Facts:

The Government of Kerala, in 1972, specified qualifications for the post of Health Inspector/Food Inspector Grade-II.

In 2014, KPSC advertised vacancies for Junior Health Inspector Grade-II, including the Sanitary Inspectors' Certificate. Candidates with a DHIC qualification were included in shortlists.

A Committee conducted a comparative study of DHIC and SIDC, concluding that DHIC is a higher qualification.

Tribunal and High Court held that there was a clear distinction between qualifications for the same post in different departments.

Issues:

Interpretation of Rule 10(a)(ii) concerning the recognition of DHIC as a higher qualification.

Whether DHIC presupposes the completion of the certificate course.

Held:

The Supreme Court observed that none of the conditions stipulated in Rule 10(a)(ii) were fulfilled. It emphasized the lack of a determination of equivalence by any executive order or standing order of the State Government and the absence of a finding that DHIC presupposes the acquisition of the lower qualification. The Court distinguished a previous case (Jyoti K K) and concluded that the judgment of the High Court did not suffer from error. The appeals were dismissed.

Facts:

The first respondent joined the school on probation for one year on July 1, 2008, but continued as a probationer for almost five years until being discharged on June 30, 2013.

Issues:

Whether the words "by another year" appearing in Rule 105(1) limit the total duration of permissible probation to two years.

Whether the 1973 Rules require the issuance of an order of confirmation for a probationer to be confirmed in service.

Held:

Interpretation of Rule 105(1) – "by another year": 1.1 The words "by another year" imply an extension of the probationary period by one additional year over and above the mandatory year, making the total probationary period two years. 1.2 Rule 105(1) imposes a limitation on the total probationary period to two years, with the first proviso exempting minority institutions from the Director's prior approval. (Para 23-33)

Confirmation of Service and Rule 105(2): 2.1 Rule 105(2) stipulates that an order of confirmation may be issued if the work and conduct of the employee during the probationary period are found satisfactory. 2.2 The mere continuation of services beyond the probationary period does not lead to deemed confirmation. Confirmation requires the issuance of a formal order. (Para 35-38)

Decision and Award of Compensation: The High Court's decision of deeming confirmation was set aside. However, due to the prolonged probationary period, the court awarded ex-gratia compensation of Rs. 5,00,000 to the first respondent under its power under Article 142 of the Constitution. (Para 47-48)

Facts:

Appellant, a partnership firm, leased land for commercial crops.

State declared the area a wildlife sanctuary in a notification on 06.03.1976.

Unsuccessful attempts to exclude the land from the sanctuary.

Subsequent 25-year lease (01.07.1977 to 30.06.2002) after the initial lease.

Collector excluded the land from the sanctuary on 19.11.1993.

Legal proceedings, including a writ petition and a civil suit for damages.

Issues:

Validity of the appellant's claim for damages.

Applicability of Section 14 of the Limitation Act.

Held:

The Wildlife Protection Act, 1972, has the effect of halting the accrual of rights in land specified in a sanctuary notification. The appellant's lease ended on 30.06.1977, while the sanctuary notification was already in effect since 06.03.1976. Thus, any subsequent lease (20.03.1978) was deemed ineffective.

The appellant had no right under the second lease and, therefore, no right against the State. The appellant's claim for damages is dismissed as the exclusion order of 19.11.1993 provided no basis for the appellant to maintain an action.

The Division Bench rightly observed that there was no evidence of the appellant being prevented from exercising lawful rights within the forest. Hence, no basis for the appellant's action for damages.

Section 14 of the Limitation Act allows exclusion of time spent in prosecuting a civil proceeding. However, requirements for its applicability are not satisfied in this case.

The matter in issue in the earlier proceeding (writ petition) differs from the present suit, ruling out the applicability of Section 14 of the Limitation Act.

Conclusion: The appeal is dismissed as the appellant had no right to claim damages after the sanctuary notification. Section 14 of the Limitation Act is deemed inapplicable to this case.

