Facts:

The respondent, a retired Train Examiner from the Indian Railways, faced difficulties in obtaining his rightful pension for over 27 years.

Various office memoranda and policy resolutions by the Government of India regarding pension calculations led to confusion and disputes.

The Central Administrative Tribunal initially ruled in favor of the respondent, but the Madras High Court overturned this decision.

Issues:

Whether subsequent office memoranda override or complement earlier ones regarding pension entitlements.

Whether the respondent's post was re-designated as Junior Engineer Grade-II.

Held:

The Supreme Court reiterated the principles laid down in the case of K.S. Krishnaswamy vs. Union of India, emphasizing that subsequent office memoranda clarified and complemented earlier ones, rather than overriding them.

The Court found no evidence to support the claim of the respondent's post being re-designated as Junior Engineer Grade-II.

Therefore, the Court set aside the judgment of the Madras High Court and allowed the appeal filed by the Union of India.

Any payments made to the respondent were to be retained, and a copy of the order was to be sent to the Department of Personnel and Training of the Government of India.

Facts:

The State of Bihar appealed against the appointment of an arbitrator under Section 11(6) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, contending that the Bihar Public Works Contracts Arbitration Tribunal Act, 2008, excluded the application of the Central Act. The arbitration agreement between the parties specified the applicability of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996.

Issues:

Whether the Bihar Public Works Contracts Arbitration Tribunal Act, 2008, excludes the applicability of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996.

Whether Section 4(3)(b) of the Bihar Public Works Contracts Arbitration Tribunal Act, 2008, is constitutionally valid.

Held:

The Supreme Court held that since the arbitration agreement between the parties specified the applicability of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, the Bihar Public Works Contracts Arbitration Tribunal Act, 2008, would not apply. Therefore, there was no ground to interfere with the appointment of the arbitrator under the Central Act.

The Court declared Section 4(3)(b) of the Bihar Public Works Contracts Arbitration Tribunal Act, 2008, unconstitutional as it allowed the termination of the Chairman and other members of the Arbitration Tribunal at the pleasure of the Government, which was inconsistent with Article 14 of the Constitution.

Facts:

The case arose from a dispute in the execution of a works contract, referred to an arbitrator by the High Court. The arbitrator issued an award in favor of the appellant. The respondent challenged the award under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. The respondent sought to amend its objections after three years, initially rejected by the trial court but later allowed by the High Court.

Issues:

Whether objections to jurisdiction can be raised under Section 34 of the Act, even if not raised under Section 16, and the permissibility of amendments to objections beyond the period of limitation.

Held:

The Court held that objections to jurisdiction could be raised under Section 34 of the Act, even if not raised under Section 16. The court disagreed with certain observations made in M/s MSP Infrastructure Ltd. vs. Madhya Pradesh Road Development Corporation Ltd., particularly regarding the interpretation of the phrase "public policy of India" and the jurisdiction of the tribunal. As the amendment application was not pressed, the appeal was rendered infructuous, and the impugned order was set aside. The matter was directed to be taken up by the trial court for consideration of objections under Section 34 of the Act.

The court left it open for the respondents to argue that their objection regarding the exclusion of the Act by the M.P. Madhyastham Adhikaran Adhiniyam, 1983 could be raised even without formal pleading, as it was a legal plea. The appellant was also allowed to argue to the contrary.

Facts:

The incident occurred on March 25, 1993, involving the shooting of the deceased by the respondents.

The prosecution's case relied primarily on the testimonies of three witnesses: Naresh Pal (PW1), Dharmendra (PW2), and Prakashee (PW3), the complainant, an eyewitness, and the deceased's wife, respectively.

The High Court acquitted the respondents, finding the prosecution witnesses not credible, leading to the appeal by the State of Uttar Pradesh.

Issues:

The credibility of prosecution witnesses.

Whether the prosecution proved guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

Held:

The Court concurred with the High Court's assessment that the prosecution had failed to establish the guilt of the accused beyond a reasonable doubt.

