Facts:

Christopher Raj borrowed Rs.30,000 from K. Vijayakumar on 12.08.2001 and issued a post-dated cheque.

The cheque bounced due to insufficient funds, leading to a complaint by Vijayakumar.

Trial court acquitted Christopher Raj, stating the cheque wasn't presented within the valid period.

High Court reversed the acquittal, convicting Christopher Raj and imposing a fine.

Issues:

Christopher Raj did not appear during the appeal before the High Court.

High Court criticized for not appointing counsel (amicus curiae) or issuing a second notice when the accused was unrepresented.

Held:

The accused, Christopher Raj, did not appear in the High Court during the appeal. The Supreme Court emphasized that in such cases, the High Court should have issued a second notice, appointed an advocate, or taken the assistance of amicus curiae.( Para 9)

Concluding, the Supreme Court declared that the High Court's decision to reverse the acquittal without affording proper representation was an error. The matter was remitted to the Madurai Bench of Madras High Court for fresh consideration, instructing the appellant to appear on a specified date.( Para 10)

Facts:

The case involved criminal appeals and a writ petition arising from Special Leave Petitions. The Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI) was the appellant, and the respondents faced charges under different sections of the IPC, Arms Act, and Prevention of Terrorism Act, 2002. The appeals were heard by a Division Bench comprising Arun Mishra and Vineet Saran, JJ.

Issues:

The misuse of the Forum of PIL, the examination of the merit of the case, the fairness of the CBI's investigation, and concerns about the bona fide nature of the petition filed.

Held:

The Court dismissed the petition, emphasizing that the Forum of PIL had been misused in this instance.

The court examined the case and found it to be meritless, stating that the CBI had thoroughly and fairly investigated the case, establishing the conspiracy between the accused persons.

Observations made by the High Court, which were set aside, were deemed based on a lopsided approach without considering the entire evidence on record.

The court expressed concerns about the bona fide nature of the petition and the undue interference in the course of justice.

The judgment clarified that, in the absence of a provision indicating who can move the court under Article 32, any member of the public acting bona fide can espouse the cause of a person or class of persons for the judicial enforcement of fundamental rights.

Decision: The petition was dismissed on the grounds that the Forum of PIL had been misused, and there was no merit found to direct further investigation or re-investigation. The concerns about the bona fide nature of the petition were highlighted, and the court emphasized the fairness of the CBI's investigation.

Facts:

GPSC issued an advertisement for ACF and RFO positions with specified reservations for various categories.

Appellant applied in the SEBC category, cleared the examination, and was listed in the select list.

Dispute arose over the interpretation of circulars and the inclusion of reserved category candidates in the general category merit list.

Issues:

Whether age relaxation for reserved categories is an incident of reservation.

Interpretation of circulars regarding the inclusion of reserved category candidates in the general category merit list.

Held:

The Court held that age relaxation granted to candidates belonging to SC/ST and SEBC category is considered an incident of reservation under Article 16(4) of the Constitution of India. The Court rejected the appellant's argument that relaxation in age at the initial qualifying stage would not violate circulars dated 29.01.2000 and 23.07.2004. The distinction between the preliminary and final examination was considered misconceived, emphasizing that a person availing age relaxation at the initial stage will necessarily avail the same relaxation at the final stage. The Court dismissed the appeal, directing the parties to bear their own costs.

Facts:

The plaintiffs claimed to be Inamdars and sought the declaration that certain lands were Inam lands of Niyamatullah Shah Dargah Haregaon.

The defendants contested the suit on various grounds, including issues related to jurisdiction, limitation, and the relief sought by the plaintiffs.

Issues:

The High Court modified the decree, holding that the plaintiffs and Defendant No. 12 were Mutawalis and not Inamdars, as originally declared by the District Judge.

The appellants raised objections regarding the jurisdiction of the civil court and the relief granted by the High Court.

Held:

The court held that the civil court had jurisdiction to decide the suit, emphasizing that the issue was about whether the properties were properties of the Dargah, not whether they were wakf properties.

