Facts:

The deceased, Ashok Kumar, died as a result of an accident on 31 March 1994, while alighting from a bus belonging to the Chandigarh Transport Undertaking. The accident caused by the sudden movement of the bus resulted in his death the following day.

The heirs filed a claim petition seeking compensation under Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, before the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal (MACT). The MACT awarded Rs. 50,000 towards no-fault liability but found no negligence on the part of the bus driver.

On appeal, the High Court awarded a total compensation of Rs 3,98,500, drawing an adverse inference due to the non-examination of the bus driver. However, it reduced the rate of interest from 12% to 6% per annum.

Issues:

Whether future prospects should be considered in computing the income of the deceased.

The correctness of the deduction of one-third towards personal expenses.

Justification for reducing the rate of interest from 12% to 6% per annum.

Held:

The High Court erred in not considering future prospects in computing the income of the deceased. Referring to the judgment in National Insurance Company Ltd. v Pranay Sethi, the Court held that an addition of 40% towards future prospects is warranted, considering the age of the deceased.

The deduction of one-third towards personal expenses was deemed proper.

Total compensation was computed at Rs 6,41,200, considering the deceased's income, loss of dependency, loss of consortium, loss of estate, and funeral expenses.

Interest was allowed at 9% per annum from the date of the petition until payment.

The appeal was allowed accordingly.

Facts:

The appellant-wife and respondent No. 2-husband had solemnized their marriage as per Sikh rites and Hindu Vedic rites in New Delhi, followed by a civil marriage in the USA.

The parties had a daughter named M.

After the marriage, the appellant fled to India with M and filed for divorce in Delhi.

The respondent filed for custody in the US.

The Delhi High Court granted custody to the respondent, directing the appellant to return M to the US.

Issues:

Whether the custody of the minor girl child should remain with the appellant in India or be returned to the US.

Determination of the jurisdiction for deciding custody proceedings.

Held:

The Court emphasized the paramount importance of the best interest of the child in custody disputes.

Considering the totality of facts and circumstances, the Court held that there was no compelling reason to direct the return of the minor child to the US. The child's stay in India with her mother, maternal grandparents, and extended family was deemed not prejudicial to her well-being.

The Court observed that custody with the biological mother is not unlawful, and the appellant's custody of M in India is lawful.

It was directed that M's custody would remain with the appellant until she attains the age of majority or until a competent court decides otherwise.

The Court suggested that proceedings for custody should be expedited in the Family Court, New Delhi.

Jurisdictional issues were not conclusively determined, but the Court suggested that the Family Court in New Delhi should decide the matter promptly.

Both parties were instructed to ensure the prompt resolution of custody proceedings in India.

Decision: The Supreme Court set aside the High Court's decision and disposed of the writ petition, affirming custody with the appellant in India until further order or until M reaches adulthood.

Facts:

Indian Bank initiated proceedings under the SARFAESI Act to enforce security interest in agricultural land.

High Court of Madras declared these proceedings null and void, citing non-applicability of the SARFAESI Act to agricultural land.

The property in question included agricultural land, for which a security interest was created by Yelagiri Dairy Farm to secure a term loan.

Issues:

Whether the SARFAESI Act is applicable to security interest in agricultural land.

Whether the classification of land as agricultural in revenue records is conclusive in determining its applicability under the SARFAESI Act.

Held:

The Court found that the Madras High Court failed to adequately determine whether the land in question was genuinely agricultural. As a result, it set aside the High Court's judgment and remitted the proceedings for reconsideration. The High Court was instructed to make a fresh determination based on the totality of facts.

The appeals were allowed, and the High Court's judgment was set aside. The case was sent back to the High Court for reevaluation. No costs were awarded in this case.

Facts:

Hetchin Haokip, the appellant, challenged the order of preventive detention issued against her husband, Jangkhohao Khongsai, by the District Magistrate of Bishnupur, Manipur.

The detention was based on allegations of involvement in criminal activities related to being a member of the KLA organization and possession of firearms.

The appellant contended that the District Magistrate failed to report the detention to the State Government "forthwith," as required under Section 3(4) of the National Security Act, 1980.

Issues:

Whether the delay in reporting the detention to the State Government by the District Magistrate violated the requirement of reporting "forthwith" under Section 3(4) of the National Security Act, 1980.

Held:

The Supreme Court held that "forthwith" under Section 3(4) means within a reasonable time and without undue delay.

While acknowledging that "forthwith" does not mean instantaneous action, any delay must be justified by unavoidable circumstances beyond the authority's control.

In this case, the District Magistrate took five days to report the detention to the State Government without providing any justification for the delay.

The Supreme Court found this delay unjustified and ruled that it vitiated the detention order.

Consequently, the Court allowed the appeal, set aside the High Court's judgment, and nullified the detention order.

Facts:

Currency Note Press & Anr (appellants), wholly owned by the Ministry of Finance, Government of India, employed the respondents at their printing press in Nashik, Maharashtra.

Respondents, former employees, filed applications under Section 33C(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, claiming overtime wages for the period from 1986 to 1990.

The Labour Court initially dismissed the applications, prompting the respondents to file a writ petition before the High Court, which set aside the Labour Court's order and granted monetary relief to the respondents.

Issues:

Whether the High Court was justified in granting monetary relief to the respondents by setting aside the Labour Court's order regarding overtime wages claimed for the period 1986 to 1990.

Held and Decision:

In paragraph 8 of the judgment, the Court mentioned five factual reasons for dismissing the appeal:

All respondents were no longer in service, having either retired or passed away.

