Facts:

Karnataka Co-operative Milk Producers Federation Ltd. (hereafter referred to as the respondent) adopted the trademark 'NANDINI' in 1985 for milk and milk products. On the other hand, NANDHINI DELUXE (hereafter referred to as the appellant) adopted the mark 'NANDHINI' for its restaurants in 1989.

The appellant applied for trademark registration for 'NANDHINI' for various food products, including milk and milk products. The respondent opposed this registration, citing deceptive similarity and likelihood of confusion.

The Deputy Registrar rejected the respondent's objections and granted registration to the appellant. However, the Intellectual Property Appellate Board (IPAB) allowed the respondent's appeals, leading to writ petitions filed by the appellant, which were subsequently dismissed.

Issues:

Whether the appellant is entitled to seek registration of the mark 'NANDHINI' in respect of the goods it deals with and whether such registration would infringe the rights of the respondent.

Held:

The Court found that not only were the visual appearances of the two marks different, but they also related to different products. Furthermore, the manner in which they were traded by the appellant and respondent respectively made it unlikely for an average person to associate the goods of one with the other.

It was noted that the appellant operated restaurants under the trademark 'NANDHINI' and had applied the mark for goods like coffee, tea, sugar, etc., which are used in restaurant services, not milk or milk products.

Disagreeing with the reasoning of the IPAB and the High Court, the Court held that there was hardly any question of confusion or deception as the goods belonging to the appellant and the respondent, although different, were not in the same class under the Trade Mark Rules, 2002.

The Court found no convincing evidence to suggest that the appellant adopted the trademark to take unfair advantage of the respondent's mark. It noted that the use of 'NANDHINI' by the appellant would not harm the distinctive character or reputation of the respondent's mark.

Consequently, the Court restored the order of the Deputy Registrar granting registration to the appellant, with the modification that registration would not be given for milk and milk products for which the appellant had abandoned its claim.

Facts:

The appellant, Central Board of Trustees, issued summons to the respondent, Indore Composite Pvt Ltd, for non-payment of Provident Fund contribution.

The appellant ordered the respondent to deposit a certain amount within a specified time and later directed them to pay damages for delayed payments.

The respondent appealed against the order, leading to a dismissal of the writ petition by the High Court without adequate consideration of the issues and arguments.

Issues:

Whether the High Court's dismissal of the writ petition was justified.

Whether there was adequate consideration of the issues and arguments by the High Court.

Held:

Having heard the learned counsel for the parties and on perusal of the record of the case, we are constrained to allow the appeal, set aside the impugned order and remand the case to the Division Bench of the High Court for deciding the writ petition afresh on merits in accordance with law.

We, however, make it clear that we have refrained from making any observation on merits of the controversy having formed an opinion to remand the case to the High Court for the reasons mentioned above. The High Court would, therefore, decide the writ petition, uninfluenced by any of our observations, strictly in accordance with law.

Decision: The appeal is allowed, the High Court's order is set aside, and the case is remanded to the Division Bench of the High Court for fresh consideration on merits.

Facts:

The State of Andhra Pradesh acquired land for laying a new broad gauge single railway line from Karimnagar to Jagitial Phase -II.

Disputes arose regarding the compensation to be paid to the landowners.

The Land Acquisition Officer (LAO) determined compensation, which was challenged by both the landowners and the Railways.

The Civil Court redetermined the compensation, which was appealed to the High Court by both parties.

Issues:

Whether the High Court erred in enhancing the compensation and reducing the deduction towards developmental charges.

Whether the deduction towards developmental charges made by the Reference Court was justified.

Whether the market value determined by the Reference Court should be upheld.

Held:

The Court analyzed the principles of land valuation and deduction towards developmental charges. It considered factors such as the size, development status, and potentiality of the acquired land. The Court noted that the Reference Court's decision to deduct 50% towards developmental charges was justified based on the characteristics of the acquired land and the lack of exemplar sale deeds. The Supreme Court upheld the market value determined by the Reference Court and found the High Court's reduction in developmental charges unjustified.

