Facts:

The case involves a dispute regarding the dismissal/removal orders of respondents by the Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF) on the grounds of non-appointment of a Presenting Officer in the departmental inquiry. The High Court set aside the dismissal orders, citing a violation of the principle of natural justice, as the Inquiry Officer acted both as prosecutor and judge in the disciplinary proceedings.

Issues:

Whether the appointment of a Presenting Officer in a departmental inquiry is a statutory requirement under Rule 27 of the Central Reserve Police Force Rules, 1955.

Whether the Inquiry Officer's dual role as prosecutor and judge violates the principles of natural justice.

Whether the High Court was justified in setting aside the dismissal orders based on the above grounds.

Held:

The Court examined Rule 27 of the Central Reserve Police Force Rules, 1955 and found no explicit requirement for the appointment of a Presenting Officer.

Disciplinary proceedings are considered quasi-judicial, and the Inquiry Officer is expected to act as an independent adjudicator, ensuring fairness and impartiality.

In cases where statutory rules are silent on the appointment of a Presenting Officer, the principles of natural justice should apply unless specifically excluded.

The Inquiry Officer's role as both prosecutor and judge compromises the fairness of the proceedings and attracts the principle of bias.

The High Court correctly set aside the dismissal orders due to the violation of principles of natural justice, allowing the appellants to proceed with the inquiry afresh.

Decision: The appeals are dismissed, affirming the decision of the High Court to set aside the dismissal orders.

Facts:

The case involved three accused individuals prosecuted for double murder and robbery. The trial court convicted all accused based on circumstantial evidence such as recoveries made at their behest and fingerprint analysis. The High Court upheld the conviction of the appellant and accused No. 1 but acquitted accused No. 3 due to the benefit of doubt.

Issues:

Whether the prosecution established a complete chain of circumstances to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.

Held:

The recoveries of jewelry, cash, and other items allegedly made from the appellant were contested. The court found discrepancies and lack of conclusive evidence regarding these recoveries, undermining their validity as incriminating evidence.

The evidence regarding a blood-stained knife was deemed inconclusive, as no clear link was established between the weapon and the crime. Similarly, the recovery of a blood-stained shirt was insufficient to prove guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

The recovery of a van and a broken number plate was questioned due to lack of independent witness testimony and inconsistencies in police statements.

The reliability of fingerprint evidence was discussed, emphasizing the necessity for a complete chain of circumstances to establish guilt.

Decision: The court allowed the appeal, holding that the prosecution failed to establish guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. The appellant was acquitted of the charges under sections 302 and 392 of the IPC.

Facts:

The case involved a dispute among family members over partitioned ancestral property.

An exchange deed was executed between the parties, involving immovable property.

The plaintiffs contended that the property was ancestral and challenged the validity of the unregistered exchange deed.

The defendant sought to rely on Section 53A of the Transfer of Property Act.

Issues:

Whether the partitioned property retained its ancestral character.

Validity of the unregistered exchange deed.

Application of Section 53A of the Transfer of Property Act.

Held:

The court held that It is settled that the property inherited by a male Hindu from his father, father's father or father's father's father is an ancestral property.

It is clear from this provision that where either of the properties in exchange are immovable or one of them is immovable and the value of anyone is Rs. 100/- or more, the provision of Section 54 of the TP Act relating to sale of immovable property would apply.

Since Exhibit P2 is an unregistered document, it is inadmissible in evidence and as such it can neither be proved under Section 91 of the Evidence Act nor any oral evidence can be given to prove its contents.

The last contention of the learned counsel for the appellant is in relation to application of Section 53A of the T.P Act... Pleadings are meant to give to each side, intimation of the case of the other, so that, it may be met to enable courts to determine what is really at issue between the parties. No relief can be granted to a party without the pleadings. Therefore, it is not open for the first defendant/appellant to claim the benefit available under Section 53A of the T.P. Act." Conclusion: The appeal was dismissed, affirming the lower court's decision.

