Facts:

The lease between Bengal Chemicals and Pharmaceuticals Limited and Ajit Nain (Respondent) expired on May 31, 2014.

A meeting on May 20, 2014, discussed the lease renewal, but terms proposed by Bengal Chemicals were not agreed upon.

A letter on May 30, 2014, proposed new terms for renewal, including increased rent.

Respondent did not agree to the terms and has not paid rent since June 1, 2014, except for a deposit made in compliance with a court order.

Estate Officer issued a notice on May 23, 2018, under the Public Premises Act.

High Court quashed the Estate Officer's order, remitting the matter for fresh consideration.

Issues:

Validity of the proposed lease renewal terms.

Non-payment of rent by the respondent.

Legality of the Estate Officer's order and subsequent High Court decision.

Held:

The Court affirmed the High Court's decision, directing the respondent to pay damages for use and occupation. Respondent is ordered to pay Rs. 2,50,000 per month as damages from June 2014 to May 2018 and Rs. 3,00,000 per month from June 2018 until the matter is disposed of afresh by the Estate Officer. Arrears are to be paid in three equal installments. The Estate Officer will determine the appropriate quantum of damages. Appellant is permitted to withdraw the deposited amount, and water supply is to be restored on the deposit of the first installment. Failure to deposit any installment may result in forfeiture of the right of defense, leading to an eviction order.

FACTS:

The appellant filed applications seeking relief against interference in the working and management of Hamdard Laboratories. Despite a court judgment upholding his appointment as Chief Mutawalli, the respondents allegedly continued to assert joint management. An inadvertent mistake in the previous judgment, using the term 'management' instead of 'banking operations,' was noted.

ISSUES:

Whether the respondents were wrongfully asserting joint management despite the court's judgment.

Clarification of the term 'management' in the previous judgment, with a focus on the resolution dated April 28, 2015.

Apprehension of non-cooperation by respondents in approving payments.

Representation of Hamdard in various criminal proceedings against the appellant.

HELD:

The court acknowledged an inadvertent mistake in the use of the term 'management' and substituted it with 'banking operations.' The resolution dated April 28, 2015, related only to two bank accounts. The court clarified that the restoration of the order was about continuing arrangements related to banking operations voluntarily arrived at.( Paragraphs 9 and 10)

While acknowledging the appellant's apprehension of non-cooperation, the court expressed hope for resolution between the parties in the interest of Hamdard's reputation and charitable work.( Paragraph 11)

Contempt petitions were dismissed in view of the orders passed in the miscellaneous applications.( Paragraph 12)

An additional application seeking direction on representation in criminal proceedings was directed to be addressed in the civil suit, as it was beyond the scope of the appeals.( Paragraph 16)

Facts:

The appellant, P. Ramesh, was convicted for the murder of his wife and an offense under Section 498A of the Indian Penal Code. During the trial, the prosecution sought to adduce the evidence of PW-3 and PW-4, the minor children of the appellant and the deceased. However, the trial judge, based on the children's inability to identify the judge and lawyers, concluded that their testimony was unacceptable, leading to the appellant's conviction. The High Court, finding the trial judge's reasoning erroneous, remanded the case to assess the capacity of the child witnesses.

Issues:

Competency of child witnesses in criminal proceedings.

Appropriate judicial response to the trial judge's erroneous reasoning.

Held:

The High Court, in its appellate jurisdiction, exercised its powers under Section 386 of the CrPC to remand the case. The competency of child witnesses must be objectively assessed, and their evidence recorded in a child-friendly environment. The appellant has the right to cross-examine the witnesses. The decision to remand was justified, considering the erroneous approach of the trial judge, and the interests of justice. The Supreme Court affirmed the High Court's decision, dismissing the appeal.

Facts:

Appellant, Randhir Singh, enrolled in the 43 Armed Brigade in 1996.

Allegation: Inappropriately touching a colleague's spouse on 11th August 2007.

Summary Court Martial (SCM) held on 22nd May 2008, leading to appellant's dismissal.

Issues:

Legitimacy of convening an SCM almost a year after the alleged incident.

Proportionality of the dismissal as punishment.

Held:

The Court held that the convening of the SCM in May 2008, almost a year after the incident, was contrary to law as there was no grave reason for immediate action. Due to the significant time elapsed since the incident and the practical difficulty in finding witnesses, the Court did not order a new inquiry.

In the exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 142 of the Constitution of India, the Court modified the punishment. The appellant's discharge from service would take effect after completing fifteen years of service, making him eligible for pension benefits. The arrears of pension were to be paid within three months.

Final Result : Allowed

Facts:

Raman Singh appointed as an ad-hoc Lecturer in English on 11 August 1993.

Appointment against a short-term vacancy due to the incumbent's leave.

Regularly appointed lecturer's death on 1 October 1993 led to the appellant's continued service.

Management sought to absorb him into the substantive vacancy, but DIOS approval allegedly not received.

Writ petition filed in April 1996 seeking mandamus for permanent appointment and salary release.

