FACTS:

The appellant was removed from the position of Headmaster after allegations of misappropriation.

Two inquiries were conducted, and the High Court later quashed the removal order citing illegality in the second inquiry.

The appellant sought back wages, challenging the denial by the High Court.

ISSUES:

Legality of the termination.

Entitlement to back wages after reinstatement.

HELD:

The Court upheld the illegality of the second inquiry, emphasizing that reasons must be recorded for a fresh appointment of an inquiry officer. Citing CSHA University vs. BD Goyal, it stressed the duty to provide reasons in case of disagreement with the inquiry report.( Paragraph 8)

Referring to Hindustan Tin Works, the Court established the normal rule of granting full back wages in cases of wrongful termination. It acknowledged the financial situation of the Municipal Council but granted compensation of Rs 5 lakhs to the appellant in full and final settlement of his back-wages claim. It highlighted the discretionary power of the court to consider circumstances like length of service, nature of misconduct, and financial condition of the employer.( Paragraph 9-11)

Considering the impracticability of reopening proceedings after a long delay and the appellant's superannuation, the Court directed the payment of Rs 5 lakhs within two months. It clarified that this amount is in addition to the retiral benefits granted by the High Court.( Paragraph 12-14)

REFERRED CASES:

CSHA University vs. BD Goyal, (2010) 15 SCC 776

Deepali Gundu Surwase vs. Kranti Junior Adhyapak Mahavidyalaya ("Deepali Surwase"), (2013) 10 SCC 324

Hindustan Tin Works (P) Ltd vs. Employees ("Hindustan Tin Works"), (1979) 2 SCC 80

Indian Rly. Construction Co. Ltd. vs. Ajay Kumar, (2003) 4 SCC 579

P.G.I, of Medical Education & Research vs. Raj Kumar, (2001) 2 SCC 54

Surendra Kumar Verma vs. Central Government Industrial Tribunal-cum-Labour Court, (1980) 4 SCC 443

Susannah Sharp vs. Wakefield [(1891) AC 173

The State issued an advertisement for a departmental examination for the position of Land Records Inspector, and the dispute arose regarding the seniority of successful candidates. The appellants claimed their seniority based on the year in which the vacancies arose, leading to a legal challenge.

Facts:

The appellants appeared for the departmental examination on May 16, 2013.

Appointment orders were issued in 2012 for 80% seniority-cum-merit vacancies and in 2014 for the remaining 20% competitive exam vacancies.

A provisional seniority list issued on November 7, 2013, excluded the appellants.

Another seniority list on April 24, 2017, determined seniority as of April 1, 2014, placing the appellants below those promoted against vacancies arising after their promotional year.

The State ordered the removal of the appellants from the seniority list, treating them as appointed in 2014-15.

Issues:

The computation of seniority for Land Records Inspectors based on the year in which their vacancies arose.

Held:

The interplay between the Rajasthan Land Revenue (Land Records) Rules 1957, particularly Rules 171-A, 347-A, and 347-B, with the Rajasthan Subordinate Services Rules of different years, is crucial. Rule 347-A indicates that conditions of service are governed by enumerated rules, including the 1960 Rules, unless otherwise provided in the 1957 Rules.( Para 24)

Rule 171-A(2) prior to its October 2014 amendment contemplated determining seniority based on continuous officiation. The amendment changed it to determine seniority based on the recruitment year of promotion.( Para 26)

Part V of the 2001 Rules does not comprehend a limited competitive examination for accelerated promotion. Rule 35, applicable to promotions, has no relevance in the context of accelerated promotion through a limited competitive examination.( Para 29)

The deeming fiction in Rule 35(6) of the 2001 Rules, applicable to promotions made under a departmental promotion committee (DPC), does not extend to candidates recruited through a competitive examination for accelerated promotion.( Para 30)

Retrospective seniority cannot be granted from a date when the employee was not borne on a cadre. Seniority must be counted from the date of initial entry into the grade.( Para 31)

The 1960 Rules give way to Rule 171-A(2) of the 1957 Rules, which determines seniority based on continuous officiation.( Para 34)

Rule 347-B of the 1957 Rules does not aid the appellants, and the 1972 Rules mentioned in Rule 347-B have no application to the present case governed by Rule 284 of the 1957 Rules.( Para 35)

Facts:

The first respondent joined the school on probation for one year on July 1, 2008, but continued as a probationer for almost five years until being discharged on June 30, 2013.

Issues:

Whether the words "by another year" appearing in Rule 105(1) limit the total duration of permissible probation to two years.

