Facts:

Mumbai Metropolitan Region Development Authority (MMRDA) granted permission in 1997 to allot land to a proposed Cooperative Housing Society of its employees.

The initial allotment lapsed due to non-compliance with regulations regarding payment of premiums.

In 2003, a fresh allotment was made by MMRDA based on a new proposal submitted by the housing society.

Appellants contested their exclusion from the list of eligible members for the new allotment, arguing that their eligibility should be determined based on the original resolution from 1997.

The housing society requested a fresh consideration of the allotment based on the Government of Maharashtra Resolution dated 09.07.1999.

Issues:

Whether the 2003 allotment constituted a fresh allotment or was a continuation of the 1997 resolution.

Whether the eligibility criteria set forth in the new resolution applied to determine eligibility.

Held:

The court held that the 2003 allotment was a fresh one based on a new proposal and a subsequent resolution. The eligibility criteria set forth in the new resolution, which included being in service on the date of the allotment letter, applied to determine eligibility. The court also noted that the housing society itself had acknowledged this eligibility criterion. Furthermore, the court observed that the area of land allotted to the society had been reduced due to the inclusion of non-eligible members in the initial list. Consequently, the court upheld the High Court's decision to dismiss the writ petition, finding no grounds for granting relief to the appellants.

Facts:

The case involves a habeas corpus petition filed by the father, Asokan K.M., expressing apprehension that his 26-year-old daughter, respondent no. 9, was being transported out of the country against her will. During the proceedings, respondent no. 9 appeared before the court and expressed her desire to stay with respondent no. 7, declining to go with her parents. Subsequently, she married the appellant, Shafin Jahan. The High Court, in its impugned order, declared the marriage null and void and directed respondent no. 9's custody to her father.

Issues:

Whether the High Court erred in annulling the marriage and determining respondent no. 9's custody while entertaining a habeas corpus petition.

Whether the invocation of the parens patriae doctrine by the High Court was justified in this case.

Whether the expression of choice and autonomy in matters of marriage is protected under Articles 19 and 21 of the Constitution of India.

Held:

The Supreme Court criticized the High Court's decision to annul the marriage and determine respondent no. 9's custody while entertaining a habeas corpus petition. It emphasized that the expression of choice is a fundamental right under Articles 19 and 21 of the Constitution, and once an individual asserts their choice freely, the court's inquiry should cease.

The Court held that the invocation of the parens patriae doctrine by the High Court was unjustified in this case. It stated that this doctrine should only be invoked in exceptional cases where individuals are incapable of asserting their own rights, such as minors or those with mental incapacity, which was not the case with respondent no. 9.

Emphasizing the importance of individual autonomy in marriage, the Supreme Court reiterated that neither the state nor society can intrude into matters of personal choice and marital decisions. It held that the High Court's interference in annulling the marriage exceeded its jurisdiction.

Facts:

Mangla Ram, the claimant, was involved in a road accident where he was driving a motorcycle and was hit by a jeep driven by respondent No. 2. This resulted in severe injuries to the claimant, including the amputation of his right leg above the knee.

Issues:

The determination of negligence, the quantum of compensation, and the liability of the insurance company.

Held:

The Tribunal, despite not fully accepting the testimony of certain witnesses, concluded that the accident was caused by the jeep driven by respondent No. 2. The High Court erred in disregarding this finding and failing to consider the evidence supporting the claimant's version of events (Para 14, 20, 21).

The High Court's assumption that the claimant was driving on the wrong side of the road based on the spot where the motorcycle was found after the accident was flawed. There was no evidence to support contributory negligence on the part of the claimant (Para 23, 24).

The claimant, due to the amputation of his right leg, was entitled to enhanced compensation, including future medical expenses for a prosthetic leg. The Tribunal's failure to consider this aspect warranted an adjustment in the compensation amount (Para 25).

Despite the absence of a valid insurance policy for the offending jeep, the principle of "pay and recover" was invoked to ensure the claimant received compensation, considering the cover note obtained from the insurance company's former development officer (Para 26).

Facts:

The appellant, Raghunath Prasad Pande, challenged a decision made by both a learned Single Judge and a Division Bench of the High Court of Karnataka. The case centered around the interpretation of Sections 14(1) and 14(5) of the Karnataka Land Reforms Act, 1961, formerly known as the Mysore Land Reforms Act, 1961. The appellant had entered into a compromise deed with the respondents on 02.03.1970, permitting the appellant to resume possession of 4 acres of land. The compromise deed was submitted before the Munsiff/Tribunal, and possession of the land was handed over to the appellant as per the order dated 2.3.1970 passed by the Munsiff/Tribunal.

Issues:

Whether the appellant's possession of the land, as per the compromise deed, complied with the procedural requirements of Section 14(5) of the Karnataka Land Reforms Act, 1961.

Held:

The Court held that despite the procedural aspect not strictly adhering to Section 14(5) of the Karnataka Land Reforms Act, the compromise deed, acted upon by handing over possession, fulfilled the substantive requirements of the law. The Court criticized the hyper-technical approach taken by the High Court and concluded that the appellant's possession of the land since 02.03.1970 was legal. The Court further noted that the land in question had already been acquired by the State Government, and the possession of 4 acres of land had been taken from the appellant for public purposes. Therefore, the Court allowed the appeal, set aside the impugned judgments, and disposed of any pending applications. No costs were awarded in the case.

Facts:

The State of Maharashtra had issued a notification on 10.01.2018, prescribing eligibility criteria for admission to Postgraduate Medical/Dental Courses in unaided Private Educational Institutions in the State.

