Facts:

The Uttar Pradesh Secondary Education Services Selection Board conducted an examination for recruitment of Trained Graduate Teachers in January 2009.

Multiple challenges were made to the examination process, leading to litigation in the Allahabad High Court.

Conflicting judgments were passed by different Single Judges of the High Court regarding the correctness of certain questions and answers.

Re-evaluation of answer sheets was directed by a Single Judge, which was upheld by a Division Bench, and disputed questions were referred to an Expert Committee.

The case eventually reached the Supreme Court due to the prolonged legal proceedings and lack of finality in the examination results.

Issues:

Whether the High Court's interference in re-evaluating answer sheets was justified.

What should be the appropriate course of action considering the multiple evaluations and legal complexities of the case.

Held:

The Supreme Court expressed concern over the prolonged litigation and lack of finality in the examination process, emphasizing the importance of judicial discipline.

The Court reiterated established principles regarding re-evaluation of answer sheets, emphasizing it should be allowed only in exceptional cases where a material error is clearly demonstrated.

The burden of proof lies heavily on the candidate to show that a key answer is incorrect without any inferential reasoning.

A middle path was chosen by the Court, directing the declaration of results based on the third evaluation of answer sheets.

Candidates already working as Trained Graduate Teachers, if found unsuccessful in the third declaration, would be allowed to continue in their positions.

Newly selected candidates would be appointed as Trained Graduate Teachers through supernumerary posts, without entitlement to consequential benefits.

The Court concluded by issuing directions to implement its decision and expressed disappointment with the handling of the case by the lower courts, stressing the importance of judicial discipline.

Facts:

Trilok Singh Chauhan (Appellant) owned Shop No. 46 Adarsh Gram Chauhan Market, Yatra Bus Station, Rishikesh.

Ram Lal (Respondent) operated a cloth business as a tenant in the shop.

Appellant issued a notice to respondent on 07.09.2001, alleging non-payment of rent since December 2000 and demanding payment within one month, failing which the tenancy would be terminated.

Appellant filed a case seeking recovery of rent, compensation, and eviction of respondent.

During the trial, issues were framed, including the determination of the rate of rent.

Trial Court found in favor of the appellant, holding the rate of rent at Rs. 1500/- per month, and issued a decree of eviction against the respondent.

High Court, exercising its revisional jurisdiction under Section 25 of the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act, 1887, set aside the Trial Court's decision, holding the rate of rent to be Rs. 250/- per month.

Issues:

Whether the High Court erred in setting aside the Trial Court's findings on the rate of rent.

Whether the Trial Court failed to consider additional issues framed during the trial.

Held:

The Supreme Court held that the High Court's decision to set aside the Trial Court's findings on the rate of rent was unsustainable. The Trial Court's decision was based on evidence, including a reference to the Evaluation List and an adverse inference drawn against the respondent. The High Court failed to adequately address these factors. Moreover, the High Court's revisional jurisdiction under Section 25 of the Act, 1887, is limited and can only be exercised in specific circumstances. Since none of these circumstances were present in this case, the High Court erred in interfering with the Trial Court's decision. Additionally, the argument regarding the Trial Court's failure to consider additional issues was rejected, as the notice clearly indicated termination of tenancy and there was no question of waiver. Therefore, the Supreme Court allowed the appeal, set aside the High Court's judgment, and restored the Trial Court's decree.

Facts:

Aftaruddin, an under-raiyat, allegedly executed a sale deed transferring land to Mamataj Begam, daughter of the raiyat.

Mamataj Begam subsequently transferred the land to the plaintiffs.

The plaintiffs filed a suit for declaration of their title over the land.

Issues:

Whether Aftaruddin, being an under-raiyat, had the legal right to transfer the land.

The effect of misrepresentation in the sale deed regarding Aftaruddin's status as a raiyat.

Held:

Aftaruddin, as an under-raiyat, was prohibited from transferring his rights in the land under Section 108 of the Tripura Land Revenue and Land Reforms Act, 1960.

