Facts:

Biswajit Sukul, the appellant, filed a civil suit against Deo Chand Sarda and others claiming arrears of rent and eviction from a shop in Silchar Town.

The suit was filed under the provisions of the Assam Urban Areas Rent Control Act.

The Trial Court dismissed the suit, but certain issues were decided in favor of the plaintiff.

The First Appellate Court and the High Court affirmed the Trial Court's decision.

Issues:

Whether the First Appellate Court had the authority to examine issues that were not challenged by the defendants.

Whether the High Court overlooked the errors committed by the First Appellate Court.

Held:

The First Appellate Court erred in examining issues not challenged by the defendants, and the High Court failed to correct this error.

The case was remanded to the First Appellate Court to reconsider the plaintiff's appeal on its merits, focusing only on the issues decided against the plaintiff by the Trial Court.

Defendants were not allowed to file cross objections at this stage since they did not do so earlier.

The First Appellate Court was directed to decide the plaintiff's appeal within six months without being influenced by any observations made by the Supreme Court.

Facts:

The petitioner filed a writ petition seeking a direction to debar legislators from practicing as advocates while serving as Members of Parliament or State Legislatures.

The petitioner argued that Rule 49 of the Bar Council of India Rules imposes a restriction on advocates from taking up other employment.

Issues:

Whether Rule 49 of the Bar Council of India Rules applies to legislators who are also practicing advocates.

Whether there is any provision in the Advocates Act, 1961, or its rules restricting legislators from practicing law during their tenure.

Held:

The court held that Rule 49 of the Bar Council of India Rules applies to advocates who are full-time salaried employees of specific entities, and since legislators cannot be characterized as such, this rule cannot be applied to them.

The court further held that there is no express provision in the Advocates Act, 1961, or its rules restricting legislators from practicing law during their tenure. Therefore, the court cannot debar elected representatives from practicing as advocates.

It was emphasized that legislators occupy a unique position as elected representatives and are not appointed or employed by any specific entity. Their powers and privileges are defined by the Constitution, and their receipt of salary and allowances does not create an employer-employee relationship with the government.

The court reiterated that there is no professional misconduct solely based on a legislator being an elected representative. It is for the competent authority to decide such matters. Additionally, the power of legislators to move impeachment motions against judges does not per se result in a conflict of interest.

Decision: The court dismissed the writ petition, stating that the relief sought by the petitioner lacked merit. The Bar Council of India had clarified that being legislators is not a disqualification to practice law, and no rule had been framed to restrict them from doing so. Therefore, the court found no basis to debar legislators from practicing as advocates during their tenure.

Facts:

The appellant, Ambadevi Sanstha, a registered Public Trust under the Bombay Public Trusts Act, 1950, appealed against judgments and orders of the High Court of Judicature at Bombay, which confirmed the sale order passed by the Joint Charity Commissioner.

The Trust had applied for permission to sell its properties, which was granted by the Joint Charity Commissioner despite objections raised by some trustees and prospective purchasers.

Several irregularities were found in the sale process, including the lack of proper valuation of the properties, failure to fix reserve prices, and acceptance of earnest money before obtaining permission for sale.

Issues:

Whether the sale order passed by the Joint Charity Commissioner was valid and in accordance with the law.

Whether the sale transactions involving public trust properties were conducted in the best interest of the trust and in compliance with legal procedures.

Held:

The Court emphasized the importance of protecting the interest, benefit, and protection of the trust when considering the sale of its properties.

It reiterated that the Charity Commissioner must be objectively satisfied that the sale is necessary for the public trust.

Several irregularities were found in the sale process, including the lack of proper valuation of the properties, failure to fix reserve prices, and acceptance of earnest money before obtaining permission for sale.

The Court annulled the sale transactions and directed the Trust to protect its properties in the future.

It ordered the restoration of possession of the properties to the Trust, emphasizing that the purchasers were not entitled to retain possession as they had enjoyed the properties for an extended period under an illegal sale.

Facts:

The dispute arose over whether the Respondent-Jagirdar or his legal representatives were entitled to claim compensation for land acquisition after the abolition of jagirs by the Abolition Act, 1953. The land had already vested in the State, was not under personal cultivation, and the respondents had received compensation under the Abolition Act and the Ceiling Act, 1972.

