Facts:

On June 13, 1995, the deceased, Shabu, and Riyazuddin were attacked while grazing buffaloes in the jungle. Shabu was fatally shot, and Riyazuddin sustained injuries. The prosecution alleged that Raja and others conspired to kill the brothers, with Raja instigating the attack. The trial court convicted Raja and others under Section 302 of the IPC read with Section 34. However, the High Court acquitted the accused, citing doubts about the reliability of the prosecution's evidence.

Issues:

The reliability of the prosecution's evidence, particularly the presence and conduct of Imamuddin (PW-1), the advocate brother of the deceased, and discrepancies regarding the absence of bullet holes in the deceased's clothes.

Held:

The Court found no serious errors in the High Court's judgment warranting interference. The High Court's doubts regarding the presence and conduct of Imamuddin (PW-1) were considered relevant, especially his actions following the incident, which were deemed unnatural.

Additionally, discrepancies regarding the absence of bullet holes in the deceased's clothes raised doubts about the prosecution's case. Consequently, the appeals were dismissed, affirming the acquittal of the respondents.

Facts:

The State of Uttar Pradesh (appellant) filed an appeal against the acquittal of the respondents in a case involving charges under various sections of the IPC.

The High Court dismissed the appellant's application for leave to appeal without providing reasons for its decision.

Issues:

Whether the High Court's dismissal of the application for leave to appeal without assigning reasons was justified.

What is the proper approach for the High Court in deciding applications for leave to appeal under Section 378(3) of the CrPC?

Held:

The Court held that the High Court erred in dismissing the application for leave to appeal without providing reasons. It emphasized the importance of the High Court's duty to apply its mind and consider whether a prima facie case has been made out or arguable points have been raised.

The Court set aside the impugned order and remanded the case to the High Court for a fresh decision on the application for leave to appeal. The Court clarified that it had not assessed the merits of the case itself but focused solely on the lack of reasoning in the High Court's order.

Facts:

Incident occurred on March 6, 1993, wherein the prosecutrix was allegedly raped.

Complaint lodged on March 8, 1993, after the prosecutrix's father returned to the village.

Medical examination of the prosecutrix on March 9, 1993, revealed indications of sexual intercourse.

Trial court convicted the accused under Section 376 IPC.

High Court acquitted the accused, citing absence of external injury and delay in FIR registration.

Issues:

Whether the absence of external injury negates the allegation of forcible rape.

Determination of the prosecutrix's age and its relevance to the case.

Justifiability of the delay in FIR registration.

Held:

The absence of external injury does not necessarily indicate consent. The Court disagreed with the High Court's reasoning and emphasized the importance of considering medical evidence and testimonies.

The prosecutrix's age was determined to be 12 years based on evidence from the school headmaster. Considering her age, her consent was irrelevant under Section 375 IPC.

The delay in FIR registration was deemed justified, given the circumstances explained by the prosecutrix's uncle. The High Court's failure to consider this aspect was noted.

Decision: The appeal by the State was allowed, and the conviction of the accused under Section 376 IPC was reinstated. However, the sentence was reduced from seven years to four years considering the passage of time. The accused was ordered to surrender to custody within four weeks if the sentence had not already been served.

Facts:

The appellants were selected for the post of Personal Assistant in the U.P. Secretariat by the U.P. Public Service Commission in 1999-2000.

Following the reorganization of Uttar Pradesh into Uttar Pradesh and Uttarakhand, the appellants were directed to join the Uttarakhand Secretariat.

The State of Uttar Pradesh provided options to its employees, including the appellants, to serve in either Uttar Pradesh or Uttarakhand, to which the appellants opted for Uttarakhand.

The appellants joined the Uttarakhand Secretariat, and their services were confirmed by the Uttarakhand government.

However, the final allocation list published by the Central Government excluded the appellants for transfer to Uttarakhand.

The High Court of Uttarakhand held that the appellants shall continue to remain employees of the State of Uttar Pradesh.

Issues:

Whether the transfer of the appellants from Uttar Pradesh to Uttarakhand was valid.

Whether the appellants can be considered as employees of the State of Uttarakhand.

Held:

The Court held that the transfer of the appellants from Uttar Pradesh to Uttarakhand was valid. The Court observed that the transfer was done with the mutual consent of both states, as contemplated by the Central Government's letter. Additionally, the appointment letters of the appellants clearly stated the possibility of their services being allotted to either Uttar Pradesh or Uttarakhand after the reorganization.

The Court emphasized that there was no infirmity in the procedure adopted by both states for the transfer of employees, as it was in accordance with the guidelines issued by the Central Government.

Therefore, the Court allowed the appeals and set aside the judgment of the High Court, ruling that the appellants shall continue as employees of the State of Uttarakhand.

Facts:

The case involved a situation of political rivalry leading to a mob assault where sharp and pointed weapons were used. This resulted in the death of five individuals and severe injuries to several others. The prosecution alleged that the offender party broke into houses, destroyed property, stole valuables, set houses on fire, and subsequently assaulted members of the complainant party.

Issues:

The trial court acquitted the accused, citing the benefit of doubt, a decision upheld by the High Court. The main issues revolved around the adequacy of evidence, the credibility of witnesses, and the oversight of vital aspects of the case.

Held:

The Court found the reasoning of the lower courts, suggesting that injuries might have occurred in a stampede, unconvincing. This was because there was no plausible explanation for only one group to sustain injuries in such a scenario.

Minor contradictions and embellishments in witness testimonies were deemed natural, especially in cases involving large gatherings. The presence of 24 injured eyewitnesses was considered credible, despite some inconsistencies.