Therefore, the appeals were allowed, setting aside the High Court's judgment and restoring the Reference Court's decision on compensation.

Facts:

The dispute arose from an MoU dated 08.12.2005 regarding the sale and purchase of shares in M/s Mancherial Cement Company Private Limited, of which all parties were directors.

Issues:

Whether Clause 12 of the MoU could be construed as an arbitration clause.

Held:

After hearing arguments and examining the clauses of the MoU, the Court held that Clause 12 did not constitute an arbitration clause. The mediators/arbitrators mentioned therein were deemed to be escrow agents appointed to oversee the successful completion of the transaction outlined in the MoU. This interpretation was based on the language used in the MoU as a whole, particularly in Clauses 8 and 11.

Additionally, the Court criticized the appellant's conduct for delays and inconsistent actions in pursuing legal remedies. As a result, the appeal was disposed of, affirming the lower court's decision.

Facts:

The appellant, Mohammed Zakir, appealed to the Supreme Court against the High Court's order dated 28.04.2017, which recalled its own order dated 18.04.2017 under Section 362 of the Criminal Procedure Code (CrPC).

Issues:

Whether the High Court's use of Section 362 Cr.P.C. to correct the earlier order on merits was permissible?

What action should be taken regarding the appellant's appeal against the notice issued by the Sessions Court?

Held:

The Court held that the High Court's use of Section 362 Cr.P.C. to correct the earlier order on merits was impermissible. Section 362 is meant for correcting clerical or arithmetical errors only, not for rehearing matters on their merits. Therefore, the Supreme Court set aside the High Court's order dated 28.04.2017.

Regarding the appellant's appeal against the notice issued by the Sessions Court, the Supreme Court decided not to delve into the merits of the matter since the appeal was pending before the Principal City Civil and Sessions Judge, Bengaluru. Accordingly, the Supreme Court set aside the High Court's order dated 18.04.2017 and directed the Principal City Civil and Sessions Judge, Bengaluru, to dispose of Criminal Appeal No.95/1997 expeditiously.

Facts:

The case involved writ petitions seeking the quashing of repeated imposition of police orders under section 144 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, which declared the Central Delhi area as a prohibited area for holding public meetings, dharnas, and peaceful protests. The petitions also sought the quashing of an order of the National Green Tribunal (NGT) prohibiting demonstrations at Jantar Mantar road. Additionally, the petitioners requested the issuance of a writ of mandamus laying down guidelines for holding public meetings and dharnas.

Issues:

Whether the repeated imposition of section 144 orders and the NGT's order amounted to a violation of the fundamental right to protest.

Whether there exists a need to balance the rights of protestors with the rights of residents and the larger public interest.

Whether regulations and guidelines should be formulated to govern protests and demonstrations effectively.

Held:

The right of people to hold peaceful protests and demonstrations is a fundamental right guaranteed under Articles 19(1)(a) and 19(1)(b) of the Constitution of India.

The court emphasized the need to balance the rights of protestors with the rights of residents and the larger public interest.

Certain categories of peaceful protests and demonstrations should be allowed in a regulated manner to enable protestors to exercise their rights without causing inconvenience to residents.

The Commissioner of Police, New Delhi, in consultation with other concerned agencies, is directed to devise proper guidelines for regulating protests and demonstrations in Jantar Mantar and Boat Club area.

The court reiterated that while the right to protest is fundamental, it is subject to reasonable restrictions imposed in the interest of sovereignty, integrity, and public order.

Decision: The court disposed of the matters by directing the Commissioner of Police, New Delhi, to formulate guidelines for regulating protests and demonstrations in Jantar Mantar and Boat Club area, ensuring that protests are conducted without causing inconvenience to residents or disrupting public order.

Facts:

The Damodar Valley Corporation (DVC) did not approach the Central Electricity Regulatory Commission (CERC) for tariff determination despite the enactment of the Electricity Act of 2003. The case revolves around the interplay between the provisions of the 1948 Act and the 2003 Act regarding tariff determination.

