Facts:

The creditor issued a notice under Section 13(2) of the Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002, initiating recovery proceedings against the debtor.

The debtor made representations seeking rescheduling of the loan, which the creditor neither considered nor communicated reasons for non-acceptance.

Negotiations ensued between the creditor and debtor, with the debtor repeatedly seeking extensions and making promises to repay, but failing to fulfill obligations.

Despite various opportunities granted by the creditor, the debtor defaulted on payments, leading to the creditor taking symbolic possession of the secured assets.

Issues:

Whether the creditor's failure to reply to the debtor's representation breached Section 13(3A) of the Act.

Whether the inclusion of agricultural land as security interest in the recovery notice was valid under Section 31(i) of the Act.

Whether the creditor's transfer of symbolic possession affected their status as a secured creditor under Section 14 of the Act.

Whether allegations of fraud and collusion between the creditor and auction purchaser were substantiated.

Held:

The failure to furnish a written reply to the debtor's representation did not significantly impact the case, as the creditor had considered the representations during negotiations.

Consequently, the debtor was not entitled to discretionary relief under Article 226 of the Constitution.

The inclusion of agricultural land as security interest was deemed valid, as the land in question was not agricultural land based on its use and purpose.

The creditor retained their status as a secured creditor despite transferring symbolic possession of the assets, as the transfer was not complete under the Transfer of Property Act.

Allegations of fraud and collusion between the creditor and auction purchaser were unfounded, as the mere existence of a dispute did not indicate collusion.

Decision: The Supreme Court allowed the appeals by ITC Limited, affirming the creditor's right to enforce security interest and rejecting the debtor's claims of impropriety.

Facts:

The appellant, Rameshwar Yadav, along with other accused individuals, had filed an application for anticipatory bail during the pendency of a case. Non-bailable warrants were issued against them, prompting them to file an application seeking recall of the warrants and dispensing with their physical appearance in court. The Sub-Divisional Judicial Magistrate rejected the application for exemption from personal appearance, citing reasons such as the accused appearing physically fit and the need for their presence in court for conciliation purposes.

Issues:

Whether the application for exemption from personal appearance under Section 205 CrPC can be made after the accused has appeared in court?

Whether the High Court's dismissal of the application under Section 482 of CrPC was justified?

Whether the Magistrate failed to consider valid grounds presented by the accused for seeking exemption from personal appearance?

Held:

The Supreme Court clarified that the application under Section 205 CrPC was filed before the accused appeared in court and thus, it was not invalid. Additionally, both Section 205 and Section 317 of CrPC empower the magistrate to grant exemption from personal appearance. The High Court's view that the remedy for exemption was only under Section 317 CrPC was deemed erroneous.

The Court criticized the Magistrate for not considering the valid grounds presented by the accused for seeking exemption from personal appearance. It held that sufficient grounds were made out for granting exemption from personal appearance and allowed the appeal.

The judgments of both the High Court and the Sub-Divisional Judicial Magistrate were set aside, and the application filed by the appellants under Section 205 CrPC was allowed, exempting their personal appearance. However, the Court clarified that the magistrate could still pass appropriate orders under Section 205(2) CrPC if and when necessary.

Facts:

The petitioner, Ganga Malik, filed a writ petition seeking relief after her son, Amitava Malik, a Sub-Inspector of Police, was killed while on duty. Amitava Malik was part of a police party attempting to arrest several accused individuals camping at the south bank of river Chhota Rangeet, P.S. Sadar, Darjeeling, when he was fired upon by miscreants. The petitioner sought various reliefs including protection for her family, expeditious trial of the case, and compensation for the loss of her son.

Issues:

Whether the petitioner is entitled to the reliefs sought in the writ petition.

What course of action should be taken regarding the trial of the criminal case and other reliefs sought by the petitioner.

Held:

The court opined that the trial of the criminal case would proceed as per the law. Regarding the other reliefs sought by the petitioner, it was determined that she could approach the State of West Bengal for appropriate relief. Therefore, the court dismissed the writ petition, granting the petitioner the liberty to seek redressal from the concerned authorities for the reliefs sought.

Facts:

The case pertained to a writ petition filed by Bimal Gurung, seeking the transfer of investigation of all FIRs lodged against him and other members of the Gorkha Janmukti Morcha (GJM) to an independent investigation agency. The FIRs encompassed various offenses under different statutes, including the IPC and Arms Act.

Gurung alleged that the FIRs were politically motivated and aimed at persecuting him and other GJM members due to their demand for a separate state of Ghorkhaland. The situation in the Districts of Darjeeling and Kalimpong had deteriorated, with violence and unrest escalating.

Issues:

Whether there were sufficient grounds to transfer the investigation to an independent agency.