Facts:

A FIR was registered for offenses under Sections 60 and 72 of the United Provinces Excise Act, 1910, and Sections 420, 467, 468, and 471 of the IPC. The charges were related to the seizure of 154 cartons of illicit liquor and a firearm from a truck by a joint team of Excise Department and police officials.

Issues:

The jurisdiction of the Collector to order the confiscation of the seized vehicle. Mustafa contended that only the Magistrate conducting the trial had the authority to release the vehicle, and the Collector lacked jurisdiction to pass an order of confiscation.

Held:

The court affirmed that the power of the Collector to order confiscation is independent of whether a prosecution for the offense has been instituted. Section 72(2) of the Act empowers the Collector to order confiscation, and the proviso allows the owner an option to pay a fine in lieu of confiscation.( Para 1-5)

The court established that the Collector has exclusive jurisdiction to order confiscation, emphasizing that the criminal court does not possess the authority to release seized items. The matter was remitted back to the High Court for a judicial review of the confiscation order passed by the Collector.( Para 6-10)

The judgment emphasized the applicability of the procedure of confiscation under the United Provinces Excise Act, 1910, as opposed to Chapter XXXIV of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Section 5 of the Code was cited, saving special or local laws.( Para 11-15)

The court delved into the specifics of the Act, affirming that the Collector has exclusive jurisdiction to confiscate vehicles. Sub-sections (3), (4), and (8) of Section 72 were analyzed, clarifying the powers of the Collector regarding the sale of seized items and distribution of sale proceeds.( Para 16-30)

The judgment concluded by highlighting the distinction between punishment resulting from prosecution and the order of confiscation passed by the Collector.( Para 31-33)

Facts:

The appellants defaulted on a loan from the respondent bank.

The bank exercised its power under section 13(4) of the 2002 Act, taking constructive possession of the mortgaged property.

DRT applications filed by appellants were dismissed for non-prosecution.

The bank proceeded with the sale of the property, and a third party emerged as the highest bidder.

Appellants attempted payments to redeem the property, but the bank rejected them, citing invalid tenders.

Sale was confirmed in favor of respondent no. 3, who complied with all conditions, transferring the property to a third party.

Applications for restoration of proceedings before the DRT were dismissed.

A writ petition was filed before the High Court seeking to quash the auction.

Issues:

Validity of the appellants' attempts to redeem the property.

The impact of the registration of the sale certificate and the subsequent transfer of the property to a third party on the rights of the parties.

Compliance with the amended Section 13(8) of the 2002 Act.

Held:

The court held that the appellants failed to make a valid tender to redeem the mortgage before the issuance of the sale certificate, and, therefore, had no subsisting right of redemption. (Para 28)

The registration of the sale certificate and the transfer of the property significantly altered the rights of the parties. (Para 25)

The appellants did not take appropriate steps to pay the outstanding dues or seek permission to deposit the required amount during legal proceedings. (Para 26)

Based on the amended Section 13(8) of the 2002 Act, the appellants' right of redemption had been extinguished before the institution of the writ petitions. (Para 29)

The court dismissed the appeals, upholding the actions taken by the respondent bank, as the appellants failed to make a valid and legal tender before the registration of the sale certificate. (Para 30)

Facts:

The case involves a family settlement between three brothers regarding the sale of a property. Allegedly, the first defendant sold the property to the second defendant without obtaining the plaintiff's written concurrence, leading to a suit for specific performance.

Issues:

Whether there was a family settlement.

Whether the family settlement was vague.

Whether the High Court was correct in holding that the courts would not exercise discretion under Section 20 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963.

The impact of the absence of written concurrence by brothers for sale.

The effect of the prohibition against fragmentation of the property under the Capital of Punjab (Development and Regulation) Act, 1952.

