Facts:

The accused appellants were charged with attacking Tej Singh on 26.05.1998, causing injuries including abrasion, contusion, and a lacerated wound.

The appellants were acquitted by the Additional Sessions Judge, Haridwar, but the High Court reversed the acquittal and convicted them.

Suresh (A-2) was sentenced to two years of rigorous imprisonment under Section 307 IPC due to advanced stage lung cancer.

Issues:

Whether the High Court was justified in reversing the order of acquittal and convicting the appellants.

Whether the involvement of the appellants in the commission of the offenses is established beyond reasonable doubt.

Held:

The Supreme Court modified the sentences of Naresh (A-1), Ashish@Shesh Raj (A-3), and Rajendra (A-4), reducing their jail sentences to the time already served, and increased the fine amount from Rs. 7000/- to Rs. 75,000/- each, to be paid to the legal representatives of Tej Singh within three months.

Failure to pay the fine would result in the revival of the original judgment, and the defaulting appellants would be taken into custody to serve the remaining jail sentences.

Suresh (A-2) had his conviction set aside and was released, with his bail bonds being canceled.

Criminal Appeal No. 396 of 2018 was disposed of in view of the judgment passed in Criminal Appeal Nos. 394-395 of 2018.

Facts:

The accused, a vendor at M/s New Bikaner Sweet Center, was found to be in possession of adulterated ghee. The Food Inspector purchased a sample from the shop, which was later confirmed to be adulterated by both the Public Analyst and the Director, Central Food Laboratory.

Issues:

Whether storing adulterated food, even if meant for use in preparing other food items for sale, constitutes an offense under Section 7 of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954.

How discrepancies between the reports of the Public Analyst and the Director, Central Food Laboratory, should be interpreted.

Held:

The court held that storing adulterated food for use in preparing other food items for sale also constitutes an offense under Section 7 of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954. The court clarified that the law was amended to explicitly prohibit such actions, irrespective of whether the adulterated food was meant for direct sale or for use in other food preparations.

Regarding discrepancies between the reports of the Public Analyst and the Director, Central Food Laboratory, the court emphasized that the Director's certificate supersedes the report of the Public Analyst. The court declared that the certificate from the Director is final and conclusive evidence and should be considered as such.

The court set aside the acquittal of the accused and convicted them under Section 2 (ia) (a) (c) & (m) of the Act, punishable under Section 16 (1) (a), read with Section 7 of the Act. However, considering the age of the accused and the closure of their business, the court directed that the sentence be confined to the period already undergone.

Facts:

M/S Container Corporation of India Ltd. (CONCOR) is engaged in the business of handling and transportation of containerized cargo.

The company filed returns for the assessment years 2003-04 to 2005-06, claiming deductions under various heads, including Section 80-IA of the IT Act.

The dispute arose when the Assessing Officer rejected the deductions claimed by the company on profits earned from Inland Container Depots (ICDs) and rolling stocks.

The company appealed to higher authorities, leading to litigation.

Issues:

Whether the activities of the company qualify as infrastructure facilities under Section 80-IA(4) of the IT Act?

Whether the notifications issued by the CBDT supporting the company's claim remain valid despite subsequent amendments?

Held:

The ICDs qualify as inland ports eligible for deductions under Section 80-IA of the IT Act.

The notifications issued by the CBDT supporting the company's claim remain valid despite subsequent amendments.

The nature of work carried out at ICDs supports their classification as inland ports.

The judgment of the High Court, allowing the deduction on income earned from ICDs, is upheld, and the appeal is dismissed.

Facts:

HCL Technologies Ltd. is engaged in the development and export of computer software and provision of technical services.

Dispute arose regarding the inclusion or exclusion of certain expenses related to providing technical services outside India while computing deductions under Section 10A of the IT Act.

Issues:

Whether expenses related to providing technical services outside India should be excluded from the total turnover while calculating deductions under Section 10A of the IT Act.

Held:

The court held that the term "total turnover" should be interpreted in conformity with the context in which it is used. Since expenses excluded from export turnover must also be excluded from total turnover to align with legislative intent, any other interpretation would be impermissible.

Emphasizing the principle of harmonious construction and the need to avoid inconsistency or repugnancy between various sections of the statute, the court ruled that deductions for expenses related to the delivery of computer software and provision of technical services outside India should be allowed from both export turnover and total turnover in the same proportion.

The appeals filed by the Revenue were deemed devoid of merit and were dismissed. All connected matters were disposed of with no order as to costs.

Facts:

The appellant, Commissioner of Income Tax-VI, contested the allowance of deduction for lease equalization charges claimed by the respondent, Virtual Soft Systems Ltd., under the Income Tax Act, 1961.

The respondent filed its return of income for the Assessment Year 1999-2000, declaring a loss and claiming deduction for lease equalization charges.

The Assessing Officer disallowed the deduction claimed, leading to appeals by the respondent to higher authorities, ultimately reaching the High Court, which upheld the decision of the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal (ITAT).

Issues:

Whether deduction on account of lease equalization charges from lease rental income can be allowed under the Income Tax Act, 1961, based on the Guidance Note issued by the Institute of Chartered Accountants of India (ICAI)?

Held:

The Supreme Court held that the respondent is entitled to bifurcate lease rental income as per the accounting standards prescribed by the ICAI. The method of accounting recommended by the Guidance Note is valid for computing real income and is in accordance with accounting principles.

