Facts:

The dispute involves a lease premises of a partnership firm named "Ramnath Anant Kesarkar" in Margao.

Appellant no. 1 and respondent nos. 1 & 3 are siblings.

Parents of the parties succeeded to the lease premises through a Deed of Partition dated 29.03.1976.

After the demise of the parents, the brother initiated Regular Inventory Proceedings in 2013, excluding the "lease premises" from the list of assets.

Appellants objected, asserting the right of a married daughter to succeed in the lease premises.

Issues:

Whether a married daughter has the right of succession in the lease premises under the Goa Rent Act, Portuguese Civil Code, and Inventory Proceeding Act, 2012?

Whether the exclusion of the "lease premises" from the list of assets in the inventory proceedings is valid?

Held:

The courts below erred in relying on the Goa Rent Act, irrelevant to the succession issue.

Both the Portuguese Civil Code and the Inventory Proceeding Act, 2012, make no gender-based distinction regarding the right of succession.

Section 399 of the Inventory Proceeding Act, 2012, encompasses immovable assets, including leases.

Section 446 allows amendment of partition, even after it becomes final, rectifying mistakes in the list of assets.

The right of the appellants to challenge the exclusion of the "lease premises" persists, notwithstanding the final order.

The appeal succeeds; the impugned orders are quashed. Appellant no. 1, a married daughter, has the right of succession in the "lease premises," which should be included in the inventory proceedings. The final order of partition may be amended with the aid of Section 446 of the Inventory Proceeding Act, 2012. No costs are awarded.

FACTS:

Jyoti Sharma committed suicide by consuming poison.

Dying declaration recorded stating harassment by the Respondent, alleging molestation and termination from employment.

Allegation of fraudulent loan in the name of the deceased and subsequent altercations.

ISSUES:

Validity of the charges framed against the Respondent.

High Court's decision to discharge the Respondent.

HELD:

The appeal arises from the High Court's judgment discharging the Respondent.

Charges were framed against the Respondent under Section 306 of IPC and Section 3(2)(V) of the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989.

Dying declaration points to harassment, molestation, and termination from employment by the Respondent.

Several complaints were filed by the deceased, including a recent one before her suicide.

Allegation of fraudulent loan in the name of the deceased and subsequent altercations between the Respondent and the deceased.

The High Court, in discharging the Respondent, relied on the absence of evidence regarding provocation, incitement, or encouragement for suicide.

Court refers to Amit Kapoor v Ramesh Chander, emphasizing limited revisional jurisdiction, stating that it should only be exercised in exceptional cases where there is a gross error.

Principles outlined for exercising revisional jurisdiction: no meticulous examination needed, interference only if there is a gross error, and the court is not to examine facts, evidence, and materials on record to determine sufficiency.

Refers to Chitresh Kumar Chopra v. State (NCT of Delhi) to establish the ingredients of the offence of abetment of suicide, emphasizing the need for mens rea.

Cites Rajbir Singh v State of U.P., highlighting the purpose of framing charges is not to ascertain guilt but to establish a strong suspicion of the accused committing the offence.

The High Court's decision to discharge the accused was not justified; it ignored material emerging during the investigation.

Material indicates multiple complaints by the deceased, alleged fraudulent loan, and actions leading to harassment and termination.

The judgment clarifies that it doesn't affect the merits of the trial.

REFERRED CASES:

Amit Kapoor v Ramesh Chander, (2012) 9 SCC 460

Chitresh Kumar Chopra v. State (NCT of Delhi), (2009) 16 SCC 605

Rajbir Singh v State of U.P., (2006) 4 SCC 51

Ramesh Kumar, (2001) 9 SCC 618 : 2002 SCC (Cri) 1088

State of Rajasthan v Fatehkaran Mehdu, (2017) 3 SCC 198

Facts:

The respondent, Lehna Singh (original plaintiff), filed a suit for perpetual injunction against the appellants (original defendants), claiming ownership and possession of a disputed land. The defendants contested, asserting a will in their favor executed by the deceased Bhagwan Singh. The Trial Court found in favor of the plaintiff, but the First Appellate Court reversed the decision. The High Court, in a second appeal, set aside the First Appellate Court's judgment and reinstated the Trial Court's decree.