The amount involved was not substantial.

The period in question was from 1986 to 1990.

The amount had already been paid to the respondents pursuant to the High Court's order.

The overtime work claimed by the respondents was admitted to have been done while on duty.

The Court further stated in paragraph 12 that, considering these factual reasons, it declined to examine the legal issues raised by the appellants regarding the interpretation of certain provisions of the Bombay Shops and Establishment Act, 1948, and the Factories Act, 1948. These issues were left open for consideration in a different case.

Therefore, in view of the foregoing discussion, the appeal was dismissed, affirming the High Court's decision to grant monetary relief to the respondents for overtime wages.

Facts:

The appellant-wife, Usha Uday Khiwansara, and the respondent-husband, Uday Kumar Jethmal Khiwansara, got married on 07.02.1992.

The husband filed for divorce in 2004 citing cruelty and desertion as grounds.

The trial court dismissed the divorce petition, but the High Court allowed the husband's appeal and granted a decree of divorce based on desertion, without hearing the wife's side.

The wife appealed to the Supreme Court against the High Court's decision.

Issues:

Whether the High Court's decision to grant divorce without hearing the wife's side was fair and just.

Whether a settlement between the parties could be reached to dissolve the marriage amicably.

Held:

The Court observed that the High Court's decision to grant divorce without hearing the wife's side caused prejudice to her rights.

The Court acknowledged the willingness of both parties to settle the matter mutually, considering the long separation, absence of any chance of reconciliation, and the wife's health condition and financial dependency.

Referring to previous judgments, the Court emphasized the need for a peaceful resolution in cases of irretrievable breakdown of marriage.

The Court accepted the terms of settlement proposed by both parties. The husband was directed to pay Rs. 30 lakhs as permanent alimony to the wife within one month, with an additional Rs. 5 lakhs towards medical expenses. All allegations and pending cases were quashed.

The appeal was disposed of based on the settlement terms, with no costs imposed on either party.

Facts:

The case revolved around the interpretation of provisions in the Homoeopathy Central Council Act, 1973, particularly regarding the power to appoint a team of Medical Inspectors for the purpose of inspecting homoeopathy colleges.

Issues:

Whether the power to appoint Medical Inspectors for inspection lies with the Central Government or the Central Council of Homoeopathy (CCH)?

Whether Regulation 3(5) of the Homoeopathy Central Council (Minimum Standards Requirement of Homoeopathy Colleges and attached Hospitals) Regulations, 2013, empowers the Central Government to appoint inspectors?

Held:

The Court held that the power to appoint Medical Inspectors for inspection lies with the Central Council of Homoeopathy (CCH), not with the Central Government. It emphasized that the Act does not confer upon the Central Government the power to appoint a team of inspectors or visitors at examinations. The interpretation of Regulation 3(5) of the Regulations, 2013, must be made in harmony with the provisions of Section 17 of the Act, which exclusively vests the power to appoint inspectors with the CCH. The Court concluded that any other interpretation would go against the legislative mandate.

The appeals were allowed, the impugned judgment of the Division Bench was set aside, and the judgment of the Single Bench was restored.

Facts:

The writ petition (Civil) No. 754 of 2016 was filed under Article 32 of the Constitution, seeking immediate and necessary action against cow protection groups engaging in violence. The petitioner raised concerns about incidents of lynching and mob violence perpetrated by such groups.

Issues:

The court was to determine the legality of lynching and mob violence and to establish the obligations of the state authorities in preventing and addressing such acts.

Held:

The court unequivocally states that lynching is unlawful and violates fundamental rights and human dignity protected by the Constitution.

The state authorities have the primary obligation to maintain law and order and prevent vigilantism of any form, including cow vigilantism. Vigilantism undermines the legal institutions of the state and leads to chaos and disorder.

The court lays down guidelines for preventive measures, including the designation of nodal officers in each district to prevent incidents of mob violence and lynching.

In case of incidents, immediate lodging of FIRs is mandated, with personal monitoring of investigations by the designated nodal officers. Additionally, a victim compensation scheme is to be prepared by state governments.

Disciplinary action is to be taken against officials who fail to prevent incidents or promptly apprehend the culprits. The court recommends the creation of a separate offense for lynching with adequate punishment.

Decision: The court emphasizes the importance of timely implementation of the prescribed measures by both central and state governments to curb mob violence and lynching and to protect the rights and dignity of citizens.

Facts:

The case involved allegations against the respondents, who were public servants, of demanding and accepting illegal gratification for expediting certain permissions related to a business venture. The prosecution relied on evidence provided by witnesses, particularly PWs 1 and 3, who testified regarding the demand and acceptance of bribe money. Additionally, the presence of anthracene powder, used in trap operations, was found on the accused and the bribe money.

Issues:

Whether the demand and acceptance of illegal gratification were adequately proven by the prosecution,

Whether the accused provided satisfactory explanations to rebut the presumption under Section 20 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988.

Held:

The Court observed that the demand and acceptance of illegal gratification were proved by the consistent testimony of PWs 1 and 3, corroborated by the presence of anthracene powder on the accused and the bribe money. The High Court's decision to acquit the accused was deemed incorrect, as it disregarded the evidence provided by the prosecution. The Court noted that the accused failed to provide any explanation to rebut the presumption under Section 20. Therefore, the Supreme Court set aside the High Court's judgment and affirmed the conviction of the accused under Section 7 and Section 13(1)(d) of the Act. However, considering the long passage of time since the occurrence of the incident, the Court reduced the sentence of imprisonment from two years to one year.