Facts:

The appellants challenged the seniority list finalized on 28th November, 2014.

Advertisement issued on 29th November, 2004, for 241 posts of Junior Engineer (Civil/Mechanical).

Selection process completed based on merit, but appointments made in a manner deviating from the merit list.

State Government approval on 3rd May, 2005, for appointments based on a roster from the Government order dated 31st August, 2001.

Writ petitioners appointed earlier in time but lower in merit.

Issues:

Conflict between Regulation 23, emphasizing seniority based on substantive appointment date, and Regulations 16, 17, and 20, prescribing appointment based on merit list.

Appointments made in contravention of statutory regulations.

Held:

The method of giving appointment to the senior most person of each category is a fortuitous circumstance, and appointments made in contravention of statutory regulations cannot defeat the rights of the appellants. Seniority has to be fixed as per the merit of the candidates determined by the Selection Committee.( Para 17)

Regulation 6 contemplates reservation in accordance with the orders of the Government, and the Government order dated 31st August, 2001, applies to determine reservation and seniority. The seniority list has not been prepared in accordance with the roster circulated on 31st August, 2001.( Para 18)

The Uttarakhand Government Servant Seniority Service Rules, 2002, are not applicable to the Nigam, as they were adopted in 2011 and framed under the proviso to Article 309, not applicable to a creation under a Statute.( Para 19)

Facts:

The prosecution alleged a conspiracy to murder the victim-deceased, involving meticulous planning by various accused. The deceased had significant financial dealings with accused-SCB, accused-SB, and others, leading to a motive for the murder. Several pieces of evidence, including the recovery of a weapon and communication records, were presented.

Issues:

The framing of charges against accused-SCB, accused-LM, accused-SS, accused-RS, and the inconsistency in the charges filed against them. The trial got truncated, impacting the legal proceedings.

Held:

The Court emphasized the importance of circumstantial evidence in proving criminal conspiracy, stating that each conspirator plays a distinct role in achieving a common purpose. The destruction of records, communication patterns, and the conduct of the accused post-murder were considered relevant. The Court directed the Sessions Court to frame charges against accused-SCB, accused-LM, and accused-SS under specific sections of the IPC and Arms Act.

Decision: Partly allowing the appeals, the Court directed the Sessions Court to frame charges against accused-SCB, accused-LM, and accused-SS as specified in the judgment. The trial with respect to other accused proceeded in their absence, creating a need for a holistic trial. The appellate powers of the High Court under Section 386 were outlined for further proceedings.

Facts:

The case involves the applicability of Section 19 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947, and Section 197 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, concerning the requirement of sanction to prosecute a public servant, especially when the public servant has retired.

Issues:

Whether sanction is necessary to prosecute a public servant who has retired before the court's cognizance?

The scope of protection under Section 197 of the Code in cases where the alleged acts are performed using the office for unlawful gains.

Held:

The court, citing the Labh Singh case, held that sanction is not required if the public servant has retired on the date of cognizance by the court. The judgment emphasized that protection under Section 197 is available only for acts committed while acting in discharge of official duty, and not for acts used as a cloak for unlawful gains.

Decision: The appeal was allowed, concluding that there was no need for sanction under Section 19 of the Prevention of Corruption Act. The High Court's observation regarding protection after retirement was deemed unjustified.

Facts:

A murder case involving the death of the appellant's nephew.

The deceased was allegedly assaulted by several individuals, leading to severe injuries and death.

The High Court granted bail to the first respondent and four other accused.

Issues:

Validity of the High Court's exercise of power in granting bail.

Prima facie view of the accused's involvement in a serious crime.

Adequacy of reasons provided by the High Court in the bail order.

Held:

The court analyzed the bail application considering various factors, including the nature of the offense, severity of punishment, prima facie evidence, and potential threats to witnesses. The court held:

The court emphasized the need for a judicious exercise of discretion while granting bail and outlined factors guiding the decision, such as the nature of the accusation, severity of punishment, and apprehension of witnesses being influenced.( Para 11)

The court clarified that at the bail stage, it is not required to delve into a detailed analysis of evidence but must assess whether there is a prima facie ground to believe the accused committed the offense.( Para 12)

Reiterated the principles laid down in Prasanta Kumar Sarkar vs. Ashis Chatterjee, emphasizing the importance of considering relevant factors in bail applications.( Para 14)