Respondents filed a writ petition challenging one of the conditions in the eligibility criteria, which required the candidate to be a domicile of Maharashtra.

Similar conditions imposed by the State Government for the academic year 2017-18 had been stayed by the High Court in a previous case.

Issues:

Whether the condition requiring candidates who had obtained a graduate degree to also be domiciled in the State of Maharashtra was permissible under the law.

Held:

The High Court accepted the challenge to the condition, ruling that it was impermissible to require candidates with a graduate degree to be domiciled in the State of Maharashtra. This decision was based on established legal principles and precedents, including the cases of Dr. Pradeep Jain v. Union of India (1984) and Vishal Goyal v. State of Karnataka (2014).

The Supreme Court affirmed the High Court's decision, noting its recent judgment in a similar matter involving the State of Karnataka.

The appeal was dismissed with no order as to costs.

Facts:

The petitioner filed a writ petition seeking investigation into known and reported cases of adulteration by independent agencies and the direct transfer of cash subsidy for kerosene oil to beneficiaries' bank accounts. The petition contained specific allegations against an individual, Devender Agrawal, regarding the ownership of multiple petroleum product dealerships.

Issues:

Whether an investigation by independent agencies into reported cases of adulteration is warranted.

Whether the direct transfer of cash subsidy for kerosene oil to beneficiaries is feasible.

Whether the allegations against Devender Agrawal regarding ownership of multiple dealerships merit investigation.

Held:

The court found that determining whether an individual owns multiple dealerships in violation of regulations falls under the purview of oil companies. The court did not express any opinion on the merits of the claims and left them to be determined in accordance with the law.

Regarding the adulteration issue, the court noted steps taken by public sector oil companies to ensure the quality and quantity of petroleum products. However, the court did not express any opinion on the merits of the claims and left them to be determined in accordance with the law.

The court disposed of the petition without further investigation.

Facts:

Maya Devi filed an application against Nonihal Singh under Section 9 of the Rajasthan Rent Control Act, 2001, citing default in rent payment.

Rent Tribunal and Rent Appellate Tribunal ruled in Maya Devi's favor.

Nonihal Singh challenged these rulings via a writ petition in the High Court.

High Court permitted Nonihal Singh to continue occupying the premises until April 30, 2019, subject to certain conditions, including depositing arrears of rent and mesne profits.

Nonihal Singh failed to deposit the arrears within the specified time.

Nonihal Singh later deposited the arrears and mesne profits, albeit belatedly.

High Court rejected Nonihal Singh's applications for extension of time and condonation of delay without considering these deposits.

Nonihal Singh appealed against these orders to the Supreme Court.

Issues:

Whether the High Court erred in rejecting Nonihal Singh's applications for extension of time and condonation of delay.

Whether the subsequent deposits made by Nonihal Singh should have been considered by the High Court.

Held:

The Supreme Court held that the High Court's orders rejecting Nonihal Singh's applications were erroneous.

The Court found that Nonihal Singh had indeed deposited the arrears and mesne profits as per the High Court's order, albeit belatedly. The Court observed that the High Court should have considered these deposits before rejecting the applications.

Therefore, the Supreme Court set aside the High Court's orders and directed Nonihal Singh to be put back in possession of the premises within a week. Nonihal Singh was instructed to continue depositing mesne profits as per the High Court's order, with Maya Devi having the option to take appropriate action in case of default.

Facts:

The appellant initiated a process for the procurement of power from Grid Connected Solar Energy.

The respondent was selected for the project but faced difficulties in land procurement, leading to a request for a change in location, which was granted by the appellant.

The appellant terminated the contract due to delays in project completion, imposing a penalty on the respondent.

The High Court set aside the termination but maintained the invocation of the bank guarantee.

Issues:

Whether the termination of the contract by the appellant was justified due to delays in project completion.

Whether the invocation of the bank guarantee was in accordance with the terms of the contract.

Held:

The Supreme Court held that while the contract allowed for the imposition of a penalty for delays, the termination of the contract by the appellant was deemed arbitrary and was rightly set aside by the High Court.

The Court upheld the invocation of the bank guarantee as per the terms of the contract. The appellant was directed to pay the amount covered by the bank guarantee, which they complied with during the legal proceedings.

The respondent was ordered to pay the penalty amount imposed by the appellant within four weeks from the date of the judgment.

Facts:

Nayabha Mapbha Ker died in a motor accident on July 18, 1993.

The accident occurred when Nayabha was traveling in a jeep, and it was hit by a truck driven by the respondent.

Nayabha's heirs filed a claim petition seeking compensation under Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, before the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal (MACT), Jamnagar.

The MACT awarded compensation, which was appealed to the High Court of Gujarat.

The High Court allowed additional compensation but reduced the interest rate awarded by the MACT.

The appellants challenged the High Court's judgment before the Supreme Court.

Issues:

Whether the High Court properly considered future prospects in calculating compensation.

Whether the reduction of the interest rate by the High Court was justified.

Held:

The Supreme Court found that the High Court failed to adequately consider future prospects in calculating compensation, as established by the decision in National Insurance Company Limited v. Pranay Sethi. It adjusted the calculation accordingly, increasing the compensation to Rs. 12,67,000, inclusive of conventional heads.

The Court upheld the High Court's decision to reduce the interest rate from 12% to 9% per annum.

Consequently, the appeal was allowed, and the compensation was enhanced to Rs. 12,67,000, with interest payable at 9% per annum from the date of the claim petition. No order regarding costs was made.