Facts:

A grocery shop named "Ambika Stores" was inspected by the Deputy Commercial Tax Officer along with the accused, during which the accounts book was seized.

The prosecution alleged that one of the accused demanded a bribe from the owner of the shop for the return of the seized accounts book.

The owner of the shop lodged a complaint with the Vigilance and Anti-Corruption Wing, based on which a trap was arranged.

The accused were caught receiving the bribe during the trap.

Issues:

Whether the evidence presented by the prosecution was sufficient to prove the guilt of the accused under the relevant sections of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988.

Whether the lower courts' findings of guilt and subsequent conviction were justified.

Held:

The Division Bench, comprising R. Banumathi and Indira Banerjee, JJ., held that the appeals were to be dismissed and the conviction upheld. The Bench noted the following:

The evidence provided by PW-2 was corroborated by the testimony of PW-3 and PW-6.

PW-3, in his Chief Examination, stated that he witnessed the accused directing the payment of the bribe.

The office assistant, PW-6, corroborated PW-2's version of events.

The Trial Court and the High Court had found the accused guilty based on this evidence and the test conducted with sodium carbonate solution.

The Bench found no grounds to take a different view from the concurrent findings of the lower courts.

Therefore, the appeals were dismissed, and the appellants were directed to surrender to custody within eight weeks to serve the remaining sentence.

Facts:

The plaintiffs filed a civil suit seeking a declaration and permanent injunction regarding a piece of land, claiming ownership based on documents and alleged possession.

The defendants contested the suit, asserting their ownership of the same land, claiming purchase from previous owners.

The Trial Court ruled in favor of the plaintiffs, which was upheld by the Appellate Court.

Dissatisfied, the defendants filed a second appeal in the High Court, which framed a substantial question of law.

Issues:

Whether the High Court's jurisdiction in deciding second appeals is limited to substantial questions of law framed by it under Section 100 of the CPC.

Whether the High Court exceeded its jurisdiction in examining the ownership issue without framing appropriate questions.

Held:

The High Court's jurisdiction in second appeals is confined to substantial questions of law framed by it under Section 100 of the CPC. The High Court cannot exceed this jurisdiction unless it assigns reasons for doing so at the time of the appeal hearing.

The High Court improperly examined the ownership issue without framing substantial questions of law related to it. This was a procedural error.

Decision: The Supreme Court set aside the High Court's judgment and remanded the case back to the High Court for reconsideration. The High Court was instructed to properly frame substantial questions of law related to the ownership of the land and decide the appeal afresh within a specified timeframe.

Facts:

The applicant-company undertook construction activities under an exemption granted by Section 23 of the Haryana Development and Regulation of Urban Areas Act, 1975.

A notification dated 18.08.1992, issued under the Punjab Land Preservation Act, 1900, prohibited construction activities on certain notified lands, including those of the applicant.

The Town and Country Planning Department of the State of Haryana supported the illegal activities of the applicant despite resistance from the Forest Department.

Issues:

Whether the construction activities carried out by the applicant violated environmental regulations and statutory notifications.

The role of the Town and Country Planning Department in supporting illegal construction activities.

Held:

The notified land under the Punjab Land Preservation Act, 1900, must be treated as forest land, and construction activities on such lands are prohibited.

The actions of the Town and Country Planning Department were criticized for disregarding environmental concerns and statutory notifications.

The court emphasized the application of the "Polluter Pays" principle, directing the applicant to pay for rehabilitation of damaged areas.

Construction carried out prior to the notification date (18.08.1992) was saved, but illegal constructions made afterward were ordered to be demolished.

The applicant was directed to refund investments made by individuals who purchased land from them after the notification date.

Compensation was ordered to be paid for the cost of construction to those affected by the demolition, to be shared by the applicant company and the Town and Country Planning Department.

Decision: The court's ruling focused on enforcing environmental regulations, holding the applicant accountable for the damage caused by its illegal activities, and compensating affected parties.

Facts:

The Respondent No. 1 issued a Request for Qualification (RFQ) for a container terminal project, divided into eligibility and Request for Proposal (RFP) stages. The Appellant and Respondent No. 2 formed a consortium that qualified in the eligibility stage. A Letter of Award was issued to the consortium, but Respondent No. 2 withdrew from the bid process. Consequently, Respondent No. 1 issued a show-cause notice, and upon failure to perform, revoked the Letter of Award. An arbitration notice was sent by Respondent No. 1, claiming disputes under an arbitration clause.

