Facts:

The case involved M/S Baspa Organics Limited (Appellant) and United India Insurance Company Limited (Respondent). The Appellant's chemical factory experienced a fire incident, and they filed an insurance claim with the Respondent. The claim was denied on the grounds that the Appellant had overvalued the factory for insurance purposes and had not possessed the necessary licenses for storing hazardous substances.

Issues:

Whether the Appellant was required to possess a license for storing hazardous substances, particularly Hexane, and whether the lack of a license constituted a material non-disclosure.

Whether the Appellant had overvalued the factory while obtaining insurance.

Held:

Issue 1 - Licensing and Non-Disclosure: The Court examined the Petroleum Act and Petroleum Rules, specifically Articles 3, 6, and 7 of the First Schedule to the 1976 Rules. It determined that the Appellant was required to possess a license for storing Hexane of the quantity in question. The exemption under the 2000 Order did not exempt the Appellant from obtaining a license under the Petroleum Act and Rules. Non-disclosure of non-possession of a required license was a material breach of the insurance policy's terms.

Issue 2 - Overvaluation: The Appellant's contention regarding overvaluation was not deeply argued. The Court refrained from examining this issue further, considering it a question of fact not requiring in-depth analysis.

Conclusion: The appeal was dismissed, affirming the National Commission's decision that the insurance claim repudiation was justified due to breach of policy terms and failure to possess necessary licenses.

Facts:

The appellant, a construction company, entered into a contract agreement with the State of Punjab for the construction of the Sutlej Yamuna Link Canal. The appellant claimed that the scope of work increased during execution due to various factors, leading to additional payments. Disputes arose, and the matter was taken to arbitration as per the agreement. The arbitrator passed an award, which was presented before the Senior Sub-Judge for approval. The opposite party objected to the award, alleging misconduct by the arbitrator and lack of reasoning in the award.

Issues:

Whether the arbitrator's award was sustainable, particularly the claims related to extra work and the calculation of premium rates.

Whether the absence of reasons in the arbitrator's award rendered it invalid.

Whether certain contractual clauses affected the claims made by the appellant.

Held:

Issue 1 - Claims for Extra Work and Premium Calculation (Para 8-16): The court found that the arbitrator's award lacked proper reasoning, as required by the contract. The contract explicitly demanded that all awards above a certain amount state the reasons for the awarded sum. The court emphasized the importance of reason-giving in quasi-judicial functions and concluded that the award's cryptic conclusion was insufficient. The court then determined that the claimant's argument, which calculated premium rates at 93.12% based solely on the difference between estimated and contract costs, was not justifiable. Clause 39 of the contract provided for the application of the Punjab Common Schedule of Rates, and a communication indicated a premium rate of 35.02%. The court held that the claims under Claim Nos. 2, 3, and 12 should be allowed with premium rates calculated at 35.02%, and the opposite party should make the necessary calculations and payments.

Issue 2 - Claim No. 8 for DALDAL Work (Para 17-18): The court recognized that Clause 39 required monthly statements for extra work claims. However, it held that such a clause should not be a strict bar when claims were substantiated and filed in the arbitration process. The court found that the arbitrator had considered relevant documents, such as soil identification and test results, while awarding an amount. The court ordered that the claim under Claim No. 8 should be calculated with premium at 35.02% and awarded to the claimant.

Issue 3 - Claim No. 16 and Interest (Para 19-20): The court upheld the decisions of the High Court and the First Appellate Court on Claim No. 16 and interest. It agreed with the reduction of interest to 12% per annum, in the absence of a specified interest rate in the contract.

Facts:

M/s. Kushang Apparel Ltd. imported CTV kits and filed six Bills of Entries on 9th February 2001. The goods were permitted to be kept in a warehouse for one year as per Section 59 of the Customs Act, 1962.

The warehouse-keeper issued notices for recovery of dues as the importer didn't clear the goods or pay warehouse rent after the bond period expired.

Auctions were held multiple times to sell the goods but weren't successful. Valuation decreased over auctions.

Tender sale was conducted later, and the goods' valuation was reduced to Rs.30 lakhs. The highest bid was Rs.41,44,555/-, and goods were permitted for release on furnishing bank guarantee and payment of charges.

Issues:

Whether the calculation of customs duty should be based on the date of deemed removal of goods from the warehouse or on the date of sale when the importer failed to seek clearance of the goods.

