Facts:

A FIR was registered for offenses under Sections 60 and 72 of the United Provinces Excise Act, 1910, and Sections 420, 467, 468, and 471 of the IPC. The charges were related to the seizure of 154 cartons of illicit liquor and a firearm from a truck by a joint team of Excise Department and police officials.

Issues:

The jurisdiction of the Collector to order the confiscation of the seized vehicle. Mustafa contended that only the Magistrate conducting the trial had the authority to release the vehicle, and the Collector lacked jurisdiction to pass an order of confiscation.

Held:

The court affirmed that the power of the Collector to order confiscation is independent of whether a prosecution for the offense has been instituted. Section 72(2) of the Act empowers the Collector to order confiscation, and the proviso allows the owner an option to pay a fine in lieu of confiscation.( Para 1-5)

The court established that the Collector has exclusive jurisdiction to order confiscation, emphasizing that the criminal court does not possess the authority to release seized items. The matter was remitted back to the High Court for a judicial review of the confiscation order passed by the Collector.( Para 6-10)

The judgment emphasized the applicability of the procedure of confiscation under the United Provinces Excise Act, 1910, as opposed to Chapter XXXIV of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Section 5 of the Code was cited, saving special or local laws.( Para 11-15)

The court delved into the specifics of the Act, affirming that the Collector has exclusive jurisdiction to confiscate vehicles. Sub-sections (3), (4), and (8) of Section 72 were analyzed, clarifying the powers of the Collector regarding the sale of seized items and distribution of sale proceeds.( Para 16-30)

The judgment concluded by highlighting the distinction between punishment resulting from prosecution and the order of confiscation passed by the Collector.( Para 31-33)

FACTS:

The appellant, Saleem Ahmed, was accused of electricity theft.

BSES sent a bill of Rs. 97,786 for theft after the meter was found not recording correct reading.

The case was settled through Lok Adalat, and the appellant agreed to pay Rs. 83,120.

ISSUES:

Whether the filing of an FIR after the settlement in Lok Adalat is legally sustainable.

Whether there was a subsisting cause of action for the FIR.

HELD:

The dispute over the outstanding amount was settled through Lok Adalat, resulting in an award.

Filing an FIR after the settlement was deemed wholly unjust and illegal.

The FIR was not permissible, as it went against the terms of the award and lacked a subsisting cause of action.

The effect of the award was to settle the dispute amicably, leaving no basis for the FIR.

The appellant had paid the awarded amount in full and final satisfaction of the claim.

REFERRED CASES:

Bhargavi Constructions & Anr. vs. Kothakapu Muthyam Reddy & Ors., (2018) 13 SCC 480

State of Punjab & Anr. vs. Jalour Singh & Ors., (2008) 2 SCC 660

FACTS:

Saleem Ahmed, the appellant, owned a house in New Delhi, rented to respondent No. 3.

BSES officials found discrepancies in the electricity meter at the house.

BSES sent a theft bill of Rs. 97,786, leading to a case against the appellant.

Permanent Lok Adalat settled the case at Rs. 83,120 against full payment.

ISSUES:

Legality of filing an FIR after settlement through Lok Adalat.

HELD:

The dispute was settled amicably through Lok Adalat, resulting in an award fully satisfying the entire claim. Filing an FIR post-settlement had no legal basis.( Paragraph 14)

Emphasized that the remedy for the parties, if aggrieved by the award, should have been to challenge it in an appropriate forum. This, however, was not the case here.( Paragraph 15)

The passing of the award concluded the dispute in full and final satisfaction of the demand. The dispute came to an end, leaving only the recovery of the awarded amount.( Paragraph 16)

The appellant paid the awarded amount, which was accepted without protest by BSES, fully satisfying the award.( Paragraph 17)

The award did not grant BSES the liberty to file an FIR post-settlement. Conditions in the award confirmed full and final settlement without reserving the right to file an FIR.( Paragraph 18)

Filing an FIR after the Lok Adalat's award was deemed wholly unjust and illegal, lacking legal sustainability.( Paragraph 20)

REFERRED CASES:

Firm Seth Radha Kishan vs. Administrator, Municipal Committee, Ludhiana, AIR 1963 SC 1547

Firm of Illuri Subbaya Chetty and Sons v. State of Andhra Pradesh, AIR 1964 SC 322