Issues:

Whether there existed a concluded contract between the parties.

The applicability of the arbitration clause to the disputes.

Held:

The Court observed that the bid process, as per the Request for Proposal (RFP) clauses, did not result in a concluded contract between the parties. The process was ongoing, and several steps were required before a contract could be enforceable.

Section 7 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872 requires acceptance to be absolute and unqualified. In this case, there was no such absolute acceptance by the Letter of Award. Therefore, there was no enforceable contract.

The Court relied on precedents such as Dresser Rand S.A. and Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited to emphasize that certain steps are necessary for a contract to materialize. It reiterated that everything before the fulfillment of these steps is merely a prelude and not a binding contract.

Even if there were an arbitration clause, it would not be suitable for the current dispute. The clause only covered disputes between a Special Purpose Vehicle and Respondent No. 1, excluding the Appellant and Respondent No. 2.

Decision: The appeal was allowed, setting aside the High Court's judgment. The Court affirmed that there was no concluded contract between the parties, and the arbitration clause referred to by Respondent No. 1 was not applicable to the dispute at hand.

Facts:

The case involves a challenge to the seniority granted to promotee officers over direct recruits within the Indian Railways Establishment, specifically concerning the Indian Railway Service of Signal Engineers.

The dispute arose when a direct recruit contested the seniority granted to promotee officers, who were placed en bloc senior to all direct recruits. The direct recruit argued that seniority should be fixed from the date of sending the requisition for vacancies relating to the year 2009. The Central Administrative Tribunal (CAT) rejected the plea, stating that the IREM provisions determining seniority based on the 'date of increment in the time scale (DITS)' were flawed and arbitrary.

The High Court upheld this decision, asserting that DoPT circulars were binding on the Railways, and IREM was not statutory but merely a set of guidelines.

Issues:

The determination of seniority within the Indian Railways Establishment, specifically concerning the Indian Railway Service of Signal Engineers.

The key contention is whether the seniority of direct recruits should be fixed from the date of sending the requisition for vacancies relating to the year 2009, as argued by the appellants.

Held:

The Court examined the Government of India (Allocation of Business) Rules, 1961, framed under Article 77 of the Constitution, which explicitly exclude the Railways from the ambit of the Department of Personnel and Training's (DoPT) jurisdiction. Consequently, DoPT circulars are not inherently binding on the Railways unless specifically accepted or made applicable.

It was clarified that both the Indian Railways Establishment Code (IREC) and IREM have statutory force, being issued under the proviso to Article 309 of the Constitution. Therefore, the Railways have the authority to govern their employees' service conditions through these rules.

Referring to the N.R. Parmar case, the Court established that seniority could be determined based on the year of requisition only if it aligns with the vacancy year. However, this principle applies solely when the recruitment year matches the vacancy year. Since the vacancies related to the year 2009, direct recruits were not entitled to seniority from 2007 when the requisition was sent.

The Court found that the Railways' amendment to the IREM rules, aligning them with the CAT's judgment, did not violate the CAT's order. The CAT had only ordered the removal of arbitrariness associated with 'DITS' and adoption of the 'year of allotment.' Therefore, the Railways' action was in line with the CAT's directive.

Decision: The Court upheld the Railways' authority to govern its employees' service conditions, including seniority determination, through the IREC and IREM. It also affirmed the validity of the Railways' amendment to IREM rules, finding it consistent with the CAT's directive to remove arbitrariness in seniority determination. We dispose of the appeal.

Facts:

Mysore Urban Development Authority (MUDA) initiated acquisition proceedings under the Karnataka Urban Development Authorities Act, 1987, and the Land Acquisition Act, 1894.

The High Court of Karnataka quashed the acquisition proceedings, citing delay in possession of the acquired land.

MUDA filed appeals before the Division Bench, which were dismissed as not pressed, based on a resolution purportedly dropping the lands from acquisition proceedings.

MUDA appealed to the Supreme Court challenging the dismissal of appeals and arguing for their right to be heard on merits.

Issues:

Whether the Division Bench erred in dismissing MUDA's appeals as not pressed.

