Facts:

Original plaintiffs filed a suit for specific performance against the original defendant.

Despite an injunction, the defendant executed a sale deed in favor of the appellant during the suit's pendency.

The appellant applied for impleadment as a defendant, claiming a direct interest in the suit property.

Trial court allowed impleadment, but the High Court set aside this order, stating the appellant was not a necessary party.

Issues:

Whether the appellant, not a party to the original agreement, can be impleaded in a specific performance suit.

Whether the High Court was justified in setting aside the trial court's order allowing impleadment.

Held:

The Supreme Court, relying on the principles in Kasturi vs. Iyyamperumal, held that the plaintiff is the dominus litis and cannot be compelled to implead a person against whom no relief has been claimed. The Court emphasized that a third party or a stranger cannot be added to a suit for specific performance merely to find out who is in possession or to avoid multiplicity of suits.

The Court agreed with the High Court's view that the appellant cannot be impleaded as a defendant in the specific performance suit against the wish of the plaintiffs. The appeals were dismissed.

Facts:

The plaintiff and the defendant were acquainted, and the plaintiff had taken financial assistance from the defendant.

A sum of Rs.5,000/- was construed as consideration for the land, and a sale deed dated 10th December 1968 was executed.

Contemporaneously, an agreement dated 10th December 1968 and another agreement on 29th August 1969 were entered into, indicating reconveyance conditions.

The plaintiff filed a suit in 1980 seeking redemption of the mortgage.

Issues:

Whether the transaction is a mortgage by conditional sale or a sale.

The relevance of mutation proceedings in determining the character of the transaction.

The plaintiff's right of redemption based on the agreements and subsequent actions.

Held:

The court interprets Section 58(c) and the proviso, emphasizing that the sale deed must embody the condition to be deemed a mortgage. Contemporaneous agreements are considered but held insufficient to alter the nature indicated in the sale deed.( Paragraphs 5-7)

The court refers to a precedent emphasizing that a sale with a condition of retransfer is not a mortgage. The real character of the transaction is determined by the provisions of the deed viewed in light of surrounding circumstances and parties' intention.( Paragraph 8)

The court examines the documents (Exhibits 23, 24, and 14/1) and concludes that the sale deed does not indicate a mortgage. The defendant's acquisition of absolute right is supported by non-repayment and initiation of mutation proceedings.( Paragraphs 9-10)

The court dismisses the relevance of a cited case (Bhimabai Mahadeo Kambekar) regarding mutation's presumptive value on title. It asserts the importance of mutation in the present context, emphasizing its relevance in construing the nature of the transaction.( Paragraph 11)

The court finds the suit seeking redemption not sustainable and suggests that if the agreement of reconveyance is to be enforced, a suit for specific performance should have been filed. The suit is dismissed based on a misconception.( Paragraph 12)

Facts:

Mohammad Badruddin faced disciplinary proceedings, resulting in a punishment of compulsory retirement, later altered to reversion.

Five charges were leveled against Badruddin, with the Inquiry Officer finding charge No. 4 proved, while charges 1, 2, 3, and 5 were not proved.

The Disciplinary Authority disagreed with findings on charges 1 and 5.

Based on charges 1, 4, and 5, along with a previous punishment of reversion, Badruddin was removed from service.

The High Court set aside the removal punishment, citing reasons for disagreement not being supplied and non-disclosure of the previous punishment.

Issues:

Violation of natural justice due to non-furnishing of the Inquiry Report.

Validity of removal from service based on multiple charges, including a previous punishment.

Held:

Non-furnishing of Inquiry Report: The Division Bench set aside the punishment, citing a violation of natural justice. The Supreme Court clarified that the Ramzan Khan judgment had prospective effect and couldn't affect inquiries conducted before November 20, 1990. As the punishment order was before this date, the Court restored the punishment of reversion.( Paragraphs 4, 5, and 7)

Removal from Service - Multiple Charges: The Supreme Court clarified that, post the 42nd Constitutional amendment, there's no mandatory requirement to communicate the proposed punishment. Non-communication of previous punishments in the show cause notice does not invalidate the punishment. However, the Court couldn't maintain the removal punishment due to findings on charge No. 4. The matter was remanded to the Disciplinary Authority for reconsideration based on charge No. 4.( Paragraphs 23 and 24)

Conclusion: The order of reversion was restored, as the non-furnishing of the Inquiry Report did not affect the pre-November 20, 1990, punishment. The removal punishment was set aside, and the case was remanded to the Disciplinary Authority for reconsideration based on charge No. 4.

Facts:

The High Court dismissed appeals by the State of Madhya Pradesh and another on merits.

Despite the dismissal of the appeals, the landowners filed a cross objection seeking enhancement of compensation.

The High Court, without proper examination and reasons, rejected the cross objection.

Issues:

Whether the High Court was obligated to independently examine the issues raised by the landowners in the cross objection.

Whether there was a case for enhancement of compensation based on the evidence presented by the parties.