Dhulabhai and Ors. v. The State of Madhya Pradesh and Anr, (1968) 3 SCR 662

Kamala Mills Ltd v. State of Bombay (1966) 1 SCR 64

NDMC vs. Satish Chand, (2003) 10 SCC 38

Raja Ram Kumar Bhargava (Dead) By LRs v. Union of India (1988) 1 SCC 681

Ram Swarup and Ors. vs. Shikar Chand, AIR 1966 SC 893

Secretary of State vs. Mask, AIR 1940 PC 105

Shiv Kumar Chadha Etc. Etc vs. Municipal Corporation of Delhi (1993) 3 SCC 161

Srikant K. Jituri vs. Corporation of the City of Belgaum, (1994) 6 SCC 572

Wolverhampton New Waterworks Co. vs. Hawkesford, [1859] 6 C. B. (NS) 336

Facts:

The case involves a challenge against notifications issued by State Governments requiring candidates to execute bonds for compulsory service upon admission to medical courses. The notifications aim to address the scarcity of specialized healthcare professionals and ensure the provision of medical assistance, particularly in government hospitals.

Issues:

The jurisdiction of State Governments to issue such notifications, the alleged violation of fundamental rights (Article 14, 19, and 21), the reasonableness of compulsory service conditions, and the impact on the right to live with dignity.

Held:

The judgment establishes that Entry 66 of List I and Entry 25 of List III of the Constitution provide the State Legislature the power to legislate on medical education. The Medical Council of India Act does not cover the subject of compulsory bonds, allowing States to legislate on the matter. State Governments, through executive orders under Article 162, have the competence to issue such notifications.( Para 17)

The court deems the notifications reasonable, considering the need for infrastructure in medical colleges, meagre fees, and the duty of government hospitals. It directs State Governments to consider a reasonable compulsory service period of two years, with a default clause requiring doctors to compensate the government with Rs. 20 Lakhs in case of non-compliance.( Para 18-19)

The judgment clarifies that conditions imposed at the time of admission do not violate the right to carry on the medical profession directly. The right to practice arises after course completion. Admissions and bond execution without protest negate claims of violation under Article 19(1)(g).( Para 20)

Article 21 obligates the State to safeguard the right to life, emphasizing the importance of government hospitals in providing medical assistance. Article 47 underscores the constitutional duty to improve public health.( Para 21-22, 25)

The right to life under Article 21 encompasses the right to live with human dignity, extending beyond physical survival. The State has an obligation to take action to protect and facilitate human dignity.( Para 26-28)

The court rejects the argument that Article 21 rights are violated, emphasizing the laudable objective of State Governments to protect the fundamental rights of the deprived sections through compulsory service bonds.( Para 32-33)

The judgment dismisses claims of forced labor under Article 23(1), noting that the service rendered is not forced labor, especially considering the benefits received by the appellants.( Para 35-36)

Section 14 of the Specific Relief Act prohibits the enforcement of contracts of personal service. The court highlights that none of the State Governments attempted to enforce the contracts through service bonds.( Para 39-40)

The judgment calls for suitable steps to establish a uniform policy regarding compulsory service for doctors trained in government institutions, considering variations in conditions imposed by different states.( Para 41)

Facts:

The appellant, Tarun Jit Tejpal, was facing trial for offenses under various sections of the Indian Penal Code, as indicated in the charge sheet filed by the Investigating Officer. The Sessions Judge had ordered charges to be framed against the appellant. Subsequently, the appellant filed a revision application before the High Court seeking discharge from the charged offenses.

Issues:

The appellant sought discharge on the grounds that the informant and the Investigating Officer were the same, alleging that this aspect vitiated the entire criminal proceedings. Reference was made to the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Mohan Lal v. State of Punjab (2018) 17 SCC 627.

Held:

The Court noted that the decision in Mohan Lal was not applicable to the present case as the criminal prosecution had been initiated before the Mohan Lal decision. Therefore, the appellant could not be discharged solely on the ground of the same person serving as both the informant and the Investigating Officer (Para 8.2).

The Court distinguished the case of Bhagwan Singh, relied upon by the appellant's counsel, stating that it was relevant after the trial and not at the stage of framing of charges. The Court emphasized that considerations regarding the conduct of the victim/prosecutrix and other merits should be addressed during the course of the trial (Para 9.5).