Issues:

The applicability of certain provisions of the 1948 Act for tariff determination, the interpretation of the fourth proviso to Section 14 of the Electricity Act, 2003, and the recognition of the social responsibilities of the DVC in tariff determination.

Held:

The grant of a transitory period for tariff determination is justified considering the statutory functions and social responsibilities mandated for the Damodar Valley Corporation.

The establishment and purpose of the Damodar Valley Corporation under the Damodar Valley Corporation Act, 1948 are discussed.

The Central Electricity Regulatory Commission (Terms and Conditions of Tariff) Regulations, 2004, although statutory, are considered subordinate delegated legislation. The court upholds the relevance of the 1948 Act in light of the legislative history and principles of law.

The fourth proviso to Section 14 of the Electricity Act, 2003, is interpreted as a substantive provision providing for the continued application of certain provisions of the 1948 Act not inconsistent with the 2003 Act.

Sections 18 and 19 of the 1948 Act are analyzed to determine their relevance in the context of licensing provisions. The court emphasizes the intention behind the fourth proviso to Section 14 of the 2003 Act.

The legislative history behind the enactment of Section 173 and the provisions of Section 14, including its fourth proviso, are considered to understand the Parliament's intention in providing partial exemption to the DVC.

The court confirms the relevance of Section 40 of the 1948 Act concerning depreciation rate and sinking fund. It also approves the debt-equity ratio adopted by the DVC.

The Appellate Tribunal's decision to allow the recovery of the entire pension and gratuity fund through tariffs from consumers is upheld.

The court agrees that recovery of costs incurred in connection with socially beneficial activities of the DVC from the common fund generated by tariffs is not inconsistent with the provisions of the 2003 Act.

Decision: The appeals are dismissed, and the findings of the Appellate Tribunal are affirmed, recognizing the unique social responsibilities of the Damodar Valley Corporation and the need to balance them with tariff determinations.

Facts:

Indian Bank initiated proceedings under the SARFAESI Act to enforce security interest in agricultural land.

High Court of Madras declared these proceedings null and void, citing non-applicability of the SARFAESI Act to agricultural land.

The property in question included agricultural land, for which a security interest was created by Yelagiri Dairy Farm to secure a term loan.

Issues:

Whether the SARFAESI Act is applicable to security interest in agricultural land.

Whether the classification of land as agricultural in revenue records is conclusive in determining its applicability under the SARFAESI Act.

Held:

The Court found that the Madras High Court failed to adequately determine whether the land in question was genuinely agricultural. As a result, it set aside the High Court's judgment and remitted the proceedings for reconsideration. The High Court was instructed to make a fresh determination based on the totality of facts.

The appeals were allowed, and the High Court's judgment was set aside. The case was sent back to the High Court for reevaluation. No costs were awarded in this case.

Facts:

Hetchin Haokip, the appellant, challenged the order of preventive detention issued against her husband, Jangkhohao Khongsai, by the District Magistrate of Bishnupur, Manipur.

The detention was based on allegations of involvement in criminal activities related to being a member of the KLA organization and possession of firearms.

The appellant contended that the District Magistrate failed to report the detention to the State Government "forthwith," as required under Section 3(4) of the National Security Act, 1980.

Issues:

Whether the delay in reporting the detention to the State Government by the District Magistrate violated the requirement of reporting "forthwith" under Section 3(4) of the National Security Act, 1980.

Held:

The Supreme Court held that "forthwith" under Section 3(4) means within a reasonable time and without undue delay.

While acknowledging that "forthwith" does not mean instantaneous action, any delay must be justified by unavoidable circumstances beyond the authority's control.

In this case, the District Magistrate took five days to report the detention to the State Government without providing any justification for the delay.

The Supreme Court found this delay unjustified and ruled that it vitiated the detention order.

Consequently, the Court allowed the appeal, set aside the High Court's judgment, and nullified the detention order.