Held:

Family Settlement and Vagueness of Clause (5) (Para 17-32): No material was presented to establish that the alleged family settlement is forged. The court proceeds on the assumption that there is a family settlement. The clause in question, requiring the concurrence of three brothers in writing, is found not to be vague. The court emphasizes the preferential offer as a condition precedent to selling to a stranger.

Specific Performance and Right of Pre-emption (Para 37-53): The appellate court's decree for specific performance is found flawed due to errors in directions and assumptions about the terms of the family settlement. The court examines the appellant's right to pre-emption and estoppel in invoking the clause. The appellant's actions and correspondence estop him from claiming the absence of written consent.

Impact of Prohibition Against Fragmentation (Para 54-66): The court analyzes the Capital of Punjab (Development and Regulation) Act, 1952, and rules prohibiting fragmentation. The appellant fails to convince the court that the assignment to the second defendant is vulnerable on the grounds of fragmentation.

Facts:

The respondent, Dilip Mulani, was accused of offenses related to bribery and corruption, particularly involving SAD refund claim cheques and illegal gratification. The Trial Court had rejected Mulani's discharge application, finding a prima facie case against him. However, the High Court set aside this decision, stating there was no prima facie evidence of criminal conspiracy and insufficient proof against Mulani.

Issues:

The sufficiency of evidence for criminal conspiracy, illegal gratification, and bribery charges. The Trial Court found a prima facie case, while the High Court held that the evidence presented was insufficient.

Held:

The Supreme Court set aside the High Court's judgment, deeming it unacceptable. It emphasized that the High Court failed to properly analyze the factual aspects and merely concluded that there was no evidence against Dilip Mulani. The case was remanded to the High Court for reconsideration on its merits, and the Supreme Court clarified that it did not express an opinion on the discharge application's merits.

The Supreme Court found the High Court's approach unacceptable and not meeting the standards of judicial scrutiny.( Paragraph No. 10)

The case was remanded to the High Court for reconsideration of the Criminal Revision Application on its own merits in accordance with the law.( Paragraph No. 11)

Facts:

The Goa, Daman and Diu Cooperative Fisheries Federation Limited (the Society) was registered under the Maharashtra Co-operative Societies Act, 1960.

The Society advanced loans to its members during the period from 1974 to 1980.

Serious irregularities in loan disbursement by the Society led to a misfeasance case and ultimately, the winding-up proceedings.

The Registrar of Cooperative Societies appointed multiple liquidators to recover loans from defaulting members.

Issues:

Whether, under Section 109, proceedings for recovery of dues against members should be closed after the expiry of the liquidation period.

Held:

The concept of restitution is a common law principle serving as a remedy against unjust enrichment. Members obtaining stay in appeal or on recovery proceedings cannot benefit from the expiry of the Liquidator's period.( Para 23)

Upon the liquidation of the Society or the expiration of the liquidation period, the liability of members for the loans does not automatically cease. The disbursement of loans in an arbitrary manner and failure to recover were key reasons for the Society's winding up.( Para 24)

The decision of the High Court, which held that winding-up proceedings must be closed after the lapse of a specific period, is set aside. The bank, being the prime lender and liquidator, can continue recovery proceedings.( Para 25)

Facts:

The appellants, village assistants, were charged with demanding illegal gratification for facilitating the transfer of an electric connection.

P.W.2 filed a complaint against the village administrative officer for demanding Rs. 600 for signing necessary papers.

The money was allegedly handed over to one of the appellants on the village administrative officer's instruction.

Issues:

Whether the appellants were involved in the demand for illegal gratification.

Validity of the defense's claim that money was received in the belief it was payment for land tax arrears.

Held:

Sufficient evidence established a prima facie case against the appellants.

The appellants were in league with the village administrative officer.

The defense's claim of receiving money for land tax arrears was belied by canceled taxation for the relevant period.

Section 20 of the Prevention of Corruption Act creates a presumption, and the acquittal under Section 7 is inconsequential.

The appeals were dismissed, and the appellants were directed to surrender for serving the remaining sentence.