There is no express bar in the Income Tax Act against bifurcating lease rental income as per the accounting standards prescribed by the Guidance Note. The Court dismissed the appeal, affirming the decision of the High Court.

Decided on : 24-04-2018

Companies Act, 1956 - Section 211

Income Tax Act, 1961 - Section 145

Counsel for Appearing Parties

K. Radhakrishnan, Sr. Adv, Mrs. Anil Katiyar, Advocates, for the Appellants; Mrs. Rani Chhabra, Santosh Kumar-I, Nikhil Nayyar, Advocates, for the Respondents

Cases Referred

Commissioner of Income Tax-VII, New Delhi Vs. Punjab Stainless Steel Industries, (2014) 15 SCC 129

Facts:

B.L. Passi filed an income tax return claiming a deduction under Section 80-O for income received from Sumitomo Corporation, Japan, for providing specialized industrial and commercial knowledge about the Indian automobile industry.

The Income Tax Department disallowed the deduction, leading Passi to appeal through various levels of adjudication, ultimately reaching the Supreme Court.

Issues:

Whether Passi was entitled to the deduction under Section 80-O of the Income Tax Act.

Held:

The court analyzed the nature of the services provided by Passi and the relevant provisions of Section 80-O. It noted that Passi claimed to have provided blueprints and information about the Indian automobile industry to Sumitomo Corporation, but failed to produce evidence such as the blueprints to substantiate his claim before the lower authorities.

The court emphasized that technical services, as per Section 80-O, involve the use of tools and machinery, which may not include managerial services. Since Passi couldn't prove the technical nature of the services provided or the basis for the alleged payment by Sumitomo Corporation, the court dismissed his appeal.

Additionally, the court affirmed the High Court's finding of a principal-agent relationship between Passi and Sumitomo Corporation, further supporting the denial of the deduction under Section 80-O.

Facts:

The case involved M/s. Calcutta Export Company, a partnership firm engaged in manufacturing and exporting casting materials.

The Assessing Officer disallowed export commission charges paid by the assessee to M/s. Steel Crackers Pvt. Ltd. due to non-deposit of tax deducted at source (TDS) within the prescribed time.

The Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeals) allowed the appeal filed by the assessee.

The Revenue appealed against the decision before the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal (ITA), which upheld the decision of the Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeals).

The Revenue further appealed to the High Court, which also dismissed the appeal.

The Revenue then appealed to the Supreme Court.

Issues:

Whether the amendment made by the Finance Act, 2010 to Section 40(a)(ia) of the Income Tax Act, 1961, has retrospective effect, and if so, whether it applies to the case at hand.

Held:

The Court held that the amendment made by the Finance Act, 2010 to Section 40(a)(ia) should be interpreted liberally and applied retrospectively from the date of insertion of the provision, aligning with legislative intent and mitigating hardships faced by taxpayers. This decision was based on the curative nature of the amendment and its aim to remedy unintended consequences and ensure reasonable interpretation of provisions.

The Court cited previous judgments, including Allied Motors (P) Limited vs. CIT, Delhi, which supported giving retrospective effect to amendments aimed at rectifying anomalies.

Therefore, the assessee in the case was allowed to claim the benefit of the amendment, and the appeals were dismissed.

Facts:

Bharat V. Patel, Chairman and Managing Director of Procter and Gamble (P&G) India, received an amount on redemption of SARs issued by P&G USA.

Assessment proceedings were conducted under Section 143(3) of the Income Tax Act, 1961, determining Patel's total income.

Patel appealed to the Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeals) and then to the Tribunal.

The High Court upheld Patel's appeal, dismissing the Revenue's appeal.

The Revenue appealed to the Supreme Court.

Issues:

Whether the amount received on redemption of SARs is taxable as capital gains or as a perquisite under Section 17(2)(iii) of the IT Act.

Whether the amendment introduced by the Finance Act, 1999, regarding taxation of specified securities has retrospective effect.

Held:

The Court held that the amendment introduced by the Finance Act, 1999, did not have retrospective effect. Hence, Patel's transaction falls outside its purview.

The Court emphasized that unless a benefit is made taxable by law, it cannot be regarded as income. Therefore, the amount received by Patel cannot be taxed as perquisite or under capital gains.

The Court rejected the Revenue's argument regarding the applicability of Section 28(iv) of the IT Act, as it pertains to business or profession-related transactions, which was not the case here.

Facts:

The case pertains to M/S. Shree Rama Multi Tech Ltd., engaged in manufacturing.

Dispute related to Assessment Years 1999-2000, 2000-2001, and 2001-2002.

Initial assessment by the Assessing Officer modified based on a Tribunal decision.

Appeals filed before the Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeals) and reassessment proceedings initiated.

Tribunal allowed respondent's claim regarding deduction of interest income and remanded other issues to the Assessing Officer.

Revenue appealed before the High Court, which upheld the Tribunal's decision.

Issues:

Whether interest accrued on deposit of share application money is taxable income.

Whether the interest income can be deducted against public issue expenses.

Held:

The Supreme Court held that interest earned on share application money deposited in compliance with statutory requirements should be eligible for deduction against public issue expenses. The purpose of such deposits was not primarily to generate additional income but to fulfill statutory requirements. Therefore, the interest earned was incidental and not the prime purpose, making it eligible for deduction.

The Court dismissed the appeals and upheld the decision of the High Court, stating that the interest income earned from share application money was liable to be set off against public issue expenses.