Facts:

The New Okhla Industrial Development Authority (NOIDA) was constituted under section 3 of the U.P. Industrial Area Development Act, 1976. The issue before the court was whether NOIDA fits the definition of a "local authority" under section 10(20) of the Income Tax Act, 1961, as amended by the Finance Act, 2002, particularly considering its functions and structure under the said Act.

Issues:

Whether NOIDA qualifies as a "local authority" under the Income Tax Act, 1961, given its constitution and functions under the U.P. Industrial Area Development Act, 1976, and a notification specifying it as an "industrial township" under Article 243Q of the Constitution.

Held:

The court held that NOIDA does not meet the criteria of a "local authority" as defined under section 10(20) of the Income Tax Act, 1961. Despite performing certain municipal functions under the U.P. Industrial Area Development Act, 1976, NOIDA lacks the essential features of a Municipality as envisioned in Part IXA of the Constitution.

The notification issued by the Governor specifying NOIDA as an "industrial township" under Article 243Q does not equate it with a Municipality as defined in the Constitution. The purpose of the notification is to exempt NOIDA from constituting a Municipality, but it does not confer upon NOIDA the status of a Municipality as per Article 243P(e).

Decision: The appeals were dismissed, affirming that NOIDA does not qualify as a "local authority" under the Income Tax Act, 1961, and the notification designating it as an "industrial township" does not alter its status in relation to the definition of a Municipality under the Constitution.

Facts:

The New Okhla Industrial Development Authority and the Greater Noida Industrial Development Authority, along with other authorities and the Commissioner of Income Tax, appealed against a judgment by the Delhi High Court. The case involved the non-deduction of tax at source under Section 194-I of the Income Tax Act by a private limited company engaged in real estate activities, which had entered into a long-term lease with Greater Noida Industrial Development Authority.

Issues:

Whether Noida and Greater Noida are considered "local authorities" under Section 10(20) of the Income Tax Act.

Whether the income of Noida and Greater Noida is exempt from tax deduction at source under Section 194A(3)(iii)(f).

Whether the circular dated 30.01.1995 applies to exempt Noida and Greater Noida from tax deduction at source under Section 194-I.

Held:

The Court held that Noida and Greater Noida are not considered "local authorities" under Section 10(20) of the Income Tax Act, as amended by the Finance Act, 2002. The Court also affirmed that Noida's income is exempt under Section 194A(3)(iii)(f) by virtue of a notification. However, the circular dated 30.01.1995, which exempted government and certain statutory authorities from tax deduction at source, is not applicable due to subsequent amendments in the law.

In conclusion, the Court dismissed all appeals, upholding the Delhi High Court's judgment that tax deduction at source is applicable on lease rent payments to Greater Noida under Section 194-I of the Income Tax Act.

Facts:

Appellant lent a sum of Rs. 2,00,000 to the respondent for business purposes, with a promise of repayment within a month.

Respondent issued a post-dated cheque of Rs. 2,00,000 to the appellant, but it bounced twice due to insufficient funds.

After receiving a notice demanding payment, the respondent accused the appellant of stealing the cheque.

Issues:

Whether the High Court's decision to set aside the conviction under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 was justified.

Whether the presumption under Section 139 of the Act was correctly applied and rebutted.

Held:

The Supreme Court allowed the appeal filed by the appellant and set aside the High Court's judgment. The Court found that:

The High Court exceeded its revisional jurisdiction by setting aside the conviction.

The presumption under Section 139 of the Negotiable Instruments Act was rightly raised against the respondent, and the respondent failed to rebut this presumption with evidence.

Mere denial of the existence of debt or liability by the accused is insufficient to rebut the presumption. The Supreme Court restored the judgment of the trial court, affirming the conviction of the respondent.

Facts:

The Government of India, Ministry of Finance, decided to extend certain benefits to officers in service in the North Eastern Region, including Special (Duty) Allowance.

