Facts:

The appellant, M/S. Achal Industries, challenged the levy of turnover tax on the total turnover as per Section 6-B(1) of the Karnataka Sales Tax Act, 1957. The appellant contended that turnover tax should apply only to the "taxable turnover" and not the entire "total turnover." Assessments for the years 1990-91 to 1999-2000 were disputed, and the appellant argued that the interpretation of Section 6-B(1) was a misconstruction.

Issues:

The interpretation of the term "total turnover" in Section 6-B(1) and whether turnover tax could be levied on the entire turnover or only on the "taxable turnover."

Held:

The Court examined the pre-amendment version of the Karnataka Sales Tax Act and noted that the expression "total turnover" under Section 6-B(1) was for the identification and classification of dealers for prescribing tax rates. The first proviso provided an exhaustive list of deductions, emphasizing that nothing else could be deducted from the total turnover for the purpose of turnover tax.( Para 8)

Referring to M/s. Hoechst Pharmaceuticals Ltd. and Others case (1983), the Court highlighted the economic superiority principle for levying turnover tax. The Court emphasized that the interpretation of the statute should not depend on contingency and applied a strict rule of interpretation, especially in taxation statutes.( Para 10)

The Court reiterated that the term "total turnover" in Section 6-B(1) was meant for the identification and classification of dealers, and the provisos made it clear that only deductions mentioned therein were allowed. The argument that "total turnover" should be read as "taxable turnover" was deemed unsustainable.( Para 12)

The Court dismissed the appeals, stating that the submissions lacked substance. The decision was in line with the interpretation that turnover tax applied to the entire "total turnover" as defined in Section 2(u-2) of the Karnataka Sales Tax Act.( Para 13)

Facts:

The High Court of Punjab & Haryana disposed of second appeals without framing substantial questions of law, which is a prerequisite under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The appeals arose from a judgment of the First Appellate Court related to property disputes.

Issues:

Whether the High Court has the jurisdiction to allow second appeals without framing substantial questions of law.

The correctness of the judgment of the First Appellate Court in the context of property entitlement.

Held:

The High Court, in allowing second appeals, erred in not framing substantial questions of law as required by Section 100 of the Code.

Remanding the cases to the High Court for fresh disposal on merits, emphasizing the mandatory nature of framing substantial questions of law.

The High Court must adhere to the proper procedure and frame substantial questions before deciding second appeals.

Facts:

The respondent-State invited tenders for irrigation works, and the appellant-contractor entered into three agreements. The appellant raised various claims, and the arbitrator awarded sums on some claims while rejecting others. Both parties filed applications challenging the award. The High Court found the awards unsustainable based on clause 59 of the Agreement.

Issues:

Validity of Claim No.1 related to extra lead for quarrying stone.

Non-supply of food grains as per the agreement conditions (Claim No.3).

Reimbursement of short supply of cement (Claim No.4).

Claim on account of stock of materials accumulated by the contractor (Claim No.7).

Interest of 18% p.a. under the Interest Act (Claim No.9).

Held:

Claim No.1: The appellant claimed extra lead for quarrying stone. Clause 59 prohibits compensation for delays caused by any party. However, as Claim No.1 wasn't related to delay but to extra lead, the appellant was entitled to the difference in the rate. The amount was to be calculated based on the cost of conveyance at the rate of Rs.13.75, and the sub-court's decision was sustained under Article 142.

Claim No.3: The claim for non-supply of food grains was found untenable. The contract specified that the appellant was to supply food grains only if available from the Government. The appellant's contention that the clause was attractive at the time of tender submission was rejected. The award by the arbitrator was not sustained.

Claim No.4: The claim for reimbursement of short supply of cement was not hit by Clause 59, but the appellant failed to provide sufficient evidence. The appellant didn't produce a ledger, vouchers, or bills supporting the purchase of cement from outside sources. Without proper documentation, the claim was not accepted.

Claim No.7: The claim for materials accumulated by the contractor was rejected as the appellant didn't use the materials for the work. The claim was based on an alleged assurance and delays, but Clause 59 prevented compensation for delays due to any cause whatsoever.

Claim No.9: Regarding interest at 18% p.a., the arbitrator awarded interest at 12%, excluding the period from the commencement of proceedings till the award date. The court restored the interest as awarded by the arbitrator.

Facts:

The Serious Fraud Investigation Office (SFIO) was directed to investigate certain entities and submit a report within three months. The petitioners were subsequently arrested by SFIO after the expiration of the specified period for investigation.

Issues:

Whether the period specified for submitting a report by SFIO under Section 212(3) is mandatory or directory? Was the arrest after the specified period illegal?

