Facts:

A civil suit was filed by A. Andisamy Chettiar against A. Subburaj Chettiar seeking a permanent injunction over property rights.

The trial court dismissed Andisamy's suit, finding his evidence insufficient to prove ownership based on a will.

Andisamy appealed the trial court's decision and sought to introduce additional evidence during the appeal process.

The first appellate court allowed Andisamy's application for additional evidence, prompting a challenge by Subburaj in the High Court.

Issues:

Whether the first appellate court was justified in allowing the application for additional evidence.

Whether the High Court was correct in exercising revisional powers in this matter.

Held:

The Court, after analyzing the provisions of the Civil Procedure Code, emphasized the limited circumstances under which additional evidence can be admitted on appeal. It held that parties are generally not allowed to introduce new evidence at the appellate stage, except as provided by law.

The Court set aside the High Court's decision and directed the first appellate court to reconsider the application for additional evidence, taking into account the principles outlined by the Supreme Court. This was done to ensure a fair and just resolution of the case. Accordingly, the appeal is disposed of.

Facts:

The case involved an appeal invoking Section 24(2) of the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013.

A Section 4 Notification was issued on November 13, 1959, followed by a Section 6 Declaration on July 12, 1966, and an Award on June 24, 1968.

The possession of the land was in dispute, but the appellants primarily argued non-payment of compensation.

Issues:

Whether the conditions for invoking Section 24(2) of the 2013 Act were met.

Whether compensation was deemed "paid" as per the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894.

Held:

The court clarified the sequential process for invoking Section 24(2) and established that the conditions were met.

Since compensation was neither paid to the appellants nor deposited in court, the acquisition proceedings were deemed to have lapsed under Section 24(2).

The court relied on previous decisions, including Pune Municipal Corporation vs. Harakchand Misirimal Solanki and Others, to define the term "paid" in the context of compensation.

The appeals were allowed with no orders as to costs.

Facts:

The trial court convicted the accused, including the husband and mother-in-law, for the offence of dowry death under Sections 304B and 498A of the Indian Penal Code (IPC). The High Court upheld the conviction but altered the sentence from life imprisonment to 10 years rigorous imprisonment.

Issues:

Whether the essential elements of dowry death under Section 304B IPC were satisfied, and whether the presumption under Section 113B of the Evidence Act, 1872 was applicable in the case.

Held:

In order to convict an accused under Section 304B IPC, specific conditions must be satisfied, including the occurrence of the woman's death within seven years of marriage, death caused by unnatural circumstances, and evidence of cruelty or harassment related to dowry demands. The term "soon before her death" indicates a proximate link between the cruelty and the death.

The presumption under Section 113B of the Evidence Act, 1872 is mandatory, shifting the burden of proof to the accused to disprove the allegation of causing dowry death. However, this presumption is rebuttable, and the accused can present evidence to prove their innocence.

Decision: The court upheld the conviction of the accused for dowry death under Sections 304B and 498A IPC, modifying the sentence but dismissing the appeal.

Facts:

The case involves an acid attack on two Dalit girls in Bihar.

The attackers had been harassing the elder sister, and the attack left both sisters with severe injuries.

The petitioner, a registered NGO, filed a writ petition highlighting the lack of adequate compensation and medical care for acid attack survivors.

Issues:

Inadequacy of compensation and medical care for acid attack victims.

Lack of proper implementation of guidelines and regulations to prevent acid attacks and provide support to victims.

Held:

The court referred to its previous judgment in Laxmi vs. Union of India, which laid down guidelines for regulating the sale of acid, compensating victims, and ensuring their medical treatment and rehabilitation.

The court directed all states and union territories to provide a minimum compensation of Rs. 3 lakhs to acid attack victims, with the possibility of providing more based on the severity of injuries.

In the present case, considering the extensive injuries suffered by the victims and the expenses already incurred on their treatment, the court awarded compensation of Rs. 10 lakhs to the main victim and Rs. 3 lakhs to her sister.

The court emphasized the responsibility of states to ensure the inclusion of acid attack victims' names under the disability list and to provide comprehensive treatment and rehabilitation as per the guidelines established.

Facts:

The appellant, M/S. Steel Authority of India Ltd., discharged excise duty on goods cleared based on invoices indicating the value of the goods at the time of clearance.

Differential duty arose later due to a price variation clause in the contract for sale.

The appellant paid the differential duty immediately upon receiving the enhanced price due to price escalation.

Issues:

Whether interest under Section 11AB is payable on the differential duty.

Determination of the point at which duty "ought to have been paid" in cases of price revision.

Held:

The appellant paid excise duty on the goods cleared based on invoices reflecting the value at the time of clearance. The differential duty arose later due to a price variation clause, and the appellant paid it upon receiving the enhanced price.

Interest under Section 11AB is chargeable where duty has not been levied or paid, or has been short levied or short paid. Duty "ought to have been paid" refers to the time when the price is agreed upon by both the seller and the buyer. In the context of price revision, duty is payable only after the revised price is agreed upon.

Duty is payable on the escalated price in cases of price revision, but the time for payment of differential duty is when the parties agree to the escalation. Therefore, interest on differential duty starts from the date of agreement on the escalated prices.

