Facts:

Dispute over two bank guarantees provided by the appellant bank in favor of the 1st respondent-plaintiff, related to the supply of plant and equipment by the 2nd respondent (defendant no. 2).

Appellant Bank claimed that the invocation of bank guarantees was not in accordance with their terms and, therefore, not liable to make payment.

Issues:

Whether the invocation of the bank guarantees was in accordance with their terms?

Could the appellant Bank dispute the invocation once the demand was made in compliance with the bank guarantees?

Held:

The bank guarantee is an independent contract, and the bank is obliged to honor it as long as it is unconditional and irrevocable.

Dispute between the beneficiary and the party at whose instance the bank gave the guarantee is immaterial.

Exceptions to interference by the Court: fraud, irretrievable injustice, or special equities.

Once demand is made in compliance with bank guarantees, the bank is obligated to pay unless falling within exceptions.

The appellant Bank's defense did not fall within the exceptions; hence, the Court should not interfere with invocation or encashment of the bank guarantee.

The appeal was dismissed.

Facts:

The respondent was granted a lease of a plot in 1981.

The State government formulated a scheme in 2003 for the conversion of residential leasehold plots to freehold.

The respondent applied for conversion in 2003, but issues arose due to alleged encroachment on government land.

Various communications and inspections took place over the years, addressing the encroachment concerns.

The State eventually granted permission for conversion in 2014, conditional on a specified payment.

Issues:

Whether the High Court was correct in directing the State to recompute the conversion charges based on the rate applicable in 2003.

The relevance of encroachment on government land in the conversion process.

Held:

The Court held that the High Court was in error in directing the State to recompute the conversion charges based on the rate applicable in 2003. The Court emphasized that the application for conversion must comply with the governing provisions of the policy set by the State government, and compliance is necessary for the right to claim conversion. The respondent was directed to pay the conversion charges on the date when a final decision was taken, considering the absence of encroachment.

Facts:

Appellant Nos. 1 & 2 filed original returns under Section 139(1) for A.Y. 2016-17.

Schemes of arrangement and amalgamation with 9 companies were entered into, with the appointed date as of 01.01.2015.

Revised Returns were manually filed after obtaining sanction from NCLT on 27.11.2018.

Department contended non-filing of application for condonation of delay and sought permission from CBDT.

Notice u/s. 143(2) to give effect to the scheme approval was withdrawn by the Department.

Writ petitions were filed by appellants challenging the Department's stance.

Issues:

Whether Section 139(5) is applicable in the case of revised returns filed after schemes' approval from NCLT.

Whether delay in filing was due to an omission or wrong statement.

Held:

Section 139(5) not applicable; revised returns not filed due to omission or wrong statement, but due to time taken for NCLT's sanction (Para 7).

Impossibility for assessee companies to file revised Returns before 31.03.2018, given NCLT's approval on 22.04.2018 and 01.05.2018 (Para 8).

Section 119(2)(b) not applicable as it is for cases of genuine hardship, not restructuring with NCLT's approval (Para 9).

Rules of procedure construed as the handmaiden of justice; purpose of assessment proceedings is to assess tax liability correctly (Para 9).

Department required to assess income of appellants post-amalgamation as per Section 170(1) of the Income Tax Act (Para 10).

Decision: Appeals allowed; Division Bench's judgment set aside.

Facts:

The Jharkhand Public Service Commission (JPSC) issued an advertisement on 19.07.2006 for the Jharkhand Eligibility Test (JET).

The test, known as the State Level Eligibility Test (SLET), is conducted to determine the eligibility of candidates for the appointment as lecturers.

The test comprises three papers, and the advertisement indicated that only candidates obtaining 50% marks in Paper I and II would be eligible for Paper III.

Issues:

The main issue revolved around the fixation of minimum marks for Paper III in the eligibility test.

The writ petitioner obtained 50% marks in Papers I and II but did not meet the 60% cut-off fixed by JPSC for Paper III.

The High Court allowed the writ petition, asserting that fixing the qualifying marks amounted to changing the rules mid-selection process.

