Facts:

The petitioner-College applied for grant of approval and recognition under Section 11(2) of the Indian Medical Council Act, 1956. Assessors inspected the institution on various dates, evaluating the standard of examination and recommending approval. Subsequent surprise inspections highlighted deficiencies, leading to recommendations by the Medical Council of India (MCI) to debar the college from admitting students. Despite the college's assertion of remedying deficiencies, further assessments revealed major shortcomings. The Central Government then decided against permitting admissions for certain academic sessions.

Issues:

Whether surprise inspections and subsequent denial of approval were legally acceptable.

Whether allegations of malafide against assessors vitiated the inspection process.

The importance of compliance and its assessment during renewal and recognition under Section 11(2) of the Indian Medical Council Act, 1956.

Held:

The Court held that surprise inspections are permissible within the framework of the Medical Council Act, 1956. Institutions must maintain compliance, and surprise inspections serve to verify this compliance. The grievance against surprise inspections lacks merit, given the necessity for institutions imparting medical education to remain compliant.

Allegations of malafide against assessors were dismissed. The presence of malafide depends on the specific facts of each case, and in this instance, no evidence supported the claim of malafide. Mere allegations do not invalidate an inspection or proceeding.

Compliance is crucial, especially during renewal and recognition assessments under Section 11(2) of the Act. Scrutiny during recognition is stringent, as minor deficiencies may escalate over time. Given the legality of surprise inspections and absence of malafide, the Central Government's decision was deemed valid .

Decision: Students already admitted to courses are permitted to continue, with the MCI directed to ensure their degrees upon completion. An inspection for recognition for the academic year 2018-2019 was ordered, with deficiencies communicated for rectification while adhering to principles of natural justice. The application submitted for the previous academic year is to be treated as an application for the subsequent year, and the bank guarantee remains valid without being encashed.

Facts:

Mangalam Publications (I) Private Limited, a private limited company, paid interim relief to its employees from 01.04.1996 to 31.03.2000 based on recommendations from the Manisana Wage Board.

The Employees State Insurance Corporation (ESIC) demanded ESIC contributions from Mangalam Publications for the period during which interim relief was paid.

Mangalam Publications argued that the interim relief should not be considered as "wages" under Section 2(22) of the Employees State Insurance Act, 1948, citing an office memorandum issued by the Government of India.

Issues:

• Whether the interim relief payments made by Mangalam Publications to its employees constitute "wages" under Section 2(22) of the Employees State Insurance Act, 1948.

• Whether Mangalam Publications is liable to pay Employees State Insurance contributions for the period in question.

Held:

The Supreme Court held that the interim relief payments made by Mangalam Publications to its employees fall within the definition of "wages" as per Section 2(22) of the Employees State Insurance Act, 1948. The Court emphasized the wide interpretation of the term "wages" in the Act, stating that any ambiguous expression should be construed in favor of employees, given the welfare nature of the legislation.

The Court disagreed with the High Court's interpretation that the interim relief should be treated as an ex-gratia payment and not as "wages" for the purpose of Employees State Insurance contributions. It emphasized that the effect of the Employees State Insurance Act, enacted by the Parliament, cannot be circumvented by departmental office memoranda.

Therefore, the Supreme Court allowed the appeal, set aside the High Court's judgment, and restored the decision of the Employees Insurance Court, holding that Mangalam Publications is liable to pay Employees State Insurance contributions for the period from 01.04.1996 to 31.03.2000.

Facts:

The case involved a dispute over the sale of immovable property belonging to a public trust under the Bombay Public Trusts Act, 1950. The property comprised a Parsi Fire Temple and other structures with tenants. A joint venture agreement for development-cum-sale was entered into between the trust and a developer for a sum of Rs. 2,95,00,000/-.

Issues:

Whether the sale transaction of the trust property complied with the provisions of Section 36 of the Bombay Public Trusts Act, 1950.

Held:

The court reiterated the requirements of Section 36, emphasizing that the Charity Commissioner must consider the interest, benefit, and protection of the trust before granting sanction for the sale or lease of trust property (Para 22-23).