Held:

In Habeas Corpus proceedings, the court must consider the legality of detention at the time of the return. The act of directing remand is a judicial function, and challenging the order of remand should not be entertained in a habeas corpus petition. The High Court was not justified in directing the release of the accused.

The High Court should not have entertained the challenge to the remand orders. The accused were produced before a competent court, and the challenge to the legality of detention should have been raised in the appropriate appellate or revisional forum.

The High Court, while having jurisdiction, erred in entertaining the petition challenging the detention based on valid remand orders.

The accused were allegedly guilty of a serious offence of fraud in relation to the affairs of a company. SFIO, being empowered under Section 212, had the authority to investigate and submit a report as per the provisions of the Companies Act, 2013.

Section 212(3) does not specify a fixed period for submitting a report. Even under sub-Section (12), there is no stipulation for the completion period of investigation. The statute has not prescribed any period for the investigation's completion.

The term "assign" in Section 212(3) contemplates a complete transfer of investigation to SFIO, and there is no provision for re-transfer to original investigating agencies.

The prescription of the period for submitting a report is purely directory. The mandate in favor of SFIO does not end with the expiry of the specified period, and the arrest after the expiry was not illegal.

While laying down a procedure, if no adverse consequences are contemplated for non-adherence, the provision is considered directory. The interpretation that the mandate ends with the expiry of the period would be incongruous and against the legislative intent.

Facts:

The Bench had earlier held Mr. Mathews J. Nedumpara guilty of contempt in the face of the Court.

Notice was issued to Mr. Nedumpara regarding the punishment for the contempt.

Issues:

Determining the punishment for Mr. Nedumpara's contemptuous behavior in the face of the Court.

Held:

Mr. Nedumpara, in his appearance, attempted various tactics to delay proceedings.

He later tendered an apology through a sworn affidavit, expressing regret for his actions.

The Court, considering the affidavit and the incidents in both the Bombay High Court and the Supreme Court, sentenced Mr. Nedumpara to three months imprisonment, suspended on the condition of his future adherence to not browbeating any judge.

Additionally, Mr. Nedumpara was barred from practicing as an Advocate before the Supreme Court for one year.

FACTS:

The Government announced tax and Central Excise concessions to attract investments in industrial sectors in states like Uttarakhand and Himachal Pradesh.

An exemption notification (No. 50/2003-Central Excise) was issued for units in specified areas, providing 100% outright excise duty exemption for ten years.

Bajaj Auto Limited, an appellant, established a manufacturing unit in 2007 and was exempted from Central Excise Duty.

Dispute arose regarding the payment of NCCD, Education Cess, and Secondary & Higher Education Cess.

The appellant argued that since it was exempted from excise duty, these cesses should also be exempt.

ISSUES:

Whether the exemption from excise duty extends to NCCD, Education Cess, and Secondary & Higher Education Cess.

Interpretation of the exemption notification and its application to the appellant.

HELD:

The judgment clarified that NCCD, though levied on the product, maintains its character as an excise duty. The exemption notification covers the "whole of the duty of excise or additional duty of excise." Therefore, once excise duty is exempted, NCCD is also entitled to the benefit of the exemption notification.( Para 22)

The exemption notification explicitly states that the exemption is for ten years from the date of commercial production of the unit. This further supports the conclusion that the appellant is not liable to pay NCCD.( Para 23)

DECISION: The impugned orders were set aside, the show cause notice was quashed, and it was held that the appellant is not liable to pay NCCD, Education Cess, and Secondary & Higher Education Cess.

REFERRED CASES:

Banswara Syntex Ltd. v. Union of India, 2007 SCC OnLine Raj 365 : (2007) 216 ELT 16

Novopan India Ltd., Hyderabad v. CCE and Customs, Hyderabad, 1994 Supp (3) SCC 606

SRD Nutrients Pvt Ltd. v. Commissioner of Central Excise, Guwahati, (2018) 1 SCC 105.

Union of India v. Wood Papers Ltd. (1990) 4 SCC 256

Facts:

The case involves retired employees of Railways, who withdrew all superannuation benefits, including the full amount in their Provident Fund account. Subsequently, they were re-employed on a retainer basis with a private limited company. The question arose whether they should be covered under the Provident Fund Scheme or treated as 'excluded employees' as per the Scheme's provisions.

Issues:

Whether the retired railway employees, having withdrawn all superannuation benefits, are to be treated as 'excluded employees' under the Employees' Provident Fund Scheme, 1952.

Held:

Background of the Act : The Employees’ Provident Fund and Miscellaneous Provisions Act, 1952, aimed to provide compulsory contributory provident funds for the future security of industrial workers. The Act allowed for the continuation of other provident funds offering equal or more advantageous terms.

