FACTS:

Corporate Insolvency Resolution Process (CIRP) initiated against M/s. Rave Scans Private Limited.

Appellant Rahul Jain submitted a revised resolution plan, approved by the NCLT on October 17, 2018.

Second respondent, Hero Fincorp Ltd., appealed, alleging discrimination between financial creditors in the resolution plan.

NCLAT modified the NCLT's order based on the discrimination claim.

The discrimination was alleged due to different percentages of admitted claims given to dissenting financial creditors compared to other financial creditors.

ISSUES:

Whether discrimination against the dissenting financial creditor was justified in the resolution plan.

The impact of the amendment to Regulation 38 on the resolution plan.

HELD:

The court held that the NCLAT's order and directions were not justified, setting them aside and restoring the NCLT's order. The court observed:

The resolution plan had been implemented, and except for the objections of the dissenting creditor (Hero), it had attained finality.

The wide observations of the NCLAT, requiring the appellant to match the payout to Hero, were not justified given that the resolution process began before the amended regulation came into force.

The liquidation value of the corporate debtor was ascertained at Rs. 36 crores, and the appellant offered Rs. 54 crores, which was approved.

Considering these factors, the NCLAT's order was deemed unjustified.

REFERRED CASES:

Swiss Ribbons Pvt. Ltd. & Anr. vs. Union of India, 2019 SCC Online SC 73

Facts:

The respondents, initially engaged as GDS in the postal department, were subsequently selected in regular posts. The issue revolves around the calculation of qualifying service for pension entitlement, specifically whether the services rendered as GDS should be factored in.

Issues:

Whether services as GDS can be considered in determining the qualifying service for pension in regular posts.

Interpretation of Clause 49(3) of the 1972 Rules regarding additional period computation.

Application of Rule 88 of the 1972 Rules for relaxing the mandatory qualifying service requirement.

Held:

The respondents cannot be deemed work-charged employees, and their services as GDS should not be considered an extension of their service in regular posts. The High Courts' view favoring GDSs in pension eligibility is not accepted, as the original applicants did not meet the 10-year qualifying period.

No specific Rule or administrative circular specifies the computation of GDS service to fill the qualifying service gap. The benefits of the 1991 circular are not applicable, given the part-time nature of GDS employment.

The interpretation of Clause 49(3) is clarified, indicating a one-time benefit for service exceeding three months in a fraction of a year.

Rule 88 empowers the ministry or department to relax Rules for preventing undue hardship. The court acknowledges the appellants' concern about the potential endless exercise but emphasizes executive discretion.

The services rendered as GDS or Extra–Departmental Agents cannot be factored in for calculating qualifying services in regular posts for pension purposes. The judgments under appeal are not sustained.

Authorities should consider Rule 88 for cases with marginal shortfalls in qualifying service, and if the Central Government or postal department issued pension orders, they should not be disturbed. For other cases without pension orders, the ministry may consider relaxing the qualifying service rule.

Facts:

A news item reported the apprehension of three judicial officers from Bihar by Nepal Police, allegedly involved in a compromising position with Nepali women in a guest house at Biratnagar, Nepal. The Full Court passed a resolution for their dismissal, bypassing disciplinary proceedings, utilizing the powers under Article 311(2)(b).

Issues:

Validity of the Full Court resolution for dismissal without a disciplinary inquiry.

Authority of the High Court to invoke Article 311(2)(b) in matters related to the subordinate judiciary.

Application of Article 311(2) to a judicial officer who has retired or attained superannuation.

Held:

Clause (b) of the second proviso to Article 311(2) can be invoked to impose punishment after recording in writing that it is impracticable to conduct an inquiry before imposing the punishment. The Division Bench clarified the consequences of quashing the dismissal order, allowing the High Court to proceed in accordance with the law, without restricting the use of Article 311(2)(b).

The earlier dismissal order dated February 12, 2014, was set aside for not recording reasons for dispensing with the departmental inquiry. The annulled order doesn't adjudicate on the merits of the allegations, leaving room for further proceedings. The Division Bench did not prohibit the High Court from invoking Article 311(2)(b) at an appropriate stage after recording reasons.

The contention that the power to dispense with an inquiry vests exclusively with the Governor, as per Nripendra Nath Bagchi, is rejected. The High Court retains authority to decide whether the conditions for invoking Article 311(2)(b) are met, and the Governor's role is in formalizing orders.