Held:

The Court observed that Order 41 Rule 22(4) of the CPC allows the cross objection to be heard and determined even if the original appeal is withdrawn or dismissed for default.

The High Court was obligated to independently examine the issues raised by the landowners in the cross objection and determine if there was a case for further enhancement in compensation.

The failure of the High Court to examine the question of whether there was a case for enhancement of compensation and the rejection of the cross objection without discussion and reasons were deemed legally unsustainable.

The appeal was allowed, setting aside the High Court's judgment, and restoring the judgment and decree passed by the Trial Court, confirming the dismissal of the landowners' suit.

Facts:

The appellant, Sulekha Rani, appealed against the judgment of the Armed Forces Tribunal (AFT) dismissing her Original Application for the grant of pension in respect of her deceased spouse's service in the Indian Army. The appellant's spouse was enrolled in the Army in 1994, posted at the Siachen Glacier, and discharged in 2001. The appellant contended that no Invalidation Medical Board was held prior to the discharge, and the absence of such a board was a violation of rules.

Issues:

Whether the absence of an Invalidation Medical Board prior to the discharge of the appellant's spouse is a violation of rules.

Whether the appellant is entitled to family pension.

Held:

The Court held that the discharge of the appellant's spouse without convening an Invalidation Medical Board was illegal. Rule 13(3)(III)(v) is a residuary provision and does not apply to cases of medical unfitness. The absence of an Invalidation Medical Board is a violation of the prescribed procedure for discharge in cases of medical unfitness. Consequently, the appellant is entitled to family pension, and the service of the deceased spouse is deemed to have continued until the date of death (30 September 2007). No arrears of wages are payable between the date of discharge and the date of death. The arrears of family pension are to be paid to the appellant within three months from the date of the order.

Facts:

The case involves the acquisition of land owned by the appellants for the benefit of NTPC (formerly National Thermal Power Corporation Limited) for public purposes. The Land Acquisition Officer (LAO) offered compensation, which the appellants found inadequate, leading them to seek a reference to the Civil Court. The Reference Court partly allowed the reference, enhancing the compensation. The State and NTPC appealed to the High Court, which dismissed their appeals and upheld the compensation. The landowners filed cross objections seeking further enhancement in compensation.

Issues:

The adequacy of compensation awarded by the Reference Court and whether the landowners had a valid case for additional compensation.

Held:

The Supreme Court allowed the appeals filed by the landowners, setting aside the High Court's order related to the dismissal of cross objections. The Court directed the High Court to re-examine the cross objections on their merits, considering whether the landowners had made a case for further enhancement in compensation based on the evidence presented. The High Court was instructed to verify if the landowners had valued their claim in the cross objection and paid the required court fees. The Court emphasized that it had not expressed an opinion on whether the landowners had a valid case for additional compensation. The High Court was instructed to decide the cross objection independently, strictly following the law and without being influenced by the Supreme Court's observations.

Facts:

Chaman Lal purchased land in 1949.

Gift deed executed in 1958 in favor of Gurdev Kaur.

Dispute arises in 1987 over the extent of gifted land.

Trial court decrees partition in 1998.

High Court interference in 2002, Supreme Court remits the case in 2003.

High Court decision in 2008 re-affirms the appeal.

Issues:

Whether the gift deed covered the entire land or only half.

Validity of the translation of the gift deed.

Jurisdiction of the High Court in a second appeal under Section 41 of the Punjab Court Act.

Held:

The High Court did not exceed its jurisdiction in examining the translation and considering the accuracy of the document. The accuracy of the translation was crucial in interpreting the gift deed, a document of title. The Court held that if the translation is inaccurate, it could result in a fundamental legal infirmity. The acknowledgment of both parties to the accuracy of the translation and transliteration was considered significant. The status of the property, after a prolonged period since 1958, is not liable to be disturbed. The Court dismissed the appeal, and parties were directed to bear their own costs.

Facts:

The case involves the sale of land by a common landowner to different parties on different dates.

Dispute centers around a passage, with the plaintiff claiming exclusive rights, while the defendant relies on a reserved right of access in an earlier sale deed.

Issues:

Whether the exclusive right granted to the plaintiff is valid in light of the reserved access rights in an earlier sale deed.

The impact of subsequent events, such as inheritance, on the rights created by the original sale deeds.

The applicability of Section 48 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882.

Held:

The court held that the easement rights reserved for defendant No. 2 in the earlier sale deed were not extinguished, rendering the exclusive right granted to the plaintiff illegal.

Section 48 of the Transfer of Property Act was cited, emphasizing that later-created rights are subject to earlier-created rights unless a special contract or reservation binds the earlier transferees.

The court stressed that rights should be adjudicated based on the documents of title in 1976, and subsequent events should not affect these rights.

The appeals were allowed, and the 16 feet x 103 feet passage adjoining the property of the defendants leading to the property of the plaintiff was reserved for the common use of defendant No. 2 and the plaintiff.