Facts:

The accused, a vendor at M/s New Bikaner Sweet Center, was found to be in possession of adulterated ghee. The Food Inspector purchased a sample from the shop, which was later confirmed to be adulterated by both the Public Analyst and the Director, Central Food Laboratory.

Issues:

Whether storing adulterated food, even if meant for use in preparing other food items for sale, constitutes an offense under Section 7 of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954.

How discrepancies between the reports of the Public Analyst and the Director, Central Food Laboratory, should be interpreted.

Held:

The court held that storing adulterated food for use in preparing other food items for sale also constitutes an offense under Section 7 of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954. The court clarified that the law was amended to explicitly prohibit such actions, irrespective of whether the adulterated food was meant for direct sale or for use in other food preparations.

Regarding discrepancies between the reports of the Public Analyst and the Director, Central Food Laboratory, the court emphasized that the Director's certificate supersedes the report of the Public Analyst. The court declared that the certificate from the Director is final and conclusive evidence and should be considered as such.

The court set aside the acquittal of the accused and convicted them under Section 2 (ia) (a) (c) & (m) of the Act, punishable under Section 16 (1) (a), read with Section 7 of the Act. However, considering the age of the accused and the closure of their business, the court directed that the sentence be confined to the period already undergone.

Facts:

M/S TechSpan India Private Ltd., engaged in software development and human resource services, filed its return of income for the Assessment Year 2001-02 declaring a loss.

The Income Tax Officer issued a notice under Section 148 for re-opening the assessment, alleging that the deduction under Section 10A of the IT Act had been allowed in excess, leading to an income escape of Rs. 57,36,811.

TechSpan challenged the re-assessment notice in the High Court, which ruled in its favor, quashing the notice and subsequent re-assessment order.

Issues:

Whether the re-opening of the completed assessment is justified under Section 147 of the Income Tax Act, 1961?

Held:

The court emphasizes the requirement that the assessing officer must have a "reason to believe" that income has escaped assessment, which cannot be merely a change of opinion on the same facts and circumstances already considered during the original assessment proceedings.

The Court concludes in paragraph 14 that since the assessing officer had already considered the matter during the original assessment and the re-assessment was based on the same facts, it amounted to a mere change of opinion and not a valid ground for re-assessment.

Therefore, the appeal filed by the Income Tax Officer was dismissed.

Facts:

The Union of India filed multiple appeals despite clear precedents and guidelines, leading to the dismissal of these appeals. The Court observed a pattern of non-compliance with the National Litigation Policy and a disregard for efficient and responsible litigation practices.

Issues:

Whether the conduct of the Union of India in filing frivolous appeals and not adhering to the National Litigation Policy warrants judicial intervention?

Whether costs should be imposed on the Union of India for such conduct?

Held:

The Court expresses dissatisfaction with the Union of India's attitude towards litigation and its failure to adhere to the National Litigation Policy. It emphasizes the burden placed on the justice system and the need for the Union of India to act as an efficient and responsible litigant. Costs of Rs. 1,00,000 are imposed on the Union of India for frivolous litigation.

The Court criticizes the Union of India for its continued non-compliance with the National Litigation Policy despite discussions and plans for reform. It underscores the importance of withdrawing vexatious cases promptly and implementing measures to reduce government litigation. The Court dismisses the appeal and directs the Union of India to deposit the imposed costs within four weeks.

Facts:

Mahindra & Mahindra Ltd. entered an agreement with Kaiser Jeep Corporation (KJC) to expand its jeep product line.

KJC provided a loan for purchasing tools and equipment, later waived off by American Motor Corporation (AMC).

The loan waiver amounting to Rs. 57,74,064/- was claimed as non-taxable by Mahindra & Mahindra Ltd.

Issues:

Whether the waived loan amount should be taxed as income under the Income Tax Act, 1961.

Held:

The court found that the waived loan amount did not meet the criteria outlined in Section 28(iv) of the Income Tax Act, as it was received in cash.

Additionally, it was determined that the loan waiver did not constitute a cessation of trading liability under Section 41(1) as the loan was not claimed as a deduction in previous assessments.

Decision: The appeals were dismissed, upholding the decision of the High Court. The court concluded that the waived loan amount should not be taxed as income under either Section 28(iv) or Section 41(1) of the Income Tax Act.

Facts:

The appellant, Tapan Kumar Dutta, was a partner in a partnership firm named "Nityakali Rice Mill". A search conducted by the Income Tax Department led to the seizure of documents and a sum of Rs. 34 lakhs from the firm's premises. Following the search, the Assessing Officer issued notices under Section 158BC of the Income Tax Act, 1961 to the appellant and the firm. Subsequently, a block assessment order was passed against the appellant for the undisclosed income.

Issues:

The validity of the second notice issued under Section 158BD of the IT Act.

Held:

In the instant case, the court analyzed the provisions of Section 158BD of the IT Act, which allows for the issuance of notices to persons other than those subjected to the initial search, based on undisclosed income found during the search.