Issues:

Whether the Respondent-Jagirdar or his legal representatives were entitled to claim compensation under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, after the land had vested in the State and compensation had been received under other statutes.

Whether the actions of the respondent in claiming compensation under multiple statutes constituted an abuse of the legal process.

Held:

The Court found that the disputed land had been declared surplus and compensation had been received under the Ceiling Act, even though it had already vested in the State under the Abolition Act.

It was established that the respondent had received compensation three times for the same land: firstly under the Abolition Act, secondly under the Ceiling Act, and thirdly under the Land Acquisition Act. The Court deemed this an abuse of the legal process and tantamount to fraud.

The Court held that the respondent or his legal representatives were not entitled to claim compensation under the Land Acquisition Act for the disputed land. The compensation received under the LA Act was impermissible and illegal, as the land had already vested in the State and compensation had been received for it under other laws.

The Court directed the respondent to refund the compensation withdrawn under the LA Act to the appellant-State. It emphasized that fraud vitiates every solemn proceeding, and no right can be claimed by a fraudster based on technicalities.

Decision: The Court ruled in favor of the appellant, finding that the respondent's claims for compensation under the LA Act were unjustified and constituted an abuse of the legal process. The Court ordered the respondent to refund the compensation received under the LA Act and emphasized the principle that fraud undermines legal proceedings.

Facts:

Seven petitioners enrolled in courses leading to Degrees in Engineering through Open Distance Learning by Janardan Rai Nagar Rajasthan Vidyapeeth, a Deemed to be University, in 2004 and 2005.

They filed a Writ Petition seeking clarification on the validity of their degrees, mandamus to prevent declaration of their degrees as null, and other reliefs.

Issues:

Whether Deemed to be Universities could offer courses in technical education through Open Distance Learning without AICTE approval.

Whether the degrees obtained through distance education mode are valid for all purposes.

Held:

The Court, referring to its decision in Orissa Lift Irrigation Corporation Limited vs. Rabi Shankar Patro and Ors., held that Deemed to be Universities were not justified in introducing new courses in technical education without AICTE approval.

The Court directed the suspension of degrees awarded by Deemed to be Universities concerned to candidates enrolled during the academic sessions 2001-2005, and recall and cancellation of degrees awarded through distance education mode to students admitted after 2005.

It ordered AICTE to conduct appropriate tests for affected students, with an option to clear the tests within stipulated timeframes, failing which their degrees would stand cancelled.

The Court also directed refunds of tuition fees and other charges to affected students who chose not to exercise the test option.

Deemed to be Universities were instructed to refund tuition fees to affected students and cease offering courses in distance education mode without specific permissions.

UGC was directed to take steps to restrain Deemed to be Universities from using the word "university" and to consider withdrawal of deemed status for certain institutions.

A three-member Committee was to be constituted to suggest oversight mechanisms for regulating deemed to be universities within six months.

The petition was dismissed as devoid of merits, being completely covered by the Court's previous decision in Orissa Lift Irrigation case.

Facts:

FIR No. 16 of 2018 was registered on March 24, 2018, for various offenses under the Indian Penal Code against 18 persons, including the appellants.

The appellants were arrested on April 8, 2018, and subsequently remanded to police/magisterial custody.

A petition was filed by the complainant seeking a fair and impartial investigation. The High Court, in response, ordered that the investigation be conducted by a Gazetted Police Officer, and the report of the investigation along with the opinion of the Investigating Officer be submitted within two months.

The investigation report was filed on July 5, 2018, but it was returned by the Magistrate due to non-compliance with the High Court's order.

The appellants filed an application for bail under Section 167(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC) immediately after the expiry of 90 days from their custody.

Issues:

Whether the investigation was complete within the prescribed period under Section 167(2) of the CrPC.

Whether the High Court's order could be construed as an extension of the investigation period.

Held:

The Court referred to previous judgments and principles laid down in Uday Mohanlal Acharya v. State of Maharashtra, highlighting that an accused has an indefeasible right to be released on bail if the investigation is not completed within the stipulated period.