Held:

The Supreme Court held that the customs duty is to be determined by backward calculation considering the sale proceeds of unclaimed/uncleared goods as the cum-duty price. The custom duty has to be calculated on the sale price and not on the duty payable on the date of deemed expiration of the permitted period of the warehouse. The circular issued by the Central Board of Excise & Customs is binding on the Revenue in this regard.

Consequently, the court directed the customs duty to be calculated as per the circular and applied in accordance with the priority specified in Section 150(2) of the Customs Act, 1962. If the bank guarantee has been invoked, the amount shall be handed over to the respondent after adjustments within three months from the date of judgment. The appeal is disposed.

FACTS:

The petitioner filed a writ petition challenging the rejection of his mercy petition by the President of India. The petitioner raised concerns related to the RTI Act, non-consideration of materials, torture, mental illness, and illegal solitary confinement.

ISSUES:

The extent of judicial review permissible under Article 32 for orders passed under Article 72.

Whether relevant materials were considered by the authorities in the decision-making process.

The validity of allegations of torture, mental illness, and illegal solitary confinement.

HELD:

The Court held that the scope of judicial review under Article 32 for orders passed under Article 72 is limited. The Court's role is to examine cases where the order was passed without the application of mind, on extraneous or irrelevant considerations, or with arbitrariness. In this case:

The Court observed that relevant materials, including case records, judgments, medical reports, and more, were forwarded to the Ministry of Home Affairs. Recommendations by the Lieutenant Governor and Home Minister were made after perusing the file, discrediting claims of non-application of mind.

The Court noted that the alleged suffering of the petitioner in prison cannot be a basis for judicial review of the executive order under Article 72.

The Court highlighted that the petitioner was kept in protective custody for security and his well-being, not in illegal solitary confinement.

The Court affirmed that all relevant materials, including the petitioner's medical report and Social Investigation Report, were considered by the President. The Court found no grounds for exercising judicial review over the order rejecting the mercy petition.

REFERRED CASES:

Bikas Chatterjee vs. Union of India and Others (2004) 7 SCC 634

Devender Pal Singh Bhullar vs. State of (NCT of Delhi) (2013) 6 SCC 195

Epuru Sudhakar and Another vs. Govt. of A.P. and Others, (2006) 8 SCC 161

Maru Ram v. Union of India and Others, (1981) 1 SCC 107

Mukesh and Another vs. State (NCT of Delhi) and Others (2017) 6 SCC 1

Narayan Dutt and Others vs. State of Punjab and Another (2011) 4 SCC 353

Satpal vs. State of Haryana (2000) 5 SCC 170

Shatrughan Chauhan and Another vs. Union of India and Others (2014) 3 SCC 1

Sunil Batra vs. Delhi Administration and Others (1978) 4 SCC 494

Facts:

The appellant was initially appointed as a part-time Gallery Attendant in 1995, and later in 2002, as a full-time Gallery Attendant. However, his services were terminated in 2004 due to a government policy. The appellant challenged this termination through legal proceedings, including writ petitions and appeals, invoking relevant sections, acts, rules, and constitutional provisions. The proceedings also considered the appellant's qualifications, his interim reinstatement, and representations to the authorities.

Issues:

The validity of the termination of the appellant's services based on government policies.

Interpretation of rules and resolutions regarding the eligibility, recruitment, and regularization of employees, specifically in the context of the appellant's appointment.

The appellant's entitlement to continuity of service and related benefits.

Held:

After a thorough examination of the facts, legal provisions, and precedents, the Supreme Court held that the appellant's reinstatement was warranted with continuity of service. The Court ruled that the Division Bench's judgment, which allowed the appellant's reinstatement but without back wages for a specific period, was appropriate. The Court reasoned that the appellant's initial appointment and subsequent service could not be invalidated retroactively based on later rules and resolutions. The Court emphasized the significance of the Division Bench's earlier order, which directed the appellant's reinstatement.

The judgment referred to the case of Secretary, State of Karnataka & Ors. vs. Umadevi & Ors. (2006) 4 SCC 1 to discuss the implications of government resolutions and rules in the context of employee regularization.

The appeal is accordingly allowed.

Facts:

N. Gangaraj, a Police Inspector, faced criminal and departmental proceedings for alleged misconduct related to demanding and negotiating illegal gratification.

The respondent was acquitted in the criminal trial, but the departmental proceedings continued based on charges related to his alleged misconduct.

Issues:

Whether the Tribunal and High Court erred in interfering with the punishment order based on discrepancies in the evidence presented during the departmental proceedings.

Whether the power of judicial review allows reevaluation of evidence, considering the principle of natural justice and adherence to statutory regulations.

