Facts:

Respondent No. 1, a school teacher, faced termination for objectionable behavior with girl students. Criminal proceedings were initiated, leading to two FIRs and subsequent police investigation.

Issues:

The key issues revolved around the termination process, the Inquiry Committee's findings, and the delayed decisions of the Nominee of Respondent No. 1 and the State Awardee Teacher due to concerns about contempt of court.

Held:

The Court emphasized the seriousness of the allegations, noting that two FIRs were filed, investigations conducted, and chargesheets filed, supporting prima facie evidence of the accusations.( Para 14)

The Court referred to the need for a sensitive approach in cases of sexual harassment, emphasizing the broader probabilities and the obligation to rely on the victim's statement when credible.( Para 15)

Highlighted that the Management had not acted hastily and had followed due process, including intimation to the Department and constitution of an Inquiry Committee. The termination decision was justified based on the Committee's findings.( Para 16)

The Tribunal and High Court's failure to appreciate the matter correctly was noted, and the appeal was allowed, setting aside the decisions of the lower courts and affirming the order of termination.( Para 17)

Facts:

Plaintiffs (Respondent Nos. 1-3) filed a suit seeking perpetual injunction against the defendants, including the appellants (Defendant Nos. 1 and 2).

Appellants contested the suit, and the Trial Court dismissed it. The First Appellate Court upheld the dismissal.

Plaintiffs appealed in the High Court, which allowed the appeal, setting aside the lower court's decision and decreeing perpetual injunction.

Issues:

Whether the High Court was justified in allowing the plaintiffs' second appeal and decreeing perpetual injunction.

Validity of concurrent findings of fact by the Trial Court and First Appellate Court.

Held:

The High Court erred in interfering with the concurrent findings of fact. The Trial Court and First Appellate Court had rightly concluded that the plaintiffs failed to prove the necessary elements for perpetual injunction.

Possession by one co-sharer is deemed possession by all, unless denial of rights, exclusion, and ouster occur for the statutory period.

The plaintiffs did not establish exclusive possession, and the appellants, as purchasers from a co-sharer, had the right to defend their title and possession.

The High Court failed to appreciate the legal and factual context and wrongly interfered with the concurrent findings. The appeal was allowed, and the Trial Court's judgment dismissing the suit was restored.

Facts:

Marriage solemnized in 2006 between the appellant-wife and respondent-husband.

In 2009, a son named Krish alias Master Krishav Gautam was born.

In 2012, the respondent-husband filed a divorce petition under Section 13(1)(ia)(iii) of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955.

Trial Court decreed the divorce petition ex-parte, directing the son to be admitted to Col. Satsangi's Kiran Memorial Public School, New Delhi.

Appellant-wife filed an appeal against the ex-parte order.

Dispute arose regarding the school where the child should study, leading to conflicting directions.

Issues:

Custody and schooling arrangements for the child.

Violation of court orders regarding the child's education.

Maintenance for the appellant-wife.

Held:

The boy, Krish @ Master Krishav Gautam, expressed a desire to continue studying in his old school, Global International School, Shahjanpur.

In the interest of the child's welfare, he cannot be compelled to join Col. Satsangi's Kiran Memorial Public School, New Delhi.

High Court directions regarding the child's admission were set aside.

The appellant-wife is directed to elect one forum for maintenance.

The respondent-husband, being the natural father, is granted visitation rights. He can take the child on Sundays and public holidays.

The child is allowed to continue studying at Global International School, Shahjanpur.

High Court is requested to dispose of the appeal expeditiously.

Facts:

The appellant, G. Ramesh, filed a complaint under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 against Vainqueur Corporate Services, a partnership firm.

The complaint alleged dishonour of cheques issued by the accused (partners) for data entry work.

The High Court, through a petition under Section 482 of CrPC, quashed the proceedings, stating inadequacy in averments to implicate criminal liability.

Issues:

Whether the complaint contained sufficient averments to implicate the first respondent (partner) under Section 141(1) of the Negotiable Instruments Act.

The misinterpretation by the High Court of considering the first accused as a company instead of a partnership firm.

Held:

The complaint sufficiently describes the nature of the partnership, the business conducted, and the role of each accused in relation to the dishonoured cheques.

The High Court's error in considering the first accused as a company is acknowledged, and it is clarified that the first accused is a partnership firm.

Averments in the complaint meet the requirements of Section 141(1), holding the first respondent liable for the offence.

Quashing of the criminal case against the first respondent by the High Court is deemed erroneous.

The appeal is allowed, setting aside the judgment and order of the High Court.

Facts:

The respondent filed an application under Section 20 of the Arbitration Act, 1940, against the appellants' predecessors-in-title.

The application was based on a partnership dated 05.07.1960, named "Gupta Bus Service," which later dissolved due to disputes.

The appellants contended that, being an "unregistered partnership," the application under Section 20 of the Partnership Act was not maintainable.

Issues:

Whether the application for arbitration is maintainable considering the partnership in question is an unregistered partnership.

Held:

The Civil Judge overruled the appellants' objection, stating that the application is maintainable.

The High Court upheld this decision.

The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, setting aside the High Court's order, and remanded the case for fresh consideration.

The High Court failed to consider the law laid down in Krishna Motor Service vs. H.B. Vittala Kamath (1996) 10 SCC 88.