Whether the allegations of bias against the state and police functionaries were substantiated.

Held:

The court reiterated that the power to transfer investigation to another agency should be exercised sparingly and only in rare and exceptional cases (Para 26). This power is invoked to ensure justice and maintain public confidence in the investigation process.

Articles 19(1)(a) and (b) of the Constitution protect the rights of freedom of speech and expression, including the right to assemble peaceably and without arms. However, these rights are not absolute and do not cover demonstrations that turn violent and infringe upon public and private property or endanger lives (Para 28).

The court observed the deteriorating situation in Darjeeling and Kalimpong, where protests had turned violent, resulting in severe damage to life and property (Para 37).

Given the seriousness of the offenses alleged in the FIRs and the state's obligation to maintain law and order, transferring the investigation en masse to an independent agency was neither practical nor justified (Para 39).

The state has a constitutional duty to maintain public order and protect citizens' lives and property. Police officers have the obligation to register FIRs promptly upon receiving information about cognizable offenses, without awaiting instructions from any authority (Para 41).

Allegations of bias against state and police functionaries were not substantiated in the present case. The court emphasized that while it's easy to allege bias, it's challenging to prove it. Therefore, the petitioner's claims that the FIRs were politically motivated and biased against him were rejected (Para 41).

While acknowledging the importance of a proper investigation for ensuring justice, the court concluded that the case did not warrant the transfer of investigation en masse to an independent agency under Article 32. The situation did not amount to individual persecution by state authorities (Para 46).

Facts:

The case involved amendments made in 1998 to the Karnataka Money Lenders Act and the Karnataka Pawn Brokers Act, which stated that security deposits provided by money lenders and pawnbrokers would not accrue interest.

These amendments were challenged on constitutional grounds.

Issues:

Whether the amendments prohibiting the payment of interest on security deposits were constitutionally valid.

Another issue was the legality of applying these amendments retrospectively to nullify a prior judgment.

Held:

The court upheld the validity of the amendments, recognizing the government's authority to regulate usurious businesses and impose stringent conditions to discourage their proliferation.

It determined that the provisions prohibiting interest payments on security deposits were reasonable and did not infringe upon Article 14 of the Constitution.

However, the court found the retrospective application of the amendments illegal, as it contravened the principle of separation of powers and the doctrine of stare decisis.

Decision: The court partly allowed the appeals, affirming the validity of the amendments but striking down their retrospective application.

Facts:

The case involves a dispute between the Board of Control for Cricket in India (BCCI) and Kochi Cricket Pvt. Ltd. regarding the interpretation of certain provisions of the Arbitration and Conciliation (Amendment) Act, 2015.

Issues:

The application of Section 26 of the Amendment Act, particularly concerning the prospective application of the Act to arbitral and court proceedings related to arbitration.

Held:

The scheme of Section 26 of the Arbitration and Conciliation (Amendment) Act, 2015 is analyzed. The provision is construed to be prospective in nature, applying only to arbitral proceedings commenced on or after the commencement of the Amendment Act and to court proceedings related to arbitration initiated after the Amendment Act came into force.

Section 26 is dissected into two distinct parts, with an emphasis on the word "but" which separates them. The first part deals with exceptions to the application of the Amendment Act, while the second part applies the Amendment Act to specific proceedings.

The absence of specific references in the second part of Section 26 to Section 21 of the 1996 Act indicates that arbitral proceedings before a tribunal are not contemplated in that part. Instead, it refers to court proceedings in relation to arbitral proceedings.

The court clarifies the application of the Amendment Act to arbitral proceedings commenced before its enactment, noting that parties may agree otherwise. The intention of the legislature is to apply the Amendment Act prospectively.

The court addresses the application of Section 36, both in its original form and as amended, particularly focusing on the meaning of "enforcement" in the context of arbitral awards.

It is determined that Section 36 deals with the execution of arbitral awards, and its amended form should apply even to pending Section 34 applications filed before the commencement of the Amendment Act.

The court rejects the argument that there is a corresponding right for the judgment debtor to stay the execution of an award. It emphasizes the procedural nature of Section 36.

The interpretation of "enforcement" in Section 36 is discussed further, affirming that it treats the arbitral award as a decree to be enforced under the Code of Civil Procedure.

The court reflects on potential anomalies arising from the prospective application of the Amendment Act but emphasizes the importance of adhering to the legislative intent.

The court comments on the proposed Section 87, cautioning against its potential impact on delaying arbitration proceedings and increasing court interference.

Despite potential legal inaccuracies in the High Court's judgment, the court decides not to interfere with it in the interest of justice, considering the specific circumstances of the case.