Held:

The Inquiry Officer (IO) conducted an investigation and found the respondent guilty of the charges. The disciplinary authority agreed with the findings and imposed the punishment.

The Tribunal set aside the punishment, citing discrepancies in evidence and the criminal court's acquittal. The High Court upheld this decision.

The Supreme Court ruled that judicial review is not an appellate process and should not involve reappreciating evidence. Discrepancies in evidence do not necessarily invalidate it.

The Court emphasized that judicial review is concerned with whether the inquiry was conducted fairly, adhering to natural justice and statutory regulations. The disciplinary authority's findings should stand unless based on no evidence or patently erroneous.

The Supreme Court referred to various judgments that emphasized the limits of judicial review and the disciplinary authority's role in assessing evidence.

Decision: The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, setting aside the orders of the Tribunal and the High Court. It upheld the order of punishment imposed on the respondent based on the findings of the disciplinary authority.

FACTS:

The appellant, Subhechha Welfare Society, a registered Welfare Society, filed Consumer Complaints on behalf of allottees who had booked units with the respondent, Earth Infrastructure Private Limited, but were yet to receive possession despite making payments. The National Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission (NCDRC) dismissed the complaints, stating that a recognized consumer association could only file a complaint on behalf of a single consumer and not on behalf of multiple consumers in a single complaint.

ISSUES:

Whether a recognized consumer association is restricted to filing a complaint on behalf of a single consumer or whether it can file a complaint on behalf of multiple consumers with similar grievances against the same seller or service provider.

HELD:

The Court examined the interpretation of Section 12(1)(b) of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986, and its Explanation. It concluded that there is no legal basis for the NCDRC's finding that a recognized consumer association can't file a complaint on behalf of multiple consumers in a single complaint.

The Court emphasized that forcing a recognized consumer association to file multiple complaints for similar grievances would defeat the purpose of such associations and lead to unnecessary and duplicative proceedings.

The Court aligned with the view taken by the NCDRC in an earlier case (Consumer Complaint No. 816 of 2016) and the Supreme Court's affirmation of that view in Civil Appeal Nos. 10882 of 2016.

The civil appeals were allowed, the NCDRC's orders were set aside, and the matter was remitted back to the NCDRC for consideration of the complaints on their merits and for passing appropriate orders.

Facts:

The appellant, Popatrao Vyankatrao Patil, participated in a public auction for sand block excavation from the Krishna river. Being the highest bidder, he won the tender for a specific sand block. However, due to opposition from villagers and proximity to a school, he couldn't obtain possession of the sand block and, consequently, couldn't excavate sand. The appellant requested a refund of the amount he deposited for the auction, which was denied.

Issues:

Whether the High Court erred in refusing to entertain the appellant's writ petition on the grounds of involving questions of fact.

Whether the denial of the refund was justified considering the appellant's failure to obtain possession and excavate sand.

Held:

The Supreme Court acknowledged that while it's not a hard and fast rule, the High Court can entertain writ petitions involving disputed questions of fact, especially if they don't require extensive evidence. The Court cited legal precedents and held that the High Court's plenary power to issue prerogative writs under Article 226 isn't limited by the Constitution and can be exercised in exceptional circumstances.

In this case, the Court noted that there were hardly any disputed questions of fact. Reports and evidence confirmed that the appellant didn't receive possession of the sand block and hadn't excavated any sand. The Court deemed the denial of refund arbitrary and unreasonable, especially considering the authorities' failure to deliver possession.

The Court emphasized the State's responsibility to act as a model litigant and avoid using technical or unjust contentions to obstruct justice. It further directed the respondents to refund the entire amount received from the appellant along with interest at a rate of 6% per annum from the first refund request until realization. The appeal is allowed.

Facts:

Between 1999 and 2001, ONGC appointed about 800 persons on a term basis for four years. The appointments were made after interviews, but without public advertisement. The appellant-Employees Union demanded regular appointments for 577 term-based employees appointed by ONGC between 1991 and 2001. An industrial dispute arose, and the matter was referred to the Industrial Tribunal.

Issues:

The determination of the date from which the concerned workmen should be treated as regularized employees.

Held:

The Supreme Court noted that the employees' union sought full regularization from the date of initial appointment, while the High Court had granted regularization from a later date. The Court distinguished relevant judgments. It held that the concerned workmen, including those who were already regularized, should be treated as regular employees from the date on which the industrial dispute was referred (21.12.2004). The Court ordered all actual benefits to be granted from that date until 01.04.2013. The other directions given by the Single Judge were upheld. The appeal was allowed accordingly.