The submissions made on behalf of the appellant on merits and the conduct of the victim/prosecutrix were deemed to be matters requiring consideration at an appropriate stage during the trial. The Court affirmed that there was more than a prima facie case against the accused, and the trial court had rightly framed the charges, a decision properly confirmed by the High Court (Para 9.5).

FACTS:

The ITBP requested about 75 acres of land for establishing a Battalion Headquarters in Kanpur Nagar.

Notifications under Section 4 and Section 6 of the Land Acquisition Act were issued for urgent acquisition of the land.

Legal challenges were raised by the landowners, leading to multiple writ petitions before the High Court.

The High Court quashed the notifications, holding that the urgency clause was improperly invoked, and there was no immediate urgency justifying the use of Section 17 and dispensing with Section 5A procedure.

ISSUES:

Whether the invocation of the urgency clause and dispensing with the Section 5A procedure were justified?

Compliance with Section 17(4) regarding the deposit of compensation.

HELD:

The High Court erred in finding no justification for invoking the urgency clause. The time gap of three months between notifications indicated a real urgency.

The purpose of land acquisition for establishing an ITBP Battalion Headquarters justified the invocation of Section 17 and dispensing with the Section 5A procedure.

The High Court's finding of non-compliance with Section 17(4) regarding compensation was unfounded, as the ITBP had deposited the estimated amount in 2009/2010.

The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, quashed the High Court's judgment, and dismissed the writ petition.

Facts:

The appellant, a judicial officer, accepted an objection raised by one of the lawyers regarding the authorization of a compromise petition in a claims case. The High Court set aside this order, making adverse remarks against the appellant, questioning his integrity, and accusing him of favoritism. The appellant challenged this decision in the Supreme Court.

Issues:

Whether the High Court's remarks against the appellant were justified.

The appropriateness of the order regarding the authorization of lawyers in the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal matter.

Held:

The Supreme Court, after considering the arguments and previous cases, held that remarks against judicial officers should not be passed lightly. The court expunged all adverse remarks against the appellant and directed the deletion of a specific paragraph from the judgment. The order imposing costs on the appellant was set aside. The court emphasized that costs are not normally imposed on the presiding officer of the court.

"We, accordingly, expunge all such remarks and direct deletion of para 15 of the judgment."( Para 11)

"We also set aside the order in so far as the imposition of costs of Rs.10,000/- on the appellant is concerned."( Para 12)

"The civil appeal is accordingly allowed, and we direct expunging of all remarks made against the appellant and further direct that para 15 of the impugned judgment shall stand deleted for all intents and purposes."( Para 14)

Facts:

The deceased, Pradeep Tokas, a 21-year-old trained swimmer, died in a motor accident.

The accident involved a collision between a two-wheeler (with the deceased as a pillion rider) and a stationary truck.

The claimants (parents of the deceased) filed a compensation claim before the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal (MACT).

MACT awarded compensation, but the High Court modified the amount based on the age of the mother of the deceased.

Issues:

Applicability of the multiplier for compensation calculation based on the age of the deceased or dependents.

Determination of notional income and inclusion of future prospects in compensation.

Held:

The Division Bench, comprising Justices Indu Malhotra and Sanjiv Khanna, held that the multiplier for compensation should be based on the age of the deceased, not the dependents. The court referred to various precedents, including Sarla Verma, Reshma Kumari, Pranay Sethi, and others, to establish this principle. Even in the case of a bachelor, the age of the deceased should be considered, aligning with settled legal norms.

The court noted errors in the High Court's decision regarding the notional income of the deceased and the failure to award future prospects. The notional income was adjusted to Rs. 12,000/- per month, and future prospects were calculated at 40% of the income.

Facts:

Corporation engaged in stocking goods, with loading and unloading work carried out by workers.

Dispute arises on whether these workers are entitled to benefits under the Provident Fund Act.

Corporation contests the claim, asserting no employer-employee relationship.

Issues:

Whether the workers are eligible for benefits under the Provident Fund Act.

Whether the Corporation is liable to pay statutory contributions for these workers.

Held:

The High Court's reliance on the Industrial Disputes Act findings was criticized.

Definition of "employee" under the Provident Fund Act differs from that in the Industrial Disputes Act, and their objectives are distinct.

Findings under the Industrial Disputes Act are irrelevant to the Provident Fund Act issue.

The High Court's order is set aside, and the case is remanded for reconsideration on merits, considering the definition of "employee" under Section 2(f) of the Provident Fund Act.

The High Court is urged to decide the writ petition expeditiously.