Facts:

The case involves a dispute over the division of properties left by a predecessor-in-interest. Following arbitration, an arbitral award was issued. Subsequently, the appellants allegedly entered into a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) with the respondents, agreeing to provide additional properties to respondent no.1. However, the execution of necessary deeds was delayed by the appellants, and the time limit for challenging the arbitral award under Section 34(3) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, expired.

Issues:

The applicability of Section 17 of the Limitation Act in an application under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act.

Held:

The Court clarified that Section 29(2) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, consists of two limbs. The first part establishes that the limitation period prescribed by the special law prevails over the Limitation Act, while the second part mandates the application of Sections 4 to 24 of the Limitation Act only if not expressly excluded by the special law.

Section 17 of the Limitation Act merely defers the commencement of the limitation period; it does not extend or break it. It postpones the start of the limitation period.

The Court outlined the characteristics of Section 34(3), highlighting that it serves as the sole remedy for challenging an award under the Arbitration Act. The time limit for commencing the limitation period is also provided in Section 34(3). The provision prohibits filing an application after three months from the receipt of the award.

Applying Section 17 of the Limitation Act to Section 34(3) would lead to inconsistencies and defeat the purpose of the Arbitration Act, which aims for speedy dispute resolution and finality of awards.

Fraud or mistake under Section 17 of the Limitation Act would only defer the limitation period if it suppressed the knowledge necessary for pursuing a legal remedy. Once a party receives the award, the limitation period begins, and subsequent fraud does not affect this right.

The respondents had the right to challenge the award upon receiving it, and any subsequent fraud by the appellants did not affect this right. Therefore, there was no need for further remand.

Facts:

The appellant filed several applications before the High Court seeking dismissal of Election Petition No.1 of 2017 on various grounds including non-removal of office objections, non-compliance with rules, and discrepancies in the copy of the election petition served on them. The High Court rejected some applications while partially allowing others. Aggrieved by this decision, the appellant filed an appeal before the Supreme Court.

Issues:

Whether the High Court's rejection of Election Application No.2 of 2017 was justified?

Whether the High Court's decision on Election Application No.3 of 2017 was correct?

What is the fate of Election Application No.6 of 2017?

Held:

The Supreme Court upheld the High Court's decision to reject Election Application No.2 of 2017. The appellant's assertions regarding non-removal of office objections were deemed vague and unsubstantiated. The High Court's presumption that office objections had been duly removed was considered reasonable.

The Supreme Court set aside the High Court's decision on Election Application No.3 of 2017 and remanded it back for fresh consideration. The appellant's claim that the copy of the election petition served on them was not a true copy was partially allowed. The appellant's plea regarding discrepancies in the served copy needed further examination.

The Supreme Court left the decision on Election Application No.6 of 2017 open for future consideration. If the appellant's remanded application (No.3 of 2017) failed, they could challenge the decision on Application No.6 of 2017 afresh.

The appeals and the accompanying application(s) are disposed of in the aforesaid terms with no order as to costs.

Facts:

Lok Prahari, through its General Secretary, filed a Public Interest Litigation invoking the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court under Article 32 of the Constitution.

The petitioner sought a declaration that a stay of conviction by an appellate court does not wipe out disqualification and revive membership retrospectively.

The petitioner argued that disqualification under certain sections of the Representation of the People Act, 1951, arises upon conviction and that the seat of a member of Parliament or State legislature becomes vacant from the date of conviction.

The matter arose from a case where a member of the Legislative Assembly in the State of Uttar Pradesh was convicted of offenses under Sections 353, 504, and 506 of the Indian Penal Code and was sentenced to imprisonment. The District Court stayed the execution of the sentence and of the conviction.

Issues:

Whether a stay of conviction by an appellate court affects the disqualification of a member of Parliament or State legislature under the Representation of the People Act, 1951.

The interpretation of relevant constitutional provisions, statutory provisions, and judicial precedents regarding disqualification upon conviction.

Held:

The Supreme Court held that a stay of conviction by an appellate court suspends the disqualification, and the seat of the member does not become vacant from the date of conviction.

The Court examined Section 389 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, which empowers the appellate court to suspend the execution of a sentence or order appealed against, for reasons to be recorded in writing. It cited previous judgments such as Rama Narang v Ramesh Narang and Lily Thomas v Union of India to establish the legal precedent regarding the effect of a stay of conviction on disqualification.