The Full Court re-recommended dismissal of the judicial officers, dispensing with the departmental inquiry in August 2015. However, the matter is pending with the State Government due to a stay order from the Supreme Court. The challenge to the order cannot be made in anticipation, and the appellants have reserved their right to challenge it when passed.

FACTS:

The appellant, husband of the deceased, was convicted under Section 302 of IPC for the murder of his wife. The case relied on circumstantial evidence, with both the trial court and the High Court concluding that it was a homicidal death.

ISSUES:

Whether the prosecution successfully established a prima facie case of a homicidal death.

Whether the appellant, under Section 313 of CrPC, provided a sufficient explanation for the circumstances leading to the unnatural death of the deceased.

HELD:

The judgment states: "In view of our conclusion that the prosecution has clearly established a prima facie case, the precedents cited on behalf of the appellant are not considered relevant in the facts of the present case. Once the prosecution established a prima facie case, the appellant was obliged to furnish some explanation under Section 313, Cr.P.C. with regard to the circumstances under which the deceased met an unnatural death inside the house. His failure to offer any explanation whatsoever therefore leaves no doubt for the conclusion of his being the assailant of the deceased."( Paragraph 15)

REFERRED CASES:

Hanumant and Ors. vs. State of Madhya Pradesh, AIR 1952 SC 343

Sawal Das vs. State of Bihar, (1974) 4 SCC 193

Shambu Nath Mehra vs. The State of Ajmer, 1956 SCR 199

Jose vs. The Sub-Inspector of Police, Koyilandy and Ors., (2016) 10 SCC 519

Trimukh Maroti Kirkan vs. State of Maharashtra, 2006 (10) SCC 681

Tulshiram Sahadu Suryawanshi and Ors. vs. State of Maharashtra, (2012) 10 SCC 373

Facts:

The prosecution alleged that the accused attacked the deceased and his relatives who were traveling on a tractor. The accused, armed with weapons, reportedly ambushed the tractor, resulting in the death of the deceased. The Trial Court convicted the accused under various sections, but the High Court acquitted them based on inconsistencies in the evidence.

Issues:

Discrepancies in the testimonies of witnesses PW-1 and PW-2.

Contradictions in the accounts of who wrote the police report.

Varied statements regarding the location of the dead body and the use of the tractor.

Delay in taking the deceased to the hospital after the alleged incident.

Inconsistencies in attributing specific acts to accused individuals.

Held:

The prosecution's claim that the deceased fell from the tractor raises doubts about the actual use of the tractor. The Investigating Officer's testimony differs from that of PW-1 regarding the location of the dead body.( Para 42)

Contradictions exist in the evidence regarding who wrote the police report, creating uncertainty about the accuracy of the accounts.( Para 43)

The delayed arrival of the deceased's body at the hospital and discrepancies in witness accounts cast doubts on the prosecution's narrative.( Para 45)

Contradictions in PW-1's statements about the position of the accused during the alleged attack raise questions about the reliability of the testimony.( Para 47)

Contradictions between PW-1 and PW-2 regarding the direction of the shot and unexplained gunshot injuries further undermine the prosecution's case.( Para 49)

Omissions in the FIR and conflicting statements about the use of the tractor contribute to the doubt surrounding the events.( Para 50 and 51)

Failure of PW5 to elicit information about the deceased falling down in the 161 statement adds to the inconsistency in the evidence.( Para 52)

Considering the overall inconsistencies and limitations of the Court's jurisdiction, the appellant fails to make a compelling case to overturn the High Court's judgment.( Para 57)

FACTS:

Appellant and Respondent No. 1 married without parental consent.

They sought police protection due to problems from the bride's parents.

High Court initially granted protection but later recalled it, directing the filing of an FIR against the Appellant under Section 9 of the Prohibition of Child Marriage Act, 2006.

The basis for the recall was the discrepancy in the Appellant's age, as per school records.

ISSUES:

Legality of recalling a protection order under Section 482 of CrPC.

Applicability of Section 9 of the Prohibition of Child Marriage Act, 2006, based on the Appellant's age.

HELD:

The High Court erred in recalling the protection order under Section 482, as there is no provision for such recall in criminal matters.

Section 9 of the Prohibition of Child Marriage Act, 2006, was misapplied. Even if the Appellant was over 18, the legislative intent suggests that only male adults marrying child brides are punishable.

The Court clarified that Section 9 should be read as "male adult above eighteen years of age marries a child," and not as "contracts a child marriage."

