Facts:

The appellant filed a suit for specific performance of a contract and alternative relief of refund of advance amount and permanent injunction against the defendants.

The suit involved unregistered agreements to sell and a registered Power of Attorney.

The Trial Court had admitted the documents as evidence, subject to proof and relevancy, while leaving open other issues regarding their validity and applicability.

The High Court reversed the Trial Court's decision, declaring the agreements inadmissible as evidence.

Issues:

Whether the suit agreement, which was unregistered, could be admissible as evidence for specific performance.

Other issues included the admissibility of the Power of Attorney and whether the documents were hit by the provisions of relevant Acts.

Held:

The Court held that the unregistered suit agreement could be admitted as evidence under the proviso to Section 49 of the Registration Act, but it would have no effect for the purposes of Section 53A of the Transfer of Property Act.

The Court upheld the Trial Court's decision to admit the documents as evidence, subject to proof and relevancy, and directed the Trial Court to decide other issues concerning their validity and applicability.

The Court directed the Trial Court to dispose of the suit expeditiously, preferably within six months.

Facts:

The deceased, aged 39 and employed with the Food Corporation of India, died in a road accident involving a Canter truck.

The Motor Accident Claims Tribunal awarded compensation based on the deceased's gross monthly salary and disregarded his income tax returns showing a higher income.

The High Court considered the income tax assessment and increased the compensation.

Issues:

Whether the income tax returns should be considered in determining the compensation for the deceased's family in a fatal accident case.

Held:

The Court held that both the salary certificate and the income tax returns should be considered in determining the compensation for the deceased's family. The Court disagreed with the Tribunal's approach of solely relying on the salary certificate and upheld the High Court's decision to consider the income tax assessment. It was stated that the claimants provided reliable evidence of the deceased's income tax returns, which was not discredited. Therefore, there was no reason to interfere with the High Court's judgment, and the Special Leave Petitions were dismissed.

Facts:

The respondent, Col Ran Singh Dudee, faced General Court Martial proceedings, which were later quashed by the court.

After reinstatement, Col Dudee received promotions but contested the promotion of a junior officer to the rank of Brigadier, claiming unfair treatment.

Issues:

Whether Col Dudee was entitled to promotions based on comparative merit and selection.

Whether the Selection Board's decision regarding Col Dudee's promotion was valid.

Held:

The court clarified that while benefits such as loss of salary and emoluments were compensable due to the court martial proceedings, promotions were not automatically guaranteed.

Promotions based on comparative merit and selection were not necessarily entitled to the officer, as per previous rulings (K.D. Gupta case).

The Selection Board found Col Dudee unfit for promotion to the rank of Colonel after considering various parameters, including disciplinary history. The court found this decision valid and not perverse.

The Selection Board's consideration of Col Dudee's disciplinary record, including a reprimand, was consistent with the Selection Policy and not illegal.

Despite sympathy for Col Dudee's nine years of service loss and imprisonment due to the court martial, the court upheld the decision of the Selection Board and rejected his challenge to the promotion of a junior officer.

Facts:

The respondent, Janakdhari Prasad, was elected to the post of member in the Panchayat Samiti.

The Election Commission disqualified the respondent on the grounds that he was deemed to be in the service of the State Government due to his appointment as an Assistant Government Advocate and receiving fees for cases conducted by him from the Government.

The High Court set aside the Election Commission's order, and the Division Bench upheld the same.

Issues:

Whether the respondent can be considered to be in the service of the State Government, thereby being disqualified under Section 139(1)(c) of the Bihar Panchayat Raj Act, 1993.

Held:

In Section 139(1)(c) of the Bihar Panchayat Raj Act, 1993, there is a postulate that a person shall be disqualified if such a person is in the service of Central or State Government or any local authority.

The respondent was treated as disqualified based on the foundation that he was in the service of the Government. However, the appointment letter issued by the Government of Bihar, Legal Department, to the District Magistrate, only mentioned the appointment of the respondent to the post of Assistant Government Advocate without specifying any fixed remuneration.

The legislature has not used the term "office of profit" in the relevant provision. Therefore, the determination of whether the respondent held an office of profit is not necessary. The absence of such a provision possibly includes persons from different fields as long as they are not in service under the government.

The existence of a master-servant relationship between the State and a person holding a post under it is crucial. However, in this case, there was no master-servant relationship between the respondent and the State Government.

The absence of essential aspects required to establish a relationship of master and servant indicates that the respondent could not have been treated to be in service under the State Government.

Decision: The Supreme Court upheld the decisions of the lower courts, ruling that the respondent was not in service under the State Government and therefore not disqualified from holding the position in the Panchayat Samiti.

Facts:

Disputes arose between M/s Raveechee and Co. (Appellant) and Union of India (Respondent) regarding a contract for quarrying, stacking, and loading stone ballast.

Arbitration proceedings commenced on 26.09.1988, and the award was passed on 22.03.2001.

Arbitral Tribunal awarded interest pendente lite at 12% on the award for damages excluding security deposits amounting to Rs. 44,92,800/- from 26.09.1988 to 22.03.2001.

High Court partly allowed the appeal of Union of India and quashed part of the award related to Claim No. 12.

Issues:

Whether Clause 16(3) of the General Contract Clauses restricted the power of the arbitrator to award interest pendente lite?

Held:

The clause did not specifically bar the arbitrator from awarding interest pendente lite.

The liability for interest pendente lite arises during the determination of losses or damages due to the claimant, not from the contract terms.

Unless specifically barred, an arbitrator has the power to award interest pendente lite.