Whether subsequent actions by the parties should influence the decision on the appeals.

Whether MUDA had the authority to withdraw from the acquisition proceedings without the sanction of the State Government.

Held:

The Court held that the Division Bench erred in dismissing MUDA's appeals as not pressed. The court emphasized the importance of the right of appeal and the need for strict compliance with legal provisions. Subsequent actions by the parties were deemed irrelevant to the decision on the appeals. MUDA was found to lack the authority to unilaterally withdraw from the acquisition proceedings without the State Government's sanction. Therefore, the appeals were allowed, and the High Court was instructed to decide the appeals on their merits.

Facts:

The case involved an appellant, Maqbool, challenging the framing of charges against him under Section 326A of the Indian Penal Code (IPC) in relation to an acid attack. The appellant argued that the injury caused was simple, not grievous, and thus, Section 326A should not apply.

Issues:

Whether an offense under Section 326A of the IPC is attracted if the injury caused in an acid attack is simple.

Whether charge can be framed under Section 326B if the injury caused is only simple.

Held:

The court held that the nature of the injury, whether simple or grievous, does not affect the application of Section 326A in cases of acid attacks. Additionally, the court clarified the distinction between Sections 326A and 326B, emphasizing that Section 326A applies when the injury falls under specified types due to an acid attack, regardless of its severity.

The court dismissed the appeal, affirming the framing of charges under Section 326A.

Facts:

The petitioners were appointed as Presiding Officers prior to the substitution of Section 6 of the Recovery of Debts and Bankruptcy Act, 1993. The original provision mandated a term of office until attaining the age of 62 or completing five years, whichever was earlier. The provision was substituted by Act 44 of 2016, effective from September 1, 2016, extending the term of office until the age of 65 or completing five years. At the time of the substitution, the petitioners had not completed five years but were attaining the age of 62.

Issues:

The applicability of the amended provision of Section 6 to the petitioners, considering their appointment prior to the substitution of the provision.

Held:

The Court held that the amended provision of Section 6 applies to the petitioners as well. Thus, they are entitled to continue working as Presiding Officers until they attain the age of 65 or complete five years' term before reaching the age of 65.

The Court interpreted the term "substitution" in legislative terms, noting that it effectively replaces the old provision with the new one. This means that the new provision operates as if it had been in place from the beginning, unless there is a clear intention otherwise.

Legislative intent was crucial in determining the applicability of the amended provision. The purpose behind amending Section 6 was to reduce the burden of pending cases by increasing the age limit of judges. Thus, a purposive interpretation of the statute was necessary to achieve the legislative objective.

The Court emphasized that the benefit of the amended provision extends to all Presiding Officers serving on the date when the amendment took effect. Consequently, those incumbents are governed by the substituted provision as if it were the only provision in force.

Decision: The Court allowed the matters and held that the amended provision of Section 6 applies to the petitioners, allowing them to continue their tenure as Presiding Officers until the age of 65 or completion of five years' term, whichever is earlier.

Facts:

The petitioners, personnel of the Army Service Corps (ASC), challenged their posting orders to operational units/areas issued by the Respondents.

The petitioners contended that their postings violated their Fundamental Rights under Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution.

The Respondents argued that the postings were within the discretion of the competent authority and were in line with organizational effectiveness and operational requirements.

Issues:

Whether the Writ Petitions filed under Article 32 of the Constitution are maintainable?

Whether the posting orders of the petitioners to operational areas/units are valid in view of previous judicial decisions?

Whether the postings of the petitioners violate any statutory rules, executive policies, or instructions?

Held:

The Writ Petitions were not maintainable under Article 32 as there was no violation of Fundamental Rights. The petitioners had an alternate statutory remedy available through the Armed Forces Tribunals.

The previous judicial decision, Lt. Col. P.K. Choudhary's Case, regarding promotions did not apply to posting orders. Different streams of the Army, including the ASC, have distinct roles, and the ASC is considered operational. Therefore, the posting orders were valid.

The petitioners failed to demonstrate any violation of statutory rules, executive policies, or instructions regarding their postings.

The oath administered to all personnel binds them to serve wherever ordered, regardless of their arm or service.

Consequently, the Court dismissed the Writ Petitions with no order as to costs.