Facts:

The dispute concerned 14 acres of land in Thenkara Village of Mannarghat Taluk in Kerala.

The respondents claimed ownership of the land, which was part of a larger parcel purchased jointly by their family members.

The State contended that the land should vest in the government under the Kerala Private Forests Act, 1971.

The respondents sought exemption from the Act's provisions, citing their intention to cultivate the land for personal use.

Issues:

Whether the respondents are entitled to exemption under Section 3(3) of the Kerala Private Forests Act, 1971.

Interpretation of the expression "intended for cultivation by him" as mentioned in Section 3(3) of the Act.

Held:

The Tribunal's decision to grant exemption to the respondents was based on factual evidence and proper interpretation of the law.

The intention to cultivate the land by the owners, as required by Section 3(3) of the Act, should be inferred from their conduct, including pre- and post-vesting activities.

The High Court's dismissal of the State's appeal was justified as the Tribunal's findings were supported by documentary evidence and were not deemed perverse or illegal.

The appeal filed by the State was dismissed, affirming the exemption granted to the respondents from the vesting of their land in the government under the Kerala Private Forests Act, 1971.

Facts:

The appeal was filed by the State against the judgment and order dated 10.08.2007 passed by the Division Bench of the High Court of Kerala at Ernakulam in M.F.A. No.297 of 2001.

The High Court had allowed the MFA filed by the respondents (landowners) and set aside the order of the Forest Tribunal.

Issues:

The interpretation of relevant provisions of the Kerala Private Forests (Vesting and Assignment) Act, 1971.

Examination of issues concerning the respondents' land, including the timing and manner of acquisition, and whether it was used for personal cultivation by the respondents.

Held:

The interpretation of relevant provisions of the Kerala Private Forests (Vesting and Assignment) Act, 1971 had already been addressed in detail in the order passed in Civil Appeal No.9912/2010, which was applicable to this case as well.

The High Court had examined issues concerning the respondents' land, including the timing and manner of acquisition, and whether it was used for personal cultivation by the respondents. The High Court's findings favored the respondents, based on the commissioner's report and on-the-spot inspection of the land.

These findings were considered to be based on proper evidence appreciation and in accordance with the law laid down by the Supreme Court in Joseph & Anr. vs. State of Kerala & Anr., (2007) 10 SCC 414. As a result, the respondents were entitled to claim exemption of their land from being vested in the State under the Act.

Consequently, the Supreme Court found no merit in the appeal and dismissed it accordingly.

Facts:

The case pertains to the procedure followed for constituting the Standing Committee and electing its Chairman under the Maharashtra Municipal Corporation Act, 1949. The process was disrupted due to the imposition of a 'code of conduct', delaying the necessary steps outlined in the Act.

Issues:

Whether the actions taken for constituting the Standing Committee and electing its Chairman adhered to the mandatory provisions of the Maharashtra Municipal Corporation Act, 1949, considering the disruption caused by the 'code of conduct'.

Held:

The High Court ruled that the Standing Committee as in existence before May 2, 2018, should have taken all necessary steps and decisions. However, there was a clear violation of the mandatory provisions of the Act and non-adherence to prescribed timelines.

The failure to comply with the steps required before the imposition of the 'code of conduct' led to deviations from the prescribed timeline. However, the actions taken, though irregular, were a result of the urgent situation and followed the mandate of the Act.

Despite the irregularity, the actions did not result in the deprivation of any rights under the statute. Even if the same actions were to be undertaken after court intervention, the outcome would not substantially differ.

Facts:

The appellant and the respondent got married in 2002, but their relationship deteriorated soon after.

The appellant filed a complaint against the respondent and her in-laws.

She also filed an application under Section 125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure seeking maintenance.

The Family Court initially granted maintenance, but the High Court later modified the amount.

The appellant appealed to the Supreme Court, challenging the quantum of maintenance determined by the High Court.

Issues:

The determination of the quantum of monthly maintenance payable by the respondent to the appellant.

The appellant contested the amount determined by the High Court, arguing that certain factors were overlooked.

Held:

The Supreme Court upheld the findings of both the Family Court and the High Court regarding the respondent's obligation to maintain the appellant.

However, the Court disagreed with the method used by the High Court to determine the quantum of maintenance.

Instead of basing the maintenance amount on the minimum wage in Delhi, the Court considered factors such as the living standard of the respondent and his family, his past conduct in prolonging the legal proceedings, and his previous income.

Taking into account these factors and the increased cost of living, the Court ordered the respondent to pay Rs. 20,000/- per month as maintenance from January 2010, and Rs. 25,000/- per month from June 1, 2018, until further orders.

Facts:

The case concerned a writ petition challenging the court's authority to issue a mandamus to Parliament to enact legislation to prevent individuals facing serious criminal charges from contesting elections. Additionally, it questioned whether the court could direct the Election Commission to control party discipline by disallowing candidates with criminal antecedents from contesting with party symbols.

Issues:

Whether the court had the jurisdiction to mandate Parliament to enact laws preventing individuals facing serious criminal charges from contesting elections.

Whether the court could direct the Election Commission to control party discipline by disallowing candidates with criminal antecedents from contesting with party symbols.

Held:

The court affirmed that criminalization in politics was a well-known phenomenon in India, with significant implications for democracy.

It was recognized that the Election Commission had been aware of the issue of criminalization in politics since 1998, and various recommendations had been made, although no legislative action had been taken.

The court emphasized that Parliament had the exclusive power to lay down disqualification criteria for membership, as specified in the Constitution and relevant sections of the Representation of the People Act, 1951.

The court clarified that the judiciary could not legislate or add new grounds for disqualification beyond what was specified by the legislature.

While the Election Commission had powers to supervise elections, it must operate within the framework of laws enacted by Parliament.