Held:

The Division Bench held that the moderation committee, constituted as per the UGC scheme, is responsible for deciding the cut-off marks for each subject.

Emphasized that there was no need to fix qualifying marks for Paper III at the advertisement stage.

Disagreed with the High Court's view that the rules were changed mid-process, asserting that no minimum marks for Paper III were specified initially.

Concluded that the High Court erred in holding that JPSC couldn't fix the minimum marks for Paper III.

Civil Appeal No. 9441 of 2019 by JPSC was allowed, and Civil Appeal No. 9442 of 2019 filed by the writ petitioner was dismissed.

Facts:

The appellant, Kanwar Pal Singh, challenged criminal prosecution under various sections, including Section 379 of IPC and Sections 3 and 4 of the Prevention of Damage to Public Property Act.

Allegations included illegal sand mining outside the permitted area based on a complaint by a Mines Department surveyor.

Issues:

Violation of Section 22 of the Mines Regulation Act, which requires a complaint by an authorized person for cognizance, and the interplay of this provision with IPC Section 379.

Whether the police could investigate the violation of Section 4 of the Mines Regulation Act.

Held:

The court clarified that the violation of Section 4 is a cognizable offense, allowing the police to investigate without any bar under the Mines Regulation Act, unlike certain provisions in other statutes (Para. 11).

The court emphasized the distinction between offenses under Section 21 of the Mines Regulation Act and Section 379 of the IPC, rejecting the argument that the actions constituted the "same offense" (Para. 7).

The court highlighted the importance of preventing illegal sand mining due to its adverse effects on the environment and public resources (Para. 69).

The court directed the trial court to independently assess factual allegations and decide the charges in accordance with the law (Para. 12).

Facts:

The appellant, Khaja Bilal Ahmed, faced a detention order based on his alleged involvement in unlawful activities. The order referred to fourteen cases between 2007 and 2016, claiming an antecedent criminal history. The appellant obtained bail in a 2018 criminal case, and the detention order was served while he was in jail. The order was confirmed on November 2, 2018.

Issues:

The appellant contested the detention order, asserting that the grounds provided were stale and irrelevant. The confirmation order's presentation raised doubts about its existence. The detaining authority considered cases that were not relied upon, leading to contradictory claims.

Held:

The order of detention referenced criminal cases from 2007 to 2016 to establish the appellant's antecedent criminal history. The detaining authority's claim that these cases were not relied upon but only referred to for background is contradictory. The Telangana Offenders Act 1986 requires relevant, non-stale material for detention. Reference to past cases lacks a clear causal connection, violating Section 3.( Para 15)

Section 12 of the Telangana Offenders Act 1986 gives the government discretion to confirm a detention order based on the Advisory Board's report. The detenu was in custody from October 25, 2018, to February 27, 2019. The order of confirmation surfaced in an additional affidavit, casting doubt on its existence during the relevant period.( Para 16)

The order of confirmation, dated December 28, 2018, was not served on the detenu until February 27, 2019. Its sudden appearance in a later affidavit raises serious doubts about its authenticity during the detention period.( Para 17–19)

The detention order is set aside due to stale and irrelevant grounds and doubts about the confirmation order's existence. The detaining authority lacked a reasonable basis to conclude that the appellant, upon release on bail, would engage in prejudicial activity. The High Court's decision is overturned, and the order of detention is quashed.( Para 20–21)

Facts:

The case involves a contract between M/S. Dyna Technologies Pvt. Ltd. (appellant) and M/S. Crompton Greaves Ltd. (respondent) for an aquaculture unit. The respondent issued a work order for construction, but on 05.01.95, instructed the appellant to stop the work, leading to a claim for compensation. The dispute was referred to an Arbitral Tribunal.

Issues:

Disallowance of Claim No. 3 (loss of profit) by the Arbitral Tribunal.

Acceptance of Claim No. 2 (losses due to unproductive use of machineries) by the Arbitral Tribunal.

Adequacy and intelligibility of reasoning in the arbitral award under Sections 31(3) and 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act.

