Facts:

The complainant (PW-3) alleged that the appellant entered her house, threatened her with a pistol, and committed rape.

No medical examination of the complainant was conducted after the incident.

Prosecution did not present any doctor in the trial to support their case.

Past instances of false complaints by the complainant against others were not disputed.

Enmity between the appellant and the complainant's husband was acknowledged.

The prosecutrix had a habit of making false allegations in disputes.

No eyewitness to the incident; PW-2, a cited witness, was a chance witness.

PW-1, the complainant's husband, admitted being away during the incident.

Issues:

Whether the prosecution has proved the case of rape against the appellant beyond reasonable doubt.

Held:

The prosecution failed to prove the rape case against the appellant.

Lack of medical examination of the complainant, absence of supporting medical evidence, and a history of false complaints weakened the prosecution's case.

Enmity between the parties and the complainant's habit of making wild allegations were crucial factors.

No eyewitness and the cited witness (PW-2) being a chance witness were significant drawbacks.

The husband's admission of being away during the incident further weakened the case.

Consequently, both lower courts were unjustified in convicting the appellant under Section 376 IPC.

The appeal was allowed, the impugned order was set aside, and the appellant was acquitted.

Facts:

The respondent, M/S Prasoon Enterprises, was engaged in the trading of spare parts of mining machinery, including steel wire ropes.

The Commercial Tax Officer (CTO) conducted a survey and found that the respondent was charging VAT at the rate of 4% on "Mobile Crane Wire Ropes."

The dispute arose regarding the proper Entry for taxing these goods under the Rajasthan Value Added Tax Act, 2003.

Issues:

Whether "Mobile Crane Wire Ropes" should be taxed at the rate of 4% or 12.5% under the VAT Act.

Held:

The relevant Entry, Entry 155 of Schedule IV, specifically includes "Hydraulic excavators (earth moving and mining machinery), Mobile Cranes and Hydraulic Dumpers (including parts thereof)," taxed at 4%.

The expression "including parts thereof" was added by an amendment, indicating that parts were taxable at 4% only after 09.05.2006.

The principle that a thing is a part of another if the other cannot function without it was applied. Wire ropes were deemed an essential part of Mobile Cranes, falling under Entry 155 and taxed at 4%.

The literature and specifications submitted by the respondent supported the indispensability of wire ropes for the effective functioning of Mobile Cranes.

Conclusion: The Court affirmed that "Mobile Crane Wire Ropes" should be taxed at 4% under Entry 155 of Schedule IV of the VAT Act based on their essential role in the functioning of Mobile Cranes. The decision aligns with the principle that a part is integral if the whole cannot operate without it.

Facts:

The case involved the interpretation of Section 142(2A) and (2C) of the Income Tax Act, 1961. The assessing officer had directed the assessee to get the accounts audited, and a dispute arose regarding the extension of time for submitting the audit report.

Issues:

The primary issue was whether, before the amendment, the assessing officer had the authority to extend time for the submission of the audit report without the assessee's application.

Held:

Sub-section (2A) of Section 142 empowers the assessing officer to direct the assessee to get the accounts audited. Sub-section (2C) imposes an obligation on the assessee to furnish the audit report within the period specified by the assessing officer. The overall time limit appears in the proviso, capping at 180 days.

The proviso allows the assessing officer to extend time on the assessee's application for valid reasons. The discretion to extend time is not absolute but subject to "good and sufficient reason."

The assessing officer, while fixing time initially, has the authority to extend it without an application. The overall ceiling of time is applicable. An interpretation otherwise would lead to absurd consequences.

The proviso creates a remedy for the assessee to seek an extension for genuine reasons. However, this does not diminish the assessing officer's authority to extend time without an application by the assessee.

The amendment was clarificatory, intended to remove ambiguity. The assessing officer's authority to extend time existed before the amendment.

The interpretation doesn't enable the assessing officer to extend the period of limitation for making an assessment under Section 153B. Explanation (iii) clarifies the exclusion of time.

Interpretation depends on the context, general scope, former state of the law, and legislative history. The amendment clarified the existing authority.

The provisions of Section 142(2C) before the amendment did not preclude the assessing officer from extending time without an application. The amendment was clarificatory in nature.

Facts:

The Agricultural Horticultural Society (Society) and its Secretary, the appellants, challenged the resumption of land by the State of Tamil Nadu for public purposes.

The land was originally allotted to the appellant-Society by an agreement dated 28.04.1980.

The State, by order dated 05.08.1989 (GO Ms. No. 1259), resumed the land for the development of sports facilities, horticulture, and horticulture research.

Issues:

Whether the resumption order was legally justified, and whether the plea of mala fides was substantiated.

Held :

The appellants primarily based their challenge on the plea of mala fides, asserting that the action was politically motivated due to their opposition party membership.

The Division Bench found no merit in the mala fides plea, stating that mere political opposition does not constitute substantial material to support a claim of mala fides.

The court upheld the resumption order as legal and in conformity with clause 4 of the allotment order, granting the State the right to resume land for public purposes.

The court emphasized that the State must ensure the land is used only for the specified public purpose and not for other purposes.

Disparaging remarks made against the appellants in the impugned order were deemed irrelevant to the core controversy.

The appeals were dismissed.

Facts:

The respondent filed a consumer complaint seeking possession of a Row House or, in the alternative, refund with interest and compensation.

