Facts:

The Gram Panchayat, Namhol requested the appellants (State) for the construction of a road from Namhol to Bahadurpur.

Possession of the land for road construction was taken in 1988.

Respondents, whose land was utilized for the road, filed a writ petition complaining of improper land acquisition.

Land acquisition proceedings initiated after court directions, and notification under Section 4(1) issued in 2005.

Land Acquisition Officer passed an award, categorizing land and fixing market value.

Respondents sought reference under Section 18, leading to the Reference Court fixing compensation at a uniform rate of Rs.7.00 lakhs per bigha.

State appealed against the fixation, claiming errors in relying on a specific sale deed (Ex.PW-1/A).

Issues:

Whether the Reference Court and the High Court erred in accepting Ex.PW-1/A as a comparable sale.

Allegation that another comparable sale (Ex.'RA' dated 04.05.2001) was not considered without valid reasons.

Appropriateness of fixing compensation at Rs.7.00 lakhs per bigha for the total acquired land of 18-15 bighas.

Held:

The Court set aside the fixation of compensation at Rs.7.00 lakhs per bigha, finding errors in relying on the specific sale deed (Ex.PW-1/A) for a small portion of land. The Court emphasized that in the absence of comparable sales in the same village, the Reference Court should consider sales in adjoining villages or use alternative methods for fixing compensation. The matter was remitted back to the District Court for fresh consideration. The Court also directed the Reference Court to dispose of the references within six months and allowed both parties to present additional evidence. The additional interest awarded at 15% per annum was set aside, leaving it open to the Reference Court to consider the claim for additional interest independently.

Facts:

The appellants, representing the State of Rajasthan, challenged the dismissal of second appeals by the High Court in a case related to mining operations. The respondent, Shiv Dayal, claimed to be the mining lessee and sought a permanent injunction against the State and its authorities.

Issues:

The dismissal of the State's second appeals by the High Court, contending that no substantial question of law was present. The Court identified five crucial questions related to forest laws, revenue laws, MMRD Act, and the status of the suit land.

Held:

The Court sets aside the High Court's order and remands the case for fresh consideration on merits.( Paragraph 12)

Rejects the High Court's reasoning that a concurrent finding by lower courts makes it unassailable in second appeal.( Paragraph 14)

Establishes that if a finding is based on misreading, against provisions of law, or without jurisdiction, it can be challenged in a second appeal.( Paragraph 21)

Enumerates five questions arising for consideration, constituting substantial questions of law.( Paragraph 23)

Allows the appeals, directing the High Court to frame appropriate substantial questions of law and decide the case afresh on merits.( Paragraph 32)

Acknowledges the death of Shiv Dayal during the appeals but asserts that appeals against him have not abated.( Paragraph 36)

FACTS:

The appellant had been obtaining individual Mediclaim Policies for family members since 2007-2008.

Dispute involves a medical claim for the year 2014-15 for the son of the appellant, Master Jasnoor Singh.

Son incurred medical expenses exceeding Rs. 8,00,000 during hospitalization in 2014.

Insurance Company initially repudiated the claim but later paid Rs. 27,550.

ISSUES:

Determination of the extent of liability of the Insurance Company under the "Parivar - Mediclaim for Family Policy."

The validity of the claim based on the pre-existing disease argument.

HELD:

The individual Mediclaim Policy for Master Jasnoor Singh was continuously held from 2007-2008 to 2014-2015.No pre-existing disease at the initiation of the policy in 2007-2008.The insurance company cannot claim pre-existing disease.The Family Mediclaim Policy had a 50% limit on the sum insured for individual claims.The maximum payable claim is 50% of the sum insured under the Family Mediclaim Policy for the medical treatment of Master Jasnoor Singh, i.e., Rs. 2,50,000.( Para 10)

Repudiation of the claim by the Insurance Company was not justified.The Insurance Company allowed the claim initially by paying Rs. 27,550, indicating that the pre-existing disease was not considered material.( Para 12)

The appellant is entitled to Rs. 2,50,000 minus the amount already paid by the Insurance Company.Additional compensation awarded for mental agony, harassment, and litigation costs.Interest at 7.5% p.a. is applicable on the balance amount payable.( Para 13)

The appeal is allowed with the above directions.( Para 14)

Facts:

Corporation engaged in stocking goods, with loading and unloading work carried out by workers.