Acknowledged the principles consistently followed in subsequent cases like Ash Mohammad vs. Shiv Raj Singh, Ranjit Singh vs. State of Madhya Pradesh, Neeru Yadav vs. State of U.P., Virupakshappa Gouda vs. State of Karnataka, and State of Orissa vs. Mahimananda Mishra.( Para 15)

Examined the post-mortem report and the charge sheet, highlighting injuries and allegations against the accused. The court found a prima facie case for setting aside the bail granted by the High Court.( Para 16-20)

Criticized the High Court's lack of detailed analysis and non-application of mind in granting bail. Emphasized that the order should have considered material facts and the seriousness of the crime.( Para 22)

Quoted Santosh Hegde's observation that an order devoid of reasons suffers from non-application of mind.( Para 23)

Addressed the need for specific reasons when bail is granted after a previous rejection and discussed the importance of open justice.( Para 24-26)

Ordered the cancellation of bail bonds, directing the accused to be taken into custody. Clarified that the judgment does not express an opinion on the case's merits at trial.( Para 28)

Facts:

The Division Bench addressed the validity of Rule 5 of the 1997 Rules, challenged on grounds of being ultra vires Section 3-A of the Central Excise Act and violative of Article 14 of the Constitution. However, the Division Bench deviated from the initial question and focused on whether an assessee paying duty under Rule 96-ZP(3) could be compelled to continue without regard to actual production.

Issues:

Validity of Rule 5 under Section 3A(4) and Article 14.

Compelling an assessee to pay duty under Rule 96-ZP(3) without considering actual production.

Held:

The Court clarified that the referred question did not arise on facts, and the assessee did not dispute the compulsion under Rule 96-ZP(3). The matter was sent back to the Division Bench to decide the questions related to the validity of Rule 5 as originally stated. The issues raised in para 51 were not relevant to the appellant's dispute.

The appeals and the tagged matters stand disposed of accordingly.

FACTS:

The first respondent applied for voluntary retirement on 14 February 1990.

The appellant denied the first respondent's application for voluntary retirement on 25 May 1990, citing incomplete twenty years of service.

The first respondent resigned on 7 July 1990, and the denial of voluntary retirement was not challenged.

The first respondent sought pensionary benefits, claiming completion of twenty years of service.

ISSUES:

Whether the denial of voluntary retirement is illegal as the first respondent completed twenty years of service?

Whether the first respondent, having resigned, is entitled to pensionary benefits?

HELD:

The court overrules the approach in Asger Ibrahim Amin, emphasizing the distinction between resignation and voluntary retirement. The decision to resign and seek voluntary retirement has different legal consequences.( Para 12)

The court dismisses the argument that the denial of voluntary retirement renders it illegal. Even if denied, the first respondent resigned, subjecting himself to the legal consequences of resignation.( Para 13)

The court finds no evidence of the first respondent challenging the denial of voluntary retirement between 25 May 1990 and 7 July 1990. Denial cannot be invoked after resignation.( Para 14)

The court declares the issue of completing twenty years of service irrelevant. Rule 26 of the CCS Pension Rules mandates forfeiture of past service upon resignation, making the first respondent ineligible for pensionary benefits.( Para 15)

REFERENCED CASES:

Asger Ibrahim Amin vs. LIC, (2016) 13 SCC 797

RBI vs. Cecil Dennis Solomon (2004) 9 SCC 461

Senior Divisional Manager, LIC vs. Shree Lal Meena, (2015) 17 SCC 43

Sheelkumar Jain vs. New India Assurance Co. Ltd. (2011) 12 SCC 197

Facts:

The tenants, represented by Harbhajan Singh and others, challenged the vires of the Punjab Religious Premises and Land (Eviction and Rent Recovery) Act, 1997, asserting their entitlement to protection against eviction under the East Punjab Rent Act. The contention was that the Religious Premises Act, a special enactment concerning landlord-tenant relationships, cannot supersede existing enactments like the East Punjab Rent Act.

Issues:

Challenge to the vires of the Punjab Religious Premises and Land (Eviction and Rent Recovery) Act, 1997, in light of existing enactments governing general landlord-tenant relationships.

Whether withdrawal of protection to tenants of land and buildings belonging to religious institutions under the Religious Premises Act is justified.