Held:

Section 34 limits challenges to an award, respecting the finality of arbitral decisions. Courts should exercise caution, deferring to the view of the Arbitral Tribunal, unless there's unpardonable perversity in the award.

Arbitration proceedings differ from judicial proceedings. The choice of arbitration reflects commercial wisdom, allowing parties to opt for arbitrators without legal experience.

Section 31(3) mandates intelligible and adequate reasoning in arbitral awards. Challenges based on impropriety or perversity in reasoning fall under Section 34, while challenges on unintelligibility equate to providing no reasons.

Section 34(4) provides for curable defects, and remanding to the tribunal is considered unless impractical, as in cases taking more than 25 years for adjudication.

The award, lacking adequate reasoning and relying on respondent approval, is unintelligible and unsustainable. The court directs payment of Rs. 30,00,000/- to the appellant within 8 weeks, settling claim No. 2, or face 12% p.a. interest until payment, bringing an end to the prolonged litigation.

Facts:

The review petitions stem from a legal dispute involving M/S SHANTI CONDUCTORS (P) LTD. and ASSAM STATE ELECTRICITY BOARD. The petitioner contends errors in the original judgment concerning the bar of time in a money suit related to interest on the principal amount.

Issues:

Whether there is an apparent error in the original judgment regarding the bar of time in the suit.

Whether the petitioner is entitled to the benefit of Section 19 of the Limitation Act.

Whether the Interest on Delayed Payment to Small Scale and Ancillary Industrial Undertakings Act, 1993, is applicable.

Held:

The Court emphasized the importance of specific pleadings for claiming exemption from the law of limitation. The petitioner failed to plead for the benefit of Section 19, and the proviso of Order VII Rule 6 cannot rescue the plaintiff. The Court rejected the claim for the benefit of Section 14 of the Limitation Act, stating that the writ petition filed by the Association was by a different entity. The scope of review is limited, and the petitioner cannot reargue previously addressed questions.

The Court rejected the submission that there is an error apparent on the face of the record regarding the date of bill for payment and the enforcement of the Interest on Delayed Payment to Small Scale and Ancillary Industrial Undertakings Act, 1993.

The Court clarified that the grounds on which the petitioner sought review were not proved, and the High Court did not grant interest under Act, 1993. The maintainability of the appeal was considered and found against the petitioner.

Decision: The review petitions (C) Nos. 786–787 of 2019 were dismissed, and review petition (C) No.789 of 2019 was rejected. The Court upheld the judgment dated 23.01.2019.

Facts:

The appellants, drivers in different government departments, claimed entitlement to Selection Grade and Special Grade pay scales. The High Court rejected their claim, asserting that they were not lawfully entitled to these scales.

Issues:

The appellants' claim for parity, the lawfulness of their entitlement to the claimed pay scales, and the interpretation of Article 14 in this context.

Held:

The court highlighted that the dismissal of Special Leave Petitions (SLPs) by the Supreme Court does not affirm the lower court's decision. The High Court had misread a previous decision, leading to a different conclusion. Judicial discipline suggests a referral to a larger Bench in such situations, but for expeditious disposal, remand to the High Court is deemed inappropriate.

The appellants failed to justify their entitlement to the claimed pay scales. The court traced the pay scales through various revisions applicable to government drivers. The determined pay scales were Rs. 4000-6000 and Rs. 4300-6000, not the claimed Rs. 5000-8000 and Rs. 5500-9000.

The court reiterated that Article 14 cannot be invoked to claim a benefit unlawfully, emphasizing positive equality. The jurisdiction of a higher court cannot be based on a wrong order from a lower forum.

The appellants are not entitled to the claimed pay scales solely based on earlier court decisions. They are only entitled to the pay scales of Rs. 4000-6000 and Rs. 4300-6000 as per G.O. Ms. No. 162.

Regarding another set of civil appeals, the drivers concerned, not entitled to promotional avenues, are directed to receive benefits under Schedule II of the 1998 Rules at Rs. 3200-4900, Rs. 4000-6000, and Rs. 4300-6000.