DIOS declined approval in a letter dated 14 July 1994, citing non-compliance with relevant laws.

Appellant moved Supreme Court under Article 136, expressing no claim to the post but seeking to continue until a regular appointment.

Issues:

Validity of the ad-hoc appointment's conversion into a substantive appointment.

DIOS's non-approval and its legal implications.

Appellant's right to continue in service and receive salary.

Held:

The Supreme Court held that the ad-hoc appointment could not materialize into a substantive appointment after the incumbent's death. The DIOS had rejected the appointment over two decades ago, citing a violation of applicable laws. The appellant continued in service through interim orders, and the management proposed him as an in-charge Principal. The Court directed steps to fill the post regularly within four months and allowed the appellant to continue on an ad-hoc basis until a regular candidate is appointed. The Court also directed payment of the appellant's salary for the period he works until a regular candidate is appointed. The appeal is accordingly disposed of.

Facts:

The accused-respondents faced trial in Sessions trial No. 80 of 2014 for offenses under Sections 452, 302/34 of the Indian Penal Code. They were acquitted by the trial court on December 19, 2016. The State sought leave to appeal, but it was declined. The victim, Naval Kishore Mishra, filed an appeal, which was dismissed on November 23, 2017, based on the reasoning that leave had not been granted to the State for its appeal.

Issues:

Whether the victim has the right to prefer an appeal against an order of acquittal under Section 372 proviso to CrPC, as amended by Amendment Act 5 of 2009?

Whether the victim, being a legal heir, is required to seek leave as in the case of the State under Section 378 of the CrPC?

Held:

The court, relying on the recent judgment in Mallikariun Koclacialli (d) through legal representatives Vs. State of Karnataka & Ors., (2019) 2 SCC 752, held that the victim, as a legal heir, has the right to file an appeal without seeking leave under Section 372 proviso to CrPC. The court emphasized that the amendment in 2009 enlarged the rights of the victim. The appeal by the victim was wrongly dismissed on the ground that leave had not been granted to the State for its appeal.

Facts:

A tripartite memorandum of settlement was signed, outlining the payment terms for contract labor engaged by the Steel Authority of India Ltd. (SAIL).

Prohibition notification dated March 17, 1993, allowed contract labor engaged before the notification to continue working until April 1996.

No fresh agreement was executed during the period from March 17, 1993, to April 1996.

Contract labor sought parity with wages of direct/regular employees of SAIL.

Issues:

Whether the duties of each contract laborer were the same or similar to those of regular employees?

Applicability of the Minimum Wages Act, 1948, and the Contract Labour (Regulation and Abolition) Act, 1970, after the issuance of the prohibition notification.

Held:

The court observed that the burden was on the contract laborers to establish the similarity of duties with regular employees. In the absence of such proof, the onus could not be shifted to SAIL.

The court clarified that the Minimum Wages Act primarily focuses on fixing rates of minimum wages, overtime rates, and related matters. It is not intended for the enforcement of payment of wages, which is covered by other laws like the Payment of Wages Act, 1936, and the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947.

The Contract Labour (Regulation and Abolition) Act, 1970, is deemed a complete code regulating contract labor in certain establishments. The court emphasized that the Act doesn't provide for total abolition but regulates employment and can lead to abolition in specific circumstances.

After the prohibition notification, the provisions of the Contract Labour Act or Central Rules, 1971, would not be available to either party. The court asserted that the claimed minimum wages could be independently pursued under the Minimum Wages Act, 1948.

The court noted the inappropriate claim by contract laborers that, post-prohibition notification, they automatically became employees of SAIL. It emphasized that a mere assertion of similar work is insufficient to claim wages applicable universally to all steel industries.

Facts:

The case involved criminal appeals and a writ petition arising from Special Leave Petitions. The Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI) was the appellant, and the respondents faced charges under different sections of the IPC, Arms Act, and Prevention of Terrorism Act, 2002. The appeals were heard by a Division Bench comprising Arun Mishra and Vineet Saran, JJ.

Issues:

The misuse of the Forum of PIL, the examination of the merit of the case, the fairness of the CBI's investigation, and concerns about the bona fide nature of the petition filed.

Held:

The Court dismissed the petition, emphasizing that the Forum of PIL had been misused in this instance.

The court examined the case and found it to be meritless, stating that the CBI had thoroughly and fairly investigated the case, establishing the conspiracy between the accused persons.

Observations made by the High Court, which were set aside, were deemed based on a lopsided approach without considering the entire evidence on record.

The court expressed concerns about the bona fide nature of the petition and the undue interference in the course of justice.

The judgment clarified that, in the absence of a provision indicating who can move the court under Article 32, any member of the public acting bona fide can espouse the cause of a person or class of persons for the judicial enforcement of fundamental rights.

Decision: The petition was dismissed on the grounds that the Forum of PIL had been misused, and there was no merit found to direct further investigation or re-investigation. The concerns about the bona fide nature of the petition were highlighted, and the court emphasized the fairness of the CBI's investigation.