Facts:

The writ petition filed by the University of Delhi, challenging the change in land use for the Delhi Metro Rail project, was dismissed on grounds of delay and laches. The Letters Patent Appeal (LPA) filed after a delay of 916 days was also dismissed by the Division Bench.

Issues:

Whether the delay in filing the writ petition and LPA could be condoned, considering the explanation provided by the appellant.

Held:

The court emphasized a liberal approach in matters of condonation of delay, irrespective of the status of the party. However, condonation should not be automatic, and the accrued rights of the opposite party must be considered.

The delay in filing the LPA was 916 days, and condonation could only be considered with a reasonable explanation. The reasons provided, including the non-availability of the Vice-Chancellor and the decision-making process of the Executive Council, were deemed insufficient.

The court found the appellant's explanation for the inordinate delay unconvincing, especially when the Vice-Chancellor, who was involved in the writ petition, was available for a sufficient period after its dismissal.

Approval from the Executive Council was obtained in 2017, yet the appeal was filed in 2018, indicating a casual approach without a proper explanation for the delay.

The appellant was aware of the land's conversion to residential use in 2005, and despite filing the writ petition belatedly, no steps were taken to file the appeal for 916 days after its disposal.

The cumulative effect of delay and laches could not be ignored, and the contention of public interest did not justify the lackadaisical approach in prosecuting the matter before the court.

Condoning the delay would be contrary to public interest, considering the manner in which the respondent, Delhi Metro Rail Corporation (DMRC), had proceeded, utilizing funds for public transport projects.

The Single Judge and Division Bench were justified in holding the writ petition and LPA were hit by delay and laches, and the decision did not warrant interference.

Facts:

The Chandigarh Housing Board (CHB) invited bids for a project, awarded it to M/S. Parasvanath Developers Pvt. Ltd.

Disputes arose regarding the construction timeline, leading to a complaint by a flat buyer.

The National Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission (National Commission) directed CHB and the Developer to pay compensation to the buyer.

Issues:

Whether the National Commission erred in fixing liability on CHB for mental harassment and litigation costs.

Whether the increase in the interest rate from 9% to 10% was justified.

Held:

The Court upheld the National Commission's order on the division of liability between CHB and the Developer in a 70:30 ratio.

The Court found that Clause 9(c) of the Tripartite Agreement (compensation clause) did not apply to the case as conditions under Clause 9(a) were not fulfilled.

The Court affirmed the National Commission's decision on mental harassment and litigation costs, stating they were not covered under Clause 9(c) and upheld the 70:30 split.

The increase in the interest rate from 9% to 10% was upheld by the Court as within the National Commission's discretionary power.

The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, upholding the National Commission's order on liability division, rejecting the argument of the inapplicability of Clause 9(c) and affirming the interest rate increase.

Facts:

The appellant challenged a clause in the advertisement for the appointment of Medical Officers, mandating that only work experience in State Government hospitals would be considered for granting marks for 'Work Experience.' The appellant's work experience in an Army Hospital was not initially considered.

Issues:

Interpretation of the term 'Government hospital' in Bihar Health Service Rules.

Challenge to the selection process and the principle of estoppel.

Applicability of constitutional values in interpreting rules.

Held:

1. Estoppel: The principle of estoppel was discussed, emphasizing that it prevents a candidate from challenging the selection process after failing in it. However, it was differentiated in cases where a candidate alleges misconstruction of statutory rules and discriminating consequences. The appellant did not challenge the selection procedure but focused on the interpretation of 'work experience,' which the court deemed valid for consideration. Para 17-20

2. Interpretation of Statutes: The court emphasized the need for literal interpretation where the text is unambiguous but advocated for a purposive interpretation when there is ambiguity. It highlighted the importance of considering constitutional values and promoting equal opportunities. Para 21-29

3. Definition of 'Government Hospital': The term 'Government hospital' was analyzed, rejecting a strict application of Rule 2(a) and adopting an expansive interpretation. The court held that the experience gained in any hospital run by the State Government or its instrumentalities, Central Government, Municipalities, and Panchayati Raj Institutions within the territory of Bihar should be considered. Para 30-36

4. Held and Decision: Rules 5 and 6(iii) were construed to include the experience gained by a doctor in any hospital run by the Bihar Government or its instrumentalities, as well as any other non-private hospital within the territory of Bihar. The respondents were directed to rework the merit list accordingly. Para 37

Facts:

The appellant, accused No. 3, sought exemption from personal appearance before the Trial Court due to business commitments and the inconvenience of traveling from Delhi to Hyderabad every Friday. The application under Section 205 Cr.P.C. was opposed by the CBI.