The clause in the agreement does not extend to binding an arbitrator; hence, the arbitrator has the power to award interest pendente lite where justified.

The judgment of the High Court was set aside, and the award passed by the Arbitral Tribunal in respect of Claim No. 12 was restored.

Facts:

The accident occurred during blasting operations conducted in a field for digging a well using a tractor. A stone fell on a person, leading to his death. The tribunal treated the accident as a vehicular accident and entertained the claim. The High Court, however, ruled that the claim petition was not maintainable since the battery, detached from the vehicle during the accident, was not part of the vehicle.

Issues:

The court was the maintainability of the claim petition under the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, in light of the circumstances surrounding the accident.

Held:

The tribunal correctly treated the accident as a vehicular accident based on the evidence presented. Contrary to the High Court's ruling, the tractor was actively involved in the blasting operation, and the battery, though detached, was still part of the vehicle during the accident.

Section 165 of the Motor Vehicles Act stipulates that a claim for compensation can be adjudicated if the accident arises out of the use of a motor vehicle. The tractor, being involved in blasting operations, fulfilled the criteria of "use" under the Act.

The term "use of the vehicle" under the Act extends to situations where the vehicle is stationary or static, provided there is a causal relationship between the violation and the accident caused. The court emphasized the need for some causal relation or relevance between the incident and the act.

Given the circumstances, it was erroneous to argue that the tractor was not in use as stipulated under Section 165. Therefore, the High Court erred in its decision.

The insurer argued that the tractor's commercial use for blasting operations breached the insurance policy, relieving them of liability. However, the High Court failed to analyze the terms and conditions of the policy and related evidence.

Reiterating the tractor's agricultural insurance coverage, the court noted that the High Court did not adequately address the policy's terms and conditions, necessitating further analysis to determine liability.

Decision: The appeals were partly allowed, and the case was remanded to the High Court to determine liability based on a thorough analysis of the insurance policy and relevant evidence. Until then, the insurance company was directed to pay the compensation determined by the tribunal to the claimants.

Facts:

The case revolved around the withdrawal of an Essentiality Certificate granted by the State Government to a medical college.

Issues:

Whether the State Government had the authority to withdraw an Essentiality Certificate once granted.

The relevance of reasons provided by the State for withdrawing the certificate.

The power of inspection post-establishment of the college.

The nature of the Essentiality Certificate issuance as a quasi-judicial function.

Held:

The Court held that the State Government cannot withdraw an Essentiality Certificate once granted by the Central Government, except in cases of fraud or if the basis for the certificate ceases to exist.

Reasons for withdrawal must be relevant to the establishment of the medical college, not merely deficiencies in its functioning.

The power of inspection post-establishment lies with the Medical Council of India.

Issuing an Essentiality Certificate is a quasi-judicial function, and it's not an "order" under Section 21 of the General Clauses Act.

Decision: The Court quashed the State Government's order withdrawing the Essentiality Certificate and declared certain conditions imposed by the State ultra-vires the provisions of the IMC Act and Regulations.

Facts:

Adesh Kaur, the appellant, acquired 903 equity shares in Eicher Motors Limited in 1994-95.

In 2012, an impersonator fraudulently changed the address of the shares to Mumbai, obtained duplicate share certificates, and transferred them to a third party.

Adesh Kaur discovered the fraud and sought revalidation of her shares, but Eicher Motors Limited did not provide relief.

Adesh Kaur filed a Company Petition before the National Company Law Tribunal (NCLT), which ruled in her favor, directing rectification of the share register.

On appeal, the Appellate Tribunal set aside the NCLT's decision, directing Adesh Kaur to pursue her remedy through a civil suit.

Issues:

Whether the procedural irregularities in issuing duplicate share certificates and the fraudulent transfer of shares warrant rectification of the share register.

Held:

The Court reinstated the order of the NCLT, finding the fraud evident and the procedural requirements for issuing duplicate shares not followed. The Court directed Eicher Motors Limited to rectify its share register and the concerned depository to rectify demat records accordingly. The Court allowed the appeals and disposed of any pending applications.

Facts:

The petition under Article 32 of the Constitution challenged the appointment of the Central Vigilance Commissioner (CVC) and Vigilance Commissioner (VC) on grounds of alleged illegality and violation of principles of 'impeccable integrity' and 'institutional integrity'.

Allegations were made against the appointees regarding their conduct, including meetings with other officials, handling of specific cases, and accusations of fabricating/forging reports.

Issues:

Whether the appointments of the CVC and VC were influenced by extraneous considerations or made in breach of statutes or rules.

Whether the allegations against the appointees were substantiated and affected their integrity.

Held:

The court clarified that judicial review is limited to examining the integrity of the decision-making process. It can set aside decisions influenced by extraneous considerations or made in violation of statutes or rules. However, the court does not have the authority to interfere with the government's choice of appointees.

The court found the allegations against the CVC regarding meetings with other officials and handling of specific cases unsubstantiated. It noted that no wrongdoing or impropriety was found in the actions of the CVC.

Similarly, allegations against the VC regarding fabricating/forging reports were examined. The court found no formal findings against the VC in this regard and concluded that his integrity was not affected.

Emphasizing the importance of thoroughly examining complaints, the court stated that allegations alone cannot be taken as serious aspersions on integrity. It declined to interfere with the appointments based on the findings presented.

Decision: The court upheld the appointments of both the CVC and VC, concluding that the integrity of the decision-making process was not compromised, and no illegality was found in the appointments.