The contention that the suit was barred by limitation was rejected, as the suit was also for possession based on title, with a limitation of 12 years.

The court rejected the appellants' argument that the High Court granted a new relief, emphasizing that the High Court had granted a lesser or lower relief, not a higher or new relief.

Applications by the appellants to place additional documents on record were rejected, as no explanation was provided for not filing these documents earlier.

Facts:

The appellant, an Airman, applied for a civil post in a bank without completing the mandatory seven years of service and without obtaining prior permission.

The appellant breached the provisions of Air Force Order 14/2008 by participating in the recruitment process without official approval.

Subsequently, the appellant moved the Air Force Tribunal seeking permission to depart from service.

Issues:

The breach of Air Force Order 14/2008 by the appellant, the balance between individual rights and service interests, and the consequences of seeking premature departure.

Held:

The Air Force Act 1950 imposes restrictions on the fundamental rights of Air Force members to ensure the proper discharge of duties and maintenance of discipline (Para 9).

Air Force Order 14/2008 holds the field, mandating seven years of service for permission to apply for a civil post. It emphasizes the criticality of manpower and the need for verification and approval before submitting applications (Para 13).

The appellant, in breach of AFO 14/2008, applied for a civil post, demonstrating a failure to comply with obligations as an enrolled member (Para 14).

The appellant does not have an unqualified right under Article 19(1)(g) to leave the service at will, considering the provisions of the Air Force Act and the terms of engagement (Para 15).

Considering the circumstances, the court decided not to direct reinstatement but ordered the issuance of a final NOC and discharge within three months, subject to the appellant depositing Rs. 3 lakhs with the Union of India (Para 16).

Decision: The court, while recognizing the breach of AFO 14/2008 by the appellant, decided not to direct reinstatement but ordered the issuance of a final NOC and discharge within three months, subject to the appellant depositing Rs. 3 lakhs with the Union of India.

Facts:

The procurer initiated a bidding process for power supply, and the appellant secured a bid to supply 1000 MW power at a specified rate. The bid was based on GMDC's commitment to supply coal. Disputes arose between the appellant and GMDC, leading to the termination of the PPA by the appellant.

Issues:

The validity of the appellant's termination of the PPA, interpretation of the relevant provisions in the PPA (Article 3.4.2 and Article 3.1.2), and the entitlement of the appellant to compensatory tariff.

Held:

The Appellate Tribunal's approach was deemed erroneous, and a harmonious reading of Article 3.4.2 and Article 3.1.2 of the PPA indicates that either party has the right to terminate the contract for non-compliance.( Para 25)

The Tribunal's interpretation that Article 3.4.2 can be invoked only with an agreement on a violation of Article 3.1.2 conditions is incorrect. This would amount to rewriting the contract and render Article 3.4.2 ineffective.( Para 26)

Both the Commission and the Appellate Tribunal erred in concluding that termination under Article 3.4.2 requires an agreement on non-compliance by both parties, which would render the provision meaningless.( Para 31)

The specific provision under Article 3.4.2 prevails over the general provisions in Article 14 of the contract.( Para 34)

The appellant was justified in invoking Article 3.4.2 due to GMDC's non-compliance with conditions in Article 3.1.2.( Para 43)

The Tribunal's finding that the appellant's bid was not based on GMDC's commitment to supply indigenous coal was erroneous. The appellant was legally entitled to terminate the agreement.( Para 44)

The appellant is entitled to compensatory tariff considering the economic justice principle, including adjustment of project costs and interest on expenditures.( Para 49)

Referring to Section 62 of the Electricity Act, 2003, the parties are directed to the Central Electricity Regulatory Commission (CERC) for the determination of compensatory tariff payable to the appellant from the termination date.( Para 50)

Facts:

The appellant, Dalbir Singh, was accused of leaving his post, jumping across a stone wall, and failing to retaliate against militants during a cordon and search operation in Jammu and Kashmir on August 13, 2006. The incident resulted in the death of a colleague, Sapper Gurmail Singh, and the loss of a Light Machine Gun (LMG).