The appellant claimed completion certificate received in 2016, seven years beyond the extended possession date.

The primary relief sought was possession, but a prayer for refund was also present.

The NCDRC modified the SCDRC order, reducing compensation from Rs. 5 lakhs to Rs. 2 lakhs.

Issues:

Whether the delay in possession was reasonable.

The buyer's right to seek a refund after a significant delay.

The applicability and fairness of the Buyer's Agreement clauses.

Held:

The Buyer's Agreement was one-sided, providing for interest on the developer's default at a much lower rate than on the buyer's default.

A seven-year delay is beyond a reasonable period; the buyer can't be expected to wait indefinitely for possession.

The Court modified the NCDRC order, directing the appellant to pay interest at 9% per annum instead of 12% to the respondent.

The order for a refund of money was justified considering the unreasonable delay.

The amount outstanding to be released from the deposited money, with the balance, if any, refunded to the appellant.

Facts:

Consumer complaint filed by the appellant, an association representing buyers.

Complaint seeks various reliefs, including possession of flats, common amenities, and restraining respondents from charging additional amounts.

Appellants claim that the second respondent, Three C Universal Developers Private Limited, is the main promoter of the project.

Issues:

Whether the direction for the deletion of the second respondent was warranted.

Held:

The NCDRC directed the deletion of the second respondent based on the argument that the consumers did not hire or avail services from the first respondent.

The Court, at this stage, found it inconclusive that the second respondent is unconnected with the project.

The issue of relief to be granted will be determined during the course of the hearing.

Order for deletion not warranted at this stage, and the second respondent is restored as a party.

Complaint admitted against both respondents for final disposal, keeping all rights and contentions open.

Appeal allowed, setting aside the NCDRC's order, and restoring the second respondent as a party.

Facts:

Robbery of a police officer's service weapon and walkie-talkie on 20.12.2005.

Murder of Bhima Waghmare on 04.01.2006, using the same stolen service weapon.

Accused No.1 and Accused No.2 apprehended during the investigation of a kidnapping case.

Accused No.1 found with the stolen service weapon and two cell phones, including the one belonging to the murder victim.

Issues:

Identification of Accused No.1 and Accused No.2 in the absence of a Test Identification Parade.

Connection between the stolen mobile phone and the accused.

Establishing the link between the accused and the murder using the stolen service weapon.

Held:

The prosecution failed to establish a conclusive link between Accused No.1 and the murder. Lack of a Test Identification Parade, inconsistencies in mobile phone ownership, and gaps in the chain of evidence led to doubts. Applying the principles of circumstantial evidence, the Court gave the benefit of doubt to the Appellant (Accused No.1) and acquitted him of all charges.

The absence of a Test Identification Parade raised doubt on the identification of the accused (Para 13a).

Inconsistencies in mobile phone ownership created uncertainty regarding its connection to the accused (Para 13c).

Insufficient evidence to conclusively link the accused to the murder using the stolen service weapon (Para 15).

Benefit of doubt given, and the appellant acquitted of all charges (Para 18).

Facts:

Appellant, Mahavir Road and Infrastructure Pvt. Ltd., undertook road construction in Nashik and obtained an insurance policy covering 'material damage.'

The insurance claim was filed citing abnormal rainfall and water logging between June 25, 2007, and July 5, 2007, resulting in damage to the roads.

The insurer rejected the claim, attributing the damage to defective workmanship and materials, and failure to provide an alternative traffic route.

NCDRC dismissed the complaint, citing inconsistencies in the appellant's statements, delayed reporting, lack of evidence supporting flood damage, and minimal rainfall data on alleged damage dates.

Issues:

Consistency in appellant's statements regarding the date of damage.

Delayed reporting of damage to the insurer.

Lack of evidence supporting flood damage.

Appellant's failure to present expert testimony regarding the alleged damage cause.

Held:

The NCDRC found inconsistencies in the appellant's statements regarding the date of damage, impacting the credibility of the claim.

The delayed reporting of damage was a breach of the insurance policy obligation, as immediate notice was required.

Lack of evidence supporting flood damage: Meteorological data showed minimal rainfall on alleged damage dates, undermining the claim of abnormal rainfall and water logging.

The absence of expert testimony on the cause of damage weakened the appellant's case.

The insurance policy specifically excluded normal wear and tear, and the evidence did not substantiate the claim of damage due to abnormal rainfall.

The appeal was dismissed, upholding the NCDRC decision.

Facts:

Appellants and two others were prosecuted for offenses under Sections 323, 324, 452, 504, and 506 IPC.

Acquitted by the Judicial Magistrate, Mathura, but the State appealed.

Appellate Court convicted appellants, sentencing them to rigorous imprisonment and fines.

Appellants filed a criminal revision before the High Court, which was dismissed ex parte.

Issues:

Validity of High Court's dismissal of the revision without assigning reasons.

Held:

The High Court failed to apply its judicial mind while dismissing the revision, lacking justification for interference. (Para 11)

The expectation was for the High Court to consider factual and legal aspects before passing appropriate orders, which was not fulfilled. (Para 12)

The impugned order lacked reasoning, making it improper for disposal in such manner. (Para 12)

Decision:

The appeal was allowed, the impugned order was set aside, and the case was remanded to the High Court for fresh consideration of the revision petition within six months. (Para 14)