Whether the 1973 Rules require the issuance of an order of confirmation for a probationer to be confirmed in service.

Held:

Interpretation of Rule 105(1) – "by another year": 1.1 The words "by another year" imply an extension of the probationary period by one additional year over and above the mandatory year, making the total probationary period two years. 1.2 Rule 105(1) imposes a limitation on the total probationary period to two years, with the first proviso exempting minority institutions from the Director's prior approval. (Para 23-33)

Confirmation of Service and Rule 105(2): 2.1 Rule 105(2) stipulates that an order of confirmation may be issued if the work and conduct of the employee during the probationary period are found satisfactory. 2.2 The mere continuation of services beyond the probationary period does not lead to deemed confirmation. Confirmation requires the issuance of a formal order. (Para 35-38)

Decision and Award of Compensation: The High Court's decision of deeming confirmation was set aside. However, due to the prolonged probationary period, the court awarded ex-gratia compensation of Rs. 5,00,000 to the first respondent under its power under Article 142 of the Constitution. (Para 47-48)

Facts:

The Government of Kerala, in 1972, specified qualifications for the post of Health Inspector/Food Inspector Grade-II.

In 2014, KPSC advertised vacancies for Junior Health Inspector Grade-II, including the Sanitary Inspectors' Certificate. Candidates with a DHIC qualification were included in shortlists.

A Committee conducted a comparative study of DHIC and SIDC, concluding that DHIC is a higher qualification.

Tribunal and High Court held that there was a clear distinction between qualifications for the same post in different departments.

Issues:

Interpretation of Rule 10(a)(ii) concerning the recognition of DHIC as a higher qualification.

Whether DHIC presupposes the completion of the certificate course.

Held:

The Supreme Court observed that none of the conditions stipulated in Rule 10(a)(ii) were fulfilled. It emphasized the lack of a determination of equivalence by any executive order or standing order of the State Government and the absence of a finding that DHIC presupposes the acquisition of the lower qualification. The Court distinguished a previous case (Jyoti K K) and concluded that the judgment of the High Court did not suffer from error. The appeals were dismissed.

Facts:

The case involves a dispute related to the unauthorized use of electricity, specifically addressing instances of tampering with meters. The appellant, West Bengal State Electricity Distribution Company Ltd. & Ors., sought legal clarification on the powers of authorities under Sections 126 and 135 of the Electricity Act, 2003.

Issues:

The defining unauthorized use of electricity, determining the authorities' powers to make assessments under Section 126(1), and understanding the interplay between criminal complaints for theft under Section 135 and assessment proceedings.

Held:

The court emphasized that unauthorized use of electricity, as per Section 126(6)(b), encompasses various scenarios, including tampering with meters.[Para 9, 11]

The power conferred on authorities under Section 126(1) allows for provisional and final assessments, even in cases of unauthorized use through theft.Distinction between Section 126 and Section 135 clarified; Section 126 focuses on revenue loss due to unauthorized use, while Section 135 addresses the riminal offense of theft.The court rejected the notion that proceedings under Section 126(1) and Section 154(5) operate parallelly, emphasizing their distinct nature.[Para 12]

Simultaneous initiation of criminal complaints for theft and assessment proceedings under Section 126(1) is permissible, especially in cases of unauthorized use amounting to theft.[Para 14]

Decision: The appeal was allowed, affirming the authorities' power to make provisional and final assessments under Section 126(1) even when criminal complaints for theft are lodged simultaneously.

Facts:

The case involves a criminal appeal by Pramod Suryabhan Pawar against the State of Maharashtra. The appellant faced charges under various sections of the IPC and the SC/ST Act based on allegations of sexual assault and insulting messages.

Issues:

The validity of the FIR, specifically addressing the alleged false promise of marriage and insulting messages.

The court needed to determine whether the "misconception of fact" regarding the promise vitiated the woman's consent and whether the SC/ST Act offenses were established.

Held:

The court emphasized the cautious use of its inherent powers under s.482 to quash an FIR, considering the denial of the prosecution's opportunity to establish its case. (Para 7, 8)

The judgment clarified the legal principles surrounding consent in sexual offenses (s.375 IPC), highlighting the distinction between false promises and breaches of promises made in good faith. (Para 9, 10, 12-14, 16)

The "misconception of fact" alleged by the complainant (promise to marry) did not vitiate consent, as the allegations did not indicate the promise was false or made in bad faith.(Para 18, 19, 20)

The offenses under the SC/ST Act were not established, as the relevant provisions were not enacted when the alleged messages were sent, and the acts did not meet the criteria of the amended Act.(Para 21, 22)

Decision: The court allowed the appeal, quashing the FIR against the appellant.