Issues:

Whether the appellant's actions constituted cowardice as per Section 34(c) of the Army Act, 1950.

The appellant claimed that he jumped over the wall to protect himself and attack the militants, while the military authorities argued that he had abandoned his post.

Held:

The court held that, based on the evidence presented, the appellant did not rise to the occasion during the militant attack, and his actions indicated cowardice. The Tribunal's conclusion that the theory of the appellant becoming unconscious could not be accepted was justified.( Para 7)

The court emphasized that while the appellant had a record of being a good soldier in past operations, a soldier cannot rely solely on past performance. In the context of protecting the nation's integrity, a soldier must rise to the occasion. The court upheld the SGCM and Tribunal's decisions, considering the gravity of the situation.( Para 8)

The court, taking into account the appellant's dismissal from service, affirmed the decision. However, it set aside the order for imprisonment, considering the appellant's gunshot injury and the considerable lapse of time since the incident.( Para 9)

The appeal is accordingly disposed of with no order as to costs. .( Para 10)

Facts:

The Board of Revenue, in accordance with Section 90, introduced Rule 106 (Tha) via a notification dated 06.11.2012, imposing fees on the import of rectified spirit. The High Court held that the State lacked legislative competence to impose such fees, asserting that rectified spirit is non-potable liquor unfit for human consumption. The State argued that the fee was not on raw rectified spirit but on pure alcoholic liter ('LPL') used in the production of potable liquor.

Issues:

The legislative competence of the State to impose fees on the import of rectified spirit, particularly concerning whether it pertains to non-potable liquor or is intended for the production of potable liquor.

Held:

The court clarified that the levy under Rule 106 (Tha) is not on the imported rectified spirit itself but on the manufactured product, Indian Made Foreign Liquor (IMFL), which is potable alcohol suitable for human consumption (Para 10).

The imposition only fructifies upon the completion of the distillation process, specifically when the product IMFL is ready for bottling. The levy is not at the stage of import or initial distillation of rectified spirit but just before bottling the final product (Para 10).

The court emphasized that the levy is on the produced foreign liquor before it is bottled for sale, and the State has the legislative competence to regulate potable alcohol, including levying charges for regulating its production (Para 11).

The court distinguished the nature of the levy, stating that it is not in the form of a tax or excise duty but rather charges for regulating the production of potable liquor and preserving public health and morality (Para 14).

The fact that the manufacturer had obtained licenses for import and production of foreign liquor does not mean the State surrendered its rights. The amended provision enables the State to levy charges for ceding its rights related to foreign liquor production (Para 15).

Decision: The appeal is allowed, upholding the State's authority to levy charges on the production of potable liquor using imported rectified spirit under Rule 106 (Tha) of the Jharkhand Excise Act, 1915.

Facts:

The case revolves around the intestate death of 'JDA,' leaving behind his wife, sons, daughters, and adopted children. The adopted daughter 'TKJ' married and passed away, leading to a dispute over the partition of the property. The trial court dismissed the suit, leading to appeals by the plaintiffs and defendant nos. 3-5.

Issues:

The conversion and relinquishment claim of 'TKJ,' the status of defendant nos. 3-5 as adopted children, and the entitlement to a share in the suit property.

Held:

Conversion and Relinquishment: The High Court erred in granting the plaintiffs a 1/4th share based on TKJ being the heir. The trial court's dismissal was justified, considering TKJ's conduct during her lifetime. Defendant no.2's expenses for property improvement supported the defense's claim.

Maintainability of Appeal: The appeal at the instance of defendant nos. 3-5 was maintainable, as they were aggrieved by the trial court's decree. The court clarified the nature of cross objections.

Division of Property: The suit property was to be divided among defendant no.2, defendant no.3, and defendant nos. 4 & 5. The High Court's share allocation was modified to give each a 1/3rd share.

Decision: The High Court's decision was quashed, and the trial court's decree dismissing the suit was restored. The appeal by defendant nos. 3-5 was partly allowed, modifying the property division.