Facts:

The case revolves around the disconnection of electricity supply to M/S Iceberg Industries Ltd. by the Bihar State Electricity Board due to non-payment or partial payment of bills, specifically Annual Minimum Guarantee (AMG) charges. The company's supply was disconnected despite an order of stay from the Consumer Grievance Redressal Forum, which resulted in legal proceedings.

Issues:

• Whether the company, M/S Iceberg Industries Ltd., qualifies as a "consumer" under the Electricity Act, 2003.
• The legality of disconnecting the electricity supply in defiance of the Consumer Grievance Redressal Forum's order.
• Whether the company was liable to pay AMG charges during the period of disconnection.
• Interpretation and applicability of Section 56 of the Electricity Act, 2003, in the context of disconnection.

Held:

The term 'consumer' is defined under Section 2(15) of the Electricity Act, 2003. The respondent company, M/S Iceberg Industries Ltd., satisfies this definition as the consumption of electricity was for its own factory. Thus, the company retains the right to approach the Consumer Grievance Redressal Forum. (Paragraphs 10-11)

The disconnection of the company's electricity supply, despite the stay order from the Consumer Grievance Redressal Forum, was found to be impermissible. The Board should not have disregarded the forum's directive and proceeded with the disconnection. (Paragraph 12)

The question of whether the company was required to pay AMG charges during the disconnection period was addressed. The Forum referred to Circular No. 477 dated 29.10.2002 (General Terms and Conditions of Supply) and partly favored the company's stance that the Board could not charge AMG during the disconnection period. The Court upheld this finding regarding the interpretation of the circular. (Paragraphs 13, 15-16)

Under Section 56 of the Electricity Act, 2003, disconnection of supply is a special power granted to the supplier. While the company's request for installment payment was initially seen as a plea for mercy, the fact that the company eventually agreed to make installment payments and entered into an agreement to clear the dues demonstrated its willingness to pay the dues. The act of disconnection on September 8, 2006, was considered arbitrary. The Board's appeals have been dismissed. The decision of the Division Bench of the Patna High Court remains valid. All related applications have been resolved. No costs shall be imposed. (Paragraphs 19-21)

Facts:

The case involves the respondent, M/S. Bombay Machinery Store, and the issue revolves around the movement of goods, delivery, and taxation under the Central Sales Tax Act, 1956. Goods were delivered to a carrier for transmission, and circulars by the Tax Administration of the State imposed a timeframe for delivery to determine the applicability of exemptions.

Issues:

• Whether a timeframe imposed by circulars for delivery of goods to a carrier is permissible under the first explanation to Section 3 of the Central Sales Tax Act, 1956?
• Whether the concept of constructive delivery applies under Section 3 of the Act?
• Whether the interpretation given in a previous case, Arjan Dass Gupta and Brothers v. Commissioner of Sales Tax, Delhi Administration, is applicable to the present case?

Held:

The first explanation to Section 3 of the Central Sales Tax Act, 1956, creates a legal fiction where the movement of goods terminates when delivery is taken from a carrier. The provision does not specify a timeframe for delivery. Therefore, fixing a timeframe through circulars is impermissible.

The concept of constructive delivery does not apply under Section 3 of the Act. The movement of goods terminates only when actual delivery is taken from the carrier.

The interpretation in Arjan Dass Gupta and Brothers v. Commissioner of Sales Tax, Delhi Administration, does not align with the correct interpretation of Section 3 of the 1956 Act.

Decision: The High Court's judgments in favor of the respondent in various appeals are not interfered with, and the appeals are dismissed.

Facts:

The dispute revolves around the valuation of imports involving plant and equipment, as well as spares. The revenue included the price paid for design and technical documents in the transaction value of the imported goods. The assessee contended that these documents were related to post-importation activities for assembly, construction, erection, operation, and maintenance of the plant. The revenue argued that, since it was a turnkey project, the entire contract value should be treated as the transaction value for customs duty calculation.

Issues:

• Whether the design and technical documents related to post-importation activities should be included in the valuation of imported goods?
• Whether the provisions of Rule 9(1)(e) of the Customs Valuation Rules apply automatically to the import of turnkey projects?

Held:

Issue 1: Valuation of Design and Technical Documents (Paras 22 and 26): The Court held that the revenue failed to demonstrate that the disputed items of the contract did not relate to post-importation activities. The expression "condition" in Rule 9(1)(e) suggests a mutual dependence between actions. The revenue's argument that the turnkey project's importation and post-importation activities were mutually dependent was not supported by evidence. Imposing such an implied condition without substantiating evidence was impermissible. The contract did not contain any part from which such a condition could be inferred. Thus, the design and technical documents for post-importation activities should not be automatically included in the valuation.