It was found that the Charity Commissioner had failed to fulfill their duty under Section 36 by not considering the interest and benefit of the trust. The sale transaction was deemed to be against the trust's interest, and the order was considered perverse (Para 24).

The court observed that the sale of such a valuable property for a paltry sum without proper valuation or public notice was unacceptable (Para 26).

The joint venture agreement was deemed to be a cloak for facilitating the sale of the property, indicating collusion between the trustees and the developer (Para 29).

The requirement of publishing a public notice in a newspaper could not have been waived, as it would have disclosed the actual value of the property (Para 31).

The court set aside the order of the Charity Commissioner and the High Court, directing the repayment of the sale amount to the developer and imposing costs on them (Para 34-35).

Decision: The decision of the court was to allow the appeal, setting aside the orders of the Charity Commissioner and the High Court, and directing the repayment of the sale amount to the developer along with imposed costs.

Facts:The case involves allegations against individuals who received confidential information about impending trades of their company and traded on it, leading to substantial profits. The practice under consideration is 'front-running' in the securities market.

Issues:

Whether non-intermediary front-running constitutes a prohibited practice under relevant securities regulations.

Held:Discuss the definition of fraud, the evolution of regulations, and the elements necessary to establish fraudulent practices under the Securities and Exchange Board of India (Prohibition of Fraudulent and Unfair Trade Practices Relating to Securities Market) Regulations, 2003.

Analyze Regulation 2(c) of the 2003 Regulations and emphasize the broad and expansive nature of the definition of fraud. Paragraphs 6 to 14 discuss the application of this definition to the facts of the case, including the involvement of the accused individuals in trading based on confidential information.

Decision:The court concludes that non-intermediary front-running constitutes a prohibited practice under the relevant securities regulations. The accused individuals, by trading on confidential information, were found to have committed fraud, inducing others to deal in securities. Consequently, they are held liable for breaching securities market integrity.

Facts:

The case concerned the constitutional validity of Section 115-O of the Income Tax Act, 1961, inserted by the Finance Act of 1997, which imposed an additional tax on the dividend distributed by a company. The tea companies involved argued that the income from which the dividend was distributed was agricultural income to the extent of 60%.

Issues:

Whether the imposition of an additional tax on dividend distribution by domestic companies fell within the legislative competence of the Parliament, considering the argument that such income was agricultural income, subject to the exclusive power of the State Legislature.

Held:

The court interpreted the legislative powers of the Union Parliament under Entry 82 of List I of the Seventh Schedule of the Constitution of India, which deals with "Taxes on income other than agricultural income." It held that the imposition of additional tax on dividend distribution fell within the legislative competence of the Parliament (para 22).

The court clarified that the income from which the dividend was distributed did not necessarily retain the character of agricultural income when distributed as dividends to shareholders (para 24).

It was emphasized that any limitation imposed on Section 115-O would alter the provision and was not warranted (para 27).

Decision: The court upheld the constitutional validity of Section 115-O and ruled that any limitation imposed on the provision would be unwarranted (para 34).

Facts:

The arbitral tribunal, appointed with the consent of the parties, directed the respondent-claimant to file its statement of claim.

However, the respondent failed to file the statement of claim within the stipulated time.

Consequently, the arbitral tribunal terminated the proceedings as per Section 25(a) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996.

The respondent subsequently filed an application before the arbitral tribunal, seeking the recall of the order terminating the proceedings, citing reasons for the non-filing of the statement of claim.

The appellant contested the maintainability of the application, arguing that the arbitral tribunal had become functus officio after terminating the proceedings under Section 25(a).

Issues:

Whether the arbitral tribunal has the jurisdiction to recall its order terminating the proceedings under Section 25(a)?

Whether the termination of proceedings under Section 25(a) can be treated as covered by Section 32(2)(c) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996?

What is the nature of arbitration proceedings, and does the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, apply to such proceedings?

Held:

The arbitration process is quasi-judicial and equitable in nature, differing from litigation in a court. The power and functions of the arbitral tribunal are statutorily regulated. The tribunal is empowered to recall its order terminating proceedings under Section 25(a) if sufficient cause is shown by the respondent.