The Court emphasized that the investigation must ideally be completed within the first 24 hours of arrest, and if not, within the prescribed period under Section 167 of the CrPC. In this case, since there were no papers or charge-sheet before the Magistrate at the end of the 90-day period, the accused were denied their right to bail. The Court rejected the argument that the High Court's order extended the investigation period, stating that there is no provision in the CrPC for such extension.

The Court allowed the appeal and directed that the appellants be admitted to bail under Section 167(2) of the CrPC, with conditions to be determined by the trial court. The Court clarified that the appellants could be arrested or re-arrested on cogent grounds, and in such cases, they would be entitled to petition for regular bail, to be considered on its own merit.

Facts:

M.L. Singla, an employee of Punjab National Bank (PNB), was dismissed from service based on charges of consuming liquor on duty and being responsible for a cash shortage of Rs. 35,000.

The bank conducted a departmental inquiry, found Singla guilty on both charges, and dismissed him from service.

Singla's appeal against dismissal was rejected, and he sought relief under the Industrial Dispute Act, 1947, leading to the matter being referred to the Labour Court.

The Labour Court ruled in Singla's favor, ordering his reinstatement with 50% back wages, but the High Court overturned this decision, upholding Singla's dismissal.

Issues:

Whether the domestic enquiry against Singla was legal and proper.

Whether the punishment of dismissal was proportionate to the gravity of the charges.

Whether the Labour Court and the High Court erred in their respective approaches to the case.

Held:

The domestic enquiry against Singla was legal and proper, as he was given full opportunity to defend himself, and no procedural lapses were observed.

The punishment of dismissal was proportionate to the gravity of the charges, considering the serious nature of both charges.

The Labour Court committed errors in failing to determine the legality of the domestic enquiry, prematurely calling for evidence on all issues, and improperly evaluating the evidence. The High Court erred in focusing on the merits of the charges rather than addressing procedural errors. Therefore, the dismissal was upheld.

Facts:

Plaintiffs filed a civil suit seeking cancellation of a sale deed.

Trial court dismissed the suit, upheld by the first appellate court and the High Court.

Parties reached a compromise during the legal proceedings, leading to the disposal of the second appeal.

One defendant challenged the compromise, leading to an appeal in the Supreme Court.

Supreme Court remanded the matter to the High Court for fresh consideration.

High Court proceeded to decide the second appeal on its merits without thoroughly examining the compromise's genuineness and legality.

Issues:

Interpretation of the Supreme Court's remand order.

Examination of the genuineness and legality of the compromise petition.

Proper procedural steps to be followed in dealing with the compromise petition.

Held:

The Court held that the High Court erred in not considering the genuineness and legality of the compromise petition as directed by the remand order. The failure to do so caused prejudice to the parties' rights. Consequently, the High Court's decision was set aside, and the case was remanded back to the High Court with specific directions. The High Court was instructed to reconsider the genuineness of the compromise and, if necessary, to refer the matter to the trial court for recording evidence.

Depending on the determination of the legality of the compromise, the second appeal would either be disposed of accordingly or heard on its merits. The Supreme Court urged the High Court to expedite the process and dispose of the matter within six months.

Facts:

The case involves an appeal against the decision of the High Court of Jharkhand, which upheld the reinstatement of 37 workmen with full back wages by setting aside their dismissal orders for contravening Section 25F of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947.

Issues:

Whether the lower courts were justified in awarding full back wages to the workmen after setting aside their dismissal orders.

Whether the principles established in previous cases regarding the awarding of back wages were properly applied in the present case.

Held:

The Supreme Court allowed the appeal in part and modified the decision of the lower courts. It was held that back wages cannot be awarded as a matter of right to the workmen solely based on setting aside their dismissal orders. The workmen must demonstrate with evidence that they were not gainfully employed during the period of dismissal. The employer also has the opportunity to prove otherwise.

The court awarded 50% of the total back wages to the workmen, considering the circumstances of the case and aiming to achieve substantial justice. This decision was made under the powers conferred by Article 142 of the Constitution of India.