Definition of "Excluded Employee" : The term "excluded employee" is not defined in the Act of 1952 but finds definition in the Scheme of 1952, specifically in clause (f) of paragraph 2.

Scheme and Structure : The Act of 1952 mandates the framing of the Employees' Provident Fund Scheme by the Central Government, and a Fund is established under this Scheme. The term "Fund" refers to the provident fund established under the Scheme.

Exemption under Section 17(1) Section 17(1) allows establishments to be exempted from the Scheme's provisions under certain conditions, emphasizing equivalent or more favorable benefits for employees.

Exclusion Criteria : Clause (i) of Paragraph 2(f) excludes an employee who was a Fund member and withdrew the full amount on retirement, including various retirement scenarios.

Specific Reference to "The Fund" : The usage of "the Fund" in Paragraphs 2(f), 26, and 69 indicates reference to the Fund created under the Scheme of 1952. To be an "excluded employee," one must be a member of this specific Fund.

Application to Retired Railway Employees: Retired railway employees, having withdrawn from a different fund, couldn't be considered "excluded employees" since they were never members of the Fund under the Scheme of 1952.

Mandatory Nature of Act and Scheme : The provisions of the Act and the Scheme are mandatory. Exemptions are allowed only under specific conditions mentioned in Section 17 and Paragraph 26.

Application Regardless of Age The Act and Scheme's operation is not restricted by the age of the employee. The argument concerning the age of the employees is baseless.

Application for Exemption : The plea that the appellants applied for exemption and received no decision was rejected. The liability to make contributions persisted until an exemption order was issued.

Single Judge's Observations : The Single Judge's suggestion regarding the application of clause (i) of Paragraph 2(f) was deemed unwarranted. The exclusion from the Scheme is limited to the categories mentioned in Paragraph 2(f).

Framework of the Scheme : The Scheme's framework is clear; a person withdrawing from the Fund created under the Scheme of 1952 may be considered an "excluded employee." This ensures continued financial security for employees.

Decision: The appeal was dismissed, affirming that the retired railway employees, having withdrawn from a different fund, could not be treated as "excluded employees" under the Employees' Provident Fund Scheme, 1952.

Facts:

The complainant (PW-3) alleged that the appellant entered her house, threatened her with a pistol, and committed rape.

No medical examination of the complainant was conducted after the incident.

Prosecution did not present any doctor in the trial to support their case.

Past instances of false complaints by the complainant against others were not disputed.

Enmity between the appellant and the complainant's husband was acknowledged.

The prosecutrix had a habit of making false allegations in disputes.

No eyewitness to the incident; PW-2, a cited witness, was a chance witness.

PW-1, the complainant's husband, admitted being away during the incident.

Issues:

Whether the prosecution has proved the case of rape against the appellant beyond reasonable doubt.

Held:

The prosecution failed to prove the rape case against the appellant.

Lack of medical examination of the complainant, absence of supporting medical evidence, and a history of false complaints weakened the prosecution's case.

Enmity between the parties and the complainant's habit of making wild allegations were crucial factors.

No eyewitness and the cited witness (PW-2) being a chance witness were significant drawbacks.

The husband's admission of being away during the incident further weakened the case.

Consequently, both lower courts were unjustified in convicting the appellant under Section 376 IPC.

The appeal was allowed, the impugned order was set aside, and the appellant was acquitted.

Facts:

The respondent, M/S Prasoon Enterprises, was engaged in the trading of spare parts of mining machinery, including steel wire ropes.

The Commercial Tax Officer (CTO) conducted a survey and found that the respondent was charging VAT at the rate of 4% on "Mobile Crane Wire Ropes."

The dispute arose regarding the proper Entry for taxing these goods under the Rajasthan Value Added Tax Act, 2003.

Issues:

Whether "Mobile Crane Wire Ropes" should be taxed at the rate of 4% or 12.5% under the VAT Act.

Held:

The relevant Entry, Entry 155 of Schedule IV, specifically includes "Hydraulic excavators (earth moving and mining machinery), Mobile Cranes and Hydraulic Dumpers (including parts thereof)," taxed at 4%.

The expression "including parts thereof" was added by an amendment, indicating that parts were taxable at 4% only after 09.05.2006.

The principle that a thing is a part of another if the other cannot function without it was applied. Wire ropes were deemed an essential part of Mobile Cranes, falling under Entry 155 and taxed at 4%.

The literature and specifications submitted by the respondent supported the indispensability of wire ropes for the effective functioning of Mobile Cranes.

Conclusion: The Court affirmed that "Mobile Crane Wire Ropes" should be taxed at 4% under Entry 155 of Schedule IV of the VAT Act based on their essential role in the functioning of Mobile Cranes. The decision aligns with the principle that a part is integral if the whole cannot operate without it.