The matter should be reconsidered in light of the mentioned decision, and the High Court is urged to dispose of the writ petition expeditiously.

Facts:

Atul Chandra Das, through his legal representatives, filed appeals against the dismissal of his suit for ejectment and the decreeing of the title suit.

Das claimed ownership of a property based on a sale and subsequent decree for specific performance.

The respondents, legal heirs of the previous owner, contested Das's claim, asserting a mortgage by conditional sale.

Issues:

Whether the transaction was a sale or a mortgage by conditional sale.

Applicability and inconsistency between Section 58(c) of the Transfer of Property Act and Section 37A of the Bengal Money-Lenders Act.

Jurisdiction and application of the State Act to the suit.

Held:

The court found that the State legislature intended to override the proviso to Section 58(c) of the Transfer of Property Act by enacting Section 37(A) of the State Act.

Despite inconsistency, Section 37(A) of the State Act prevails in the State due to the assent given by the President under Article 254(2).

Das's claim of ownership was rejected, and the mortgage by conditional sale was upheld.

Decision: The appeals were dismissed, affirming the concurrent findings of the lower courts.

Facts:

Bhana, the original owner of the disputed properties, had two marriages and children from both wives.

A gift of the suit land was made to Smt. Banti, Bhana's second wife, in 1950 for maintenance, leading to mutation in her favor.

Litigation ensued between the parties, challenging the gift, and a civil suit in 1953 upheld reversionary rights of the son, Darshan Singh.

Bhana executed a will in 1973, bequeathing his estate to plaintiffs, excluding Smt. Banti and the appellant (Ajit Kaur).

The trial court held that Banti became the absolute owner after the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, and dismissed the suit filed by the plaintiffs.

Issues:

Validity of the will dated 5th January 1973.

Applicability of Section 14 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956.

Reversionary rights and possession over the disputed property.

Held:

The Court examined the validity of the will dated 5th January 1973, and the appellate court's findings on a subsequent will dated 21st February 1973 were considered. The latter was held to be not legally executed and proved.

The Court discussed Section 14 of the Hindu Succession Act, emphasizing that possession must be under some vestige of a claim, right, or title. Mere possession would not confer pre-existing rights.

The effect of mutation in revenue records was clarified, stating that it does not create or extinguish title. The court highlighted that fiscal proceedings do not confer a right of acquisition.

The Court rejected the appellant's claim of absolute ownership based on possession at the time of the Act's enforcement, as the possession lacked a valid claim, right, or title.

Facts:

'HAM' founded Hamdard Dawakhana as a sole proprietor.

'HAM' passed away, leaving behind wife and two sons, 'AH' and 'MS.'

In 1948, 'AH,' 'MS,' and their mother executed a Deed to manage Hamdard.

'AH' became the sole surviving Wakif Mutawalli as per the 1948 Deed.

In 1964, 'AH' appointed his two sons 'AM' and 'HA' as Mutawallis.

Dispute arose after the death of 'AM' over the Chief Mutawalli position.

Issues:

Dispute over the appointment of Chief Mutawalli.

Applicability of the rule of primogeniture.

Interpretation of the 1948 Deed as amended in 1973.

Held:

The order of the Division Bench cannot be sustained. The nature of Hamdard is not Wakf as defined in the Wakf Act, 1995. Consent order in appeal relates to interim injunction issues, not the issues in the suit. The argument that consent order relates to issues framed after pleadings is rejected.

The 1973 Deed is not a new document but an amendment of the 1948 Deed. The entire document, as amended in 1973, must be read together to determine the Chief Mutawalli appointment process.

Rule of primogeniture is not explicit in the amended clauses. The 1973 Deed specifies the senior most male descendant as Chief Mutawalli, supporting equal representation to heirs of both sons of Wakif Mutawalli.

The constitution of the Board in 1995 does not negate the seniority principle. The 1973 Deed does not show the applicability of the rule of primogeniture but equal representation. Delay and laches argument are not tenable.

Ad interim mandatory injunction is granted to protect parties' rights. The argument against directing parties to do something not in existence at the time of filing is rejected. The order of the Division Bench is set aside, and the Single Bench's decision is restored. The suits will be decided based on evidence.

Facts:

The case involves a dispute over the ownership of scheduled properties. The appellants claim rights based on sale deeds executed by 'JK' in 1955, asserting her as the granddaughter of 'R,' the original owner. The respondents, however, assert ownership through a chain of transactions from the second wife of 'R,' 'S.'

Issues:

The validity of the appellants' claim based on the sale deeds executed by 'JK,' the interpretation of the Mysore Hindu Law Women’s Rights Act, 1933, and the application of the Limitation Act, 1908, particularly Articles 140 and 141.

Held:

The widow, 'S,' held a limited estate, and her rights were not absolute under Section 11 of the Mysore Hindu Law Women’s Rights Act, 1933.

No vested interest existed for reversioners as long as 'S' was alive, and 'JK' could be considered a reversioner only after the death of 'S' in 1938.

The period of limitation for filing a suit for recovery of possession commenced upon the death of the widow in 1938, and the 12-year limitation period ran out in 1950, extinguishing the alleged reversioner 'JK's right.

'JK's sale deed in 1955 conveyed no right, and even if the limitation period started from that date, it ran out in 1967.

The High Court's judgment, affirming the Appellate Court, was upheld, dismissing the appeals.