Issues:

Jurisdiction of the High Court in a second appeal under Section 100 CPC.

Whether the High Court can re-appreciate evidence in a second appeal.

Validity of the Will in favor of defendants.

Held:

The Trial Court held the Will surrounded by suspicious circumstances, while the First Appellate Court, through re-appreciation of evidence, deemed it genuine. The High Court, in a second appeal, exceeded its jurisdiction by re-evaluating the evidence. The Court refers to the limitations under Section 100 CPC, emphasizing that the High Court's interference is only permissible if substantial questions of law are involved.( Para 13)

The High Court's interference with the First Appellate Court's findings on the Will, which were based on a proper appreciation of evidence, was unwarranted. The Court cites Kondiba Dagadu Kadam to assert that the High Court cannot substitute its opinion unless the findings are contrary to law or based on inadmissible evidence.( Para 15)

The substantial questions of law framed by the High Court are deemed inadequate and irrelevant. The Court reiterates the importance of adhering to the limits set by Section 100 CPC.( Para 15.1)

Quoting Madamanchi Ramappa v. Muthaluru Bojappa, the Court emphasizes the duty to intervene when the High Court contravenes the limits prescribed by Section 100 CPC.( Para 16)

The appeal is allowed, the High Court's judgment is set aside, and the First Appellate Court's judgment is reinstated. The plaintiff's suit is dismissed.( Para 17)

Facts:

Respondent obtained a Shipment Policy valid until 31 July 2002.

Approval granted by ECGC for covering shipments to SICOREP.

Buyer's bank changed from Credit Lyonnais to BHCI.

BHCI released documents without buyer's acceptance, leading to non-payment.

First respondent unable to pay own banker (PNB), who claimed under its policy.

ECGC made provisional payment to PNB, later rejecting the first respondent's claim.

State Commission and National Commission ruled against ECGC, stating it admitted liability by honoring commitment to PNB.

ECGC appealed, claiming exclusion due to the default of the collecting bank.

Issues:

Whether ECGC is liable for the loss arising from the buyer's non-payment due to the change in the nominated bank.

Whether honoring the commitment to PNB under a different policy constitutes an admission of liability to the first respondent.

Held:

Court invokes Article 142, directing no recoveries from the first respondent.

Loss attributed to the buyer's actions, and no evidence of first respondent's complicity.

ECGC not liable under the exclusionary provision as the collecting bank defaulted.

Honoring commitment to PNB under a different policy doesn't imply liability to the first respondent.

Appeal allowed, setting aside the National Commission's judgment.

Facts:

Advocate 'MN' representing the petitioners attempted to browbeat and insult Judges of the Supreme Court. This was not the first instance of such behavior by the advocate, with a history of similar conduct before Tribunals and the Bombay High Court.

Issues:

Contemptuous behavior by Advocate 'MN' and the need for appropriate punishment.

Legitimacy of the writ petition seeking a second review of the judgment.

Held:

When contempt is committed in the face of the Court, judges are empowered to take stern action. Referring to Sukhdev Singh Sodhi v. Chief Justice S. Teja Singh, the Court emphasized the authority to address contempt, especially when a judge is personally attacked.( Paragraph 9)

In Leila David (2) v. State of Maharashtra, differing views on summarily dealing with contempt in the face of the Court were resolved in Leila David (6) v. State of Maharashtra. It was established that summary action, without notice, is within the Court's duty. Pasayat, J.'s perspective was affirmed.( Paragraph 10)

Contemptuous conduct deserves severe punishment. Although the Court could have imposed punishment in the order, in the interest of justice, a notice was issued to Advocate 'MN' to determine the appropriate punishment for committing contempt.( Paragraph 13)

Regarding the writ petition seeking a second review, it was held that it is barred by Order XLVII, Rule 5 of the Supreme Court Rules, 2013. Additionally, Article 32 petitions do not lie against the judgment of the Supreme Court. Section 16(2) of the Advocates Act, 1961 was affirmed as constitutional, stating that the designation of Senior Advocate is not an absolute right.( Paragraph 15)

Decision: The Court dismissed the writ petition, emphasizing the severity of contemptuous behavior and reserving the determination of the punishment for Advocate 'MN' for a later stage.