The court emphasized that the Assessing Officer must be satisfied that the undisclosed income belongs to someone other than the searched person. The court further noted that since the same Assessing Officer assessed both the firm and the appellant, the Assessing Officer had jurisdiction to proceed against the appellant under Section 158BD. The satisfaction of the Assessing Officer should be based on seized materials, not merely on disclosures made by the appellant.

The court concluded that the Assessing Officer's decision to issue the second notice under Section 158BD was based on a proper evaluation of seized materials and was in accordance with the law.

Therefore, the court upheld the decision of the High Court and dismissed the appeal.

Facts:

The judgment arises from a reference made by a three-judge bench to a larger bench concerning the interpretation of Regulations 9(IV) and 9(VII) of the Postgraduate Medical Education Regulations, 2000. The petitions before the court sought declarations regarding the power of states to provide a separate source of entry for in-service candidates seeking admission to postgraduate medical courses. The primary contention was whether Regulation 9 prohibits states from providing such a separate source of entry.

Issues:

Whether states have the authority, under Entry 25 of List III, to provide a separate source of entry for in-service candidates seeking admission to postgraduate medical courses, despite Regulation 9 of the Postgraduate Medical Education Regulations, 2000.

Whether the interpretation of Regulation 9 in the case of Dinesh Singh Chauhan holds precedent and restricts states from providing reservations or a separate source of entry for in-service candidates.

Held:

The court refused the prayer for interim relief sought by the petitioners, as the interpretation of Regulation 9(IV) in the case of Dinesh Singh Chauhan remains valid. The court emphasized that Regulation 9 is a self-contained code regarding admission procedures for medical courses, and states cannot undermine these procedures. The decision in Dinesh Singh Chauhan construes Regulation 9 as prohibiting reservations or a separate source of entry for in-service candidates in postgraduate degree courses.

Therefore, any attempt to provide such reservations would impinge upon Entry 66 of List I and the regulatory powers vested under central legislation.

Facts:

T. Jayachandran, a stockbroker, acted as a broker for Indian Bank in purchasing securities.

Indian Bank sought to save itself from high-interest rates by luring PSUs to make fixed-term deposits at higher interest rates.

Jayachandran purchased securities for Indian Bank at a prescribed price, including covering extra interest payable to PSUs.

Income Tax department raised a demand for additional tax, alleging that Jayachandran should be taxed on the sum payable to the PSUs as income.

Issues:

Whether the additional interest payable to PSUs could be assessed as the income of Jayachandran.

Held:

The court examined the nature of the relationship between Jayachandran and Indian Bank regarding the transactions. It considered evidence from criminal proceedings, including the findings of the CBI court, which acquitted Jayachandran and concluded that he acted as a broker for Indian Bank. Based on the evidence and conduct of the parties, including the acknowledgment by Indian Bank of demand drafts taken by Jayachandran, the court held that he acted as a broker and not as an individual dealer.

Therefore, the additional interest payable to the PSUs could not be considered his income.

Facts:

The case involves a petition challenging the validity of a no-confidence motion against the 'Pramukh' (chairperson) of a Kshetra Panchayat in Uttar Pradesh. The motion was moved by 39 elected members, but the petitioner contested its validity, arguing that only 26 members had properly signed it. The dispute revolved around the status of 13 elected members who allegedly did not take their oath of office.

Issues:

Whether the no-confidence motion against the 'Pramukh' was valid, considering the disputed status of 13 elected members who had not taken their oath of office.

The secondary issue involved the interpretation of relevant provisions of the Uttar Pradesh Kshettra Panchayats and Zila Panchayats Adhiniyam, 1961, and related rules, particularly regarding the participation of members who had not taken their oath of office.

Held:

The judgment, delivered by Madan B. Lokur, J., addressed the validity of the no-confidence motion. It was concluded that the motion was numerically valid since it was signed by more than 50% of the elected members, even if the disputed 13 members were not considered for signing the motion.

The judgment also clarified the status of elected members who had not taken their oath of office. While it was acknowledged as illogical for these members to sign the motion without having the right to vote in the Panchayat, there was no legal challenge to their status as elected members. Therefore, they were deemed entitled to sign the motion.

Deepak Gupta, J., concurred with the conclusion regarding the validity of the motion. However, he emphasized the seriousness of taking the oath of office and suggested maintaining an official record of oath-taking to avoid future disputes.

Facts:

The case involves a dispute regarding the timing of filing applications for redetermination of compensation under Section 28A of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894.

The appellant sought redetermination of compensation based on a judgment of the High Court passed under Section 54 of the Act.

Issues:

Whether an application under Section 28A of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, can be filed within three months from the date of the judgment of the High Court or Supreme Court passed in appeal under Section 54 of the Act.

Held:

The Court clarified the scope and applicability of Section 28A of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, and made the following decisions:

The redetermination under Section 28A is only available in respect of an "Award" passed by the "court" under Part III of the Act.

The appellate courts' judgments under Section 54 are not within the purview of Section 28A.

The entitlement to redetermination of compensation lies only in terms of Section 28A of the Act based on the award of the Reference Court, not on judgments of appellate courts.

The appeal was accordingly dismissed, and any pending applications were disposed of with no costs incurred.