The Court quashed the directions to lodge an FIR, stating that Section 9 did not apply to the case.

Police protection was deemed unnecessary as the couple was reported to be living happily without threats from family members.

Facts:

The co-accused, now deceased, abducted a 10-year old girl and her 7-year old brother using a borrowed school van. The accused-petitioner joined them later. The girl was raped and sodomized, and both children were administered poison. Failing in their attempt to poison the victims, they were thrown into a canal, resulting in their drowning. The trial court and the High Court convicted the accused-petitioner under various sections, including murder and rape, and imposed the death sentence.

Issues:

The review petition challenged the conviction and death sentence. The main issues included the voluntariness of the petitioner's confession, the validity of the death penalty, and the adequacy of legal representation.

Held:

Scope of Review: The scope of review in death penalty cases is narrow, allowing intervention only for errors apparent on the face of the record or discovery of new evidence causing manifest injustice. The Court reaffirmed restrictive principles applied in previous decisions on the scope of review.

Voluntariness of Confession & Effect of Retraction: The Court emphasized that the validity of a confession in India hinges on compliance with statutory provisions ensuring voluntariness. Even in the absence of a provision for retracting a confession, the Court reduces its probative value when retracted. In this case, the Magistrate complied with all procedural requirements, affirmatively ensuring voluntariness.

Independent Re-appreciation of Evidence: The Court rejected the contention that the appeal was decided without independently re-appreciating evidence, asserting a critical analysis during the proceedings leading to a unanimous finding of guilt.

Plea of Inadequacy of Legal Representation: While acknowledging refusals by counsel, the trial court ensured legal aid representation, eliminating prejudice. The High Court and this Court provided due legal representation, dismissing claims of deficient assistance.

Allegations of Discrepancies in Arrest & Recovery of Evidence: Disputes over the date of arrest were deemed immaterial. Analysis of depositions proved the integrity of evidence recovery, dismissing doubts over identification by the victim's father.

Plea of Erroneous Conviction under Section 376 IPC: Considering medical evidence and circumstances, the Court affirmed the accused-petitioner's conviction under Section 376 IPC.

Plea of Erroneous Reliance on POCSO: The Court clarified that the accused-petitioner was not convicted under the POCSO Act, and the passing reference to it was for assessing the gravity of the crime.

Sentencing: The Court rejected contentions against death penalty, emphasizing the gravity of the offenses, lack of remorse, and absence of mitigating factors. Dissenting views were deemed to have little precedential value.

Facts:

An agreement was made on 30.08.2001 between the respondent-Central Warehousing Corporation and the appellant for handling and transportation work. The contract was terminated due to poor performance, and a dispute arose. The arbitrator awarded in favor of the respondent, upholding the termination and justifying the forfeiture of the security deposit and detention of equipment. The appellant filed objections under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act.

Issues:

Validity of termination and forfeiture of security deposit.

Detention of equipment.

Counterclaims raised by the appellant.

Held:

The Arbitrator and the Courts upheld the termination, justified the forfeiture of the security deposit and detention of equipment. The court noted the failure of the appellant to deliver the container, resulting in missed export schedules. The appellant received the full payment as per the arbitral award even before filing objections under Section 34. The court found no reason to interfere with the Arbitrator's decision.

Facts:

The appellant, Union of India and others, challenged the orders of the Armed Forces Tribunal regarding the entitlement of the respondent, V.R. Nanukuttan Nair, to the service element of disability pension from the date of discharge. The respondent was discharged on June 30, 1978, after 10 years and 169 days of service, having been in a low medical category since 1970.

Issues:

The denial of the service element of disability pension to the respondent, who was granted disability pension but was denied the service element.

Held:

The Court examined Regulations 78, 105B, and 107 of the Navy (Pension) Regulations, 1964. The argument of the appellant, stating that the service element is admissible only after completing 15 years of qualifying service, was rejected. The Court held that the purpose of Regulation 105B is to prevent dual payment of the service element of disability pension when an individual is entitled to service pension as well. It emphasized that the absence of the expression 'on completion of qualifying service' in Regulation 105B supports the interpretation that completion of 15 years is not a prerequisite for the service element.

The Court concluded that a harmonious reading of the regulations, considering the object of granting disability pension, supports an interpretation that advances the purpose of the grant of disability. Therefore, the service element should be payable to an individual who has completed the period of engagement in the low medical category, even if not completing the qualifying service of 15 years.