Dispute arises on whether these workers are entitled to benefits under the Provident Fund Act.

Corporation contests the claim, asserting no employer-employee relationship.

Issues:

Whether the workers are eligible for benefits under the Provident Fund Act.

Whether the Corporation is liable to pay statutory contributions for these workers.

Held:

The High Court's reliance on the Industrial Disputes Act findings was criticized.

Definition of "employee" under the Provident Fund Act differs from that in the Industrial Disputes Act, and their objectives are distinct.

Findings under the Industrial Disputes Act are irrelevant to the Provident Fund Act issue.

The High Court's order is set aside, and the case is remanded for reconsideration on merits, considering the definition of "employee" under Section 2(f) of the Provident Fund Act.

The High Court is urged to decide the writ petition expeditiously.

Facts:

The appellant, the Institution of Mechanical Engineers (India), conducts bi-annual examinations and awards the AMIE certificate.

Government recognition was provisionally granted in 1976, acknowledging the AMIE certificate as equivalent to a degree in Mechanical Engineering.

A notification recognized the Technician Engineers' Examination as equivalent to a Diploma in Mechanical Engineering from State Polytechnic.

A writ petition challenged the validity of the AMIE certificate for state-related services.

The High Court, in a previous judgment, held that the AMIE certificate could not be treated as equivalent to a degree in engineering.

A review application was filed, and the Registrar of the Supreme Court refused to register the application.

Issues:

Recognition and equivalence of the AMIE certificate to a degree in Mechanical Engineering.

Validity of the AMIE certificate for recruitment/promotion to state services.

Held:

The Registrar's refusal to register the application for clarification and modification was deemed correct.

The appellant, by its own admission, conducts examinations without imparting education and does not fall under the Acts specified.

The appellant's claim of equivalence lacks a statutory basis, as Section 22(1) of the UGC Act designates specific bodies to confer degrees.

Equivalence to AMIE certificates was granted by the Ministry of Human Resource Development (MHRD) until 31.05.13, as evidenced by official notifications.

An exception was made for candidates enrolled up to 31.05.13, declaring their AMIE certificates equivalent to a Mechanical Engineering degree for Central Government employment.

Decision: The Miscellaneous Application No. 2367 of 2018 is rejected. The AMIE certificates for candidates enrolled up to 31.05.13 are considered equivalent to a degree in Mechanical Engineering for Central Government employment.

Facts:

The plaintiffs contended that defendants 1 to 3 executed agreements for the sale of land, while defendants asserted that the agreements were collateral security for a loan. The dispute also involved subsequent supplementary agreements and possession of the land.

Issues:

The nature of the transaction, the readiness and willingness of the plaintiffs to perform their part of the contract, the application of the doctrine of lis pendens, and the appropriate relief to be granted.

Held:

Nature of Transaction: The court found that the agreements evidenced a sale transaction rather than serving as security for a loan. The execution of supplementary agreements after notice reinforced the intention of the parties towards the sale transaction.

Readiness and Willingness of Plaintiffs: The plaintiffs demonstrated readiness and willingness to perform their part of the contract, making payments against the sale consideration. The court rejected the defendants' denial and emphasized that the plaintiffs' conduct was not inequitable.

Doctrine of Lis Pendens: The court applied the doctrine of lis pendens, stating that subsequent sale transactions were subject to the rights determined in the pending suit. However, the court disapproved the characterization of the sale deeds as illegal.

Relief Granted: The court partly allowed the appeal and awarded compensation of Rs. 15,00,000 to the respondent No. 2 in lieu of specific performance. Various factors, including the long possession of subsequent purchasers and the enhanced valuation of the land, influenced this decision.

Limitation: The court addressed the limitation issue, affirming that the plaintiffs filed the suit within the prescribed three-year period, and no delay operated against them.

Observations on the Nature of Transaction: The court criticized the lower courts for casting doubts on the nature of the transaction based on irrelevant considerations. The supplementary agreement after notice was emphasized as reaffirming the intention of a sale transaction.

FACTS:

The case involves the acquisition of 131 kms of land, including 6 kms owned by the appellants, for the construction of a Special Railway Project-Western Dedicated Freight Corridor. The appellants raised objections under Section 20D(2) of the Railways Act, asserting that no order was passed on their objections. They sought the quashing of the Notification issued under Section 20A and the declaration issued under Section 20E.