Facts:

The case involved a dispute regarding the interpretation and implementation of the Pre-conception and Pre-natal Diagnostic Techniques (Prohibition of Sex Selection) Act, 1994, along with the associated rules. The Union of India appealed against a judgment of the Delhi High Court, which questioned the statutory authority to prescribe qualifications and training for individuals employed in genetic counselling centres, laboratories, and clinics.

Issues:

The legality and validity of the qualifications and training requirements prescribed under the Pre-conception and Pre-natal Diagnostic Techniques (Prohibition of Sex Selection) Act, 1994, and the associated rules, particularly in light of the Delhi High Court's judgment challenging their statutory basis.

Held:

The Parliament has conferred rule-making authority upon the Central government under the Pre-conception and Pre-natal Diagnostic Techniques (Prohibition of Sex Selection) Act, 1994, to specify minimum qualifications for persons employed at genetic counselling centres, laboratories, and clinics. The Court emphasized that the specifications of qualifications and training should be interpreted purposively to fulfill the objectives of the Act.

The judgment of the Delhi High Court, which questioned the statutory authority to prescribe qualifications and training, was stayed during the pendency of the proceedings. The Supreme Court directed strict enforcement of its earlier directions issued in a previous case related to the effective implementation of the Act's provisions.

Facts:

The case involves the interpretation of the Advocates Act, 1961, particularly regarding the practice of law by foreign law firms and lawyers in India.

Issues:

Whether foreign law firms/companies or foreign lawyers can practice law in India, both in litigation and non-litigation aspects.

Whether foreign lawyers can conduct arbitration proceedings in India.

Whether the Advocates Act applies to the customized and integrated services provided by Business Process Outsourcing (BPO) companies.

Held:

The practice of law encompasses both litigation and non-litigation activities, including giving opinions, drafting instruments, and participating in legal discussions. This applies to both Indian and foreign law. (Para 39)

Advocates enrolled with the Bar Council alone are entitled to practice law, and this includes non-litigation work. The regulatory mechanism for advocates applies to non-litigation activities as well. Foreign law firms/companies or lawyers cannot practice law in India without subjecting themselves to the Bar Council's regulatory mechanism. (Para 40 and 44)

Whether a visit by a foreign lawyer amounts to practicing law depends on the frequency and nature of the visit. Regular visits may constitute practice, while casual visits for advice may not. The determination of whether a visit amounts to practice is a question of fact. (Para 41 and 44)

Foreign lawyers may conduct arbitration proceedings related to international commercial arbitration if governed by specific rules or the Arbitration Act. However, they must adhere to the code of conduct applicable in India. (Para 45)

The applicability of the Advocates Act to BPO companies providing services potentially amounting to the practice of law depends on the substance of the services offered. If the services indeed constitute the practice of law, foreign law firms or lawyers are not allowed to engage in such activities. (Para 43 and 46)

Decision: The court upholds the prohibition on foreign law firms and lawyers from practicing law in India without subjecting themselves to the regulatory mechanism of the Bar Council. The court also modifies certain directions regarding the conduct of arbitration proceedings and the applicability of the Advocates Act to BPO companies, emphasizing a case-by-case determination based on the substance of the services provided.

Facts:

Raghuwar Pal Singh was appointed as a Veterinary Compounder.

His appointment was made without the required prior approval of the competent authority, as mandated by the Central Cattle Breeding Forum (Class III and IV Post) Recruitment Rules, 1969, and executive instructions.

Issues:

Whether the appointment made without prior approval of the competent authority was valid.

Whether termination of service without affording an opportunity of hearing was justified.

Held:

The recruitment procedure for the post of Veterinary Compounder was governed by the Central Cattle Breeding Forum (Class III and IV Post) Recruitment Rules, 1969, and executive instructions. These rules necessitated the issuance of appointment letters only by an authorized officer and after obtaining prior approval of the competent authority.

The appointment of Raghuwar Pal Singh lacked prior approval of the competent authority, rendering it null and void.

The Ministry concluded that the appointment was illegal due to various irregularities, including the unconstitutional constitution of the Selection Board and the Director Incharge nominating himself as the Chairman of the Board despite being related to the candidate.

Since the appointment was a nullity, there was no requirement to observe principles of natural justice before terminating Raghuwar Pal Singh's service.

The subject office order terminating Raghuwar Pal Singh's service was justified based on the illegality of his appointment, and it did not necessitate affording him the opportunity of a hearing.

The High Court's decision to interfere with the subject office order solely on the ground of lack of opportunity to the respondent was deemed incorrect.

Decision: The Court upheld the termination of Raghuwar Pal Singh's service due to the illegal nature of his appointment, which lacked prior approval from the competent authority.