The excise duty was paid based on the price charged at the time of clearance, and it could not be treated as short paid. Interest is not payable on the principal amount of excise duty in such cases.

Previous judgments holding interest payable did not consider the expression "ought to have been paid" in Section 11AB. The rationale behind imposing interest as compensation for loss of revenue was questioned.

The decision in previous cases requires reconsideration due to the fundamental principle that the value of goods for duty purposes is determined at the time of removal.

Facts:

The case arose from Civil Appeal No. D 35086 of 2013, which raised doubts about the period of limitation for filing a written statement or giving the version of the opponent under Section 13(2)(a) of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986.

Issues:

Whether the law laid down by the Supreme Court.

Held:

The Court reiterates the view expressed in Dr. J.J. Merchant (supra), which mandates that the District Forum can grant a maximum extension of 15 days for the opposite party to file its version, making the total period for filing or giving the version 45 days. This interpretation is essential to adhere to the legislative mandate of disposing of cases within a specified time frame.

The Court emphasizes the chronological precedence of Dr. J.J. Merchant (supra) over Kailash (supra), underscoring that the latter should have respected the former's view as it was decided earlier.

The Court refers to the legal principle that a decision by a larger Bench binds subsequent Benches of lesser or equal strength.

Ultimately, the Court holds that the law laid down in Dr. J.J. Merchant (supra) should prevail, thereby providing clarity on the issue of time limitation for filing a version in consumer protection cases.

Facts:

The dispute arose regarding the calculation of registration fees for stockbrokers under the amended Regulations, specifically Schedule IIIA, introduced effective from October 1, 2006. The appellant, OPG Securities Private Ltd., contested SEBI's demand for registration fees based on turnover beyond the previous year.

Issues:

Whether SEBI's demand for registration fees based on turnover beyond the previous year was justified.

The applicability of Schedule IIIA and its effect on the calculation of registration fees.

Held:

The Court held that SEBI's demand for registration fees beyond the turnover of the previous year was illegal and contrary to the regulations. The Court clarified that the annual turnover of a broker is merely a measure of the levy and not the subject matter of the levy itself. Therefore, SEBI's demand for fees based on turnover beyond the previous year was not justified. The Court also emphasized that Schedule IIIA, upon becoming applicable to the appellant, superseded the provisions of Schedule III for the calculation of registration fees. Hence, SEBI could not levy fees based on Schedule III once Schedule IIIA became applicable to the appellant.

The Court allowed the appeal, setting aside the impugned order of the Securities Appellate Tribunal and quashing SEBI's demand for registration fees. It directed SEBI to refund any amount already paid by the appellant, along with interest, and ordered the refund to be made without delay. There was no order as to costs in the case.

Facts:

Adani Agri Fresh Ltd. (M/s. AAFL) entered into a contractual agreement with RMS Fruits and Company (M/s. RMSFC) for the supply of fruits.

M/s. AAFL required M/s. RMSFC to furnish bank guarantees for payment.

M/s. RMSFC failed to honor the payment, prompting M/s. AAFL to invoke the bank guarantees.

M/s. RMSFC sought injunctions against the invocation of bank guarantees through civil suits.

Issues:

Whether injunctions should be granted against the invocation of unconditional bank guarantees.

Whether the circumstances warranted the granting of such injunctions in the present case.

Held:

The court held that injunctions against the invocation of unconditional bank guarantees should only be granted under exceptional circumstances, such as flagrant fraud or irreparable injury. In the present case, the court found no evidence of fraud or irreparable injury. Therefore, the injunctions granted by the lower courts were not justified. The court directed the State Bank of Mysore to honor the bank guarantees. Additionally, the court granted liberty to M/s. RMSFC to amend their plaint to claim dues under the contractual obligations.

The appeal is disposed of in the above terms.

Facts:

The appellant, Sujoy Mitra, was facing trial in a case related to Section 376 of the Indian Penal Code.

The complainant was a citizen of Ireland residing in Dublin.

The trial court permitted the testimony of the complainant (PW5) to be recorded via video conference.

Issues:

The appellant challenged the procedure adopted by the trial court for recording the testimony of PW5.

Held and Decision:

The Supreme Court granted leave for the appeal and considered the challenges raised by the appellant regarding the procedure adopted by the trial court in recording the statement of PW5.

The Court laid down additional procedures and safeguards to be followed while recording PW5's statement through video conferencing, ensuring fairness and compliance with legal requirements.

These procedures included provisions for video conferencing facilitated by the National Informatic Centre (NIC) using "VC Solution" software, nomination of a responsible officer from the Indian Embassy in Ireland to be present during the recording, and ensuring no other person is present in the room during the recording.

The Court rejected the appellant's contention that the recorded video-graphic testimony should be furnished to him, stating it could lead to a cumbersome process and unnecessary duplication of records.

The appeal was disposed of, with instructions for the trial court to fix a hearing date after the video conferencing facilities were set up and synchronized between the trial court and the Indian Embassy in Ireland.

The trial court was directed to forward the order to the Ambassador of the Indian Embassy in Ireland for compliance.

The parameters outlined by the Court were to be followed for recording PW5's testimony afresh, in addition to the procedures and safeguards provided in the impugned order.