The termination of proceedings under Section 25(a) cannot be treated as covered by Section 32(2)(c) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. Section 32(2)(c) contemplates different grounds for termination, distinct from the situation arising under Section 25(a).

The arbitral tribunal has the power of procedural review, akin to a quasi-judicial authority. While the tribunal is not bound by the procedural rules of the Civil Procedure Code, it can draw sustenance from its fundamental principles. The principles underlying Order 9 Rule 13 of the Code of Civil Procedure can be invoked by the arbitrator unless parties agree otherwise.

Decision: The appeal is dismissed, affirming the decision of the High Court. The arbitral tribunal is directed to reconsider the application filed by the respondent for the recall of the order terminating the proceedings, taking into account the principles outlined in this judgment.

Facts:

The case pertains to the interpretation of Section 9(5) of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016, concerning the time limit for rectifying defects in the application for the initiation of the corporate insolvency resolution process.

Issues:

Whether the time limit mentioned in the proviso for subsection (5) of Section 9 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016, is mandatory or directory in nature.

Held:

The court found that the provision for removing defects within seven days is directory, not mandatory (Para 20).

It was discussed whether the rejection of the application due to failure to rectify defects should be considered a rejection on merits or an administrative action. The court concluded that such rejection should be viewed as administrative, allowing the applicant to file a fresh, complete application (Para 21).

The court outlined three stages of the application process: filing, scrutiny, and adjudication. It emphasized that while time limits are important during the adjudication stage, they are less so during the pre-adjudication stage (Para 22).

It was noted that it's in the applicant's best interest to rectify defects promptly, as an incomplete application will not be entertained (Para 23).

The court suggested a balanced approach where the time limit is seen as directory but failure to adhere to it requires the applicant to provide a sufficient explanation for the delay. The adjudicating authority will then decide whether the explanation is acceptable before proceeding with the application (Para 24 and 25).

Decision:

The court held that the proviso to Section 9(5), providing for removing defects within seven days, is directory in nature. However, failure to remove objections within this time frame requires the applicant to provide a sufficient explanation. The decision to entertain the application on merits will depend on the adjudicating authority's satisfaction with the explanation provided (Para 25).

Facts:

The appellant was charged with the murder of Shantabai, a widow residing with her son. The prosecution alleged that the appellant, who frequently visited Shantabai, was last seen with her before her disappearance. Later, Shantabai's decomposed body was found in a dry well.

Issues:

The reliability of circumstantial evidence, including the recovery of silver ornaments from the appellant's house and the timing of events leading to Shantabai's death.

Held:

The court found various discrepancies and contradictions in the prosecution's case, including errors in the timing of events and inconsistencies in witness testimonies. Despite strong suspicion against the appellant, the court held that suspicion alone is insufficient to establish guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Therefore, considering the material contradictions and failure to establish a complete chain of circumstances, the court granted the appellant the benefit of doubt and set aside his conviction under Section 302 of the IPC. This decision was in line with established legal principles regarding circumstantial evidence and the requirement for a complete chain of circumstances to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. We accordingly allow the appeal.

Fact:

The Municipal Corporation of Delhi issued a notice under Section 126 of the Delhi Municipal Corporation Act, 1957, proposing to enhance the rateable value of a property owned by Dharma Properties Pvt. Ltd. The notice was received by the respondent after the specified period.

Issues:

Whether the notice received after the specified period would be invalid.

Whether the assessment for subsequent/future periods could be based on such a notice, even if it was invalid for the initial assessment year.

Held:

The Court held that the notice was indeed time-barred as it was received after the specified period. The Court agreed with the High Court's decision on this issue, emphasizing that the giving of notice requires communication or informing the recipient, and mere dispatch does not suffice (Para. 12-14).

However, the Court disagreed with the High Court's decision regarding subsequent assessment years. It held that the notice, though invalid for the initial assessment year, could still be valid for subsequent years if received within the Assessment Year. The Court emphasized the scheme of assessment under the Act, where assessment for property tax is demanded only from the ensuing year in which the assessment is finalized. The appeal is accordingly allowed. (Para. 15-21)