction under Section 3(1)(10) of the Atrocity Act, the alleged incident must occur in a place within "public view." Upon reviewing the evidence, the Court found that the prosecution failed to satisfy this essential requirement. It noted that the altercation, which took place at a village dairy, did not meet the legal threshold established by the Apex Court regarding the public nature of the venue.
Medical Evidence Contradicts Prosecution Claims
In a significant blow to the prosecution's narrative, the Court pointed out that the medical evidence did not support the claims of physical assault. The Medical Officer who examined the victims found no external injuries on either the wife or the daughter of the informant. This lack of physical evidence, combined with the testimony of witnesses, led the Court to conclude that the prosecution had failed to prove the charges of assault under the IPC beyond a reasonable doubt.
Court Notes Animosity And Suppression Of Material Evidence
The High Court observed that there was a history of deep animosity between the two groups, including a pending criminal case where the informant's son was accused of a serious offense against a relative of the accused. The Court also criticized the prosecution for not examining a material witness who had allegedly informed the informant about the incident. The bench noted that this omission constituted a "fundamental defect" and suggested that the prosecution had suppressed the actual genesis of the crime.
"The prosecution has suppressed the genesis of the crime in question... one of the material witnesses, who had informed the informant about the incident, was not examined."
Double Presumption Of Innocence In Acquittal Appeals
Regarding the scope of interference in acquittal orders, the Court reiterated the principles laid down in Chandrappa vs. State of Karnataka. It held that an appellate court should not disturb an acquittal merely because two views are possible. Justice Prachchhak emphasized that the presumption of innocence is reinforced once a Trial Court records an acquittal. Unless the lower court's approach is vitiated by manifest illegality or perversity, the High Court is reluctant to interfere.
The High Court concluded that there was no credible evidence to connect the accused with the alleged crimes. Finding no infirmity or illegality in the Trial Court's 2012 judgment, the Court dismissed the State's appeal and confirmed the acquittal of the respondents. The bench ordered that the bail bonds of the accused be cancelled and the records be returned to the lower court.
Date of Decision: 30 June 2026