Respondents, pharmacists in CRPF, were posted in different places in India, including the North Eastern Region.

A letter dated 31.03.1987 extended the benefit of Special (Duty) Allowance to CRPF personnel posted in the North Eastern Region, provided their headquarters were in that region.

The respondents filed an application claiming the allowance but were denied due to their headquarters being outside the North Eastern Region.

An Office Memorandum dated 03.08.2005 clarified the allowance would be admissible to personnel actually working in the North East Region.

Issues:

Whether the respondents were entitled to Special (Duty) Allowance from the date of their posting in the North Eastern Region or only from 03.08.2005 when the Office Memorandum was issued.

Held:

The Court held that the purpose of granting Special (Duty) Allowance was to attract and retain competent officers in the North Eastern Region. The denial of this allowance to personnel posted in the region, but with headquarters outside, was found unjustified and against the purpose of the allowance. The classification made in the Government Order dated 31.03.1987, differentiating between personnel based on the location of their headquarters, did not pass the test of valid classification under Article 14 of the Constitution. Therefore, the subsequent clarification in the Office Memorandum dated 03.08.2005, allowing the allowance to all personnel posted in the North Eastern Region, irrespective of the location of their headquarters, was considered corrective of this error. The appeal was dismissed, upholding the judgment of the High Court, and directing the grant of Special (Duty) Allowance to the respondents for the period they were actually posted in the North Eastern Region.

Facts:

Devidas Loka Rathod, the appellant, was accused of assaulting individuals with a sickle, resulting in injuries and the death of one person. The trial court and the High Court rejected Rathod's defence of unsoundness of mind. The appellant appealed to the Supreme Court.

Issues:

Whether the appellant's defence of unsoundness of mind was valid.

Whether there were gaps in the prosecution's case regarding the appellant's mental state.

Whether the appellant was entitled to the benefit of the exception under Section 84 of the IPC.

Whether proper care and support should be provided to the appellant under Article 21 of the Constitution.

Held:

The Court examined the evidence and found gaps in the prosecution's case regarding the appellant's mental state. It concluded that there was sufficient doubt about the appellant's mental condition at the time of the offence based on medical evidence and other factors.

Therefore, the appellant was entitled to the benefit of the exception under Section 84 of the IPC. As a result, the Court acquitted the appellant of all charges and directed his release from custody.

Additionally, the Court emphasized the need to provide the appellant with proper care and support in accordance with his right to life under Article 21 of the Constitution.

Facts:

The petition under Article 32 of the Constitution challenged the appointment of the Central Vigilance Commissioner (CVC) and Vigilance Commissioner (VC) on grounds of alleged illegality and violation of principles of 'impeccable integrity' and 'institutional integrity'.

Allegations were made against the appointees regarding their conduct, including meetings with other officials, handling of specific cases, and accusations of fabricating/forging reports.

Issues:

Whether the appointments of the CVC and VC were influenced by extraneous considerations or made in breach of statutes or rules.

Whether the allegations against the appointees were substantiated and affected their integrity.

Held:

The court clarified that judicial review is limited to examining the integrity of the decision-making process. It can set aside decisions influenced by extraneous considerations or made in violation of statutes or rules. However, the court does not have the authority to interfere with the government's choice of appointees.

The court found the allegations against the CVC regarding meetings with other officials and handling of specific cases unsubstantiated. It noted that no wrongdoing or impropriety was found in the actions of the CVC.

Similarly, allegations against the VC regarding fabricating/forging reports were examined. The court found no formal findings against the VC in this regard and concluded that his integrity was not affected.

Emphasizing the importance of thoroughly examining complaints, the court stated that allegations alone cannot be taken as serious aspersions on integrity. It declined to interfere with the appointments based on the findings presented.

Decision: The court upheld the appointments of both the CVC and VC, concluding that the integrity of the decision-making process was not compromised, and no illegality was found in the appointments.