The Court emphasized the importance of considering evidence related to charges other than murder, such as burning houses and unlawful assembly. The oversight of vital issues by the High Court led to an unjust decision, warranting remand for rehearing.

Decision: The Supreme Court allowed the appeal and remitted the matter to the High Court for rehearing, emphasizing the need for a comprehensive consideration of all evidence and issues to ensure justice.

Facts:

The appellant, Krishan Kumar, appealed against the High Court of Rajasthan's decision to set aside his acquittal and remit the case to the trial court. The High Court's decision was based on the non-examination of the prosecutrix before the trial court.

Issues:

Whether the High Court erred in setting aside the appellant's acquittal without affording him an opportunity of hearing.

Whether the matter should be remitted back to the High Court for fresh consideration.

Held:

The Court held that the High Court's decision to set aside the appellant's acquittal without giving him an opportunity of hearing was erroneous.

The Court also noted that the prosecutrix had filed an appeal against the appellant's acquittal, which was pending before the High Court.

Consequently, the Supreme Court set aside the impugned order and remitted the matter back to the High Court for fresh consideration.

The High Court was instructed to afford sufficient opportunity to both the appellant and the prosecutrix during the reconsideration of the case.

The Court urged the High Court to decide the matter expeditiously and in accordance with the law.

The appeal is accordingly disposed of.

Facts:

The appellants filed a suit seeking a declaration of their exclusive right to conduct religious services in St. Mary’s Church and cemetery, based on Ext A3, an assignment-cum-gift deed. The trial court ruled in favor of the appellants, but a Division Bench of the High Court overturned this decision, holding that the control and management of the properties were still with the parishioners despite the title being vested with the Quilon Diocese.

Issues:

Whether the appellants have the exclusive right to manage St. Mary’s Church and its properties.

Whether the Division Bench erred in holding that the control and management of the properties remained with the parishioners.

Held:

The disputes between the appellant Patriarch and the respondents Malankara were settled in the K.S. Varghese case, affirming the validity and binding nature of the 1934 Constitution upon the Parishioners. The Parish Church must be managed according to the powers conferred under the 1934 Constitution. The Malankara Metropolitan enjoys all temporal, ecclesiastical, and spiritual administrative powers.

Ext.-A3-Sale-cum-Gift Deed was executed in favor of the Metropolitan of Quilon Diocese, indicating that the properties were gifted subject to the control of the Metropolitan in appointing Vicar, Priests, etc. The recitals in Ext.-A3 confirm that St. Mary’s Church and the properties were gifted to the Metropolitan of Malankara, thus coming under his spiritual and temporal control.

Decision: The Supreme Court allowed the appeals, affirming the appellants' right to manage the church and its properties in accordance with the 1934 Constitution and the provisions of Ext.-A3.

Facts:

The State Government of West Bengal initiated the Panchayat election process through a notification.

Legal disputes arose, including the acceptance of nominations submitted electronically by the State Election Commission.

Issues:

Whether the High Court's directions regarding the acceptance of nominations in electronic form were legally valid.

Whether the electoral process had been appropriately followed.

Held:

The Division Bench of the High Court overstepped its jurisdiction under Article 226 by directing the acceptance of nominations electronically (Para 16-19).

The Panchayat Elections Act and rules provide a comprehensive framework for elections, which doesn't include electronic nominations. Legislative amendment would be required for such a change (Para 16-19).

The electoral process had already commenced, and the deadline for nominations had passed, making the High Court's directions inappropriate (Para 16-19).

Disputes regarding elections should be addressed through procedures outlined in the Panchayat Elections Act, primarily through election petitions (Para 25-27).

The Court extended the period for filing election petitions for uncontested seats using its powers under Article 142 of the Constitution, considering the seriousness of allegations and pending proceedings (Para 30-32).

Decision: The Court set aside the High Court's direction regarding electronic filing of nominations and emphasized adherence to established electoral procedures and legal remedies for dispute resolution. It extended the period for filing election petitions for uncontested seats.

Facts:

Mr. Anurag Mittal filed an appeal against a decree of divorce obtained by him.

During the pendency of the appeal, a settlement was reached between Mr. Anurag Mittal and his former spouse, indicating his acceptance of the divorce decree.

Mr. Anurag Mittal filed an application for withdrawal of his appeal before the date of his second marriage to Mrs. Shaily Mishra Mittal.

Issues:

Whether the second marriage between Mr. Anurag Mittal and Mrs. Shaily Mishra Mittal during the pendency of the appeal against the decree of divorce was valid.

Interpretation of Sections 5(i) and 15 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955.

Held

The validity of the second marriage hinges on the interpretation of Sections 5(i) and 15 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955.

Mr. Anurag Mittal's application for withdrawal of the appeal effectively ended the appeal process and was deemed to have been withdrawn on the date of its filing.

The intentions of Mr. Anurag Mittal, evidenced by his acceptance of the divorce decree through the settlement and withdrawal of the appeal, played a crucial role in determining the validity of the second marriage.

The court concluded that the restriction placed on a second marriage under Section 15 did not apply in this case, given the circumstances and the principles of purposive construction.

The marriage between Mr. Anurag Mittal and Mrs. Shaily Mishra Mittal was held valid as the former spouse of Mr. Anurag Mittal could not be considered a living spouse at the time of the second marriage.

Decision: The court upheld the validity of the second marriage based on the withdrawal of the appeal and the intentions of the parties involved, as per the provisions of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955.