Issue 2: Application of Rule 9(1)(e) to Turnkey Projects (Paras 27 and 28): The Court explained that if a single agreement involves both imported dutiable equipment and services for post-importation activities, and these items can be segregated, the importer can claim duty exclusion for items directly related to post-importation activities under Rule 9. In this case, the authorities considered the imported items and post-importation activities as interdependent due to the same contract. However, the Court emphasized that such interdependence must be explicitly demonstrated in the contract terms. The appellant's argument that the import of equipment was supplemented by post-importation work was not supported by the contract's terms.

All connected applications shall stand disposed of.

Facts:

Two letters dated 20.3.2019 and 19.3.2019 signed by alleged contemnor nos. 1 and 2 were circulated. The letters contained disrespectful, scandalous, and scurrilous allegations against two Judges of the Supreme Court. A Bench issued notice to the contemnors and directed the matter to be placed before the Chief Justice of India for constituting an appropriate bench to hear and decide the contempt case.

Issues:

• Whether the Supreme Court's suo motu contempt proceedings were validly initiated.
• Whether the Bench acted as a judge in their own cause.
• The freedom to criticize court judgments while respecting judicial decorum.

Held:

Powers of the Supreme Court (Para 7): Article 129 of the Constitution confers the Supreme Court with the powers of a Court of Record, including the power to punish for contempt. This constitutional power cannot be abridged by statute. Article 142 allows the Court to punish for contempt, subject to parliamentary law. Article 129, being the primary source of the Court's power, is not subject to the same restriction as Article 142. The Supreme Court's powers extend to framing rules, such as The Rules to Regulate Proceedings for Contempt of the Supreme Court, 1975.

Notice for Contempt (Para 32): The Rules require that the brief nature of the contempt be stated in the notice. The notice in question met this requirement, and the order initiating contempt proceedings reflected the grounds for contempt. Thus, the notice was legally valid.

Suo Motu Proceedings (Para 34-35): The Court, based on information received, took suo motu note of the contempt. This procedure is valid as the matter was placed before the Chief Justice for listing before the appropriate bench, maintaining the suo motu nature of the proceedings.

Judge in their Own Cause (Para 40): The Bench's actions were justifiable in issuing notice and subsequently referring the matter to the Chief Justice for assignment to an appropriate bench. This procedure did not amount to the Bench acting as a judge in their own cause.

Freedom to Criticize (Para 48): Citizens have the right to criticize court judgments, but they cannot attribute motives to judges or question their bona fides. Slanderous and scandalous allegations, particularly when circulated widely, undermine the justice delivery system's integrity.

While the truth can serve as a defense in contempt cases, the provided arguments and pleadings lack substantial evidence to support such a defense. The allegations, which are both scandalous and offensive, are unfitting for Judges of the highest Court.

Facts:

 The case involves a charge against the respondent, a trustee in a Deemed University, for allegedly collecting extra amounts from students on the pretext of allowing them to fill examination forms. A complaint also alleged that the respondent demanded money from a complainant failing which the complainant's daughter would not be permitted to appear in the examination.

Issues:

• Whether a "Deemed University" falls within the definition of "University" under Section 2(c)(xi) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988.
• Whether the respondent's position as a trustee in the Deemed University qualifies him as a "public servant" under the Act.
• Whether there is sufficient evidence to establish a prima facie case against the respondent.

Held:

Issue 1: The Court held that the term "University" in Section 2(c)(xi) of the Act should not be restricted to the technical definition provided in the University Grants Commission Act, 1956. The Prevention of Corruption Act has a broader purpose of preventing corruption, and it covers individuals who perform public duties, even if they are not traditionally considered public servants. Thus, a "Deemed University" is not excluded from the ambit of the term "University" under Section 2(c)(xi).

Issue 2: The Court noted that the focus of Section 2(c) of the Act is on the public duty performed by an individual, not just their position. The respondent, in his capacity as a trustee, was involved in matters related to admissions, fees, and donations, indicating a public duty. Therefore, the respondent could potentially be considered a "public servant" under the Act.

Issue 3: The Court emphasized that at the stage of Section 227 of the CrPC, the court's jurisdiction is limited, and detailed appreciation of evidence should be reserved for trial. The evidence, including statements and documents, raised a grave suspicion regarding the respondent's involvement. Thus, it was not appropriate to discharge the respondent at this stage, and the trial court should proceed with the case.

The appeal is allowed, setting aside the Gujarat High Court's judgment of February 2, 2018.

Facts:

Applications were invited for the appointment of Sub Inspector of Police (Trainee) by the Kerala Public Service Commission (KPSC). The KPSC published the first Ranked List (RL-I) on 11.09.2013, and subsequent selections were made based on this list. A challenge was made to the unified/consolidated ranked list, leading to legal proceedings.

Issues:

• The validity and applicability of RL-I, the interpretation of Rule 13 of the Kerala Public Service Commission Rules of Procedure, and the subsequent advice and appointments made by KPSC.