The Court concluded that once a conviction is stayed during the appeal process, the disqualification under the Representation of the People Act, 1951, does not operate. Therefore, the seat of the member does not become vacant from the date of conviction. The power conferred on the appellate court under Section 389 includes the power to stay a conviction, which suspends the operation of the disqualification.

Additionally, the Court dismissed the petitioner's request for certain directions to be issued to the Union Government regarding the dissemination of judgments related to disqualifications of sitting members.

Facts:

The case involves the interpretation of various provisions of the Constitution of India regarding reservation in promotions and the application of the creamy layer principle to SCs and STs.

Issues:

The judgment include the validity of the M. Nagaraj case judgment, the application of the creamy layer principle, the interpretation of relevant constitutional provisions, the object of reservation, and the reservation in promotions for SCs and STs.

Held:

The court held that the judgment in M. Nagaraj case did not need to be referred to a seven-judge bench. However, the requirement for the State to collect quantifiable data showing backwardness of SCs and STs, as mandated by the M. Nagaraj case, was deemed invalid to this extent .

The application of the creamy layer principle to SCs and STs was upheld. Only individuals within SCs and STs who have come out of untouchability or backwardness due to belonging to the creamy layer would be excluded from reservation benefits. This application was seen as consistent with Articles 14 and 16(1) of the Constitution .

The court emphasized a harmonious interpretation of Articles 14, 16, 341, and 342 of the Constitution, clarifying that Parliament has the freedom to include or exclude persons from the Presidential Lists based on relevant factors. Similarly, Constitutional Courts have the authority to exclude the creamy layer from these lists when applying the principles of equality under Articles 14 and 16 .

The court reiterated that the purpose of reservation is to ensure the progress of backward classes of citizens and their attainment of equality with other citizens of India .

The determination of adequate representation in promotional posts for SCs and STs under Article 16(4-A) is left to the discretion of the States, considering the efficiency of administration and the need for reservation at different levels of promotion .

The court clarified that while a proportionality test to the population as a whole may be considered for representation in promotional posts, the language of Article 16(4-A) allows States to determine adequate representation based on the specific context of the promotional post in question.

Facts:

The appellant's wife died along with her child by drowning in a river within seven years of her marriage. The Trial Court convicted the appellant under Section 304-B IPC, which was affirmed by the High Court with a reduced sentence. The appellant contended that there was neither cruelty nor any demand for dowry.

Issues:

Whether the evidence presented in the case warrants interference by the Supreme Court under Article 136 of the Constitution of India?

Held:

The Supreme Court will not reassess the evidence at large in an appeal under Article 136, particularly when it has been concurrently accepted by the High Court and the Courts below.

Interference by the Supreme Court is justified only if something more is shown, such as a violation of principles of natural justice, error of law or procedure, misreading of evidence, or manifestly perverse conclusions by the High Court.

Material in the form of testimony from witnesses PW-1 and PW-3 regarding dowry harassment was present. This included complaints made by the deceased to her father and elder sister about harassment by the appellant.

The presumption under Section 113-B of the Evidence Act for dowry death was applicable considering the circumstances presented in the case.

The trial court's conclusion was based on evidence, including testimony from various witnesses, and was not manifestly perverse. The view taken by the trial court and affirmed by the High Court was warranted by the materials on record.

Decision: The appeal was dismissed, and the conviction under Section 304-B IPC was upheld.

Facts:

The appeal arose from a judgment of the High Court of Karnataka, which set aside the judgments of the trial court and the first appellate court and directed the parties back to the trial court. The High Court allowed three applications filed by the respondent under Order XLI Rule 27 of CPC, seeking permission to produce additional evidence.

Issues:

Whether the High Court was justified in allowing the applications for additional evidence under Order XLI Rule 27 of CPC.

Whether the High Court was justified in directing the parties back to the trial court for a fresh decision.

Held:

The judgment address the first issue regarding the justification of allowing additional evidence under Order XLI Rule 27 of CPC. The court affirmed that the High Court was justified in allowing the applications for additional evidence, citing legal principles and precedents governing the admissibility of such evidence.