Facts:

Dr. P. S. Malik, serving as an Additional District Judge, faced written complaints of sexual harassment at the workplace. The complaints were submitted by a lady Junior Judicial Assistant who worked in the petitioner's court. The petitioner was subsequently suspended, and an Internal Complaints Committee was constituted to investigate the matter.

Issues:

The petitioner contended that, due to the existence of an Inquiry Report by the Internal Complaints Committee, the High Court lacked the authority to initiate an inquiry or suspend him.

Additionally, concerns were raised regarding the non-supply of the Preliminary Inquiry Report dated 05.11.2016 to the petitioner.

Held:

The term "control" in Article 235 includes disciplinary control over judicial officers. Disciplinary authority for judicial officers lies with the High Court, allowing it to initiate disciplinary proceedings and suspend members of the judiciary.[Para 9, 14, 16]

The Sexual Harassment of Women at Workplace Act, 2013, including Sections 11 and 13, addresses mechanisms for protecting the dignity and welfare of women at the workplace. These provisions do not impede the High Court's control over judicial officers.[Para 18-21]

The Full Court's decision to suspend the petitioner and initiate the inquiry on 13.07.2016 was deemed error-free. The Preliminary Inquiry Report dated 05.11.2016 did not contain findings but recommended an inquiry. The Inquiry Report dated 09.03.2018, submitted after the completion of the inquiry, was supplied to the petitioner. The right of appeal is granted under Section 18 only when the report is submitted under Section 13 to the employer.[Para 22, 24-26]

The petitioner's argument that the non-supply of the Preliminary Inquiry Report dated 05.11.2016 vitiated the proceedings was not accepted, as the report did not contain findings against the petitioner.[Para 26]

Decision: The writ petition was dismissed, affirming the High Court's authority to initiate disciplinary proceedings. The court held that no prejudice was caused to the petitioner by the non-supply of the Preliminary Inquiry Report. The petitioner retained the right to raise all pleas of facts and law during the ongoing disciplinary proceedings.

Facts:

On 08.01.1984, the deceased, Ram Autar, was attacked in his courtyard by appellant No.1 and others, resulting in a gunshot injury.

Witnesses presented inconsistent statements on who fired the fatal shots, leading to contradictions in the evidence.

Issues:

Identification of the person responsible for the fatal gunshot.

Application of Section 34 IPC to establish common intention.

Held:

The High Court affirmed the conviction under Section 302 IPC read with Section 34 IPC.

Even if appellant No.1 was identified as the shooter, the conviction of appellant No.2 was sustained with the aid of Section 34 IPC.

Section 34 IPC requires the establishment of common intention and the commission of the crime by more than one person in furtherance of that intention.

Presence of appellant No.2 with a rifle was established by consistent eyewitness evidence.

The court concluded that appellant No.2 acted in concert with appellant No.1, sharing the common intention, justifying the invocation of Section 34 IPC.

The appeal against appellant No.2 was dismissed, affirming the life imprisonment sentence.

The appeal against appellant No.1 was dismissed as abated due to his demise.

Facts:

The competent authority issued a detention order under Section 3(1) of the COFEPOSA Act, leading to the detainment of the respondent. The order was subsequently referred to the Advisory Board for evaluation.

Issues:

The Advisory Board's opinion, which, in its report, asserted that there was no sufficient cause for the continued detention of the respondent under Section 3(1) of the COFEPOSA Act.

Held:

In accordance with Article 22, Clause (4) of the Constitution, no law permitting preventive detention can authorize detention beyond three months unless an Advisory Board reports, within that period, that there is sufficient cause for such detention. The Advisory Board holds exclusive authority to determine the sufficiency of cause for detention.( Para 9)

Provisions in Section 8 of the COFEPOSA Act outline the procedure for reference to the Advisory Board, emphasizing the confidentiality of the assessment report and the non-confidential nature of the opinion. If the Advisory Board opines that there is no sufficient cause for detention, the appropriate government must revoke the order.( Para 10)

The nature of the opinion provided by the Advisory Board is neither judicial nor quasi-judicial. Treating it as a judgment of a criminal court is deemed erroneous. The opinion serves to assist the government and is binding only if it favors the detenu. It cannot be reviewed or scrutinized by judicial courts or tribunals.( Para 15)

Decision: The petition challenging the Advisory Board's opinion is deemed not maintainable, as the Advisory Board's role is confined to providing an opinion for the government's consideration.