Facts:

The appellant, Mukesh Chand, a consumer of electricity, faced allegations of power theft by BSES Rajdhani Power Limited (BSES). BSES filed an FIR under Section 135 of the Electricity Act, 2003, and sent a bill to the appellant. The parties later settled the matter in a Lok Adalat, wherein BSES agreed to withdraw all cases against the appellant.

Issues:

The compounding of the offense of power theft in accordance with the settlement reached in the Lok Adalat, particularly considering Section 152 of the Electricity Act, 2003.

Held:

The appellant filed a petition under Section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code in the High Court seeking the quashing of the FIR. The High Court dismissed the petition without considering Section 152 of the Electricity Act.

The Lok Adalat settlement played a crucial role, as condition (iii) stated that BSES agreed to withdraw all cases against the appellant.

The court, after hearing arguments, allowed the appeals and set aside the impugned order. The case was remanded to the High Court for a fresh examination, emphasizing the importance of considering Section 152 of the Electricity Act in the context of compounding offenses.

The court clarified that it had not applied its mind to the merits of the case and directed the High Court to decide the matter strictly in accordance with the law, uninfluenced by any observations made in their order.

Final Result: Allowed

Facts:

The respondent filed a civil suit against the appellants (HUDA) claiming a decree for declaration with consequential relief.

The trial court decreed the suit, and the first appellate court affirmed the judgment.

HUDA filed a second appeal in the High Court, which was barred by 1942 days, leading to an application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act to condone the delay.

The High Court rejected the application, holding the cause pleaded by HUDA insufficient, resulting in the dismissal of the second appeal.

Issues:

Whether the delay in filing the second appeal was justifiable.

Whether the grounds presented for condonation constituted a sufficient cause.

Held:

The delay of 1942 days was inordinate, not properly explained, and the grounds under Section 5 of the Limitation Act were deemed insufficient.The appellant-HUDA, being a statutory authority with a legal department, was expected to handle legal matters diligently.The duty of the officers-in-charge of the legal cell to promptly file the appeal was emphasized.( Para 14-15)

The appellant-HUDA failed to discharge its duty with due diligence despite having all facilities and infrastructure.Officers-in-charge should be held accountable for the lapse, making good the loss suffered by HUDA.The delay could not be justified by the alleged inaction of the lawyer, and the duty to ensure timely filing rested with HUDA.( Para 16-20)

The delay of 1942 days was deemed wholly inordinate, and the explanation provided did not constitute a sufficient cause under Section 5 of the Limitation Act.The High Court's decision to not condone the delay was upheld, and the appeals were dismissed.( Para 21-22)

Facts:

The State of U.P. referred an industrial dispute to the Industrial Tribunal to decide the legality and correctness of the termination order of the appellant (workman).

The Industrial Tribunal awarded in favor of the appellant, directing reinstatement with back wages.

The employer filed a writ petition in the High Court challenging the award.

The High Court allowed the writ petition, setting aside the Industrial Tribunal's award.

The appellant filed a review petition, which was also dismissed by the High Court.

The appellant appealed to the Supreme Court against the High Court's orders.

Issues:

Whether the High Court was justified in setting aside the award of the Industrial Tribunal, specifically regarding the continuous service of the appellant with the employer.

Held:

The Court found no merit in the appeals.

The main question was whether the appellant was in continuous service for one year with the employer, as required under Section 6-N of the U.P. Industrial Disputes Act.

The Court held that it cannot examine this factual question de novo, as it was a finding of fact already determined by the High Court.

The decision in Sriram Industrial Enterprises Ltd. vs. Mahak Singh & Ors. was cited but deemed distinguishable on facts.

The High Court's order to not recover the substantial amount already paid to the appellant during the litigation was upheld.

The Court affirmed that proceedings under Section 17-B of the ID Act are independent and not dependent on the final order in the main proceedings.

The employer, even if successful in upholding the termination, cannot recover the amount paid during the proceedings.

The appeals were dismissed.