Held:

The State legislature has the authority to enact separate laws on a similar subject if they serve different objectives and protect distinct sets of rights. The Religious Premises Act, specific to premises of religious institutions, is distinct from the East Punjab Rent Act, which deals with general landlord-tenant relationships.

Section 3 defines "unauthorized occupation of religious premises," emphasizing that valid grants, leases, and allotments protect occupants from being deemed unauthorized. The crucial criterion is adherence to the terms of the grant, lease, or allotment.

Eviction proceedings under Sections 4 and 5 empower the Collector to order eviction after due process, with a subsequent right of appeal and judicial review. The Collector must be satisfied that the premises are in unauthorized occupation.

Properties of religious institutions form a separate and distinctive class, justifying differential treatment under the law. Granting exemption to such properties from rent control legislation is a reasonable classification based on intelligible differentia and serves public purposes.

Various central and state legislations treat religious institutions as a separate class, further supporting the validity of such classification.

Exempting buildings belonging to charities, religious, or secular institutions from rent control legislation does not violate Article 14, as it is a reasonable classification based on intelligible differentia and serves public purposes.

The legislative intent behind rent control legislations is to remedy specific issues without unduly curtailing landlords' rights.

The legislature can provide special procedures for eviction as long as they have a reasonable nexus to the legislative objective and the class of landlords justifies such treatment.

The Religious Premises Act, being a specific enactment, prevails over the East Punjab Rent Act, and the classification of "religious institutions" aligns with the underlying public interest.

Facts:

The Vainganga Sahakari Sakhar Karkhana Ltd. defaulted on loan repayment to the Maharashtra State Co-operative Bank.

The bank initiated recovery proceedings under the SARFAESI Act, leading to the sale of mortgaged properties.

Employees filed for unpaid salaries recovery under the MRTU & PULP Act.

The Industrial Court issued a recovery certificate against the Karkhana but not the bank.

The High Court modified the order, directing the Collector to recover from the bank's sale proceeds, citing Section 529A of the Companies Act.

Issues:

Applicability of Section 529A of the Companies Act to co-operative societies under Section 167 of the Societies Act.

Priority of employees' dues recoverable as arrears of land revenue under MRTU & PULP Act against the claims of a secured creditor under SARFAESI Act.

Held:

Applicability of Section 529A of the Companies Act: The Court held that Section 529A of the Companies Act does not apply to co-operative societies under Section 167 of the Societies Act. The specific bar in Section 167 prevents the application of the Companies Act to such societies.

Priority of Employees' Dues: The Court clarified that employees' dues, recoverable as arrears of land revenue under MRTU & PULP Act, do not constitute a paramount charge under Section 169(1) of the Land Revenue Code. Such dues have priority only over unsecured claims as per Section 169(2).

Distribution of Sale Proceeds under SARFAESI Act: The Court considered the sale letter dated 08.03.2010 and sale certificate dated 14.09.2010 as a contract between the bank and the subsequent purchaser, forming a contract to the contrary under Section 13(7) of the SARFAESI Act.

Conclusion and Enforcement: The recovery certificate was held valid against the bank for employees' dues. The bank was directed to pay employees' dues from the sale proceeds. The subsequent purchaser was liable for other dues within six months.

The instant appeal is disposed

Facts:

Hindustan Zinc Limited had four high tension electricity connections for its units.

Dispute arose over unscheduled interchange charges in open access agreements dated 10.03.2005.

Rajasthan Electricity Regulatory Commission initially decided to resolve the dispute but later appointed an arbitrator under Section 86(1)(f) read with Section 158.

Issues:

Whether the appointment of the arbitrator under Section 86(1)(f) was valid.

The scope of arbitration proceedings under the Electricity Act.

Held:

The High Court rightly held that the arbitrator's appointment under Section 86 was not valid as the dispute involved a consumer (Hindustan Zinc Limited) and a distribution licensee (Ajmer Vidyut Vitran Nigam Limited). Section 86(1)(f) only allows arbitration between licensees and generating companies.

The court also clarified that the word 'and' in Section 86(1)(f) should be read as 'or' to avoid an anomalous situation where the State Commission cannot both decide a dispute and refer it to arbitration.

The High Court's finding on the lack of jurisdiction of the arbitrator under Section 86 was upheld, rendering the arbitration award non est in law.

The appeal stands disposed of accordingly