Directing the Election Commission to disallow candidates with criminal charges from contesting with party symbols would exceed its constitutional mandate.

The court stressed the importance of voters having access to information about candidates' criminal backgrounds and directed candidates and political parties to disclose such information publicly.

The court recommended that Parliament enact legislation to prevent individuals facing serious criminal charges from entering politics, acknowledging the possibility of false cases but suggesting that Parliament address this through appropriate legislation.

Facts:

The case originated from concerns raised by a former Chief Justice of India regarding inhumane conditions in prisons, including overcrowding, unnatural deaths of prisoners, inadequacy of staff, and lack of training for staff. The State initially resisted the petition but later acknowledged the need for reforms.

Issues:

The Court was tasked with addressing the inhumane conditions prevailing in prisons and the necessity for reforms in prison administration to uphold prisoners' rights under Article 21 of the Constitution.

Held:

The Court directed the Ministry of Home Affairs to constitute a Supreme Court Committee on Prison Reforms. The committee was tasked with reviewing various aspects related to prison reforms, including implementation of guidelines, training of prison personnel, conditions of women prisoners, overcrowding, violence prevention, staff inadequacy, establishment of open prisons, and the well-being of children in conflict with the law.

The Court emphasized the significance of public interest litigation (PIL) in addressing social issues and ensuring accountability. It appreciated the efforts of the Amicus Curiae in assisting the case and making valuable suggestions for the recognition and implementation of prisoners' human rights.

Facts:

Navin Kumar Singh, a Chemical Engineer, was initially appointed in E-2 Grade at Dankuni Coal Complex (DCC), a unit of Coal India Ltd.

Singh requested a transfer to Central Mine Planning and Design Institute Limited (CMPDIL), another subsidiary of Coal India Ltd., which was approved.

Company policy stated that employees who requested inter-company transfers for personal reasons would lose their past seniority in the previous company.

Singh was denied promotion to the E-3 Grade at CMPDIL, as his service at DCC was not considered.

Singh challenged this decision in court, arguing that his service at DCC should be counted for determining his eligibility for promotion.

Issues:

Whether the past service of Navin Kumar Singh at DCC should be considered for determining his eligibility for promotion to the E-3 Grade at CMPDIL despite the inter-company transfer.

Held:

The Supreme Court held that Navin Kumar Singh's past service at DCC should indeed be considered for determining his eligibility for promotion to the E-3 Grade at CMPDIL, despite the inter-company transfer policy. The Court concluded that while the policy stated that seniority would be lost in the new company upon transfer, it did not explicitly address the exclusion of past service for all purposes. Therefore, Singh's past service should be counted for eligibility for promotion, even though his seniority in CMPDIL would start from the date of his joining there.

The Court further clarified that the Office Memorandum dated 5th June, 1985, which addressed issues related to inter-company transfers, did not hinder Singh's claim. The memorandum aimed to ensure fair treatment for transferred employees in terms of promotion opportunities but did not affect the length of service.

Accordingly, the appeals filed by Coal India Ltd were dismissed, affirming the decision of the High Court to grant Singh notional seniority and eligibility for promotion based on his past service at DCC.

Facts:

Biswajit Sukul, the appellant, filed a civil suit against Deo Chand Sarda and others claiming arrears of rent and eviction from a shop in Silchar Town.

The suit was filed under the provisions of the Assam Urban Areas Rent Control Act.

The Trial Court dismissed the suit, but certain issues were decided in favor of the plaintiff.

The First Appellate Court and the High Court affirmed the Trial Court's decision.

Issues:

Whether the First Appellate Court had the authority to examine issues that were not challenged by the defendants.

Whether the High Court overlooked the errors committed by the First Appellate Court.

Held:

The First Appellate Court erred in examining issues not challenged by the defendants, and the High Court failed to correct this error.

The case was remanded to the First Appellate Court to reconsider the plaintiff's appeal on its merits, focusing only on the issues decided against the plaintiff by the Trial Court.

Defendants were not allowed to file cross objections at this stage since they did not do so earlier.

The First Appellate Court was directed to decide the plaintiff's appeal within six months without being influenced by any observations made by the Supreme Court.

Facts:

The petitioner filed a writ petition seeking a direction to debar legislators from practicing as advocates while serving as Members of Parliament or State Legislatures.

The petitioner argued that Rule 49 of the Bar Council of India Rules imposes a restriction on advocates from taking up other employment.

Issues:

Whether Rule 49 of the Bar Council of India Rules applies to legislators who are also practicing advocates.

Whether there is any provision in the Advocates Act, 1961, or its rules restricting legislators from practicing law during their tenure.

Held:

The court held that Rule 49 of the Bar Council of India Rules applies to advocates who are full-time salaried employees of specific entities, and since legislators cannot be characterized as such, this rule cannot be applied to them.

The court further held that there is no express provision in the Advocates Act, 1961, or its rules restricting legislators from practicing law during their tenure. Therefore, the court cannot debar elected representatives from practicing as advocates.

It was emphasized that legislators occupy a unique position as elected representatives and are not appointed or employed by any specific entity. Their powers and privileges are defined by the Constitution, and their receipt of salary and allowances does not create an employer-employee relationship with the government.

The court reiterated that there is no professional misconduct solely based on a legislator being an elected representative. It is for the competent authority to decide such matters. Additionally, the power of legislators to move impeachment motions against judges does not per se result in a conflict of interest.

Decision: The court dismissed the writ petition, stating that the relief sought by the petitioner lacked merit. The Bar Council of India had clarified that being legislators is not a disqualification to practice law, and no rule had been framed to restrict them from doing so. Therefore, the court found no basis to debar legislators from practicing as advocates during their tenure.