Various inconsistencies and discrepancies in the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses were noted, including contradictions, lack of plausible explanations for their presence at the scene, and suspicious conduct. The failure to present crucial witnesses further weakened the prosecution's case.

Therefore, the appeal filed by the State of Uttar Pradesh was dismissed, affirming the acquittal of the respondents.

Facts:

The appellant participated in an auction held on 14th February 2013.

He deposited earnest money and part of the auction amount.

Eventually, he deposited the remaining 75% within 15 days of the confirmation of sale.

The auction was challenged, leading to litigation.

Issues:

Whether the 15-day period for depositing the remaining 75% started from the date of communication of confirmation of sale or from the date of the auction.

Held:

The court analyzed Rule 9 of the 2002 Rules and concluded that the 15-day period for depositing the remaining amount starts from the date of confirmation, not from the date of the auction. Various provisions of Rule 9 indicated that the deposit of the remaining amount is to be made after confirmation of sale by the secured creditor. Therefore, the auction purchaser had complied with the provisions of Rule 9 by depositing the remaining 75% within 15 days of the confirmation of sale.

The court allowed the appeal, set aside the impugned orders, and directed the delivery of possession in accordance with the law.

Facts:

The appellant challenged the election of respondent no.1 by filing an election petition before the High Court, alleging various violations of instructions issued by the Election Commission and provisions of the Representation of People Act. Respondent no.1 filed two applications seeking to strike out certain paragraphs of the election petition and to dismiss the petition in limine. The High Court allowed both applications.

Issues:

Whether the High Court's approach in considering the applications was correct.

Whether the election petition disclosed a cause of action.

Whether the paragraphs sought to be struck out contained material facts.

Whether the High Court erred in its analysis of the contents of certain paragraphs of the election petition.

Whether the applications filed by respondent no.1 should be rejected and the Election Petition restored for further proceedings.

Held:

The High Court's approach in considering the applications was erroneous as it ventured into analyzing the matter on its merits, which was prohibited at that stage.

The election petition should be read as a whole, and it cannot be dissected sentence-wise or paragraph-wise to rule out the disclosure of a cause of action.

The High Court misdirected itself in concluding that the election petition did not disclose any cause of action. The pleadings should contain all necessary details and particulars as required by law.

The averments made in the paragraphs of the election petition were not frivolous and vexatious, and the High Court erred in analyzing their tenability on merits.

The High Court's analysis of the contents of certain paragraphs of the election petition was incorrect. Those paragraphs disclosed material facts necessary for adjudicating the grounds for declaring the election void.

Both applications filed by respondent no.1 were to be rejected, and the Election Petition was to be restored to the file of the High Court for further proceedings. Similarly, the applications filed by the appellant were to be restored for decision by the High Court.

Facts:

Respondent no. 2, a government employee belonging to the Scheduled Caste, filed an FIR in 2006 against two senior officers (non-Scheduled Caste) for making adverse entries in his Annual Confidential Report. The appellant, in 2011, refused sanction to proceed against the senior officers. Subsequently, in 2016, respondent no. 2 lodged another FIR against the appellant. The appellant sought quashing of the proceedings, which was rejected by the High Court.

Issues:

Whether there is an absolute bar against the grant of anticipatory bail in cases under the Atrocities Act.

Whether procedural safeguards are necessary to prevent false implications and arrests under the Act.

Whether the exclusion of anticipatory bail applies only to genuine cases and not to those where no prima facie case is made out or the allegations are patently false or mala fide.