Issues:

Whether the appellant's grounds for dispensation with personal appearance were valid, considering the seriousness of the charges.

Held:

The Court, referring to Bhaskar Industries Ltd. case, allowed the appeal, quashing the High Court and Trial Court orders. The appellant was granted exemption with conditions:

An undertaking that the appellant won't dispute his identity, his counsel will appear on each hearing, no objection to evidence recording in his absence, and no adjournments requested.

The appellant to appear for framing charges and when the Trial Court insists on his presence.

Failure of counsel to appear or adjournment requests may lead to the Trial Court exercising powers under Section 205(2) Cr.P.C.

Facts:

The case involves recruitment for the post of Technician Grade-II in Uttar Pradesh. The qualification requirement initially included a CCC certificate issued by DOEACC and was later amended to include CCC certificate or its equivalent computer qualification.

Issues:

Validity of qualifications and equivalence of CCC certificate.

Scrutiny process for verifying candidates' computer qualifications.

Deletion of names from the select list.

Held:

The CCC certificate is a well-known certificate issued under the Government of India, and there is no evidence of it being granted by any other body. The CCC certificate mentioned in the advertisement refers to CCC certificate issued by DOEACC/NIELIT.( Para 42)

The advertisement did not permit candidates to self-certify or declare equivalence of their computer qualification to CCC. Scrutiny of qualification is the responsibility of the recruiting agency/employer.( Para 52)

In the absence of guidelines or criteria for equivalence, the recruitment process without scrutiny of candidates' qualifications is an abdication of duty by the Corporation and the Commission.( Para 60)

The Division Bench erroneously restored the select list without considering cases where deletions were upheld by an earlier Division Bench.( Para 65)

Impleadment of every candidate is unnecessary when the challenge is based on an arbitrary or illegal process. Few selected candidates were impleaded in the writ petitions.( Para 75)

Facts:

The complainants, respondents 1 to 3, filed a complaint of medical negligence against appellant No. 1 (hospital) and appellant Nos. 2 to 4 (pediatricians and ophthalmologist) and respondent No. 4 (gynecologist). The National Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission (NCDRC) held appellant No. 1 guilty of medical negligence, leading to the total blindness of respondent No. 1, a pre-term baby. The NCDRC awarded compensation of Rs. 64,00,000.

Issues:

Whether the appellants owed a legal duty of care to the complainants?

Whether the failure to inform the mother of respondent No. 1 about the necessity of the ROP test and the high risks involved constituted a breach of duty?

Whether the failure to carry out the mandatory ROP test amounted to gross negligence and deficiency of service?

Whether the inordinate delay in providing medical records constituted professional misconduct?

Held:

The inordinate delay of over 2 years in making the Medical Records of Respondent No.1 available to the Respondent No.2 constituted a grave professional misconduct under Regulation 7. Regulation 7 holds that the refusal or failure to provide medical records within 72 hours is professional misconduct, rendering the doctor/hospital liable for disciplinary action and punishment under Regulation 8. Withholding the medical records for over 2 years was a gross deficiency in service by the Appellant No.1-Hospital and its management.

The ROP was not advised or carried out by the hospital or the senior ophthalmologist throughout the period of hospitalization of the baby, leading to a breach of duty. The lack of justification for not conducting the mandatory ROP screening during the baby's stay under direct care and supervision amounted to negligence.