The sale deed's misrepresentation of Aftaruddin as a raiyat was a subterfuge to circumvent the law, which was impermissible.

The subsequent purchasers couldn't benefit from this fraud, as the protection provided by Section 108 couldn't be negated by such tactics.

The High Court's decision was set aside, and the trial court's judgment was restored, thereby dismissing the appeal.

Facts:

The appellant, Asharfi, and another individual, Udai Bhan, were accused of forcibly entering the house of the victim, Phoola Devi, on the intervening night of 8/9.12.1995, and committing rape.

The appellant was convicted by the trial court for offenses including house trespass, rape, and causing hurt, along with a charge under Section 3(2)(v) of the SC/ST Prevention of Atrocities Act.

The conviction and sentence were affirmed by the High Court, leading to Asharfi's appeal to the Supreme Court.

Issues:

Whether the evidence supported the conviction and sentencing under the relevant sections of the IPC and the SC/ST Prevention of Atrocities Act.

Specifically, the Court had to determine if the offense of rape was committed with the intention of targeting the victim because of her caste identity, as required by Section 3(2)(v) of the SC/ST Prevention of Atrocities Act.

Held:

The Court upheld the conviction and ten-year sentence under Section 376(2)(g) IPC for rape, based on the evidence provided by the prosecution, including the victim's testimony and medical evidence.

However, the Court set aside the conviction and life imprisonment sentence under Section 3(2)(v) of the SC/ST Prevention of Atrocities Act, as the evidence did not establish that the appellant committed the offense specifically because the victim belonged to a Scheduled Caste. This section required proof of intention to target the victim based on her caste identity, which was lacking in this case.

Therefore, the appellant's appeal was partially allowed, with the conviction and sentence under Section 376(2)(g) IPC and other offenses upheld, while the conviction and sentence under Section 3(2)(v) of the SC/ST Prevention of Atrocities Act were set aside.

As the appellant had already served more than ten years in prison, the Court ordered his immediate release unless he was required in any other case.

Facts:

The appellant, Manjeet Singh, purchased a second-hand Tata open truck insured by the respondent insurance company. The truck was stolen by passengers who were given a lift by the truck driver. The insurance company repudiated the claim on the grounds of breach of policy terms due to unauthorized passengers.

Issues:

Whether giving a lift to passengers constituted a fundamental breach of the insurance policy.

Whether ongoing arbitration proceedings between the finance company and the appellant affected the appellant's rights against the insurance company.

Held:

The Supreme Court held that the act of giving a lift to passengers, although a breach of policy terms, was not a fundamental breach that would nullify the insurance policy.

Furthermore, the Court found that ongoing arbitration proceedings between the finance company and the appellant did not affect the appellant's rights against the insurance company.

Therefore, the Supreme Court allowed the appeal and directed the insurance company to pay 75% of the insured amount along with interest and additional compensation to the appellant. The amount was to be deposited before the District Forum, with priority given to settling the finance company's claim if not already resolved through arbitration.

Facts:

The case pertains to the applicability of the Modified Assured Career Progression (MACP) scheme for PBORs in the Indian armed forces. The dispute arises from differing interpretations regarding the effective date of the MACP scheme, whether it should be implemented from January 1, 2006, or from September 1, 2008. The 6th Central Pay Commission recommended changes to the pay structure, pay bands, grade pay, and pension, which were accepted by the Central Government through a resolution dated August 30, 2008.

Issues:

Whether the MACP scheme, being part of the pay structure, should be applicable from January 1, 2006, as per the government resolution, or from September 1, 2008, as argued by the Union of India to prevent potential financial implications for employees.

Held:

The court held that the MACP scheme should be applicable from January 1, 2006, based on the government's resolution accepting the 6th CPC recommendations. The resolution clearly stated that changes in pay structure, pay bands, grade pay, and pension would be effective from January 1, 2006. The court emphasized that the MACP scheme is part of the pay structure and affects grade pay and pension, as supported by Annexure-I of the resolution.