ISSUES:

Non-compliance with Section 20D(2) – Effect on the acquisition.

Validity of the objections raised by the appellants.

Competent Authority's duty to pass a reasoned order.

Communication of the order to the appellants.

Contradictory stand by the respondents on the nature of the order.

Timing of the order under Section 20D(2) in relation to personal hearing.

Strict construction of expropriatory legislation.

Balancing appellants' rights and the larger public purpose.

Compensation assessment for the acquired land.

HELD:

In the absence of an order under Section 20D, no further steps in the acquisition could be taken. Section 20D provides a substantive right for landowners to object before being divested of their land. The right to file objections under Section 20D is akin to Section 5-A of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. The Court emphasized the need for a reasoned order after considering objections.

The limited right to file objections and have a personal hearing under Section 20D must not be reduced to an empty formality. The Competent Authority is duty-bound to pass a reasoned order reflecting application of mind.

A valid order must be reasoned and communicated to the parties. Internal file notings or reports submitted to the Central Government do not constitute a valid order. No order rejecting objections was passed after the personal hearing, and the Competent Authority did not communicate file notings to the appellants.

Contradictory stands by respondents on the nature of the order. The order under Section 20D(2) cannot precede the personal hearing. Strict construction of expropriatory legislation is necessary, and deviations invalidate subsequent acquisition steps.

The Competent Authority, being quasi-judicial, must act in conformity with mandatory statutory provisions. In the absence of an order under Section 20D(2), subsequent acquisition steps are invalidated.

Despite finding a breach, the Court decided not to set aside the entire acquisition. The relief is molded by compensating the appellants for the 6 km stretch based on the current market value, as per Section 20G of the Act.

The remaining 125 km stretch stands acquired, with pre-construction activity completed. To balance rights and public purpose, compensation for the appellants is directed based on the current market value.

Despite the breach, the Court refrains from setting aside the acquisition for the remaining 125 km stretch, as landowners are satisfied with the compensation awarded.

REFERRED CASES:

Decided on : 13-08-2019

Land Acquisition Act, 1894 - Sections 5A and 17 - Acquisition Proceedings - Invocation of urgency provisions under Section 17 of the Act and dispensing with the right to file objection under Section 5A of the Act, is found to be illegal - A situation where because of delay in challenging these acquisitions by the land owners, developments have taken in these villages and in most of the cases, third party rights have been created - A more practical and workable solution by adequately compensating the land owners in the form of compensation as well as allotment of developed Abadi land at a higher rate i.e. 10% of the land acquired of each of the land owners against the eligibility and to the policy to the extent of 5% and 6% of Noida and Greater Noida land respectively. (See : Savitri Devi v. State of U.P., (2015) 7 SCC 21)

Railways Act, 1989 - Sections 20A, 20G and 20G(2) - Acquisition proceedings - Compensation - Absence of an order passed on the objections under Section 20D - Challenge before this Court has been made by the Appellants with respect to a stretch of land admeasuring approximately 6 kms, out of the total stretch of 131 kms - Remaining stretch of land comprising of 125 kms has been acquired, and stands vested in the Government - Respondents have stated on Affidavit that preconstruction activity and earth work has been completed on most parts of the stretch. Furthermore, most of the bridges are either in progress, or have already been completed - No mala fides have been alleged by the Appellants against the Respondents in the acquisition proceedings - Larger public purpose of a railway project would not be served if the Notification under Section 20A is quashed - Public purpose of the acquisition is the construction and operation of a Special Railway Project viz. the Western Dedicated Freight Corridor in District Surat, Gujarat.

Counsel for Appearing Parties

Mr. C.G. Sharma, Advocate, Mr. G.C. Sharma, Advocate and Mr. Nachiketa Joshi, Advocate, for the Appellant; Ms. Kumud Lata Das, Advocate, for the Respondent.