Medical negligence comprises a legal duty, failure to inform about risks, resulting damage, and breach of duty. The cause of action for negligence arises when damage occurs. Appellant Nos. 1 to 3 are liable for medical negligence, as they failed to advise or guide the parents about the possibility of ROP in a premature baby, leading to total blindness.

Decision: The Court affirmed the findings of the NCDRC, holding Appellant No.1-Hospital, Appellant Nos. 2 and 3 (pediatricians), and Appellant No.4 (ophthalmologist) jointly liable. Compensation of Rs. 76,00,000 was awarded to respondent No. 1.

FACTS:

The minor daughter was born on 21.08.2007 and was over 12 years old.

The father filed a Guardianship Petition, seeking custody, citing the mother's Paranoid Schizophrenia and cruelty towards the child.

The mother resisted, accusing the father of sexual abuse, making it unsafe for the child to be in his custody.

Various counsellors' reports indicated the child's comfort with the father, and the mother's video clippings did not support her allegations.

ISSUES:

Custody determination based on the welfare and well-being of the child.

Validity of the allegations of sexual abuse by the mother against the father.

HELD:

The Court, considering parens patriae jurisdiction, emphasized the welfare of the child. After individual interviews, the minor girl, over 12 years old, expressed a definite desire to reside with her father. The Court affirmed the Family Court's Order granting custody to the father and specified visitation rights for the mother.

In Nil Ratan Kundu & Anr. vs. Abhijit Kundu (2008) 9 SCC 413, the Court established that while exercising parens patriae jurisdiction, the paramount consideration should be the welfare and well-being of the child. The Court is not bound by statutes, rules of evidence, procedure, or precedent.

The Order is prima facie in nature and made at an intermediate stage of the proceedings.

This Special Leave Petition is disposed of accordingly.

Referred C:ases

Nil Ratan Kundu & Anr. vs. Abhijit Kundu (2008) 9 SCC 413 : 2008 (11) SCALE 437

Facts:

Daffodills Pharmaceuticals Ltd., a pharmaceutical supplier, participated in a tender process initiated by the State of U.P. to supply pharmaceutical products to various hospitals. Despite winning the bid, the State, on the basis of a criminal case against the former director, Mr. Surender Chaudhary, issued an order directing a halt to local purchases from Daffodills.

Issues:

Legality of the State's decision to stop local purchases from Daffodills.

Violation of principles of natural justice in not providing Daffodills with an opportunity to be heard before the decision.

Held:

The court identified the impugned order as a debarring and preventing directive against Daffodills for an indefinite duration, surpassing the typical finite lifespan of blacklisting orders.( Paragraph 13)

Citing precedents, the Court emphasized the necessity of providing an opportunity of hearing before proposing drastic adverse actions like debarring or blacklisting.( Paragraph 14)

The Court criticized the State's assumption of complicity by Daffodills and stressed that unilateral action without giving an opportunity of hearing was a violation of principles of natural justice.( Paragraph 15)

The Court acknowledged the limited scope of judicial review in public contract matters but highlighted the flagrant violation of natural justice by the state's action.( Paragraph 16)

Considering the time elapsed since the impugned order, the Court quashed the directive and set aside the High Court's judgment in the overall interest of justice.( Paragraph 17)

Facts:

The Special Land Acquisition Officer issued notifications for acquiring land for the Hubli Ankola Broad Gauge Railway Line. The Land Acquisition Officer's initial award was contested by the appellant(s), leading to a Reference Court enhancing compensation. The High Court later reduced the compensation, citing the nature of the acquired land as 'dry land' and applying an annual depreciation of 15%.

Issues:

Validity of the High Court's decision reducing compensation.

Delay in filing the appeal by the present appellant(s).

Entitlement to interest during the period of delay.

Held:

The Court, relying on prior judgments, held that identically situated appellants should not be treated differently due to delays in filing appeals. It emphasized a pragmatic approach in compensation matters, condoning the delay in filing and restoring parity in compensation. The appellant(s) were entitled to the same compensation awarded by the Reference Court, but not to interest for the period of delay.

The appeal was allowed in part, setting aside the High Court's decision, restoring the Reference Court's award, but denying interest for the delay in filing the appeal.