The court dismissed the government's argument regarding potential financial implications and stated that the intention of the government, as reflected in the resolution, was clear. Additionally, administrative instructions issued later, such as the letter of May 30, 2011, contradicting the resolution, were deemed invalid. The court found no merit in the appeals and disposed of them accordingly.

Facts:

A works contract was awarded by the Union of India to M/S. Susaka Pvt. Ltd.

Disputes arose between the parties, leading to arbitration proceedings.

The Arbitral Tribunal partly allowed the claims of M/S. Susaka Pvt. Ltd.

The Union of India challenged the arbitral award under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act before the Bombay High Court.

The Single Judge partially allowed the appeal, modifying the award of interest on certain claims.

M/S. Susaka Pvt. Ltd. appealed against the modification before the Division Bench, which set aside the Single Judge's order.

The Union of India appealed to the Supreme Court.

Issues:

Whether the Arbitral Tribunal was justified in awarding interest on various claims.

Whether the Union of India waived or abandoned its objection regarding interest payments.

Held:

The Supreme Court held that the Union of India had waived its objection regarding interest payments by not raising it at earlier stages of the proceedings. The court noted that the Union of India did not appeal the part of the Single Judge's order that rejected their application under Section 34 of the Act in relation to other claims. Therefore, the court found no merit in the appeal and upheld the decision of the High Court and the arbitral award in favor of M/S. Susaka Pvt. Ltd.

The court emphasized the principle of waiver and held that parties must raise objections at appropriate stages of proceedings. Since the objection regarding interest payments was not raised earlier, the appellant could not raise it for the first time in the Supreme Court. Therefore, the appeal was dismissed.

Facts:

The State Government of Maharashtra introduced a subsidy scheme in the form of exemption of entertainment duty for newly set up Multiplex Theatre Complexes for three years, followed by a reduced rate of 25% for the subsequent two years.

The scheme aimed to promote the construction of Multiplex Theatre Complexes to address the declining occupancy in traditional cinema theatres.

Issues:

Whether the subsidy provided to Multiplex Theatre Complexes should be classified as a capital or revenue receipt under the Income Tax Act.

Held:

The Court held that the subsidy provided to Multiplex Theatre Complexes constitutes a capital receipt. The purpose test was applied to determine the nature of the subsidy, focusing on whether it was intended to assist in setting up new units or expanding existing ones.

The Court observed that the objective of the subsidy scheme was to facilitate the construction of new cinema houses, aligning with the purpose of capital investment.

It was emphasized that the point of time at which the subsidy is paid, the source of the subsidy, and the form of subsidy are irrelevant in determining its nature.

The Court dismissed the appeals filed by the Revenue, affirming that the subsidy provided by the State Government was indeed of a capital nature and not a revenue receipt.

Facts:The respondent was charged under Section 376 of the Indian Penal Code. He approached the High Court seeking the summoning of material not included in the chargesheet under Section 91 of the CrPC. The High Court allowed this application, contrary to the decision of the trial court. The appellants challenged this decision in the Supreme Court.

Issues:

Whether the High Court's decision to allow the summoning of material not part of the chargesheet under Section 91 of the CrPC was contrary to established law.

Whether the defense could be considered at the stage of framing charges, potentially leading to a mini-trial.

Held:The Supreme Court held that while ordinarily, the accused cannot invoke Section 91 of the CrPC at the stage of framing charges, the court has the authority to summon material not included in the chargesheet if the interest of justice demands it. However, this does not confer an automatic right to the defense to invoke Section 91 at this stage. The court emphasized that the necessity or desirability of summoning a document should be assessed concerning the stage when the request is made and the party making the request. The court set aside the view taken by the High Court and directed the trial court to proceed with the issue of framing charges based on the observations made. The trial court was instructed to handle the matter expeditiously and in accordance with the law.

This decision is in line with the observations made in Debendra Nath Padhi and Hardeep Singh cases, where the court emphasized the court's duty to uphold justice and the rule of law, even if it means summoning material not included in the chargesheet.