Held:

The Full Bench of the Kerala High Court had the competence to finally decide the case under Section 7 of the Kerala High Court Act, 1958. The Full Bench analyzed the factual matrix and found that the first Ranked List (RL-I) published on 11.09.2013, ceased to operate on 01.06.2016, in accordance with Rule 13. The interim order passed by the Tribunal on 05.12.2013, did not interdict the operation of RL-I. The final advice from RL-I was made on 11.11.2015, and the last batch of candidates joined training on 01.05.2016, triggering the application of the first proviso to Rule 13.

Therefore, the appellants' claim based on RL-I was not valid for vacancies reported after 01.06.2016. Such vacancies should be filled from candidates in the fresh Ranked List (RL-II published on 26.05.2015 or RL-III published on 14.03.2019).

Facts:

The case involved a dispute between Seth Group and Mittal Group, both parties of a Joint Venture (JV) Company. The JV Company had acquired land including Sector 89, Faridabad, with the intent to develop it. Disputes arose over liabilities and development rights, leading to litigation, including Writ Petitions. A MoS was executed on May 4, 2015, outlining obligations. The Seth Group alleged that the Mittal Group did not fulfill their obligations as per the MoS and court orders, deliberately and intentionally.

Issues:

• Whether the Mittal Group willfully failed to fulfill their obligations under the MoS and court orders, leading to contempt of court proceedings.

Held:

 The court analyzed the clauses of the MoS and the respective obligations of the parties. The Seth Group was found to have complied with their obligations, except for depositing a specific amount (Rs. 25.27 crores) toward liabilities. The Mittal Group failed to fulfill their obligations under clauses 1.2, 5.3, and 8 of the MoS. Specifically, they did not deposit the balance amount for the EDC liability of Rs. 59.05 crores.

The court noted that the Seth Group's liability was limited to their share of the land (Rs. 25.27 crores), and the balance was to be paid by the Mittal Group/JV Company. The Mittal Group's non-compliance affected license renewals and rendered the MoS unworkable. The court provided a two-month extension for the Mittal Group to fulfill their obligations, failing which contempt proceedings would be initiated.

The respondent purchased a "Transit Marine Insurance Policy" to cover the transportation of a helicopter from Langley, Canada to Bhopal, India. The policy specified the transit route, and the helicopter was transported in a knocked-down state to New Delhi. Subsequent damage was reported during inspection and assembly at New Delhi. The respondent claimed coverage under the policy for the reported damages.

Issues:

• Whether the damage occurred during the ordinary course of transit as defined by the policy.
• Whether the unpacking, assembly, and storage of the helicopter at New Delhi fell within the scope of coverage.
• Impact of altering the nature of the cargo on insurance coverage.
• Burden of proof on the respondent to establish loss during transit.

Held:

The insurance cover is tied to the voyage itself and extends from the time the cargo leaves the warehouse until the end of the ordinary course of transit. The expression "in the ordinary course of transit" depends on context and includes interruptions incidental to or in furtherance of transportation.

Unpacking, assembly, and storage of the helicopter at New Delhi terminated the ordinary course of transit. The policy covered only risks associated with transportation, not flight or operation.

Changing the nature of the cargo from knocked-down to ready-to-fly state exposed insurer to unanticipated risks, ending policy coverage.

Burden of proof lies with the insured to show loss during transit within policy terms. A mere assertion is insufficient; proximate cause must be demonstrated.

Decision: The appeals were allowed. The court held that the insurance coverage ended when the cargo was unpacked, assembled, and stored at New Delhi. The nature of the cargo was altered, exposing the insurer to risks beyond the policy's scope. The respondent failed to establish that the reported damages occurred during transit and within policy terms.

Facts:

Appellant's land was acquired in 1973 for the benefit of the respondent company.

Parties reached an agreement to retain a portion of the land and sell the rest, subject to arbitration for price determination.

An arbitrator's award determined the price of the land in 1985.

Respondent sought execution of the award, including directing the appellant to execute a sale deed.

Issues:

• Could the award be independently executed?
• Could the respondent claim execution of the sale deed based on the award?

Held:

The award was only for the determination of the price of the land and not for enforcing the agreement. (Para 30)

The award was merely declaratory of the price of the land, subject to the agreement. The relief for execution of the sale deed based on the award was outside the realm of law.The respondent abandoned its direct claim for execution of the sale deed under the agreement by withdrawing the suit.

Execution of an award can only be for what has been awarded or decreed and not beyond it. The award in this case only declared the price of the land. Going beyond the decree to change the nature of the case was not permissible. The award did not constitute a conclusive contract for execution. (Para 32)

The High Court's judgment was quashed. The appellant was directed to pay specified amounts to the respondent for litigation costs and expenses. (Para 38, 44-46, 48)

Accordingly, this appeal stands allowed in terms of the directions given hereinabove.