Held:

The court affirmed its jurisdiction to issue appropriate orders or directions for the enforcement of fundamental rights, emphasizing the need to uphold constitutional values. It reiterated the importance of protecting rights guaranteed under Articles 14, 19, and 21 of the Constitution. Para (31, 32)

The court highlighted the objective of the Atrocities Act to prevent atrocities against marginalized communities and promote constitutional values of fraternity and integration. It emphasized the need to prevent perpetuating casteism and stressed the importance of interpreting the Act in a manner that promotes these values. Para (42, 49, 52)

The court ruled that exclusion of anticipatory bail under Section 18 of the Atrocities Act applies only to genuine cases and not to those where no prima facie case is made out or the allegations are patently false or mala fide. It advocated for a purposive interpretation of the law to achieve its objective and emphasized the principle of proportionality. Para (53, 56, 60)

The court underscored the importance of safeguards against false implications and arrests under the Atrocities Act. It directed that arrest of a public servant requires written permission from the appointing authority, and for non-public servants, permission from the Senior Superintendent of Police (S.S.P.) is necessary. Preliminary inquiries must also be conducted before registering an FIR to prevent frivolous or motivated cases. Para (64, 67, 75)

The court concluded that the proceedings against the appellant were liable to be quashed as they amounted to an abuse of the process of the court. Para (82)

Conclusion: The court quashed the proceedings against the appellant. It clarified that there is no absolute bar against anticipatory bail under the Atrocities Act. Procedural safeguards, including permissions for arrest and preliminary inquiries, are necessary to prevent false implications and arrests. The exclusion of anticipatory bail applies only to genuine cases under the Act. The directions provided by the court are prospective.

Facts:

The case involved allegations of conspiracy and financial fraud against the appellant, who was one of the Chief Executive Trustees of a charitable trust in Kerala.

Two FIRs were filed in relation to the same incident - one by a trustee of the trust against the appellant and others, and another by the appellant against respondent No. 3.

The High Court quashed the FIR filed by the appellant, leading to the appeal before the Supreme Court.

Issues:

Whether the subsequent FIR filed against the same accused for the same incident could be quashed.

Whether the High Court's decision to quash the FIR was justified.

Held:

The Supreme Court held that the High Court had committed a jurisdictional error in quashing the subsequent FIR without properly considering the law on the subject. The court referred to previous judgments, including Upkar Singh vs. Ved Prakash and Surender Kaushik vs. State of U.P., which established that while two FIRs for the same incident are generally not permissible, a counter-complaint against one of the accused in the first FIR is legally maintainable and can be tried on its merits.

The court emphasized the importance of considering the specific circumstances of each case before applying general legal principles.

Therefore, the appeal was allowed, setting aside the High Court's order. The trial was directed to proceed on merits, free from any influence from the Supreme Court's observations, and to be completed within a year.

Facts:

The case pertains to the inadequate implementation of the BOCW Act and the Cess Act by the State Governments and Union Territory Administrations (UTAs), despite the enactment of these laws aimed at safeguarding the rights and welfare of construction workers.

Issues:

The failure of the State Governments and UTAs to effectively implement the BOCW Act and the Cess Act, thereby denying construction workers their entitlements and benefits under these legislations.

Held:

The BOCW Act and the Cess Act are considered social justice legislations, enacted to uphold the Directive Principles of State Policy outlined in the Constitution, particularly Articles 39 and 42, which focus on the health, strength, and just and humane conditions of work for workers. Additionally, Article 21 guarantees the fundamental right to a life of dignity for all individuals, including construction workers. (Para 63)

Despite the enactment of laws and directions issued by the government and the court, there has been a lack of substantive change in the condition of construction workers due to the disregard and apathy of State Governments and UTAs. This failure amounts to exploitation of construction workers and reflects a dire need for effective implementation of legislations aimed at their welfare. (Para 64)

Specific directions are issued to strengthen the registration machinery for establishments and construction workers, establish and strengthen machinery for cess collection, frame a comprehensive Model Scheme for the benefit of construction workers, and conduct a social audit on the implementation of the BOCW Act for better future enforcement. (Paras 68, 69, 71, 76)

General directions include the constitution of State Advisory Committees, Expert Committees, appointment of Registering Officers, establishment of Welfare Boards and Funds, issuance of identity cards to construction workers, and extending benefits under various labor laws. (Para 78)

The Union of India is directed to take proactive measures for the management and utilization of cess collected for the welfare of construction workers, ensuring their entitlements are not unjustly deprived. (Para 79)