Deal with the second issue concerning the direction of the parties back to the trial court. The court found that the High Court erred in directing the parties back to the trial court and instead instructed the High Court to guide the first appellate court in recording the additional evidence. The court emphasized the importance of expediting the resolution of the case, considering the prolonged litigation and the interests of justice.

Facts:

The respondents were engaged as TV News Correspondent and TV Assistant News Correspondent on a contract basis.

They were later declared as government servants with effect from certain dates but were not promoted for twelve years.

The respondents filed applications before the Central Administrative Tribunal (CAT) claiming entitlement to benefits and promotions under the Indian Broadcasting (Programme) Service Rules 1990.

The CAT allowed their applications, directing the government to grant them benefits and consider them for promotion.

The appellants challenged this order before the High Court of Andhra Pradesh, arguing that the respondents couldn't be considered for promotion as their posts were not included in the Rules.

The High Court upheld the Tribunal's decision, stating that the respondents fulfilled the definition of a departmental candidate under the Rules and should be considered for promotion.

Issues:

Whether the respondents are entitled to benefits and promotions under the Indian Broadcasting (Programme) Service Rules 1990.

Whether the posts of TV News Correspondent and TV Assistant News Correspondent are covered under the Rules for the purpose of promotions.

Held:

The Court affirmed the judgment of the Tribunal and the High Court. The Court clarified the following:

Promotions already effected and existing seniority shall not be affected.

For employees who have retired, a notional pay fixation shall be carried out for determining retiral benefits.

Individual cases for promotion would be considered against available vacancies, keeping seniority in view.

The appeals were disposed of accordingly, with no order as to costs.

Facts:

Ms. Indira Jaising, representing an intervenor in a batch of cases, filed a Miscellaneous Application seeking reliefs regarding remarks made against her during the proceedings before the Supreme Court.

The remarks in question allegedly suggested contempt of court and scandalizing the judiciary.

Dr. Abhishek Manu Singhvi, representing Ms. Jaising, argued that her submissions were not intended to denigrate the judiciary and emphasized her reputation.

Mr. Mukul Rohatgi, opposing the application on behalf of the State of Maharashtra, argued that Ms. Jaising's submissions were indeed made during the proceedings.

Issues:

Whether the remarks made against Ms. Jaising amounted to contempt of court or scandalizing the judiciary.

Whether the reliefs sought in the Miscellaneous Application should be granted.

Held:

The court noted that Ms. Jaising's submissions regarding contempt notices to the Administrative Committee of the High Court were on record, indicating that they were indeed made during the proceedings.

The court further observed that its remarks regarding the conduct of the petitioners and intervenors were based on arguments presented during the proceedings, implying that Ms. Jaising, as an intervenor, was associated with those remarks.

Therefore, the court disposed of the Miscellaneous Application, indicating that the reliefs sought by Ms. Jaising were not granted.

Facts:

The petitioner filed a Writ Petition under Article 32 seeking live streaming of proceedings in cases of public importance before the Supreme Court of India. The petitioner argued that live streaming would enhance transparency, accountability, and access to justice in the Indian legal system.

Issues:

Whether live streaming of court proceedings in the Supreme Court of India is feasible and desirable.

What regulatory framework is required to implement live streaming while ensuring the dignity and privacy of litigants and witnesses, and without impinging upon the administration of justice.

Held:

The Court recognized the principle of open trials and access to the public during court proceedings as fundamental. It noted that while the Constitution explicitly mandates open pronouncement of judgments, the concept of open court hearings can be inferred from relevant provisions in the Criminal Procedure Code and Civil Procedure Code.

Live streaming of court proceedings was deemed feasible and desirable, as it has the potential to enhance access to justice and promote transparency in the judicial process.

The Court emphasized the need for a comprehensive regulatory framework to implement live streaming. It acknowledged the importance of balancing the right to privacy and dignity of litigants and witnesses with the principles of open justice.

Implementation of live streaming was endorsed, with guidelines suggested by the Attorney General. The Court proposed a phased approach, starting with a pilot project for cases of national and constitutional importance. It emphasized the importance of technical specifications, archival procedures, and copyright issues.

Decision: The Court allowed the Writ Petition and directed the implementation of live streaming of court proceedings in the Supreme Court of India in a progressive and structured manner, with safeguards to protect the rights of litigants and witnesses and to ensure the dignity and majesty of the Court.