Cases Referred

A.K. Kraipak vs. Union of India [(1969) 2 SCC 262 : AIR 1970 SC 150]

Bachhittar Singh vs. State of Punjab, AIR 1963 SC 395

CCE vs. Orient Fabrics (P) Ltd., (2004) 1 SCC 597

Hindustan Petroleum Corpn. Ltd. vs. Darius Shapur Chennai, (2005) 7 SCC 627

Indore Vikas Pradhikaranv. Pure Industrial Coke & Chemicals Ltd., (2007) 8 SCC 705

J&K Housing Board v. Kunwar Sanjay Krishan Kaul, (2011) 10 SCC 714

Jilubhai Nanbhai Khachar vs. State of Gujarat, 1995 Supp (1) SCC 596

Laxminarayan R. Bhattad vs. State of Maharashtra [(2003) 5 SCC 413]

Laxmi Devi vs. State of Bihar, (2015) 10 SCC 241

Kranti Associates (P) Ltd. vs. Masood Ahmed Khan, (2010) 9 SCC 496

Khub Chand vs. State of Rajasthan, AIR 1967 SC 1074

Kunwar Pal Singh vs. State of U.P., (2007) 5 SCC 85.

Nandeshwar Prasad v. State of U.P. [AIR 1964 SC 1217]

Nazir Ahmad vs. King Emperor, (1875) LR 1 Ch D 426

Om Prakash vs. State of U.P., (1998) 6 SCC 1

Raghbir Singh Sehrawat vs. State of Haryana, (2012) 1 SCC 792

Rao Shiv Bahadur Singh vs. State of Vindhya Pradesh, AIR 1954 SC 322

Savitri Devi vs. State of U.P. & Ors, (2015) 7 SCC 21

Sethi Auto Service Station vs. DDA, (2009) 1 SCC 180

Shanti Sports Club v. Union of India, (2009) 15 SCC 705

State of Punjab vs. Gurdial Singh, (1980) 2 SCC 471

State of U.P. vs. Singhara Singh, AIR 1964 SC 358

Union of India vs. Krishan Lal Arneja, (2004) 8 SCC 453

Union of India v. Shivraj, (2014) 6 SCC 564

Usha Stud & Agricultural Farms (P) Ltd. v. State of Haryana, (2013) 4 SCC 210

Facts:

The case involves Assam Public Works as the appellant, challenging actions related to the National Register of Indian Citizens (NRC) in Assam. The matter pertains to citizenship provisions, especially Section 6A of the Citizenship Act, 1955.

Issues:

The primary issues revolve around the interpretation and application of Section 6A, the special provisions for Assam, and the procedures outlined in Rule 4A of the 2003 Rules for the NRC in Assam.

The addresses concerns raised by the State Coordinator regarding descendants of individuals with D Voter (DV)/Declared Foreigner (DF) status.

Held:

The Court clarified that issues related to Sections 3 and 6A of the Act are pending consideration by a Constitution Bench. It upheld the special provisions of Rule 4A and the Schedule for NRC in Assam, considering the unique citizenship category created by Section 6A. The Court directed the State Coordinator to act on the suggestions/prayers made in the report, subject to further orders from the Constitution Bench.

The Court emphasized the necessity for a security regime similar to AADHAR data security before making the list of inclusions and exclusions available. Validity of orders under the IMDT Act was directed to be governed by the Gauhati High Court decision in Anowar Ali v. State of Assam (2014).

Subject to orders from the Constitution Bench, the Court affirmed that the National Register of Citizens (NRC) will be updated.

Facts:

The assessee, engaged in brokerage business, underwent a search and seizure operation.

The assessment was completed, adding amounts for unexplained cash, jewelry, hundies, and cash receipts.

The Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeal) partially allowed the appeal, deleting certain additions.

The Tribunal, on cross objections, quashed the reassessment proceedings due to the absence of notice under Section 143(2).

Issues:

The impact of the absence of a notice under Section 143(2) on the validity of the reassessment proceedings.

The appellant relied on Section 292BB to argue that the assessee's participation cured any deficiencies in notice issuance.

Held:

The Court upheld the decision of the High Court and the Tribunal that the absence of a notice under Section 143(2) rendered the reassessment proceedings invalid.

Section 292BB was interpreted to cure infirmities in the service of notice but not to save the complete absence of notice.

The legal fiction created by Section 292BB applies only if the notice emanated from the department and the assessee participated in the proceedings.

Since no notice under Section 143(2) was issued, the proceedings were deemed invalid.

The appeals were dismissed, and no costs were imposed.